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Chapter 1
Introduction
Stephany Griffith-Jones and Bettina De Souza Guilherme
This book is the result of the 3  years comparative and multidisciplinary Jean 
Monnet Network, “Crisis-Equity-Democracy for Europe and Latin America”, of 
senior academics and policy advisors from four European and three Latin 
American countries, including experts on the European Union and Latin American 
regionalism.
The rationale of the project and the common link is that both Europe and Latin 
America can learn from their respective experiences on “crisis”, its management 
and the distributive and democratic implications at national and regional level. The 
Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and the global financial crisis of 2008 and 
the following Eurozone debt crisis have much in common in regard to their eco-
nomic and social impacts and the following wave of populism and polarisation. 
Furthermore, the research and exchange in the network clearly showed that these 
crises are symptoms and consequences of the same systemic flaws inherent both in 
the present EU and global financial, economic and governance system. Given that 
both regions face fairly similar global unsustainability challenges, from a macro- 
financial as well as an environmental point of view, their similarities should call for 
the joint elaboration and implementation of a bi-regional strategic alliance for 
addressing the roots of the global crisis.
S. Griffith-Jones 
Initiative for Policy Dialogue, Columbia University, New York, USA
Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University Brighton, Brighton, UK  
B. De Souza Guilherme (*) 
Founder and Co-coordinator of the Jean Monnet Network “Crisis-Equity-Democracy for 
Europe and Latin America”, IRELAC, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: bettina.desouza@europarl.europa.eu
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The main purposes of the project can be summarised as to (1) locate in the cur-
rent global financial system one of the very major causes of the financial and debt 
crises in the EU and Latin America; (2) map and evaluate how both regions and 
individual countries within both regions have tried to manage these crises; (3) dis-
cuss the economic, political and social effects of theses crises on both regions and 
individual countries; (4) and, finally, to make policy suggestions on how to transi-
tion from finance capitalism to a more sustainable real capitalism, on how both 
regions can better manage/govern/respond to such systemic pressures and on how 
they can increase their cooperation.
The book begins in Chap. 1 with a theoretical introduction which includes a 
chapter by Stephan Schulmeister that explores the effects of the paradigm change 
on economic policies in Europe and in Latin America and a second chapter by 
Christian Ghymers, which analyses some key systemic aspects of the global crisis, 
i.e. climate change, macro-financial instability and the weakening of democracy and 
upon their inter-connections. These intertwined aspects reflect myopic prices, the 
non-incorporation of externalities as well as the lack of needed regulation of finan-
cial markets and are also linked by the way public decisions are biased towards the 
short-term, and influenced by vested interests.
The following chapters are divided in five parts. The second part explores aspects 
of regional governance and how the economic and financial crises were managed in 
Europe and Latin America. The chapters share a common diagnosis that, with the 
breakup of the Bretton Woods System and the following liberalisation of capital 
flows and deregulation of financial markets, the emerging countries have been sub-
ject to bubbles and crisis, in which they were confronted with capital flight to safe 
havens similar to what occurred later to the countries in the euro area most affected 
by the crisis and in both cases their central banks did not have the control over the 
currency in which their debts were denominated. Paul De Grauwe, for instance, 
compares the situation of a debtor country within the Eurozone to the status of the 
emerging countries in a debt crisis and reveals similarities because “they cease to 
have control over the currency in which their debt is issued. As a result, financial 
markets can force these countries’ sovereign defaults. This makes the monetary 
union fragile and vulnerable to changing market sentiments” (De Grauwe 2012).
In both regions, debtor countries had at most insufficient (public) debt relief but 
suffered major (internal) devaluations (lowering of real wages and pensions and 
cuts in essential public services, especially health and education) and a prolonged 
period of economic stagnation, decline or low growth. The IMF adjustment pro-
grammes for Latin America and the Troika programmes for Europe’s debt crisis 
countries bear indeed strong similarities and economic and social consequences 
leading to a lost decade, decline of the middle class, lowering of living standards of 
poorest people and fall in investment, the increase of inequality and poverty by 
reducing the role of the state, cuts in public services and social spending. Griffith 
Jones identifies the vulnerability of European creditor banks to debt reduction as a 
key problem in the euro area debt crisis, as it was in the Latin American debt crisis, 
which was managed in the interests of the creditor banks and countries: this is in one 
sense much more serious in the European case than in Latin America, because the 
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main lender to Southern European countries were creditors and investors from other 
European countries. This and major flaws in the architecture of EMU as well as 
their lack of accountability played against an EMU crisis management based on the 
“general interest” of the European Union and are a major cause for the publicly 
displayed conflict between debtor and creditor countries leading to a nearly existen-
tial crisis of Economic and Monetary Union, much to the detriment to the European 
Union’s image within the European Union, in Latin America and globally.
Comparing the crises of the 1980s, 1990s and 2010s, we can identify failures of 
the coordination of both macroeconomic policies and the absence of debt restructur-
ing mechanisms at international level (both at EU and at the global level). Failures 
in providing these coordination efforts could entail, as was the case in the 1980s, 
and is again in the 2010s, a delay in implementing the required solutions making the 
social cost of these episodes more profound (Sanguinetti 2014).1
There are, however, differences in timing and sequence of events, in the strength 
of the “social model”, and concerning the process of regionalism. Latin America 
has been a pre-runner or prototype of debt crises, but both the social model and 
regionalism are much more developed in Europe. In fact, in Europe, where both 
debtor and creditor countries were in the same economic area, the European Union 
has been both part of the problem as a trigger of the crisis and key to solutions of the 
crisis. In Latin America, regionalism never achieved the same level of integration, 
nor was there a serious ambition or project that could pair the EU. At the time of the 
1980s Latin American debt crisis, there was an attempt to coordinate different Latin 
American debtor positions (in the ad hoc Cartagena Group), but it had limited 
impact, due to insufficient political commitment by the Latin American debtor gov-
ernments and effective divisive tactics by the creditor governments. Furthermore, 
creditors were outside Latin America. Moreover, regional organisations have been 
much more of a political nature in Latin America. Except for the recent results of the 
Pacific Alliance, even the organisations, which prioritised the liberalisation of trade 
such as Mercosur, never achieved full free trade. Additionally, due to the increasing 
political polarisation in the last years, the existing regional organisations even lost 
the capacity to effectively intervene in the cases of (political) crisis to mediate a 
solution.
The volume takes account of these differences by having a strong focus on the 
analysis of the architectural flaws and the democratic deficit of the Economic and 
Monetary Union and analysing and proposing a number of reforms of EMU, rang-
ing from Treaty reform to reforms not requiring Treaty reforms. It presents propos-
als on policy priorities, including development and strategic partnerships promoting 
the green transition, greater cooperation for SMEs and a macroeconomic coopera-
tion between the two regions in the framework of a renewed strategic alliance. The 
proposals thus foresee both the reforms to fix the problems, which triggered the 
1 Sanguinetti Pablo, Comments on “The Latin American Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective” by 
José Antonio Ocampo in Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2014-07-23). Life After Debt: The Origins and 
Resolutions of Debt Crisis (International Economic Association) (Kindle Locations 2943–2944). 
Palgrave Macmillan. Kindle Edition.
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crisis, and proposals, which lead the way out of the crisis and into a more sustain-
able future for both regions with the EU as a motor.
On Latin America, we address the issue of regionalism in three chapters: one on 
the structure of crisis management at regional level, a second one on the impact of 
crisis on regionalism in the region and the third on the structural lack of total factor 
productivity increases, which includes proposals for improving it including by a 
strategic alliance with the EU. The second one deals mainly with the impact of the 
crisis in some of the regional key players on regionalism and the effectiveness of 
regional organisations addressing crises. Furthermore, it is obvious that the failure 
of an adequate crisis management based on solidarity at European level, the applica-
tion and enforcement of similar adjustment programmes as in Latin America in 
spite of Europe’s pride in its social model and social market economy, had the con-
sequence of undermining confidence and enthusiasm for the European Union.
The third and fourth parts explore the impact of the crisis in Europe and Latin 
America, at the national and regional levels, including the political polarisation and 
rise in populism. The crisis in Latin American countries follows a different timeline, 
and the developments in Latin America seem to be ahead of Europe. In the after-
math and possibly as a reaction of the lost decade of the 1980s and the intensive 
austerity programmes, most of the key countries in Latin America experienced a 
“pink wave” of more left-wing and/or populist governments, followed by a “blue 
wave of neoliberalism”. The interesting point in common between the two regions 
is that after the crisis and the austerity era, political positions, parties and govern-
ments seem to be more polarised and less stable. Some of the European populist 
parties on the left, such as Podemos or Syriza, were to some extent taking these 
movements and their strategies as a model. However, in Europe, left-wing parties 
and other organisations were not able to benefit from the “systemic crisis of neolib-
eral capitalism” to use the momentum to change both European and Global gover-
nance, while the “pink wave” did lead to establishment of a number of regional 
organisations and the rise at least of Brazil as one of the BRICS and motor of South- 
South and sustainable development for a certain period, i.e. until about 2013.
During this period, in Europe, the financial crisis and the following and overlap-
ping migration crisis with an equally “poor” crisis management and lacking solidar-
ity by the European Union both furthered the rise of right-wing populism, 
xenophobia, nationalism and euro-scepticism jeopardising liberal democracy, 
regional integration and multilateralism. This poses an obstacle to put into place the 
necessary reforms in the design of the European Union to remedy the revealed flaws 
of EMU’s architecture and keeps the inbuilt weaknesses. A re-nationalisation of 
political competences will rather further increase the vulnerability in a system of 
global financial markets without adequate political and democratic governance and 
regulation. The current political wave is one of a retreat into national populism and 
putting into question regionalism, the urgency of climate change and 
multilateralism.
Given the rise of nationalism, soveranism and populism, Part IV contains five 
articles on these topics and their impact on regionalism, including a chapter on the 
populism in Europe. Additionally, a number of case studies in Part III, such as 
S. Griffith-Jones and B. De Souza Guilherme
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Greece, Italy, Portugal, Venezuela and Brazil, have integrated the rise of populism 
within the analysis.
While the starting point in both regions are financial crises caused by deregulated 
financial markets in the aftermath of the break-up of the Bretton Woods system, the 
research also analyses the governance and legitimacy crisis regarding the crisis 
management and economic, social and political consequences at EU level and at 
national level in a sample of the debtor countries. Greece was chosen for not only 
being a highly indebted country at the moment the crisis broke out (in fact triggering 
the Eurozone debt crisis) but also having been submitted to intentionally tough and 
punitive austerity programmes, with extremely negative effects on the economy and 
the majority of its people, which were clearly and repetitively rejected by its popula-
tion. Additionally, the Greek sovereign debt crisis led to a nearly existential crisis of 
the euro area through the risk of contagion. Portugal had been suffering from a lack 
of competitiveness. While the first (right wing) government rather outperformed the 
Troika adjustment programmes to implement pro-market structural reforms, the 
electorate as a consequence exchanged the government for a left-wing coalition 
which turned the Portuguese programmes into a success story of a country undergo-
ing adjustment programmes, with a high degree of ownership taking into account 
the policy choices of the population, and with a more pro-Keynesian macroeco-
nomic policy, that yielded positive results.
Italy went through an economic and political crisis triggered by the sovereign 
debt crisis and amplified by the incomplete structure of the Eurozone. The ingrained 
causes were the long-term structural problems and high public debt levels, leaving 
it vulnerable to external shocks. Italy did not undergo a Troika-led adjustment pro-
gramme; however such adjustment was imposed by a technocratic government 
implementing austerity measures and reforms to signal to markets and stop the spi-
ral of distrust and negative self-fulfilling expectations, but in fact so far not (suc-
cessfully) addressing the sources of the problems, in particular the lack of total 
factor productivity growth. Italy is the example for a bigger and more powerful 
crisis country in which the disaffected voters turned for a time to right-wing parties, 
which temporarily became part of the government and confronted the other 
European partners by putting into question the existing rules of Economic and 
Monetary Union.
For the case studies in the region of Latin America, we have selected a number 
of key players undergoing major crisis with economic and political consequences 
for the entire region: Brazil, which had developed into the regional leader of South 
America, and Venezuela, which promoted and actively supported a populist and 
ideological anti-market regionalism. Brazil and Venezuela are addressed in a more 
in-depth analysis which focuses predominantly on the contemporary (political) cri-
sis, including the rise of polarisation and populism, although it is clear that eco-
nomic development and political crisis constantly feed on each other and can never 
be regarded as completely independent. Another interesting aspect we address in 
our volume is the rise and role of new social movements and new political parties 
both in Latin America and in Europe. In Venezuela and Brazil, we can observe the 
mobilisation of major social movements and protests as a turning point of the “pink 
1 Introduction
6
tide”, the left-wing governments, with the subsequent loss of public support,  leading 
in both cases to a regression of the democratic development. In both cases, the eco-
nomic and political crisis is partly related to the “resource curse”, with an over- 
dependence on petrol and other primary resources and major corruption scandals and 
the decline of the economy in line with the fall of petrol prices. In the case of Venezuela, 
the mixture of the economic mismanagement and even humanitarian crisis, the politi-
cal crisis and the foreign political tensions with the USA led to the conversion of the 
government into a left-wing authoritarian regime. In Brazil, the economic slowdown 
was used as a window of opportunity to impeach the elected president accusing her of 
creative accounting and reversing the left-wing government agenda into a Washington 
Consensus programme. At the following elections, the most popular (left wing) candi-
date was impeded to stand for elections by a judicial-political intrigue, paving the way 
for a populist authoritarian regime from the extreme right.
The crisis has also recently led to violent events even in successful economies in 
Latin America, like Chile, a country which in spite of very impressive growth (till 
recent years) and poverty reduction achievements had not only a very unequal 
income distribution but also still a rather extreme version of the market economy, in 
aspects like pension system, health and education. Therefore, this country also faces 
major challenges not just to restore growth but to significantly improve income 
distribution, as well as make important reforms in its economic development model, 
especially in sectors like its pension, health and education systems away from an 
extreme market economy, to a more balanced model, that involves a greater role of 
government institutions to deliver public goods, like good health and education at 
reasonable cost for all, including the poorer segments of the population, as well as 
sufficient pensions for the relatively poorer people, via solidarity redistributive 
mechanisms. Moreover, we also analyse the impact of their crisis on regional insti-
tutions in Latin America and regional integration. The book furthermore has a com-
parative study on the economic policies of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
One of the main conclusions of the network and project that is both valid for 
Europe and for Latin America is that the current financial system provokes eco-
nomic, social, ecological and political instability and urgently needs to be reformed.
The last chapters, in Part VI, present proposals of the network reaching from the 
transition from finance capitalism to an economically, socially and ecologically sus-
tainable real capitalism, to reforms in both regions and at the inter-regional level of 
EU-LAC relations. The increase of inequality in some countries and weakening 
of the middle classes as well as insufficient and slowing down of income increase of 
the poorer segments in recent years led to the loss of trust in the traditional political 
parties, often captured by the financial markets, an increased polarisation and the 
rise of populist forces, parties and political leaders. To give an answer to these 
developments, and in order to introduce more “stability”, “sustainability” and 
“equity” into the current European and global model, Europe has the potential 
and the responsibility to develop a European “Eco-social model” as a prototype and 
motor for a global “Eco-social model”. The book introduces the potential of mod-
ernising and enlarging the welfare state as probably the most important fundament 
of a new/renewed “European identity”. New labour time models as prerequisite for 
continuing economic growth with continuous implementation of technical progress 
S. Griffith-Jones and B. De Souza Guilherme
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(raising labour productivity) and sustained full employment are desirable aims. An 
active modern industrial policy, partly funded by public development banks, which 
can help redirect also private finance to key sectors, is also essential to make growth 
sustainable, inclusive and dynamic.
The network considers the bi-regional EU-LAC cooperation as a further stepping 
stone in stimulating and reviving multilateralism and improving global governance 
through a “macroeconomic dialogue” between academics, civil society and offi-
cials, a “public-private strategy with a view to improve the joint competitiveness 
and the participation in GVCs in the global markets” as well as sustainable invest-
ment projects promoted via the EIB, targeted to achieve the new “green and social 
deal” for Europe, Latin America and globally. A more intensive cooperation of the 
two regions could be not only be mutually beneficial in times of major trade ten-
sions but especially represent a valuable contribution to overcome the current crisis 
of multilateralism and global governance. The COVID-19 pandemic crisis, which 
evolved after the end of the research conducted by the authors of this book rein-
forces the arguments put forward, and the necessity to deepen the cooperation 
between the European Union and Latin America. We have also received the good 
news about the renewal of the Jean Monnet Network “Crisis-Equity-Democracy for 
Europe and Latin America”, what will enable the researchers to continue their join 
efforts to reflect upon the crises, and advance proposals to the regions and their 
political dialogue, contributing to foster EU-CELAC Strategic Alliance.
Disclaimer The opinions expressed in this introduction/volume are the sole responsibility of the 
authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament or of any 
other EU institution.
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Chapter 2
The Road from Prosperity into the Crisis: 
The Long Cycle of Post-War Economic, 
Social and Political Development
Stephan Schulmeister
Abstract This chapter provides an empirically founded reconstruction of the long 
road of (Western) societies into the present crisis as a background for the different 
studies carried out as part of the Jean Monnet Network “Crisis–Equity–Democracy 
for Europe and Latin America”.
 Introduction and Overview
This chapter addresses the key puzzle of post-war economic development: until the 
1970s, production, trade and employment grew strongly and steadily, in the global 
economy as well as in the different regions; since then, however, economic growth 
has been declining over the long run and has become unstable over the short and 
medium run. At the same time, the differences in economic dynamics have been 
rising across continents and regions: Latin America and – to a lesser extent – Africa 
were hit by debt crises in the early 1980s and late 1990s and by the instability of 
commodities prices, whereas the economies in (East) Asia have been performing 
strongly, in particular in China.
The difference in economic performance between the 1950s and 1960s the sub-
sequent crisis phase is the more puzzling as only the second phase was shaped by 
basic technological innovations (microelectronics, robotics, internet, biotechnol-
ogy, nanotechnology) which – according to mainstream economics – should have 
accelerated economic growth. Market liberalization should have had the same effect 
as financial markets and labour markets were highly regulated in the 1950s and 
1960s. In the prosperity phase, the welfare state was built up strongly, yet the public 
debt declined relative to GDP, whereas the opposite developments took place over 
the subsequent decades. All these facts stay in contrast to conventional (equilib-
rium) theory. An empirically founded reconstruction of the long road of (Western) 
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societies into the present crisis provides the background for the different studies 
carried out as part of the Jean Monnet Network “Crisis–Equity–Democracy for 
Europe and Latin America”. A first sketch of the systemic causes of the long post- 
war cycle is as follows.
Understanding the main causes of the Great Depression – financial instability, 
austerity policies and protectionism  – provided the economic guidelines for the 
prosperity phase: the incentive conditions directed the capitalist “core energy”, i.e. 
striving for profits, to activities in the real economy. Stable dollar exchange rates, 
stable commodity prices, interest rates below the rate of economic growth and 
“sleeping” stock markets (at least in Europe) rendered financial speculation unprof-
itable and raised the profitability of investment, production and trade in the real 
economy at the same time. In addition, building up the welfare state strengthened 
confidence of households, reduced income inequality and fostered the steady expan-
sion of consumption. This “real-capitalist” system was based on the theory of John 
M. Keynes which called not only for an economically active government but also 
for stabilizing financial markets. The “European Social Model” combined real-cap-
italist incentive conditions with a strong welfare state (also the Cold War called for 
a “social capitalism”): market and state, competition and cooperation, entrepreneur-
ship and trade unionism, and individual self-interest and social coherence were 
regarded as complementary. The success of real capitalism laid the ground for its 
own decline: Over the 1960s, full employment and the expanding welfare state 
shifted power from business to unions. The latter enforced more employee partici-
pation as well as a redistribution in favour of wages. The leftist “Zeitgeist” strength-
ened social-democratic parties. In addition, the environmental movement (“Club of 
Rome”) denounced the capitalist growth model as unsustainable. All these develop-
ments together caused (big) business to turn towards the neoliberal ideology which 
promised disciplining trade unions, weakening the welfare state and establishing a 
truly free market economy.
Friedrich A. von Hayek, the great antipode of Keynes in the debates over the 
world depression in the 1930s, had begun to plan a counter-movement against 
Keynesianism already after his “defeat” caused by the success of Keynes’ General 
Theory (1936). Hayek’s book The Road to Serfdom (1944) provided the ideological 
fundament of the neoliberal movement. In 1947, Hayek founded the Mont Pelerin 
Society as neoliberal network of outstanding economists (“original thinkers”); intel-
lectuals, in particular journalists (“second- hand dealers in ideas”); and wealthy 
people as financiers of university chairs or think tanks. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
the “original thinkers” worked on the theoretical foundation of their vision of a 
“free market economy” – from Friedman’s “proof” of the impossibility of destabi-
lizing financial speculation (1953) or Buchanan’s “public-choice approach” of ana-
lysing politics as a purely egoistic business of politicians to Friedman’s theory of a 
“natural rate of unemployment” (1968) and Robert Lucas’ concept of “rational 
expectations” (1972). These theories legitimated the offensive against the welfare 
state, trade unions and financial market regulations and got rising support from 
“industrial capitalists” (threatened by the rising power of unions) as well as from 
“finance capitalists” (threatened by rising inflation).
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The road into the present crisis began with the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods 
system between 1971 and 1973: the dollar lost 25% of its value; OPEC reacted with 
the first oil price “shock” in 1973. This sequence repeated itself between 1976 and 
1979, leading to the second oil price “shock”. Both “shocks” triggered two reces-
sions and a strong acceleration of inflation. Neoliberal “original thinkers” took the 
coincidence of rising unemployment and rising inflation as disprove of Keynesian 
macroeconomics – even though their recommendations had contributed to this coin-
cidence (“battle over the Phillips curve”). By the late 1970s, monetary policy began 
to fight inflation through raising interest rates like never before, far above the rate of 
economic growth. As this policy was most pronounced in the USA, the dollar almost 
doubled its value between 1980 and 1985, thereby appreciating the burden of inter-
national dollar debts: in 1982, the debt crisis of Latin America broke out. Within a 
decade, the economic system in the West was transformed from “real capitalism” to 
“finance capitalism”, guided by the neoliberal “navigation map”: the volatility of 
exchange rates and commodities prices, booming stock prices as well as a positive 
interest-growth differential shifted activities of non-financial business towards 
financial investments, facilitated by innovations like financial derivatives. The 
financial sector gradually transformed itself from a sector servicing the real econ-
omy to the dominant sector in the overall economy.
Neoliberal theories also legitimized policies against trade unions and the welfare 
state, first adopted in Chile after the military coup in 1973 and then in the UK and 
the USA where Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan came to power in 1979 and 
1980, respectively. Over the 1980s, high dollar interest and rising dollar exchange 
rates dampened the real economy in the USA strongly. Hence, monetary policy gave 
up monetarism and has been following an anti-cyclical course since Alan Greenspan 
became chairman of the Fed in 1987. Since Bill Clinton became US president in 
1992, also fiscal policy has been conducted in an increasingly active, counter-cycli-
cal manner. In other words, since the early 1990s, macroeconomic policy in the 
USA has been following a “trivial Keynesian” course. At the same time, economic 
policy in the EU gave up the Keynesian target of full employment and of social 
security through a comprehensive welfare state and began to follow neoliberal 
guidelines.
The main reason for this (gradual) change was the following. Finance-capitalist 
incentive conditions had caused the public debt to rise stronger in Europe than in the 
USA since financing the welfare state necessitates full employment. In the early 
1990s, policy in the EU began to fight these “twin problems” through restrictive 
fiscal policy based on rules (Maastricht criteria, fiscal compact) and through labour 
market deregulation: the number of atypical jobs rose steadily (comprising nowa-
days roughly one third of overall jobs in the EU), unemployment benefits and social 
transfers in general have been cut, and the confidence in the welfare state got weaker. 
At the same time, speculative activities in financial markets boomed like never 
before, contributing to the rise in income and wealth inequality. After the stock 
market crash of 2000/2002, stock prices, house prices and commodity prices 
boomed simultaneously. The three “bull markets” tilted in 2007/2008 into three 
“bear markets”, causing the biggest wealth devaluation since 1929 (the last time 
when these asset prices declined simultaneously).
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The systemic character of the financial crisis of 2008 and, hence, of the subse-
quent rise of unemployment and the public debt could not be recognized through the 
lens of “neoliberal glasses”: after saving the banking sector and stimulating the 
economy in the crisis year 2009, austerity policy in the EU was again intensified, in 
particular in Southern Europe. Speculation on the bankruptcy of these states, first 
against Greece, then against Portugal, Spain and Italy, had caused interest rates to 
rise tremendously. Looking for a “save haven”, investors drove up prices of govern-
ment bonds of Germany and the other “good” countries. The related decline in inter-
est rates in the “North” and rising interest in the “South” intensified the tensions 
within the European Monetary Union (EMU) and endangered its existence. In 2012, 
the ECB turned to an extremely loose monetary policy through lowering the key 
interest rate to zero and through buying government bonds. This policy caused bond 
prices to boom like never before and strengthened also the stock bull market which 
had already taken off in spring 2009. In addition, house prices have been rising 
strongly, this time not only in the USA and in the UK but also in continental Europe. 
Hence, the potential for a new simultaneous wealth devaluation has been built up in 
recent years. Austerity policies, on the one hand, and booming financial wealth, on 
the other hand, have increased inequality, strengthening the feelings of bitterness, 
uncertainty and fear of the future not only on behalf of the underprivileged but also 
of middle class people. Populists address both groups, promise “social warmth” 
within the own nation and direct their feelings against scapegoats of all types: 
against “the” globalisation, “the” EU, “the” system as well as “the” Greeks or “the” 
foreigners – in recent years in particular against refugees.
Whereas the prosperity phase had come to an end due to the success of real capi-
talism and the related shift in power in favour of trade unions and leftist parties, the 
crisis phase comes to an end due to the failure of finance capitalism and the related 
meltdown of wealth (in the next financial crisis) as well as the growing frustration 
of the “non-elites” in society. The above hypothesis about the driving forces of post-
war development implies that there operates an interaction between economic theo-
ries and reality. On the one hand, theories serve as “navigation maps” thereby 
changing reality and leading occasionally into crises (as in the 1930s). On the other 
hand, new theories emerge in reaction to these crises, guiding economic develop-
ment into new directions (as in the 1950s and 1960s).
 Framework Conditions and Economic Performance 
of Western Capitalism During the 1960s and 1970s
Over the 1950s and 1960s, an active policy aiming at full employment, stable eco-
nomic growth and social coherence together with stable exchange rates, commodity 
prices and interest rates (below the rate of economic growth) channelled striving for 
profits towards entrepreneurial activities in the real sphere of the economy. Under 
these real-capitalist incentive conditions, the economies of industrial countries grew 
strongly and steadily. For several reasons, this development was particularly 
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pronounced in Western Europe. First, the reconstruction after WWII promoted 
investment and production. Second, building up the welfare state strengthened the 
confidence of households and, hence, their consumption. Third, trade liberalization 
and the integration process promoted trade in Europe stronger than elsewhere (the 
EEC and the EFTA were founded in 1957 and 1960, respectively).
Over the 1950s, the rate of unemployment had fallen steadily. In 1960, it 
amounted in Western Europe to only 1.8% on average and fluctuated slightly around 
2% until 1974 (Fig.  2.1). The welfare state was enlarged and the infrastructure 
improved. Both activities strengthened and stabilized economic growth so that the 
public debt was declining continuously from almost 70% of GDP in the early 1950s 
to less than 40% in the early 1970s (Fig. 2.1).
Against the background of historical experience, this performance appeared as 
“economic miracle”. However, it was just the result of coherent framework condi-
tions: liberalizing goods markets and keeping financial markets regulated fostered 
activities in the real economy for two reasons. First, the costs of financing invest-
ment, production and trade were low and stable. Second, financial speculation was 
unprofitable. At the same time, building up the welfare state strengthened confi-
dence and fairness in society. In other words, the strength of the European Social 
Model consisted in providing room for individual, self-interested “expansion” in the 
real economy through competition in liberalized goods markets, combined with 
strengthening social coherence through the welfare state (“institutionalized 
solidarity”).
Promoting activities in the real economy through competition in goods markets 
combined with cooperative strategies in politics shaped economic development also 
at the global level: international trade was liberalized in several GATT rounds; 
transnational cooperation was strengthened through the Marshall plan, through 
development aid, through the activities of The World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund as well as through the international monetary system. Until 1971, 
the dollar remained stable vis-à-vis the other reserve currencies contributing to the 
(relative) stability of commodity prices and to stable growth of world production – it 
fluctuated just between 4% and 6% per year (Fig. 2.2).
The success of the real-capitalist system, in particular when combined with a 
comprehensive welfare state, slowly changed the distribution of income and power 
in society and prepared the ground for the neoliberal “counter-offensive”. Over the 
1950s, a (tacit) deal between entrepreneurs and unions had prevailed: the latter 
accepted the dispositive power of the entrepreneurs as “bosses” and got “in 
exchange” more jobs. This deal came to an end once full employment was reached. 
Now, unions called for (more) employee participation and in particular for redistri-
bution in favour of wages. Supported by permanent full employment, strike activi-
ties roughly tripled between 1965 and 1968 (particularly in Italy, France and the 
UK), enforcing to a large extent the fulfilling of the unions’ demands: wages rose 
much faster than labour productivity; the wage share in nominal GDP increased 
over the 1960s like never before (Fig. 2.1).
Also ideological developments raised the concerns of industrialists about the 
long-term consequences of full employment and an expanding welfare state: in 
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the second half of the 1960s, most intellectuals turned to the left (the students’ 
protests in 1968 and the often sympathetic reports in the media were clear indica-
tors of these changes). The left “Zeitgeist” strengthened social-democratic parties 
(Willy Brandt became chancellor in Germany in 1969, Bruno Kreisky in Austria 
in 1970). The “Club of Rome” criticized the resource-wasting capitalism (“The 
Limits to Growth”, 1972) which appeared as the ultimate cause of global pollu-
tion. In the USA, industrialists became also concerned about the negative impact 
of the Bretton Woods system. Over the 1960s, the US economy lost almost perma-
nently export market shares to Europe and Japan. Yet, the USA would never be 
able to devalue its currency due to its role as anchor of the Bretton Woods rules 
(the original dollar exchange rates had been “fair” due to the advantage of the US 
economy after WWII but became progressively overvalued due to the catching-up 
of other industrial countries, in particular Germany and Japan). The confidence in 
the exchange rate system got weaker also in the rest of the world since the USA 
abused its role as “world banker” through “dollar exports”, in part for financing 
the Vietnam War. When the French president De Gaulle asked his central bank to 
have dollar claims converted into gold in 1967, the USA refused to do so. This 
decision made it clear that the USA would not stick to the gold convertibility of 
the dollar.1 In addition, inflation began to rise in the 1960s, caused by persistently 
high economic growth and the related wage-price spiral. The acceleration of 
1 For the fundamental shortcoming of the Bretton Woods system, e.g. the double role of the dollar 
as standard currency of the world economy and as national currency of the USA, see 
Schulmeister (2000).
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inflation was particularly pronounced in the USA, to a large extent due to rising 
expenditures for the Vietnam War.
All these developments together rendered the neoliberal ideology (mainly in the 
form of monetarism) progressively more attractive for wealthy people. It promised 
to weaken trade unions and the welfare state, to fight leftist political movements, to 
get rid of the system of fixed exchange rates and to reduce inflation – the latter was 
particularly important for owners of big financial wealth which had grown strongly 
during the prosperity phase. For all these promises, neoliberal “original thinkers” 
had produced theoretical foundations, from Hayek’s “The Road to Serfdom” (1944) 
or Friedman’s “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates” (1953) to his “The Role of 
Monetary Policy” (1968) which based an attack on full employment policy on his 
concept of a “natural rate of unemployment” (see section “Public Finances Under 
Real-Capitalist and Finance-Capitalist Conditions”).
 Systemic Changes in Global Capitalism Since the 1970s 
and Their Impact
The support of “big business” alone would not have been sufficient to make neolib-
eralism the most influential ideology of past decades because its call for weakening 
the welfare state as well as trade unions was not popular, certainly not among most 
European citizens. Therefore, the advance of neoliberalism took place “through the 
backdoor” of liberalizing financial markets: letting the system of pegged exchange 
rates collapse with the intention to weaken the dollar, strengthened by an expansive 
monetary policy, produced the expectation of a dollar depreciation which was then 
brought about through the respective speculative transactions. Over the 1970s, two 
dollar depreciations triggered two oil price “shocks”, followed by two recessions 
and a rise in inflation, unemployment and the public debt.
These problems were then “cured” through neoliberal “recipes”, e.g. “struc-
tural reforms”, like (further) deregulating financial markets, weakening labour 
protection, dampening real wages, cutting social expenditures, raising interest 
rates and restricting the room for manoeuvre of fiscal and monetary policy through 
rules. These “therapies” worsened the “disease” which in turn called for increas-
ing the “dose”. In this way, the economic regime was transformed from a real-
capitalist into a finance-capitalist system. The most important steps of this process 
were as follows.
In August 1971, the USA let the system of fixed exchange rates collapse (Figs. 2.2 
and 2.3): during the subsequent bear market, the dollar lost 25% of its value vis-à-
vis the other SDR currencies (DM, franc, pound, yen). This development hit those 
countries most which exported exclusively crude oil, priced and paid in dollars: the 
OPEC countries in the Middle East. In October 1973, OPEC took advantage of the 
Yom Kippur War to fight back by putting through a tripling of crude oil prices 
(Fig. 2.3; the oil boycott served as bluff). The first “oil price shock” led into the first 
post-war recession in all industrial countries. As a consequence, not only inflation 
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but also unemployment rose significantly. This constellation was then taken as dis-
prove of the Phillips curve and, hence, of Keynesian economics altogether (see 
below). In a second bear market, the dollar lost again 25% of its value between 1976 
and 1979, leading to the second “oil price shock” in 1979 (again, OPEC took advan-
tage of political turbulences like the coming to power of the Ayatollahs). It was 
again followed by a recession.
Since 1972, the oil price had risen by a factor of 11. The inflationary pressure 
spilled over to the prices of manufactures. As a consequence, the price level in over-
all world trade almost quadrupled during the 1970s (Fig. 2.4). The inverse develop-
ment of the dollar exchange rate and world trade prices is, however, also due to the 
conversion of manufactures prices from the different national currencies into dol-
lars. This statistical effect is of enormous economic importance: as most interna-
tional debts (in particular of developing countries) are held in dollars, any persistent 
dollar depreciation is associated with negative real interest rates (approximated as 
difference between the nominal dollar rate – LIBOR – and the annual changes in 
world trade prices in dollar terms).
To put it concretely, exports of non-US countries to countries other than the USA 
earned DM, yen, etc. whose dollar value rose strongly over the 1970s. In particular, 
the “tiger economies” of that decade like Mexico, Argentina and Brazil took advan-
tage of this valuation effect: they incurred more and more dollar debts to finance 
their import surplus (which helped industrialized countries struggling with two “oil 
price shocks”). This behaviour seemed rational as the falling dollar depreciated dol-
lar debts. At the same time, the “petro dollars” of oil exporters, deposited in London, 
were “recycled”, mainly to Latin American countries.
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As reaction to the acceleration of inflation in the 1970s, monetary policy 
increased interest rates like never before, most strongly in the USA (Fig.  2.4).2 
Hence, traders expected an appreciation of the dollar (also because it had become 
strongly undervalued) which finally took off when Ronald Reagan was elected pres-
ident of the USA in November 1980. Over the following 5 years, the strongest dol-
lar bull market ever took place (Fig. 2.3). It appreciated international dollar debts, 
which Latin American (but also African) countries had accumulated during the 
1970s under completely different conditions: between 1979 and 1981, the real inter-
est on an international dollar debt jumped from −6% to +18% (Fig. 2.4). One year 
later, the international debt crisis broke out, which dampened the real economy in 
not only in these countries but in Latin America as a whole for more than a (“lost”) 
decade. The increasing overvaluation of the dollar caused the bull market to tilt in 
1985 again into a bear market. Until 1995, the dollar lost almost 50% of its value, 
providing relief for international dollar debtors (Figs. 2.3 and 2.4): dollar prices in 
world trade picked up and, the real interest fell between 1985 and 1987 by almost 
14% points.
Over the 1990s, the economic performance of the USA improved relative to 
Europe and Japan, due to the undervaluation of the dollar and the expansionary 
policy of the Clinton administration. In 1995, the second dollar bull market took off: 
world trade prices started to fall, the real interest on an international dollar debt 
jumped from −3.4% to +11.3% (Fig. 2.4). As a consequence, the booming econo-
mies in East Asia, which had financed their rising current account deficits through 
dollar credits, slid into a liquidity crisis in 1997/1998.3 The crisis then spilled over 
to Russia and Brazil. Both countries had – partly successfully – attempted to curb 
inflation through fixing the exchange rate of their respective currencies vis- à- vis the 
dollar. As long as the inflation in these countries was significantly higher than in the 
USA, nominal interest rates in Russia and Brazil, respectively, exceeded dollar 
rates. Speculators tried to profit from this differential through short-term capital 
inflows in both countries. As the dollar appreciated more and more, and, hence, also 
the rouble and the real, confidence in the pegged exchange rate vanished, capital 
flew out and forced a massive depreciation of both currencies. As an indirect conse-
quence of the depreciation of the Brazilian real by roughly 60%, also the currency 
board of Argentina collapsed in 2002.
Between 2002 and 2007, the dollar exchange rate again declined strongly 
(Fig.  2.3). This bear market induced a strong rise in world trade prices. As a 
consequence, interest rates on an international dollar debt became negative again, 
2 This policy was in line with monetarist theory and with the “trivial Keynesian” IS/LM approach. 
However, by raising interest rates, one does not specifically dampen inflation but the economy as a 
whole (which will then also reduce inflation). Such a strategy raises interest payments and, hence, 
production costs due to the interest rate accelerator: If, e.g. the interest rate rises from 5% to 8%, 
interest payments rise by 60% (in case of bank credits at flexible rates).
3 The “tiger economies” ran out of dollar liquidity to service their dollar debts. As their production 
structure was much better than that of Latin American countries in the early 1980s, they could 
overcome the crisis rather fast.
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relaxing the financial crises of emerging market economies (Fig. 2.4). Sequences of 
bull and bear markets shape commodity price dynamics in general, particularly over 
the past 15 years when financial “investors” become increasingly active in commod-
ity derivative trading. The parallel price movements of crude oil, wheat, corn and 
rice before and after 2008 indicate the importance of “bulls” and “bears” in blowing 
up asset values before the crisis and melting them down during the crisis (Fig. 2.5).
Under the condition of widely fluctuating exchange rates and commodity prices, 
and of a positive interest-growth differential (Fig. 2.1), financial and non-financial 
business shifted activities from the real to financial investment and short-term spec-
ulation (“finance capitalism”). This shift was fostered by financial innovations, in 
particular derivatives of all kinds which became the most important vehicles for 
speculation (Fig. 2.11). The change in incentive conditions for making profits had 
two effects. First, the sequence of bull and bear markets of exchange rates, com-
modity prices, interest rates, stock prices and house prices triggered “oil price 
shocks” and debt crises of developing countries and caused the great financial crisis 
of 2008. Second, non-financial business reduced the accumulation of real capital 
and, hence, the creation of “normal” jobs.
Europe was much more affected by this shift in capital accumulation from real to 
financial assets. First, the sustainability of the European Social Model depends 
much more on a high level of employment (consisting of “normal” jobs) as com-
pared to the US model (“working-poor jobs” did  – and still do  – not fit to the 
European welfare state system). Second, economic policy in the USA emancipated 
itself from the concept of a rules-based fiscal and monetary policy in the late 1980s 
and has since then followed a (primitive) Keynesian policy. As a consequence, real 
capital accumulation picked up in the USA in the 1990s, whereas it declined in 
many European countries, in particular in Germany (Fig. 2.12).
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Between the early 1970s and the late 1980s, unemployment rose strongly in 
(Western) Europe (in spite of the decline in the wage share (Fig. 2.1)). As unem-
ployment is extremely costly for welfare states (due to rising social expenditures 
and falling receipts from taxes and social security contributions), also the public 
debt increased with some time lag. This rise was further strengthened by the persis-
tently positive interest-growth differential (Fig. 2.1).
Over the 1990s and 2000s (until the financial crisis), the “twin problems” unem-
ployment and public debt could be mitigated (Fig. 2.16), however, at the expense of 
damaging the European Social Model: the decline in the rate of unemployment was 
primarily the (statistical) result of the expansion of atypical jobs due to labour mar-
ket deregulations since economic growth remained weak (fluctuating around an 
annual rate of 2% (Fig. 2.1)). The (small) reduction in the ratio of public debt to 
GDP was achieved mainly through cutting social expenditures, i.e. through weaken-
ing the welfare state. At the same time, stock prices boomed like never before 
(Figs. 2.8 and 2.11).
After the burst of the “internet bubble” in 2000/2002, three simultaneous bull 
markets developed (house prices, stock prices and commodity prices) which tilted 
around 2007 into three bear markets: house prices started to decline in late 2006, 
followed by stock prices and finally by commodity prices (Fig. 2.6). Insofar as bull 
markets and bear markets are the most typical feature of asset price dynamics, the 
financial crisis can be considered as result of “business as usual”. However, a simul-
taneous devaluation of house wealth, stock wealth and commodity wealth seldom 
occurs; the last time this happened was in 1929.
The mutually reinforcing effects of simultaneous bear markets become evident if 
one compares the period 2007/2008 to that of 2000/2002 (Fig. 2.5). In the latter 
case, the strong devaluation of stock wealth was to a great extent compensated by 
the revaluation of real estate wealth (a recession followed nevertheless). The devalu-
ation of stock wealth, housing wealth and commodity wealth contracted balance 
sheets, reducing the equity of all asset holders. As the share of equity in total assets 
was lowest in the case of banks (in order to profit from leverage), they would have 
collapsed had the government not refinanced them – at costs of several trillion dol-
lars. The measures for bailing out the banks and for stimulating the economy in the 
Great Recession of 2009 caused budget deficits to soar to unsustainable levels, in 
particular in those countries like Greece where the deficit had been (much) too high 
already before the crisis. When the newly elected (socialist) Greek government 
admitted that the previous (conservative) government had reported wrong budget 
data to the European Commission and asked for financial support, all other EMU 
governments refused to grant it.
The intention of rejecting support was to “punish” Greece for the misbehaviour 
of its government; the effect, however, was an epidemic rise in interest rates not 
only in Greece but also in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. The rejection signalled 
financial market agents that Greece and other EMU states could in fact slide into 
bankruptcy since the respective national central bank cannot provide the govern-
ment with credits in a monetary union. As a consequence (investment), banks and 
hedge funds started to speculate on the bankruptcy of EMU member states through 
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“credit default swaps” (CDS), first against Greece, then against Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Italy. This business turned out to be extremely profitable for the “early 
birds”: CDS premia with respect to government bonds of Greece or Portugal rose by 
a factor of 10. Hence, also the value of those CDS contracts, which were concluded 
at an earlier stage, rose by the same factor. Interest rates on government bonds of the 
“targeted” states increased in tandem with the CDS premia.
At the same time, investors seeking a “save haven” drove up prices of govern-
ment bonds of Germany and other “good” countries: As a consequence, interest 
rates declined in the “North” where the economy started to recover and soared in the 
“South” where the crisis deepened. The “interest split” of the euro area caused also 
political tensions to rise. When the interest rate “epidemic” reached Spain and Italy 
(causing CDS premia and the contract values to rise by a factor of 5), ECB president 
Mario Draghi underlined in July 2012 the determination of the ECB “to do what-
ever it takes to preserve the euro”. This announcement together with an extremely 
expansionary monetary policy stopped the “game” of speculating on the bankruptcy 
of EMU member states. Interest rates began to fall in all EMU countries (had the 
ECB president Trichet adopted such a policy already 2 years earlier, the euro crisis 
would have been prevented).
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In March 2015, the ECB intensified its loose monetary policy though “quantita-
tive easing”, i.e. asset purchases from banks to the amount of 60 bn. € per month 
(this sum was increased to 80 bn. € in March 2016). This policy was indispensable 
for saving the euro since the government of countries as big as Spain or Italy could 
not be (re)financed through the euro bail-out fund (European Financial Stability 
Facility, later European Stability Mechanism).
The developments leading into the euro crisis can be summarized as follows: the 
refusal of EU policy makers to give financial support to Greece in fall 2009 trig-
gered a bear market in government bonds of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and 
Italy and a bull market in government bonds of Germany and the other “good” 
countries. The move of the ECB towards an extreme loose monetary policy in 2012 
turned the bear market in government bonds of Southern European countries into a 
bull market and strengthened also the stock bull market which had already taken off 
in March 2009 – not only in Europe but on a global scale. At the same time, also 
house prices boomed again, this time not only in the USA and the UK but also in 
continental Europe. Once again, three bull markets of stock prices, house prices and 
bond prices have built up the potential for three bear markets (Fig. 2.6; “Euro Bund 
Future” indicates the development of German 10-year government bond prices).
 Macroeconomic Effects of Bull Markets and Bear Markets
The long swings of asset prices impact upon the real economy through their valua-
tion effects. Rising stock prices, for example, increase the financial wealth of their 
owners (also indirectly via pension and college funds, etc.). If they trust in the per-
manent character of the (re)valuation, gains, they will increase their expenditure as 
US households did during the 1990s. The expansionary effects of bull market feed-
back on the strength of the asset appreciation, in particular, if the latter does not 
increase other people’s liabilities at the same time (e.g. if the bull market concerns 
stocks or residential buildings). By the same token, bear markets dampen the real 
economy. For example, a fall in the value of savings for pensions or college costs 
will cause households to save more (consume less) out of their current income.
In the case of exchange rates, one has also to take into account the effects of 
appreciation and depreciation trends on capital flows, on terms of trade and the 
related trade flows as well as on the re(de)valuation of international debts. These 
effects are strongest in the case of “bulls” and “bears” of the dollar exchange rate 
since commodities are priced in dollars, and most international debts, in particular 
of emerging countries, are held in dollars. As a consequence, any dollar apprecia-
tion (trend) improves “ceteris paribus” the terms of trade of net commodity export-
ers (at the expense of net importers) and appreciates dollar debts/assets.
The opposite holds in the case of a dollar depreciation (trend). The net effect of 
the related redistribution processes on the global economy is mostly negative as the 
demand of winners rises more slowly than the demand of losers falls. This is par-
ticularly true in the case of strong oil price changes. When they rise as in the 1970s 
(in reaction to the preceding dollar depreciations), the additional demand of 
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oil-exporting countries falls short of the decline in the demand of industrial coun-
tries. However, when oil prices fall strongly (as 1984/1986 or 2014/2016), the net 
demand effect is again negative.
The strongest influence on the real economy exerts house price fluctuations: dur-
ing a bull market, house owners feel richer, increase consumption and/or take up 
additional credits using the rising house value as collateral. In addition, real estate 
developers or private speculators buy and/or build houses as speculation vehicle. 
These activities are fettered by financial innovations which enable creditors to bun-
dle claims against house owners in “asset-backed security” (ABS) and sell them as 
“collateralized debt obligation” (CDO). When the bull market tilts into a bear mar-
ket, the values of houses often sink below the value of the respective credits, and the 
owners (have to) leave their home. As a consequence, also the ABSs and CDOs 
become (almost) worthless. This wealth meltdown wipes out equity and forces the 
losers to radically cut expenditures. By the end of the bear market, asset manage-
ment firms like BlackRock or Blackstone buy houses at low prices and rent them 
out, partly to their former owners. When a new bull market takes off, these investors 
profit from the revaluation of houses (instead of their inhabitants).
In more general terms, during the upswing and downswing of asset prices, a 
redistribution process takes place. Who gets on the trend in its early stage makes 
profits at the expense of the “late-coming bandwagonists”. As a group, the winners 
are the professional traders, and the losers are the amateurs (including many pen-
sion funds). A thought experiment clarifies the issue: If the level of stock prices at 
the end of the “bear” would be the same as at the beginning of the “bull”, the overall 
value of stock wealth would be the same. However, its distribution has changed: The 
wealth of professionals (in the aggregate) has grown by the same amount by which 
the wealth of amateurs (in the aggregate) has shrunk. In accounting terms, the 
effects of asset price fluctuations are as follows. Any appreciation extends balance 
sheets, blowing up the equity of (net) asset holders and wiping out equity of (net) 
liability holders (e.g. of dollar debtors in the case of a dollar appreciation). The 
opposite holds for a depreciation process (Koo 2009). These effects of “bulls” and 
“bears” have become more pronounced since the 1990s due to the growing domi-
nance of IFRS accounting standards (assets and liabilities have to be valued at their 
current market values).
The different channels through which the long swings of asset prices impact 
upon the real economy are rather neglected in macroeconomic theory. This is par-
ticularly true for the mainstream of the past decades since “New Classical 
Macroeconomics” and “New Keynesian Economics” exclude the possibility of 
“bulls” and “bears” by construction.4 John M. Keynes had stressed the role of uncer-
tainty, emotions and social interaction like herding as fundamental reasons for the 
specific instability of financial markets (particularly in Chap. 12 of his “General 
4 Equilibrium theory can take into account “bubbles” which, however, are essentially different from 
bull markets: A bubble represents a non-fundamental, exploding equilibrium price path (equilib-
rium in the sense that expectations of rising prices are fulfilled), whereas a bull market is limited 
by the repercussions of the overvaluation on the real economy. Agents take these feedback effects 
into account. Hence, they know from the very beginning that any bull market comes to an end. In 
addition, equilibrium theory cannot explain the persistence of bear markets.
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Fig. 2.7 Trending and speculation in the crude oil futures market. (Source: NYMEX)
Theory”), yet he did neither provide a theoretical elaboration of his insights nor 
integrate them into his general theory.5
Those two phenomena which have shaped economic development over the past 
decades and which represent characteristic features of finance capitalism have still 
to be theoretically explained: the tremendous rise in speed and volume of (deriva-
tives) trading of stocks, bonds, foreign exchange and commodities, on the one hand, 
and the increase in the amplitude of long-term trends of these prices, on the 
other hand.
 How Bull and Bear Markets Are Brought About
Asset prices fluctuate almost always around “underlying” trends.6 The phenomenon 
of “trending” repeats itself across different time scales (“self-similarity”). For 
example, there occur trends based on tick or minute data (Fig.  2.10) as well as 
trends based on daily data (Figs. 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9). “Technical” or “algorithmic” 
trading aims at exploiting the trending of asset prices. In the case of trend- following 
5 In a nutshell, these insights provided the microeconomic foundation of Keynes’ macroeconomic 
theory (“homo humanus”). However, most “Keynesians” did not take Keynes’ insights about the 
importance of uncertainty, emotions and social interactions serious. The main exception are “Post-
Keynesians”, in particular Hyman P. Minsky. However, also Minsky dealt mainly with booms in 
credit markets and not with everyday business in financial markets of all types, namely, self-refer-
ential “money making” through speculation (see Schulmeister 2018, Chap. 5).
6 Empirical research on asset price dynamics is documented in Schulmeister (2008, 2018, Chap. 9).
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moving average models, a trader would open a long position (buy) when the current 
price crosses the MA (moving average) line from below and sells when the opposite 
occurs (Figs. 2.7 and 2.10). By contrast, contrarian models try to profit from trend 
reversals and, hence, change open positions when a trend “loses momentum”. 
Technical models are applied to price data of almost any frequency (Figs. 2.7, 2.8, 
2.9, and 2.10). Due to the increasing use of intraday data, “algo trading” has become 
the most important driver of financial transactions. They rose from 15.5 times of 
world GDP to 72.4 times in 2007, declined in the aftermath of the financial crisis but 
then picked up again, at least in Europe (Fig. 2.11).
There operates an interaction between trending of asset prices and technical trad-
ing. On the one hand, traders use different models to exploit price runs, and, on the 
other hand, the aggregate behaviour of all models strengthens and lengthens the 
price runs. Long-term price trends result from the following process. “Mini-trends” 
(e.g. based on minute data) add up to one trend based on 10-minute data. Several of 
these trends accumulate to one trend based on hourly data and so on. Over an 
extended period of time (often several years), upwards (downwards) trends last lon-
ger than counter-movements, causing the price to rise (fall) in a stepwise process. 
As a consequence, all important asset prices like exchange rates, stock and bond 
prices as well as commodity prices fluctuate in irregular cycles (“long swings”) 
around their fundamental equilibrium without any tendency to converge (Figs. 2.3, 
2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9). This evidence completely contradicts equilibrium theory 
according to which asset prices should – in reaction to news – jump to their new 
fundamental equilibrium. Hence, there should be neither short-term nor long-term 
trending.
The pattern of asset prices can be explained as result of the following trading 
behaviour. Price runs are usually triggered by news. In order to reduce the complex-
ity of trading decisions under extreme time pressure, traders form only qualitative 
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expectations in reaction to news, i.e. expectations about the direction of the immi-
nent price move. Subsequent to an initial upwards (downwards) price movement 
triggered by news, follows a cascade of buy (sell) signals stemming from trend-
following technical trading systems. At first, the most price-sensitive models based 
on high frequency data (“fast models”) produce signals, at last the slowest models 
based on hourly or daily data. When an upwards (downwards) trend loses momen-
tum, contrarian models start to open short (long) positions, thereby contributing to 
a trend reversal. Most of the time there prevails an “expectational bias” in the mar-
ket, in favour of or against an asset. Such a bias reflects the – optimistic/bullish or 
pessimistic/bearish – market sentiment. News in line with the prevailing bias get 
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higher recognition and reaction than news which contradict the market mood. This 
behaviour causes price runs in line with the “market mood” to last longer than coun-
ter-movements, bringing about “bulls” and “bears”.
The more the asset becomes over(under)valued, the greater becomes the proba-
bility of a change in the direction of the long-term trend: first, because market par-
ticipants know from experience that any bull/bear market comes to an end; second, 
because there operate long-term “contrarians” in the market who sell (buy) in an 
“overbought” (“oversold”) market; and third, because the effects of an over(under)
valuation on the real economy progressively strengthen corrective forces (e.g. the 
deterioration of the current account and the related decline in economic growth in 
the case of a persistently overvalued currency).
To conclude, “overshooting” is not an exception due to some “shock” but the 
most characteristic property of long-term asset price dynamics. Exchange rates, 
stock prices and commodity prices fluctuate in a sequence of “bulls” and “bears” 
around their fundamental equilibrium without any tendency of convergence towards 
this level.
 A General Framework: Real Capitalism 
and Finance Capitalism7
Over the past decades, economic policy guided by the neoliberal “navigation map” 
has dampened economic growth through two transmission channels. First, it led into 
recessions as results of the “oil price shocks” in 1993 and 1979 (triggered indirectly 
by giving up the fixed exchange rate system) and into the big financial crises in 1982 
and 2008 (caused by boom-bust cycle of asset prices). Second, the intrinsic instabil-
ity of exchange rates, commodity prices, interest rates and stock prices has shifted 
striving for profits from the real to the financial economy. Unemployment, precari-
ous jobs, the public debt and rising inequality are just symptoms of a dysfunctional 
economic system, i.e. finance capitalism. Under real-capitalist conditions (until the 
1970s), non-financial business focused on the accumulation of real assets: at stable 
exchange rates, commodity prices and – in Europe – stagnating stock prices as well 
as interest rates below growth rates, financial speculation did not make sense. Since 
the 1970s, however, the value of financial capital rose much faster than that of real 
capital (at current asset prices, hence, influenced not only by real/financial invest-
ment but also by the swings of asset prices (Fig. 2.12)).
In the following, I shall sketch a theoretical framework for the distinction 
between a real-capitalistic and a finance-capitalistic system. There exist three types 
of participation in the production process, labour, real capital and finance capital, 
and, hence, three types of economic and political interests (Table 2.1). The eco-
nomic interests of real and finance capital stay in direct conflict with one another. 
7 The two types of a capitalist system are discussed more in detail in Schulmeister (2018, Chap. 8). 
A first sketch in English is in Schulmeister (2014) (this section draws on this article).
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No welfare state 
No trade unions
Weak welfare state
Weak trade unions
Strong welfare state 
Strong trade unions
Political interests
Strong central bank
Restrictive monetary policy
Privatisation of social security
Anticyclical policy
Growth policy:
Infrastructure
Education, etc.
Full employment policy
Social security
Education
Public services
Economic interest in 
state/government
Real capitalLabour or finance capitalReal capitalPotential coalition partners 
Rising interest ratesRising wagesConflicts of interests
High profitability of financial 
investments:
- High interest rates
- High exchange rates
- Unstable financial markets
High profitability of real 
investments: 
- Low interest rates
- Low exchange rates
- Stable financial markets
Full employment 
Real wage increases 
Economic interests
Finance capitalReal capitalLabour
Table 2.1 Labour, real capital, finance capital
Real investments call for low interest rates and exchange rates, and stable financial 
markets, whereas financial investments and speculation profit from exactly the 
opposite conditions. The conflict of the (“purely”) economic interests between real 
capital and labour can be considered less pronounced than the conflict between real 
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capital and finance capital. For example, an increase in production costs due to 
higher wages leads to a much higher increase in final demand and, hence, in receipts 
of the business sector as compared to an equivalent cost increase caused by higher 
interest rates. Even though the interests of real capital and labour are different as 
regards the distribution of income, both factors have a common interest in generat-
ing a high overall income and, hence, in a strong and stable production growth.
The interests of labour, real capital and finance capital differ markedly also with 
respect to the role of government. Whereas labour profits from a comprehensive 
welfare state, real capital is mainly interested in government activities which foster 
real production over the long run (e.g. through improving infrastructure and the 
education system) and which stabilize it over the short run (e.g. through anti-cycli-
cal policy measures). Finance capital is mainly interested in a strong central bank, a 
restrictive monetary policy and the privatization of social security (Table 2.1).
Neoclassical theory cannot consider the conflicts of interest between real capital 
and finance capital because it assumes that there exist only utility-maximizing indi-
viduals equipped with rational expectations. However, also Keynes and his follow-
ers did not provide a general framework to analyse the interaction between 
entrepreneurial interests and (financial) rentier interests (even though Keynes often 
referred to “rentiers”). By contrast, classical economists, in particular Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo, did focus on the relationship between rentiers, capitalists and 
workers; however, their rentiers were the landlords, whereas the modern rentier is 
primarily owner of financial assets.
For the same reason, one cannot identify “classes” of “real capitalists” and 
“finance capitalists” in modern society: non-financial corporations as well as 
employees own financial assets and have therefore also finance capital interests. It 
depends on the framework/incentive conditions of the economic system whether 
striving for profit concentrates on investment and innovation in the real sphere or in 
the financial sphere of the economy. In the first case, real capitalism prevails, in the 
second case finance capitalism (Table  2.2). The different system conditions also 
affect the financial sector: In the first case, banks act as “servants” for the real econ-
omy (financing investment, production and trade); in the second case, more and 
more (shadow) banks engage in “finance alchemy”. Real capitalism consists of 
many conditions which complement and reinforce each other like a (tacit) coalition 
between the interests of labour and real capital (against the interests of finance capi-
tal). As a consequence, industrial relations are shaped by close cooperation (“Rhine 
capitalism”). Market and government, competition and cooperation are regarded as 
complementary; there prevail many – partly conflicting – targets of economic pol-
icy, reaching from stable growth to providing social security and a “fair” income 
distribution.
During real-capitalist periods (as between ~1890 and 1914 and between ~1950 
and the mid-1970s or in China since the early 1980s), those economic theories dom-
inate or are at least influential which underline the crisis-prone nature of capitalism 
(like Keynesian theories). These theories legitimize a strong government, an active 
economic policy and market regulations. Stable exchange rates as well as stable and 
low interest rates limit the returns from financial investment and speculation and 
focus striving for profits on the real economy (Figs.  2.1 and 2.2). Thus, real 
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capitalism can be conceived as a positive-sum game. The theoretical/ideological 
basis of finance capitalism is (neo)liberal theories which call for a free market econ-
omy, especially for liberalizing financial markets, for a strong state as regards its 
core functions (security for citizens and their property) and for a weak state as 
regards welfare and labour regulations. These theories legitimate a (tacit) coalition 
between the interests of real and finance capital against the interests of labour 
because persistent full employment during a real-capitalist period shifts power in 
society from business to trade unions and from conservative to social-democratic 
parties. Therefore, entrepreneurs become (again) attracted by the (neo)liberal pro-
gram. In this sense, the “excessive” success of real capitalism like full employment 
and the welfare state lays the ground for its fall (e.g. rising tensions in the relations 
between real capital and labour undermine their coalition).
Under a finance-capitalist regime, the volatility of exchange rates and commodi-
ties prices and the high level of interest rates have two effects on non-financial 
Table 2.2 Real capitalism and finance capitalism
Real capitalism Finance capitalism
Implicit coalition Labour & real capital Real capital & finance capital
Business/unions Corporatism Conflict
State/market Complementary Antagonistic
Targets of 
economic policy
Full employment, high growth, 
social security. “Fair” 
distribution of income and 
wealth
Price stability, “sound” public finances, 
regulations of policy, de-regulation of 
markets, declining government share. 
International competitiveness
“Power center” of 
economic policy
Government Central bank
Economic paradigm Keynesianism Monetarism/neoliberalism
Diagnosis/therapy Systemic Symptom-oriented
Financial 
conditions
Interest rate < growth rate, 
“calm” stock markets, stable 
exchange rates and 
commodities prices
Interest rate > growth rate, boom and 
bust on stock markets, unstable 
exchange rates and commodities prices
Striving for profits 
focuses on
Real economy (positive-sum 
game)
Finance economy (zero-sum game)
Advantaged Debitors Creditors
Economic model Social and regulated market 
economy
“Pure” market economy
Focus of 
globalization
Stable monetary system, 
regulation of financial markets, 
deregulation of goods markets 
(GATT), cooperative growth 
strategies (Marshall plan, 
development aid)
De-globalization of politics through 
rising competition of national 
economies, deregulation of financial 
markets, lack of global strategies to 
tackle global problems (e. g., climate 
change)
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business. First, these conditions dampen its activities in the real sphere of the econ-
omy since they become more uncertain and more expensive. Second, these condi-
tions make financial speculation and accumulation more attractive. This attraction is 
further increased by the emergence of financial innovations like derivatives which 
contribute to a dramatic expansion of financial markets shifting also the best human 
resources from real economy to “finance alchemy”. At the same time, financial busi-
ness becomes the dominant sector in the overall economy. The weak growth of real 
investment and, hence, of the overall economy causes unemployment and the public 
debt to rise which in turn strengthens the game “let your money work”. For exam-
ple, the shift in provisions for retirement from the welfare state system of “pay-as-
you-go” to the (finance-capitalist) system of individual investment in financial 
assets lengthens stock market booms. Thus, the discrepancy between the market 
value of financial assets and their underlying in the real economy widens. This 
development leads to “corrections” in the form of financial crises (the crisis of 2008 
can be seen as a particularly big correction as it concerned three bull markets at the 
same time). Whereas trading in asset markets represents just a zero-sum game, 
finance capitalism as a whole becomes a negative-sum game in its final stage: the 
destabilization of the most important prices for entrepreneurial activities like 
exchange rates, stock prices and interest rates together with the effects of financial 
crises progressively dampen the real economy. The system starts to implode through 
a series of crises, deepened by austerity policy. In this sense, the accumulation of 
negative outcomes of finance capitalism lays the ground for its own fall.
 Employment Under Real-Capitalist 
and Finance-Capitalist Conditions
According to the mainstream (neoclassical) economic theory, supply and demand in 
the labour market determine the level of real wages and employment. When unem-
ployment rises as a consequence of” demand shocks” such as financial crises or oil 
price shocks, job losses can be compensated only by real wage moderation. Higher 
wage flexibility is, however, hampered by unemployment benefits, labour protec-
tion, minimum wages and the power of unions (characteristic components of the 
European Social Model). As a matter of fact, however, labour costs are a function of 
real wages relative to labour productivity. In Europe, the latter has been growing 
even faster than wages since the late 1970s (and much faster than in the USA), 
exactly during that period when unemployment was rising (the wage share in 
national income declined noticeably (Fig.  2.1)). In addition, if the “rigidity” of 
European labour markets were truly important, this would have to show up in a less 
efficient allocation of labour and thus weaker growth of productivity as compared to 
the USA. Actually, however, labour productivity has been growing faster in Europe 
than in the USA – in tandem with the capital-labour ratio (capital intensity).
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The neoliberal explanation of labour demand rests on the (neoclassical) produc-
tion function where capital input and labour input can be substituted for each other 
as a function of relative factor prices. However, an analysis of the observed realiza-
tions in the K-L-Y space in the USA, Germany and Japan (overall economy and 12 
subsectors) between 1960 and 1995 reveals the following stylized facts:
• Capital intensity grows year after year, i.e. monotonically; the shift to ever more 
capital-intensive technologies is driven by technical progress and, hence, 
irreversible.
• The capital-labour ratio is unrelated to shifts in the factor price ratio (Fig. 2.13).
• Labour productivity grows in tandem with capital intensity: The higher and bet-
ter the capital equipment of a worker becomes, the higher gets his productivity.
A linear-limitational production function with an irreversibly rising slope of the 
production rays fits these observations better than the neoclassical production func-
tion: in the short term, the factor input ratio is fixed; if the output is to be increased, 
labour and capital inputs need to be raised proportionally, and short-term demand 
for labour will be mostly influenced by expectations concerning demand in the 
goods markets; in the long term, capital intensity increases as a function of technical 
progress rather than of factor prices – more capital per labour is associated with a 
different quality of capital, meaning that labour productivity rises with capital inten-
sity. An increase in output can be realized by either of two ways (or a mixture 
of both):
 1. Movement along a ray with constant capital-labour ratios: capital intensity and 
labour productivity remain constant; the additional output is achieved by a 
greater input of capital and labour of the same quality.
 2. Movement to a steeper production ray: the additional output is achieved by the 
increase and, hence, improvement of capital per labour unit and by the related 
learning process on the part of workers, capital intensity and labour productiv-
ity rise.
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Under these conditions, the dynamics of job creation depends on the dynamics of 
real capital accumulation and of technical progress. The latter is to a large extent the 
result of (basic) innovations stemming from the “world of engineers” (interacting 
with the economic system). The dynamics of real capital accumulation depends 
primarily on the (expected) profitability of activities in the goods markets as com-
pared to those in the financial markets. These observations and considerations sug-
gest that the essence of persistent unemployment is sketched by analogy to the 
musical chair game: There are 100 chairs, 110 people want to get one, and those 
persons who do not get a chair are the least qualified. If they are (re)qualified, they 
might get a chair in the next rounds, yet, at the expense of others.
From this perspective, high and persistent unemployment is due to a shortage of 
jobs. To overcome the problem, job creation must become less risky and more prof-
itable for entrepreneurs. This calls for real-capitalist framework conditions, not for 
lower wages (high/full employment in the 1960s was associated with wages rising 
faster than labour productivity  – the opposite has been the case afterwards 
(Fig. 2.14)).
 Public Finances Under Real-Capitalist 
and Finance-Capitalist Conditions
The ratio of public debt to GDP was declining in (Western) Europe for 20 years 
from 70% to 40% when the welfare state was built up, and it has been rising to 
roughly 100% since the 1970s in spite of consolidation efforts (Fig.  2.16). This 
development casts doubt on the belief that the government has direct control over its 
fiscal stance. Instead of a symptom-oriented “diagnosis”, one has to take into 
account how the different sectors of the economy  – households, business, 
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government and the rest of the world (ROW)  – behave under real-capitalist and 
finance-capitalist framework conditions.8 If, e.g. the business sector reduces its defi-
cit in a recession, then the government suffers from a rising deficit due to the opera-
tion of the automatic stabilizers (and eventually also due to discretionary measures). 
If the business sector increases its deficit again for financing real investments, then 
the government can easily improve on its balance during the recovery. The recession 
in Germany in 1967 and the subsequent years is a good example for the interaction 
of the financial balances under real-capitalist conditions (Fig. 2.15).
Over the medium and long run, real-capitalist incentive conditions ensure that 
the business sector takes over household saving in the form of investment credits 
and transforms it into real capital and jobs (Fig. 2.15). As a consequence, the gov-
ernment’s budget remains in balance, and the debt-to-GDP ratio declines since the 
rate of interest lies below the rate of economic growth (Fig.  2.16). Under these 
conditions, the surpluses and financial assets of private households (roughly) equal 
the deficits and financial liabilities of the business sector.
Finance-capitalist conditions change the interaction of financial balances and the 
dynamics of debts/assets in three respects. First, recessions occur more frequently 
than in a real-capitalist regime due to turbulences like oil price “shocks”, interest 
rate “shocks” and dollar exchange rate “shocks”. Second, recoveries become pro-
gressively weaker as financial instability and the related profit opportunities from 
speculation dampen real investments. Third, the rate of interest is higher than the 
rate of economic growth.
The dynamics of public debt is driven by two factors, the accumulation of (pri-
mary) deficits and the interest-growth differential. The latter does impact upon of 
the development of the public debt mainly indirectly, i.e. through the adjustment of 
the business sector to a positive or negative interest-growth differential.9 The reason 
for that is clear-cut: if the rate of interest exceeds the rate of growth (in nominal 
terms), any debtor (sector) has to run a primary surplus in order to stabilize its debt 
relative to GDP (“dynamic budget constraint”). To achieve such a surplus, non-
financial business reduces real investment in favour of financial accumulation 
(Figs. 2.12 and 2.15). At the same time, also financial businesses and households 
run primary surpluses (e.g. private households – a creditor sector – save usually 
more than their net interest income). Under this condition, the government can 
achieve a primary surplus only if the rest of the world runs/accepts a primary current 
account deficit (the primary balances of all sectors sum up to zero). Germany, for 
example, was able to stabilize its fiscal stance mainly through rising surpluses vis-
à-vis (and at the expense of) other countries.
8 In the following, we specify only non-financial business since the financial balance of the finan-
cial sector was close to zero most of the time.
9 When calculating the interest-growth differential, the distinction between nominal and real terms 
does not matter as both the interest rate and the growth rate have to be deflated with the same index 
of the general price level, i.e. the GDP deflator. However, in the context of analysing the interaction 
of financial balances of sectors, one should operate generally with nominal figures (balances can-
not be deflated).
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To summarize, finance-capitalist conditions in general and a positive interest-
growth differential in particular inevitably lead to a rise in public indebtedness and 
in global imbalances (if countries compensate the decline in the deficit of non-
financial business through rising current account surpluses). This conclusion is in 
line with the empirical evidence. Under the incentive conditions of the 1950s and 
1970s, the surpluses of households were taken over by the business sector in the 
form of deficits (Fig. 2.15) in order to finance the accumulation of real capital and, 
hence, the creation of jobs (Fig. 2.13). Economic growth at full employment enabled 
governments to build up the welfare state and keep the budget in balance at the same 
time. At a negative interest-growth differential, public debt declined relative to GDP 
(Fig. 2.16).
Since the 1970s, the finance-capitalist framework conditions induced non-finan-
cial business to reduce its deficit und to become a surplus sector in almost all indus-
trial countries (like Germany (Fig. 2.15)): real investments were reduced in favour 
of financial investments, the stock of real assets has been declining relative to finan-
cial assets (Fig. 2.12), job creation and economic growth slowed down, and unem-
ployment rose so that most countries have been running budget deficits (even 
Germany (Fig. 2.15)).10 Given the positive interest-growth differential, the public 
10 Only in recent years did Germany achieve a balanced or even a surplus budget, however, at the 
expense of the rest of the world: The European Monetary Union enabled Germany to fully profit 
from its restrictive wage and fiscal policy since the appreciations vis-à-vis Germany’s euro partner 
countries were no longer possible. The German contribution to the development of the “euro cri-
sis” is documented in detail in Schulmeister (2018, Chaps. 11, 12, and 13).
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debt-to-GDP ratio has risen strongly over the long run (Fig. 2.16). The fiscal com-
pact (signed in 2012) represents a further step in a series of attempts of EU politics 
to govern the fiscal stance of a country through certain rules (the first attempt con-
sisted in the 3%-deficit rule in the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992). In addition to the 
3% rule as maximum of the general budget deficit, there is a second rule for the 
structural budget deficit which must not exceed 0.5% of GDP. This holds for all 
states with a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 60%. According to the debt brake rule, 
these states have also to reduce this ratio by at least one twentieth (5%) per year of 
the exceeded percentage points (e.g. if a state has a debt of 100% of GDP, it should 
reduce this ratio by 2% points each year).
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The most problematic rule concerns the structural deficit since the latter is a 
theoretical construction and cannot be directly calculated. Hence, the room for 
manoeuvre of fiscal policy can be restricted by the estimation method of structural 
deficits. This holds true in particular for the method used by the European 
Commission. These objections shall be concretized, taking the development in 
Spain after the crisis of 2008 as example (Fig. 2.17; all data stem from EC data 
bases, Fall 2013).
The financial crisis and the collapse of the real estate bubble caused a deep reces-
sion in 2009; unemployment and the budget deficit increased sharply. As unemploy-
ment did not decline afterwards, it became “natural”  – by theoretical and 
methodological construction, the NAWRU follows the actual unemployment rate 
(Fig. 2.17). Since less employable people are fed into a Cobb-Douglas function, 
potential output started to decline. As a consequence, the output gap did not rise in 
spite of the deepening of the crisis but stays at roughly 4%. Therefore, most of the 
actual deficit became “structural” (the EC estimates the cyclical component in gen-
eral as roughly 50% of the output gap). The excessive structural deficit forced the 
government to more austerity. In 2011, transfers stagnated (in spite of unemploy-
ment rising above 20%), and government consumption shrunk. These measures 
induced a further decline of GDP in 2012 (together with tax increases which how-
ever did not result in higher receipts due to the new recession). As a consequence, 
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the fiscal stance improved much less than expected, calling for further austerity. In 
the meantime, the debt-to-GDP ratio was rising from 40% to more than 80%. If 
economic policy had continued to follow the fiscal rules, a downwards spiral would 
have developed. Fortunately, policy in Spain but also in Portugal and France delib-
erately (though tacitly) ignored the fiscal compact from 2013 onwards and took 
some expansionary measures. The structural balance of these states by far exceeded 
the 0.5% benchmark (whereas Italy tried to stick to this rule), yet no excessive defi-
cit procedure was initiated by the European Commission. Together with the 
extremely loose monetary policy of the ECB, the moderate expansionary fiscal 
policy enabled the economy of these countries to recover.
 Production of Economic Theories and Long-Term 
Economic Development
The observations presented so far cast doubts on the most fundamental propositions 
of neoclassical theory which has become once again the paradigm in economics 
(completed by “rational expectations”). Hence, this theory provided the basis of the 
“navigation map” of economic policy in the EU. But how could a theory remain 
dominant whose most fundamental propositions cannot be reconciled with the 
empirical evidence, in particular as regards the price dynamics in those markets 
which come closest to the theoretically ideal market, i.e. the financial markets? This 
section addresses this puzzle by reconsidering the interaction between economic 
developments and theory production.
The abatement of the revolution of 1848 was followed by a period of strong 
growth of the real economy (railways, construction), ideologically based on “lais-
sez-faire liberalism”. Marx and Engels explained the rising inequality and the mis-
ery of the working class as necessary outcome of capitalism which must be overcome 
on the basis of socialist theories. Together with their (real) wealth grew the tempta-
tion of “industrial capitalists” to (also) become “money capitalists” (Marx), e.g. to 
get even richer through speculation in the stock market, but also in real estate. By 
the late 1860s, stock and house prices started to rise more and more. The finance-
capitalist boom ended abruptly with the crash of 1873: Both bull markets tilted into 
bear markets leading into the “long depression.”
On the academic level, “laissez-faire theories” came under attack; instead, con-
cepts became popular which stressed the role of economic actors as social beings 
and which called for an active state, be it through building up a social state 
(“Kathedersozialisten” like Gustav Schmoller), be it through (protectionist) indus-
trial policy (e.g. Friedrich List). In addition, also the more radical socialist/Marxist 
theories influenced the economists’ debates. The longer the depression lasted, the 
more oppressing became the social problems, and the bigger became the power of 
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the workers’ movement (in 1875, the “Sozialistische deutsche Arbeiterpartei” was 
founded in Gotha, unifying two socialist forerunner parties). As a reaction, the basic 
components of the welfare state (health and pension insurance) were introduced in 
Germany by chancellor Bismarck and afterwards in most other European countries.
The improved confidence in the state, new investment opportunities through 
implementing new technologies (electricity and chemistry), stable financial condi-
tions through fixed exchange rates (gold standard) and low interest rates and the 
related wave of globalisation contributed to the real- capitalist expansion of the 
“belle époque” (~1890 to 1914). This was particularly true for Germany where all 
kinds of futures contracts were banned by law in 1896 (after a wave of wheat specu-
lation had collapsed). Germany became the leading country in industrial produc-
tion, and the capital of the UK became the leading financial centre.
On the academic level, neoclassical theory became the paradigm in economics. 
It had been developed since the 1870s (independently) by William Jevons, Carl 
Menger and Leon Walras and is strictly based on the interaction of individual agents 
in markets. In ideological terms, the concept of the “homo oeconomicus” and, 
hence, of individualism can be considered a reaction to the rising influence of 
socialist theories.
After World War I, the dominance of the “free-market view” facilitated the devel-
opment of one of the strongest stock bull markets in history: Over only 4 years – 
between 1925 and 1929 – stock prices almost quadrupled in the USA, people took 
up more and more credits to finance buying stocks and to “let their money work”. 
The boom then spilled over to other industrial countries. The crash of 1929 caused 
a recession so that budget deficits widened. Economic policy followed the advice of 
mainstream economists to adopt an austerity policy according to neoclassical the-
ory. This policy paved the way into the Great Depression, together with the collapse 
of the gold standard, competitive devaluations and other forms of protectionism.
The consequences of the depression were so catastrophic that also the learning 
process enforced by this crisis was deep. It resulted in a new macroeconomic theory 
(provided by Keynes), in an active economic policy focusing on full employment, 
in stable exchange rates, deregulation of goods markets but strict regulation of 
financial markets. Two other developments promoted prosperity. First, confidence 
was strengthened through building up the welfare state. Second, there prevailed a 
tight coherence between the technological paradigm (Fordism) and the economic 
paradigm (Keynesian welfare model).
The success of the European Social Model laid the ground for its own decline: 
Full employment and building up the welfare state shifted power from business to 
unions which asked for (more) employee participation and for a redistribution in 
favour of wages (Fig.  2.14). The “Zeitgeist” shifted to the left (1968, etc.) and 
brought social-democratic parties to power as in Germany and Austria. The environ-
mental movement took off and attacked the capitalist model as obsolescent (the 
“Club of Rome” was founded 1970). All these developments caused “big business” 
to support the neoliberal movement against full employment, Keynesianism and the 
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welfare state.11 The stepwise realization of the monetarists’ demand for deregula-
tion of financial markets transformed the system from a real- capitalist into a finance-
capitalist regime.
All important steps on the long way from prosperity into the present crisis – from 
moving to “flexible” exchange rates in 1971 to the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
subsequent euro crisis – were guided by the recommendations of neoliberal theo-
ries.12 Yet, this “Weltanschauung” still dominates at the academic level, in interna-
tional organizations, in governmental institutions (ministries), in the media and in 
politics. The main reason for the persistence of neoliberalism lies in its history: 
never before had the enforcement of an economic paradigm so systematically been 
prepared, realized and anchored in the minds of the elites. This process began 
already during the Great Depression.
In 1931, Hayek became professor at the London School of Economics (LSE) at 
the age of 32 and turned soon into the most famous opponent of Keynes in the 
debates over the role of economic policy in the Great Depression. After the over-
whelming success of Keynes’ “General Theory” (1936), Hayek became an outsider 
within the economists’ profession and began to focus on planning a movement 
against the foreseeable advance of the welfare state, legitimized by Keynes’ theory. 
Hayek participated in a first meeting of like-minded economists and sociologists in 
Paris in August 1938 (during this “Colloque Lippmann”, the term “neo-liberalism” 
was coined). During the war, Hayek provided the ideological fundament for the 
neoliberal movement with his “Road to Serfdom” (1944). As next step, Hayek 
founded the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) in 1947. This network links together top 
scientific economists (“original thinkers” in Hayek’s words  – as yet, eight MPS 
members got the “Nobel prize”), other intellectuals working in academia, media or 
think tanks (“second-hand dealers in ideas”), politicians (like Ludwig Erhard) and 
wealthy people as financiers of MPS activities.
Hayek took the “Fabian Society” as model for the neoliberal movement. This 
leftist group of social reformers had successfully changed values and attitudes in the 
British society between the 1880s and the 1920s. In “The Intellectuals and 
Socialism” (1949), Hayek proposed to his combatants that also the neoliberal move-
ment should focus on influencing the intellectuals because “once the most active 
part of the intellectuals has been converted to a set of beliefs, the process by which 
11 As early as 1943 did Michal Kalecki foresee the long-term political consequences of full employ-
ment policy: “Lasting full employment is not at all to their [‘business leaders’] liking”. The work-
ers would “get out of hand” and the “captains of industry” would be anxious to “teach them a 
lesson” (…). In this situation a powerful alliance is likely to be formed between big business and 
rentier interests, and they would probably find more than one economist to declare that the situa-
tion was manifestly unsound” (Kalecki 1990, p. 355).
12 One has to distinguish between (at least) three neoliberal schools, the Austrian school (Hayek 
and Co.), the Chicago (neoclassical/monetarist/New Classical) school (Friedman, Lucas and Co.) 
and the German ordoliberal school (one could also add the Virginia school with Buchanan as lead-
ing figure which, however, is a close “ally” of the Chicago school). These schools differ fundamen-
tally in their assumptions and methods; however, they arrive at practically the same policy 
recommendations (see Schulmeister, Chap. 6).
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these become generally accepted is almost automatic and irresistible” (quoted in 
Jones 2012, p.  80). Hayek was convinced that “the building of a free society” 
through defeating Keynesianism and weakening the welfare state could actually be 
achieved even though this might take “two or three generations”.13 As first step, one 
needed anti-Keynesian theories, produced by the “original thinkers”, which would 
then be “translated” in the language of ordinary people by the “second-hand dealers 
in ideas” and promoted by think tanks.
In the 1950s and 1960s, Hayek, Friedman, Stigler, Becker, Coase and Buchanan 
(to name only the most prominent MPS members and – later – “Nobel laureates”) 
produced a great variety of theories, directed against the then dominant economic 
paradigm, i.e. Keynesianism:
• Financial speculation is predominantly rational and, hence, stabilizing (Friedman 
1953). This (tautological) “proof” legitimated later the deregulation of financial 
markets.
• Keynesian fiscal policy has little effect since households base their consumption 
on their “permanent” and not on their current income (Friedman 1957).
• In his “opus magnum”, Hayek called for the restriction of any activities of the 
state besides protecting the individual liberty and property of its citizens 
(Hayek 1960).
• George Stigler (University of Chicago) developed the concept of “regulatory 
capture” according to which market regulations are (ab)used by lobby groups 
(Stigler 1971).
• At the University of Virginia, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock built up the 
“public-choice school”: Politicians act mainly their private interest (Buchanan 
and Tullock 1962).
• Gary Becker generalized the “homo oeconomicus”: All human relationships 
such as love, marriage, parenthood, etc. are guided by rational utility maximiza-
tion (Becker 1976).
• Friedman “proved” (together with Anna Schwartz) that the Great Depression 
was not caused by the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent austerity 
policy but by the central bank, i.e. by the state (Friedman and Schwartz 1963).
The presidential address of Milton Friedman at the meeting of the American 
Economic Association in 1967 signalled the start of the decisive attack (Friedman 
1968): full employment policy is not only useless but detrimental because there 
exists a natural rate of unemployment. Any attempt to push unemployment below its 
level results in higher inflation. The whole argument was tautological: If one 
assumes that output is determined in real terms through market equilibria (vertical 
Phillips curve), then any monetary impulse can only have inflationary effects. The 
construction of Friedman’s model was, however, brilliant: He took the modified 
13 Milton Friedman was more optimistic. He stated in his article “Neo-Liberalism and Its Prospects”: 
“The stage is set for the growth of a new current of opinion to replace the old, to provide the phi-
losophy that will guide the legislators of the next generation even though it can hardly affect those 
of this one”. Quoted in Jones (2012, p. 85).
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Phillips curve (Samuelson and Solow 1960) as point of departure, which – errone-
ously – implied that economic policy can choose between inflation and unemploy-
ment. Such a choice turns out to be non-sense if one takes interest rates into account: 
Any rise in inflation causes nominal interest rates to rise and interest payments on 
outstanding debts to rise even faster so that investments and employment will 
decline with some lag.14 For more than a decade, monetarism became the dominant 
macroeconomic paradigm based on the quantity theory of money. However, being 
neoclassical thinkers and, hence, believing in “money does not matter”, monetarists 
overlooked a trivial, yet fundamentally important fact: money is not only used for 
transactions with goods and services (PQ x Q) but also with financial assets of all 
kinds (PF × QF): M × V = PQ × Q + PF × QF.
Since the volume of financial transactions is many times bigger (and more unsta-
ble) than the volume of transactions with goods and services (Fig. 2.11), a stable 
relationship between money supply and PQ  ×  Q is a theoretical impossibility 
(Schulmeister 2018, p. 88f and p. 157f). The collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
and the following dollar depreciation induced the first “oil price shock” followed by 
the first global recession since the 1930s. The “original thinkers” then used the 
coincidence of rising unemployment and rising inflation as disprove of the Phillips 
curve and of Keynesian theory in general. The “battle over the Phillips curve” 
marked the decisive defeat of Keynesian economics. As substitute, the old general 
equilibrium theory was restored and complemented by “rational expectations” 
(Lucas 1972): It is assumed that agents form their expectation according to the “true 
model” which is the model of the rational expectations of economists themselves (a 
Freudian projection). As some kind of terminological twist, Lucas and Co. called 
their approach “New Classical Macroeconomics” instead of “old neoclassical 
microeconomics”.
Once any kind of non-rationality, uncertainty, social interaction and emotions 
were removed from the economic theorist’s world, one no longer needed to account 
for different economic agents. Hence, the “new classical macroeconomists” con-
structed “dynamic general equilibrium (DSGE) models” based on “representative 
agents”, preferably eternally living. In this world, expansionary fiscal policy is use-
less (“Ricardian equivalence”; Barro 1974) as is any kind of macroeconomic policy 
(“Lucas critique”; Lucas 1976). Business cycles can only be caused by technologi-
cal shocks (“real business cycles”; Kydland and Prescott 1982). Once the “original 
thinkers” had produced economic theories, the intellectuals (“second-hand dealers 
in ideas”) should sell them to the public. To this end, more and more neoliberal 
think tanks were founded like the “Institute for Economic Affairs” in the UK, the 
“Liberty Fund”, the “Heritage Foundation” or the “Cato Institute” in the USA (to 
mention only the biggest “tanks”). Their number grew particularly fast after the 
14 To illustrate this accelerator effect, if inflation rises by 2% points causing the nominal interest 
rate to increase from 4% to 6%, then interest payments rise by 50% (for credits at flexible rates). 
Phillips himself had (plausibly) interpreted the inverse relationship between the change in wages 
and unemployment as reflecting just the (unidirectional) influence of the employment situation on 
the bargaining power of unions (Phillips 1958).
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breakthrough of the neoliberal offensive in the 1970s. Since 1981 neoliberal think 
tanks are linked together through the “Atlas Network”, it comprises today almost 
500 institutions all over the world.15
Over several decades, the increasing dominance of the neoliberal 
“Weltanschauung” changed politics, values and attitudes. Slowly, “the market” 
became the highest (economic) being which transforms the individual egoisms into 
the social optimum with an “invisible hand”. Therefore, men have to subordinate to 
market forces, even the democratically legitimized politics (see the notion “market- 
conform democracy” used by Chancellor Merkel). That “the market” appears to be 
a subject to which men have to adjust is also expressed in everyday language (“the 
markets discipline Greece with higher interest rates” – in its plural form, “markets” 
almost always means “financial markets”). Through turning the subject-object rela-
tionship between men and market upside down, neoliberalism became the most 
powerful ideology of anti-enlightenment and of de-politicizing politics: men cannot 
and/or should not organize consciously development processes in society through 
political coordination (e.g. by building up a comprehensive welfare state). Instead, 
social development should be driven by market competition of individuals, coordi-
nated by the “invisible hand”. The propagation of this ideology – massively fostered 
by the breakdown of “real socialism” in 1989 and thereafter – strengthened the feel-
ing of people to be exposed to incomprehensible economic fluctuations, in particu-
lar of globalized financial markets. At the same time, austerity policies weakened 
the trust in the welfare state. Right-wing populists address the feelings of uncer-
tainty, fear of the future and anger and promise to “clean up” the system.
 The “Long Cycle” as Sequence of Real-Capitalist 
and Finance-Capitalist Regimes
The Russian economist Nikolai Kondratieff was the first to discover the phenome-
non of the “long cycle” or “long wave” in economic development. In his interpreta-
tion, the upswing is caused by technological innovations like the steam engine, 
railways or electricity; the downswing sets in when the technology has already been 
widely diffused (Kondratieff 1926).
However, the post-war long cycle can hardly be explained by this model since 
fundamental technological innovations like microelectronics in all its manifesta-
tions, biotechnology and nanotechnology were developed primarily since the 1970s, 
i.e. over the downswing phase (over the 1950s and 1960s, no fundamentally new 
technologies had been developed). Based on the distinction between real and finance 
15 See www.atlasnetwork.org. For details of how the neoliberal master minds organized the 
advancement and diffusion of their ideology, see Walpen (2004), Burgin (2012), and Jones (2012). 
The essence of this literature is summarized in Schulmeister, Chap. 6.
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capital, the long cycle might better be understood as a sequence of real-capitalist 
and finance-capitalist regimes.
The upwards phase of the long cycle is brought about through incentive condi-
tions which focus profit-seeking on activities in the real economy (financial specu-
lation is restricted). Real accumulation is booming; finance capital grows in tandem 
with real capital or somewhat slower due to the undervaluation of financial assets, 
in particular of stocks. The longer the boom lasts, the more real and financial wealth 
is accumulated. Their owners become increasingly interested in “let our money 
work” also through financial speculation. At the same time, the economic and politi-
cal position of workers improve due to full/high employment. Trade unions and 
leftist parties go on the offensive. Liberal or neoliberal theories and political con-
cepts become more attractive for rentiers as well entrepreneurs. In this way, the 
success of real capitalism, i.e. the accumulation of wealth and full employment, lays 
the ground for a change in the economic paradigm and in the respective “navigation 
map” for politics.
Under finance-capitalist incentive conditions, economic growth declines, unem-
ployment and the public debt rise, austerity policies deepen the crisis. The “syn-
chronization” of bull and bear markets causes asset revaluations, followed by 
devaluations which lead finally into a deep financial and economic crisis as in 1873, 
1929 and 2008. In this way, the failure of finance capitalism lays the ground for its 
decline and the search for new framework conditions during the trough phase of the 
long cycle. The incentive structure is changed in favour of entrepreneurial activities, 
in particular through financial regulations and a more active economic as well as 
social policy.16 The key empirical facts concerning the long cycle over the last 
150  years have already been sketched in sections “Framework Conditions and 
Economic Performance of Western Capitalism during the 1960s and 1970s” and 
“Public Finances Under Real-Capitalist and Finance-Capitalist Conditions”. Here, 
they are only shortly recapitulated. After the boom of the real economy in the 1850s 
and 1860s, speculation led to the great real estate, bank and stock market crash of 
1873, followed by the “long depression”. The tensions in society became more pro-
nounced as did the power of the workers’ movement. As a reaction, the basic com-
ponents of the welfare state were introduced in the 1880s.
The related stabilization of purchasing power and, hence, of final demand, but 
also stable exchange rates, low interest rates and the first wave of globalisation, 
16 In a profound and original study in economic history, Arrighi (2010) combines a similar model 
of long waves with Fernand Braudel’s concept of centre and periphery and the related role of the 
hegemon in the global economy. In Arrighi’s interpretation, an economic and political system 
becomes the hegemon during a real-capitalist upwards phase and then moves to “high finance” and 
by doing so finances the upwards phase of its successor. In this way, the Republic of Genoa 
financed the expansion of the Dutch Republics during the sixteenth century which then financed 
the industrialization of Great Britain. When London moved to “high finance” in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, it financed the US expansion. When the Wall Street became dominant in the 
late 1970s, the USA started to finance the expansion of the Chinese economy through joint ven-
tures which also provide a continuous technology transfer (it goes without saying that this note is 
only an extremely simplified sketch of Arrighi’s concept of “systemic cycles of accumulation”).
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contributed to the real-capitalist expansion of the “belle époque” (~1980 to 1914). 
Over the “roaring 1920s”, the mood of “let your money work” broadened and led to 
a spectacular stock-market boom which crashed in October 1929 together with real 
estate and commodity prices. The subsequent financial crisis and austerity poli-
cies – derived from neoclassical theory – paved the way into the Great Depression. 
The consequences of the depression were so catastrophic that also the learning pro-
cess enforced by this crisis evolved in an in-depth manner. It resulted in a new 
macroeconomic theory (Keynesianism), an active economic policy focusing on 
stable growth and full employment, stable exchange rates (“Bretton Woods”), 
deregulation of goods markets (e.g. though the GATT rounds) but strict regulation 
of financial markets.
Whereas the Kondratieff model stresses the importance of technological innova-
tions as driving force of the upswing, the model presented here stresses the impor-
tance of the relationship between technical and social innovations, i.e. of the 
coherence/incoherence between the technological paradigm and the socio-economic 
paradigm. The post-war prosperity phase is a good example: The “Fordistic” type of 
(mass) production fitted well to the Keynesian paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s 
which legitimates the strengthening and stabilizing of mass consumption. Expressed 
in more general terms: the (in)coherence between the technological paradigm and 
the economic and social paradigm is a key factor in the dynamics of the long cycle. 
When technological innovations take place, they usually cannot be fully utilized 
because there is a lack of accommodating social innovations. For example, Fordistic 
mass production was already adopted in the 1920s but could not be fully used within 
the “laissez-faire paradigm”.
In an analogous way, one can argue that nowadays those social innovations are 
missing which would accommodate the technological innovations of the last 
decades in such a way that the society as a whole can profit from progress in tech-
nology as well as in the socio-economic relations. The contradiction between the 
progression in technology and regression in economics, i.e. the return to the old 
“laissez-faire paradigm”, is one important feature of the current crisis (in natural 
sciences a return to an old paradigm is unconceivable).
 The European Model and the US Model Under Real-
Capitalist and Finance-Capitalist Conditions
Table 2.3 summarizes the main differences between the European Social Model and 
the US model of society in a stylized manner. These differences have developed 
over several centuries, whereas changes between real-capitalist and finance-capital-
ist framework conditions take place within few decades. The roots of the European 
Social Model lie in the traditionally great importance of citizens being embedded in 
social contexts. The respective organizations range from the feudal system or the 
guilds of craftsmen in medieval times to interest groups like trade unions and up to 
the modern welfare state. In the USA, by contrast, competition as individuals is the 
most important form of economic interaction – not the least because the USA has 
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evolved from a society of immigrants in which the fight for survival and expansion 
is of central importance. As a consequence, organisations like trade unions or politi-
cal parties as a means of pursuit of interests play a comparatively greater role in 
Europe. Individual freedom, social justice and solidarity can be considered the key 
values of European society (“liberté, egalité, fraternité”). In the USA, by contrast, 
individual freedom ranges by far the highest (“pursuit of happiness”).
These differences are also reflected by the way how insurance against basic risks 
of life is provided and how the education system is organized. In both respects, the 
welfare state plays a much more important role in Europe as compared to the 
USA. As a consequence, the relationship between market and state is (traditionally) 
considered complementary in Europe but rather antagonistic in the USA.
Significant differences have also been prevailing as regards the relationship 
between the real and the financial sphere of the economy and the related “economic 
culture”. The economies in (continental) Europe have been focused on the real 
economy. In the USA (and also in the UK), the “Wall Street” (and the “City”) plays 
Table 2.3 European model versus US model
Europe USA
Long-term development 
path
Citizens embedded in social contexts 
(feudal system, communities, interest 
groups, welfare state)
Citizens as (former) 
immigrants: Mentality of 
adventurers, Competition 
as dominant form of 
social interaction
Pursuit of interests Mainly through organisations (unions, 
etc.)
Predominantly as 
individuals in markets
Fundamental values Individual freedom and social justice 
(“Liberte, egalite, fraternite”)
Individual freedom 
(“pursuit of happiness”)
Importance of trade unions 
and organisations of 
entrepreneurs
Great Little
Labour relations Corporatism No institutionalized 
cooperation
Labour markets Regulated “Hire and fire”
Insurance against illness, 
old-age poverty, 
unemployment
Provided by welfare state Mainly private (or no) 
insurance, unemployment 
benefits modest
Education system Primarily run by welfare state Mainly private
Relationship market/state Complementary Antagonistic
Importance of the welfare 
state
Great Little
Importance of the financial 
sector
(Traditionally) Less important Very important
Focus of making profits (Traditionally) Real economy Real and financial 
economy
“Economic culture” “Real capitalism” combined with 
welfare state
“Real and financial 
capitalism” (“Silicon 
Valley culture” combined 
with “Wall Street 
culture”)
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a key role in the economic system. Since the early 1990s, the practice of economic 
policy in the EU has been staying in an increasing contradiction to the principles of 
the European Social Model. This policy was shaped by the following general guide-
lines (Table 2.4): restrictive regulation of fiscal and monetary policy and deregula-
tion of financial, goods and labour markets. These neoliberal guidelines have 
progressively weakened the European welfare state. At the same time, US economic 
policy has been following a “trivial Keynesian” course.
The fiscal rules were established in 1992 in the Treaty of Maastricht and have 
then been tightened through the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and 2012 through the 
Fiscal Compact. In the USA, by contrast, fiscal policy has been following a pro-
nounced countercyclical course. For example, in and after recessions, the govern-
ment increased the budget deficit deliberately and strongly. Afterwards it did not 
adopt a savings policy but let the automatic stabilizers care for a continuous 
improvement of the fiscal stance.17 Monetary policy in the euro area is shaped by the 
statute of ECB which gives price stability the highest priority and leaves almost no 
room for other economic targets. By contrast, the US central bank considers growth 
of production and employment as important as price stability. US authorities try to 
support the own economy not only by means of an active fiscal and monetary policy 
but also by stimulating exports through an undervalued dollar exchange rate. For 
example, during and after the recessions in 1991 and 2001, the “talking the dollar 
down” on behalf of US politicians contributed to strong depreciations of the US 
currency. After the Great Recession of 2009, this strategy failed due to the deepen-
ing of the euro crisis which caused the euro exchange rate to decline.
To summarize, a comparison of the fiscal and monetary policy adopted by the 
EU, on the one hand, and by the USA, on the other, suggests that an exchange of 
concepts took tacitly place around 1990. The EU took over the monetarist approach 
of regulating fiscal and monetary policy in a restrictive manner, whereas the USA 
adopted a “trivial Keynesian” approach. An evaluation of the realization of the four 
combinations of real/finance capitalism, on the one hand, and the European/US 
model, on the other hand, in post-war history (plus the special case of the US 
17 This “trivial Keynesian” course was and is facilitated by the privilege of issuing the main inter-
national reserve currency, the US dollar. Since the USA can finance its external deficit in its 
national currency, it is much less financially constraint than all other countries. This helps also to 
finance the US government deficit.
Table 2.4 Europe and USA under real and finance capitalism
Institutional framework 
conditions
Macro-economic framework conditions
Real capitalism Finance capitalism
Mixed (Bastard-
Keynesian monetary 
and fiscal policy, 
speculation focused 
on stock market)
European Social Model Europe until 
~1973/1980
Europe since 
~1973/1980
—
US-Model US until ~1973/1980 US since ~1973/1980 US since ~1990
2 The Road from Prosperity into the Crisis: The Long Cycle of Post-War Economic…
52
strategy since the early 1990s) suggests that the best performance was realized in 
Europe over the 1950s and 1960s due to the coherence between the principles of the 
European Social Model and a real-capitalist incentive structure. The worst perfor-
mance can be attributed to the (inconsistent) combination of finance-capitalist con-
ditions and the European model, i.e. the development in the EU over the last 
20 years.
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Chapter 3
The Systemic Nature of the Global Crisis 
and Some Principles for Tackling It
Christian Ghymers
Abstract This chapter argues that climate change, the global macroeconomic crisis 
and the weakening of democracy are all expressions of the same incoherence in the 
present global economic system, which operates on the basis of major ‘market fail-
ures’ that are characterized by the same kind of economic mechanism based on 
biased relative prices for fossil energies, financial returns and social cohesion. 
Therefore, the only practical solution is to make sustainable production profitable 
by first correcting these relative prices in order to re-establish a systemic conver-
gence between private and social returns and between political and economic 
democracy.
 A Holistic View, A Concerning Diagnostic
The crisis is systemic…
One of the important results of the comparative analysis undertaken in the 
Monnet Network is the awareness of systemic nature of what is commonly referred 
to as ‘the crisis’. This result leads to a serious consideration of the hypothesis of 
unsustainability in the present global economic order. The emergence and persis-
tence of the global crisis of 2008–2009, which became in the following decade 
(2010–2019) a global crisis of democracy in Western societies, announce a clear 
rupture with respect to the dominant Western models of governance and relation-
ships among citizens. Beyond this observation, which is slowly being shared by a 
growing number of observers, the changes presently underway involve not only an 
adaptation of socioeconomic policies in Europe and Latin America to new con-
straints but also a more radical revision of the dominant paradigms of the world 
economy. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the systemic aspects of the global crisis 
that affects both regions and the rest of the world in order to prioritize the design of 
a coherent solution for particular regions.
C. Ghymers () 
Founder and Co-coordinator of the Jean Monnet Network “Crisis-Equity-Democracy  
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…and global, characterized by unsustainability from macroeconomic policies to 
democracy and the environment ….
Indeed, the crisis is global, not just in the geographical sense but also in the sys-
temic sense for being the manifestation of economic behaviours that accumulate, 
the costs of which are passed on to subsequent generations with an exponentially 
growing price. The most emblematic and fatal consequence is global warming, 
which should lead soon to a general unsustainability of the present economic and 
sociopolitical order. This unsustainability is not only limited to the environment, 
with climate change, but also concerns the macroeconomic aspects of our econo-
mies, with a slowdown in growth and productivity, a lack of room for manoeuvres 
in both monetary and fiscal policies, a concerning accumulation of debts and finan-
cial weaknesses, inefficiencies in financial globalization that increases pro-cyclical 
instabilities, allocation of global savings towards overconsumption and involvement 
of a massive waste of resources and of CO2 emissions by the richest economies, 
which are not moving towards more beneficial and sustainable productive invest-
ments. Unfair income distribution and insufficient welfare expenditures increase 
and drive our societies towards political deadlock, exposing democracies to populist 
waves and ultimately to the destruction of life on the planet. Paradoxically, climate 
change, which is the worst global dimension of the present sustainability crisis, is 
not effectively prioritized either by policymakers and public opinion – except the 
recent wake-up call from the youth1 – or by economists. This amazing procrastina-
tion threatens life on the planet and is dramatically increasing the costs of any 
solution.
…which are linked together…
The key thesis of this chapter is that climate change, the global macroeconomic 
crisis and the weakening of democracy are all expressions of the same incoherence 
in the current global economic system, which operates on the basis of the same 
principle, ‘market failures’; i.e. those who cause damage to others do not pay for it 
because biased relative prices do not incorporate fatal external effects: overly low 
costs or no cost at all for carbon emissions, overly high relative returns for financial 
activities with respect to productive activities and overly high prices for safe assets 
in US dollars (overly low yields).
‘Climate change is a result of the greatest market failure the world has seen’ 
(Stern 2007) and the most emblematic consequence of the systemic unsustainability 
that results from the overwhelming short-termism of our materialist rationality, 
whatever be the ideological option (right or left). All these phenomena of dysfunc-
tional behaviours share a common systemic origin and respond to the same kind of 
simple economic mechanisms through biased relative prices: the fact that numerous 
important economic decisions are biases due to being mainly taken on the basis of 
short-term, distorted, short-sighted price systems that amplify their damaging future 
effects (social, economic and political). Furthermore, both climate change and 
1 Although it is an important step for spreading awareness in public opinion, this emerging move-
ment is still very unprepared and does not push concrete measures.
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financial/macroeconomic instability are also linked to financial reasons and are a 
result of the same disinformation from vested interests. This short-termism and 
materialist rationality rely, of course, upon values, but changing them is a much 
more complex issue than changing relative prices and fighting against lobbies.
The reasons for such linked inefficiencies are explained below. It is a complex 
result from a combination of financial flows, dogmatic views, deeper mental struc-
tures that prefer short-term advantages and sociopolitical features manipulated by 
vested interests. In spite of these very resilient ultimate causes, these risky and 
costly defects could be fixed with simple technical solutions insofar as they address 
the same basic action mechanisms of these price distortions by using adjusted indi-
vidual incentives. They all come either from market or administrated prices that do 
not correctly incorporate the externalities of these decentralized decisions or from a 
lack of collective goods or their abuse by not paying adequately for them. In both 
cases, relative prices are misleading. These typical situations of market failures are 
characterized by a systemic divergence between private and social returns, which 
creates a typical moral hazard that inevitably leads to unsustainability. Therefore, it 
is futile and even counterproductive to try to attack the effects without correcting 
first the systemic mechanisms. Furthermore, the different areas of unsustainability 
even mutually reinforce each other, which explains the unsustainability and inevi-
table collapse of the present regime: macroeconomic and financial architecture 
caveats feed global warming by diverting financial flows. The manipulation of 
democracy and an increasingly unfair income distribution maintain the unsustain-
ability of these linked processes, which are a threat to democracy itself.
…and illustrated by three relevant cases of distortion…
We single out three emblematic cases of these mutually supportive price distor-
tions or incorrect market signals that make the present system not only inefficient 
but also contradictory to economic efficiency and unsustainable, not only economi-
cally but also socially and therefore politically:
• The use of a national currency – the US dollar – as the main vehicle of interna-
tional payments and reserves makes the public good of the international mone-
tary system (IMS) asymmetric, impeding its management for world interests 
(Triffin dilemma2); this dollar-based IMS generates several distortions and sig-
nificant spillovers upon the rest of the world: automatic financing of US external 
and fiscal deficits at lower interest rates (price distortion) by capturing the world 
demand for safe assets in order to allocate global savings to US overconsumption 
by playing the role of international banking transformation. This function biases 
the US policy mix towards expansionist, pro-consumption monetary policies and 
causes significant spillovers upon the rest of the world including mismanage-
ment of global liquidities, accumulation of financial risks and overly low savings 
2 The Triffin dilemma expresses the simple fact that increasing international liquidity means 
increasing the external liabilities of the US economy, the currency of which is demanded as an 
international reserve; this fact leads to the logical impossibility of regulating global liquidity and 
managing an optimal policy mix in the USA, which provokes global liquidity cycles and global 
macroeconomic instability.
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(public good failures). This asymmetric IMS is so dysfunctional and unsustain-
able that the gap between the (increasing) power of unilateral US monetary pol-
icy and the (decreasing) relative weight of the US economy has risen dramatically 
with the explosive increase of free international financial flows, the growing role 
of global banks operating in dollars and the rapid development of emerging 
economies resulting from the so-called globalization.
• The excessive financial globalization and deregulation promoted by the dollar- 
based IMS have led to another kind of moral hazard provoked by key price dis-
tortions and lack of regulations: the higher profitability of financial speculation 
with respect to production activities creates economic instability and high costs 
because deregulated financial systems mechanistically propagate shocks and 
endogenous financial crises which have amplified macroeconomic crises; finan-
cial markets are not the same as other markets because operators are dependent 
upon the liquidity condition, which is a public good.
• More generally regarding non-financial markets, some significant price distor-
tions also result from the inadequate internalization of the externalities issued by 
decentralized economic actors; it is the same kind of inner near-sightedness of 
any decentralized (competitive) price system when prices do not incorporate all 
the information or do not take adequate account of spillover effects, as is the case 
for environmental damages and especially the very inadequate (or absent) price 
on carbon emission.
The parallel between the damages caused by the excessive emission of CO2 and 
the excessive spillovers resulting from the conjunction of an asymmetric IMS and 
untamed free financial markets deserves especial attention. It is not just a similarity 
but an intertwined cumulative process. In concrete, positive terms, to reach the neu-
tral carbon output required for our survival as living species, crucial changes in rela-
tive prices are urgently needed not only for the internalization of all carbon footprints 
but also for the IMS and financial markets in order to correct relative financial 
returns capable of ensuring the (very) large financial flows required for making pos-
sible and directly profitable the output changes towards a low-carbon system in the 
emerging economies and other LDCs. Also, the manipulation of public opinion and 
policymakers is very similar in these three cases, with a combination of simplistic 
dogmatism and rent-seeking by using financial resources to corrupt decision- makers 
or misinform citizens.
…which form a pyramid of systemic unsustainability…
These three global destabilizing mechanisms are related and mutually supportive 
both in their deeper causal origin and methods and in their functional connections 
for a restoration of profitable sustainability and a change in the order based upon 
inequality/power imbalances and the resulting lack of multilateral organization/
international cooperation. Indeed, the caveats of an asymmetric IMS allow for 
maintaining international power for the US economy and oligarchic interests in the 
rest of the world on the part of financial policymakers in central banks and treasur-
ies. This status quo combination makes global warming worse and impedes a sys-
temic solution towards a sustainable economic order on the planet.
C. Ghymers
59
The lack of external constraint for the USA allows for the sustaining of a more 
expansionist policy mix by accelerating the cheap financial inflows necessary for 
feeding the global macroeconomic imbalances inherent to the (unsustainable) US 
consumption way-of-life. This imbalance is closely linked to the need to import 
external savings and to control fossil fuel markets.3 Financial globalization through 
large multinational banks operating basically in dollars is a complementary part of 
the system based upon the free-market tale that permits an extension of unproduc-
tive financial capitalism. This extension is necessary for feeding the macroeconomic 
imbalances as well as for sustaining the political bias and the manipulation that are 
necessary to the status quo but that contribute to increases in the gap between eco-
nomic and political democracy.
The result is an excessive and counterproductive financial globalization because 
capital movements flow in the wrong direction for sustainable economic develop-
ment: from poor to rich economies and from real investments to financial ones, 
exposing the world to global macroeconomic disequilibrium and to the launch of 
negative spillovers through a pro-cyclical, global financial cycle with perverse 
effects upon exchange rates, capital flows, growth, savings and the environment. 
These three major distortions are related to – and consolidate – inequality and power 
abuses, thus manifesting an increasing gap between political and economic democ-
racy. There is a total correspondence between those who benefit the most from CO2 
emissions and those who suffer the most from global warming. Rising temperatures 
will cause the poorest to suffer the most, even in the wealthiest nation in the world 
(Hsiang et al. 2017). In parallel, it is now obvious that the hypertrophy in the finan-
cial sector not only was not favourable to growth and social mobility but also 
increased social costs, inequality and political instability. This growing divergence 
between political and economic democracy is the main visible manifestation of the 
inner contradiction upon which the economic system has lost its rationality through 
fundamental relative price distortions that lead to destructive results that in turn cre-
ate mistrust in democratic institutions, which feeds the rapid expansion of popu-
lism. This is a fatal paradox since materialism leads to its own contradiction by 
destroying the basis of material welfare and life.
…in which the unfounded belief in the efficiency of financial markets bears a very 
heavy responsibility…
The radical neo-liberal reaction to the Triffin dilemma was free floating and 
financial liberalization. Indeed, abandoning most of the regulations inhibiting capi-
tal movements appeared as the easiest and most coherent action in a binary reaction 
against state intervention to face imbalances developed under less liberal policies. 
Such a dogma was based upon the simplistic belief that financial markets would 
necessarily be as efficient as any product market by fixing competitive asset prices 
and yields as a result of their fundamental value.
This is an epistemological mistake that has triggered new mechanisms of addi-
tional macroeconomic imbalances. The paradigm of financial market efficiency 
3 Oil is traded in US dollars, like coal used to be traded in British £, when the £ was the main key 
currency.
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plays a complementary role in the transmission of the ‘built-in destabilizer’ 
(Ghymers 1986; Triffin 1991) in the dollar system. The reason is merely that finan-
cial markets do not operate in the same way as product and service markets because 
the behaviours of financial operators are not independent but linked through mimetic 
competition to their assessment of liquidity conditions, which tends to be self-ful-
filling. This absence of operator independence impedes the efficiency of financial 
markets and explains their inherent instability. Unlike in other markets, credit 
demand and supply move together with liquidity conditions, keeping yields and 
interest rates from playing the balancing role of ‘objective’ market prices. As shown 
by Aglietta (2018), in Minsky’s (1982) line of Keynes’ interpretation, financial mar-
ket behaviours are not governed like other markets by the objective fundamental 
value of assets with a symmetry of information but by liquidity, which is mainly 
self-fulfilling and makes financial operators mutually dependent: liquidity intrinsi-
cally reflects this interdependency because financial markets operate under ‘mimetic 
competition’ (Orléan 1999) when forming expectations of asset values and debt 
sustainability: credit providers tend to expect the same kind of valuation change in 
asset prices as borrowers do. This link biases the credit market indicators towards a 
one-way bet. Therefore, credit demand and supply cannot ensure a stable equilib-
rium through yield changes like other markets used to do because demand and sup-
ply move together. Contrary to non-financial markets, in which the two sides of the 
market have opposing interests with regard to prices since demand is subject to satu-
ration condition (i.e. the demand slope is negative), financial markets are inherently 
unstable and inevitably generate a succession of euphoria and panic as a result of 
their subjective common perceptions of liquidity, which link credit demand and 
supply: the credit demand slope could be positive when the expected change in asset 
value is higher than the costs of borrowing, but since this expectation is shared by 
both borrowers and credit suppliers on financial markets, the expected yields cannot 
have the stabilization role of normal competitive market prices. Liquidity is self-
fulfilling and pro-cyclical: in the cyclical upwards phase, optimistic expectations 
increase the demand for credit even with interest rate increases, while lenders 
increase also their supply of credit since they perceive fewer business risks and 
since their collaterals acquire more value. Paradoxically, indebtedness tends to con-
tract the risk premium. When the cyclical bubble bursts, the same cumulative pro-
cess is in motion on the negative side: asset values decrease while debt values 
remain (or even increase in real terms), moving back credit supply and demand. The 
deterioration of debtors directly affects that of creditors and lenders, triggering a 
deleverage adjustment process that has macroeconomic depressing effects (balance 
sheet recession). Mimetic competition is necessarily biased towards pro-cyclical 
behaviour, impeding the self-regulation of liquidity by credit price adjustments.
Here the market price distortion comes from the fact that financial prices are self- 
correlated through liquidity perceptions by both sides of financial markets, which cre-
ates a destabilizing financial cycle. In the past 30 years, the size of global finance in 
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the world economy has been moving from 280% of GDP to 430% (Artus 2019),4 and 
the causality relation between the real cycle and the financial cycle has been reversed: 
the financial cycle explains the real cycle in the period of 1996–2018 while the con-
trary was true from 1980 to 1995. Except for emerging economies, the size of finance 
is not favourable to growth. Furthermore, Artus (2019) shows that the gravity of reces-
sion increases with the size of finance in the GDP and the ‘allocative efficiency’ of 
savings has been a concern since 1990, in the sense that savings have been oriented 
mainly towards inefficient uses such as real estate or public consumption and not 
towards productive investments. These contradictory economic results should call 
into question the paradigm of financial market efficiency. Facts show that market 
incentives are biased towards a hyper-development of financial capitalism. Distortions 
in market incentives have induced non-financial business to reduce its deficit (dissav-
ing) to become a surplus (saving) sector in almost all industrial countries: real invest-
ments have been reduced in favour of financial investments, the stock of real assets 
has been declining relative to financial assets, job creation and economic growth have 
slowed, and unemployment has risen, such that even stability-oriented countries such 
as Germany have been running budget deficits most of the time. Given the positive 
interest-growth differential, the public debt-to-GDP ratio has risen strongly, leading to 
over-indebtedness. At the same time and as a consequence of the easiness to ‘make 
money with money’ in financial capitalism, a process of growing income inequality 
has started to increase the gap between political and economic power, strengthening 
the lobbies and amplifying the incoherence in the economic rationality. This feature is 
at the very centre of the political, economic and moral crisis facing humanity: eco-
nomic power – ownership of financial resources in the hands of few – tends to become 
immune to economic democracy, in contrast to the three first decades of the post-war 
period, a period that showed a development of market economies oriented towards 
real output and quasi- full employment.
…but remains unable to answer to the threat of global warming.
On top of this macroeconomic disequilibrium leading that has led to the political 
crisis of the emerging populism is the unsustainability of the present Anthropocene 
epoch: the fact that the acceleration of the influence of human behaviour on Earth’s 
atmosphere in recent decades is threatening the existence of humankind as a bio-
logical species. This constraint is by definition the most global ever faced, but it is 
also more radical than the previous ones faced by human societies insofar as – con-
trary to past economic constraints – the irreversibility of the damages for the planet 
calls into question the existence of human life itself, not to mention the costs. In the 
past, human societies faced many serious constraints but generally not the global 
life system, and the successive constraints were successfully bypassed as a result of 
the genetic basic instinct of our species for dominating and exploiting the Earth, 
especially when translated into the materialist rationalism which has been shaping 
our societies since the eighteenth century Enlightenment and its consequent expand-
ing industrial revolutions.
4 These numbers are based upon Natixis data: finance weight is measured as the total of outstanding 
loans, bonds, stock market capitalization and M2 money stock divided by world GDP at cur-
rent prices.
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 How to Explain the Absence of a Coherent Reaction 
to the Present Unsustainability of the World Economy?
The procrastination of all policymakers facing the three main facets of the systemic 
unsustainability…
It is really amazing that the global warming which has been scientifically identified 
for at least half a century as an inescapable consequence of our consumption of fossil 
energies remains without any significant counteraction in spite of the dramatic 
increase of the costs of inaction. Neither the ecologists nor the economists – with 
minor exceptions – have formulated adequate reactions. Trying to explain this irratio-
nal behaviour affecting all political regimes is the key for understanding the global 
crisis and how to get out of it. Indeed, the socio-psychological mechanisms at stake 
are the same for climate change and for the macroeconomic deadlocks as well as for 
the asymmetric dollar-based IMS. The principles at work in CO2 greenhouse effects5 
5 Global warming resulting from the CO2 greenhouse effect, which was discovered by Joseph 
Fourier in 1824, was scientifically established in 1856 by Eunice Newton Foote, an American 
woman, who was not credited for her discovery due to being a female and suffragette. History 
attributes the discovery to John Tyndall, who ‘rediscovered’ it in 1859. In 1896, Svante Arrhenius 
(Swedish Nobel Prize winner) recalculated it. Further analysed in 1939 by Guy Stewart Calendar, 
it was demonstrated empirically in 1953 by Gilbert Plass and in 1957 by Roger Revelle and Hans 
Suess. The concept was diffused pedagogically by the magazines Time, Life, and in 1958 by the 
‘Bell Science Hour’ and through a popular movie by Frank Capra. As of the 1950s, energy compa-
nies ordered several scientific studies, all concluding there was a causal link between the use of 
fossil fuels and global warming, implying therefore a questioning of their future exploitation and 
profits. In 1958, Revelle and Keeling started to measure a daily record of CO2 concentration, based 
upon which the so-called Keeling curve shows that CO2 emissions were accelerating and reaching 
a record level in 3 million years. On these bases, as of 1960, the Jason Committee (a secret group 
of elite scientists which advises the US government on strategic security matters of science and 
technology) used MacDonald’s model on climate change to convince US presidents (beginning 
with John Kennedy in 1961) that fossil fuel burning would lead to dangerous global warming that 
would endanger the planet. These analyses all concluded by proving the reality of global warming 
due to fossil energy and the need for urgent actions and for launching international measures, 
including Revelle and Keeling’s report in 1977 and the Charney Report in 1979 (‘Carbon Dioxide 
and Climate: A Scientific Assessment’), from which several initiatives emerged, such as the inter-
national carbon tax proposed by William Nordhaus (Carter’s economic adviser and Nobel Prize 
winner in 2018), Carter’s ‘Changing Climate’ report (published in 1983) and the report by the 
Environment Protection Agency, both of which scientifically confirmed Charney’s alarming report 
and warned that it was urgent (and maybe too late) to act, but all were blocked or abolished by 
President Reagan in the 1980s and the US press, influenced by lobbies seeking to divert the scien-
tific conclusions through the counter-argument that market forces would take charge, thanks to the 
US scientific progress to come, therefore opposing any costly changes to the US economy. During 
the 1988 presidential campaign, G. Bush took the electoral commitment to act for curbing global 
warming, but the fossil energy industry and their major users organized a massive campaign of 
disinformation (half a billion US dollars only in 1989 and 2 billion between 2000 and 2016), 
throwing doubts upon the scientific basis of climate change risks and timing. In spite of a growing 
international consensus for an international treaty to limit CO2 emissions with carbon taxes, the 
vested interests won the battle with the decisive influence of John Sununu (the head of the Bush 
administration), who kept the Noordwijk Conference (November 1989) from enacting an interna-
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as well as those in any externality,6 the near-sighted financial market7 and asymmetry 
in the IMS,8 have been scientifically known and explained extensively for more than 
half a century. In spite of all the necessary information, both the scientific community 
and policymakers have acknowledged that the huge gap between the causes and the 
effects was making it too difficult and too risky for there to be any effective action to 
face powerful lobbies because the value of the future was too low compared to the 
immediate economic advantages for citizens resulting from burning fossil fuels: all 
the progress in well-being since the industrial revolution has been produced by the 
(overly) low price of energy afforded by burning fossil combustibles. Such a general-
ized procrastination has also been observed in the financial and monetary fields, 
where the establishment strongly defends the status quo against regulations and 
changes in the IMS.
…helps to identify the roots of our unsustainability in our materialist rationality, 
with its male binary order resulting from the evolutionary process that was neces-
sary for our past survival and economic development…
This crazy race towards human destruction is based upon much deeper aspects 
that analyses of economic or political economy might make clear. We are convinced 
that pure economic mechanisms must be viewed as reflecting our ‘binary thinking’ 
bias. The way we think and base our scientific analysis is very ‘male-oriented’. This 
seems to be the result of millions of years of evolutionary progress based upon a 
primitive survival selection, combined later with the rationality built upon the post- 
Socratic philosophy9 imposed by thousands of years of economic selection. Such a 
double natural selection has introduced fatal contradictions into our global eco-
nomic system which counteract our own pretention to materialist efficiency and 
progress in productivity. As Sarah Myhre (2019) argues, not only is gender inequal-
ity not a ‘natural law’, but it is a monstrous unnatural bias destroying nature itself. 
In the American Andes, the ‘Pachamama’  – a feminist Amerindian concept that 
personalizes mother nature – transforms the abusive rationality of the male predator 
into a rape which is eventually castigated by the self-destruction of its unnatural 
material results, turning the expected material benefits and rationality into negative 
output, i.e. showing the irrational male behaviour. Therefore, the survival of not 
tional compulsory limitation of CO2 emissions. The doubts about the existence of global warming 
due to CO2 are now scientifically discarded because, contrary to previous historic climatic changes, 
this time the changes are global, i.e. simultaneously observed on all continents.
6 The inefficiencies due to externalities in market economies were explained by Alfred Marshall in 
1890 and elaborated by A. Pigou in 1920 and are an indisputable part of Economics.
7 The instability of financial markets was analysed by Keynes in the 1930s.
8 The incoherence of the dollar-based IMS was denounced tirelessly by Triffin from the 1950s up 
to his death in 1993.
9 Plato and Aristotle believed that nature ordained not only physical differences between males and 
female but mental differences as well, declaring that women were incapable of reasoning and as 
such subjected to men: ‘Nature makes women inferior to men’. This long-lasting exclusion of half 
of humanity has had severe consequences for peace, human harmony, economic and political 
development and respect for life and our planet. See Whitbeck (1976) and Maloney (1991).
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only our own civilization but furthermore that of humankind would depend on our 
ability to resolve the gender issue.
Admittedly, the cultural rationality has demonstrated its efficient supremacy. 
Indeed, the progressive emergence of Western societies and their temporary mate-
rial superiority with the industrial revolution and its accelerated global extension are 
the positive results of fragmented analyses and binary belief cultures. However, 
these material successes are only one side of the real world. Negative spillovers and 
perverse effects are becoming now explicit and visible. So far, the institution of a 
rational materialistic science has imposed a ‘dictatorship of reason and material-
ism’10 in which science is not about developing human consciousness and life in a 
holistic approach to the planet but about power and money in a linear, fragmented, 
male binary hierarchical order. This order and its spectacular material results have 
produced a terrific illusionary bias by separating our perception of our power from 
our impacts on life and our planetary systems. One example is the fact that eco-
nomic growth and its measure in terms of GDP have become a pathetic illusion as 
far as the negative output of CO2 emissions and other depletions of natural species 
and resources are not taken into account in the statistics. The result is a predatory, 
unfair attitude on the part of the present generation against subsequent ones and of 
the richest against the poorest.
…but paradoxically this successful, historic evolutionary process has become a 
destructive natural process…
Presently, the systemic difference between this crisis and the previous ones is 
based upon the fact that the individual (male) genetic motor which permitted an 
overcoming of previous material constraints and shaped our ‘way of thinking’ has 
become itself the cause of the problem of unsustainability. According to neurosci-
ence – which will not be developed here since it lies outside the scope of the present 
research11 – the most fundamental reason for the process of destruction of life on 
Earth is based upon our brain structure, which has selected a segmented way of 
thinking necessary for ensuring our material success and the industrial revolutions. 
The resulting economic supremacy has pushed the world toward a male rationality 
based upon a binary method that has led to a dichotomist conception of life, which 
10 See the work of Francisco Varela and the Santiago School of Cognition, e.g. Varela et al. (2016).
11 The deeper roots of Western societies’ rationality extend far beyond the Enlightenment to the 
whole post-Socratic way of thinking in Western cultures. See the ‘Institute of Human Conductivity’, 
founded by Carlos Gonzalez Carrasco and based at Regent’s University, London, www.humancon-
ductivityinstitute.com: ‘The old scientific narrative is practiced as an exclusive binary. The prac-
tices of scientific materialism have caused a brutal process of dehumanisation and the unprecedented 
destruction of our planet. Dominant “rational-logical” scientific materialistic practices have 
reduced life to a degraded, debased and undignified monetised commodity. It has fragmented and 
separated our mind from our body, our body from our spirit, human from humans and humans 
from nature. This is a catastrophic and collective failure of human thinking. The old fixed and rigid 
scientific paradigms and dogmas have decayed to the point of an irreversible collapse, a process of 
continuous systemic crisis of its individual parts (corporate, economic, political, social, ecological, 
spiritual, moral, ethical) but for HCI these individual expressions are in fact parts of a systemic 
crisis of the whole’. See also Ghymers and Gonzalez Carrasco (2016).
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in turn has created an ‘illusory commodified reality’ that is engaging humankind in 
a dehumanized deadlock (Gonzalez Carrasco 2017) and a fictitious immediate 
well-being.
Such a destructive ‘natural selection’ seems to respond to an individual brain 
structure that has been shaped by millions of years of survival struggle but that has 
been unable, as a result of the actions of dopamine incentives, to spontaneously take 
into account a collective global constraint and a long-term improvement instead of 
an immediate satisfaction. As explained by S. Bohler (2019),the human brain bal-
ances immediate (‘animal’) impulses controlled by the striatum (mesencephalon) 
and the (human) capacity to assess and plan for the future managed by the cortex 
(frontostriatal fibres). The striatum was configured by the past animal fight for sur-
vival, which needed to give priority to immediate advantages when individuals were 
in competition in the natural selection process, while the cortex development 
emerged later in human societies as a result of the rational preference for the future.
…through an imbalance that is favourable to populism, which draws upon imme-
diate impulses instead of forecasting rationality…
Nevertheless, the recent technological and economic progresses combined with 
the uncertain climate created by the global crisis have developed a culture biased 
towards instantaneity, which tends to weaken the countervailing power of our cortex 
upon our animal striatum through the issuance of dopamine that is neurochemically 
dominated by our animal nature. The result would be a trend favourable to the ‘me 
now’ of materialism and to short-term profits through individual brains in competi-
tion that prefer immediate advantages when uncertainty reigns.
This universal phenomenon, which is referred to as the psychological ‘temporal 
loss of valorisation’, is not new but has been compensated by the easy economic 
growth of the pre-global crisis period, during which apparently rapid productivity 
increases combined with social protection fed an illusionary security. The general-
ization of economic uncertainty with the global crisis has created a socio- 
psychological shock of popular fears, which weakens the collective ability to plan 
for the future. The popular reflex of fear gives preference to the immediacy sup-
ported by the memory of the past, ‘democratically’ refusing any longer-term con-
siderations, rejecting the elites in power viewed as necessarily guilty for the current 
deteriorations and, opting for status quo, condemning democracy to populism. This 
risk was spectacularly illustrated by the recent French social revolt of the ‘gilets 
jaunes’, in which 80% of the citizens opted for the immediate purchasing power 
advantages of lower oil prices and deficit spending at the expense of the longer-term 
collective interests of financing the energy transition.12
…leading ‘ceteris paribus’ to a civilizational collapse…
Our current sustainability crisis is the result of all the negative human impacts on 
our vital planetary eco-systemic interdependencies, which the materialist- 
fragmented- rationality paradigm ignores by maintaining an illusory reality. As 
12 Of course, such a populist rejection of longer-term rationality was spurred and amplified by the 
lack of fair distribution in the government measures. However, most of their claims reflect the 
desire for immediacy instead of systemic improvements.
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already denounced some 20 years ago by Tom Bentley and Daniel Stedman Jones 
(2001, p. 16), this triumph of individualism, still superficially defensible in terms of 
social progress and justice, has most obviously contributed to the loss of faith in the 
democratic frameworks and cultures which previously underpinned common life. In 
every industrialised society, willingness to vote and place confidence in public insti-
tutions has steadily declined….but the collective consequences of unchecked indi-
vidualism, and its primary form of agency  – market exchange  – present basic 
challenges not just to those societies in terms of their cohesiveness and quality of 
life, but also to the world as a whole.
Since the method of Western thinking has led to an efficient conquest of power 
and impressive technical and economic performance based upon predominantly 
materialist cultures and apparently scientific arguments, a natural selection process 
has diffused it globally. With this irreversible expansion, the inner caveats of 
Western materialism (both capitalist and socialist) have been accumulating behav-
iours that are exponentially destructive for humanity and ecological systems, with 
counterproductive socioeconomic results that generate exponentially growing eco-
nomic costs, which are leading to civilizational collapse. The reason for this threat 
is the difficulty for a male culture to become more aware of the interdependent and 
unitary nature of life as a whole when money is the main power and tends to be 
concentrated and used by vested interests for exploiting the animal-male determin-
isms in people. Regulations have been systematically reduced or inhibited by dog-
matic reasoning without any scientific basis but merely driven by vested interests 
and rent-seeking abuses created by this imbalanced male culture.
…because the strict law of universal entropy is not counteracted by a systemic 
organizational progress towards a multilateral governance in the financial and 
environmental areas…
The most visible proof of the wrong direction of a ‘simulated materialistic real-
ity’ is simply the deadlock created by our inability to wean our dependencies on 
fossil fuels, explained – on top of obscure manipulations from vested interests and 
conspiring ideologies – by our lack of vision and collective support for organizing 
the deeper systemic transformation urgently required to ensure an economic sus-
tainability capable of safeguarding life and democracy through an effective multi-
lateral governance for regulating international trade and finance.
Among the main results of the joint research of this Jean Monnet Network is the 
identification of a global systemic failure in the present economic order, which 
explains the current sustainability crisis and the impossibility of breaking the status 
quo in order to implement multilateral solutions. This present deadlock represents 
the major challenge for the survival of humankind. The window of opportunity for 
solving it is about to close in the midst of an amazing mood of civil reluctance or 
passivity that is putting the present world on the brink of our own civilizational col-
lapse, which indicates that the systemic issue is much deeper and broader than its 
traditional economic and political domains. We are facing a very powerful para-
digm; its roots are deeply genetic but have been transformed into cultural and philo-
sophical features with a gender inequality bias. Its powerful resilience comes from 
the abuses of vested interests that exploit our genetic animal dependence upon 
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dopamine in order to mask the growing gap between private and social returns. This 
abuse of power means that institutional democracy is turned into an illusion because 
there is no sufficient economic democracy but rather an excessive concentration of 
monetary power in an ethical desert. In this process, without a strong reaction in 
terms of ‘ethical values’, the emergence and achievement of ‘noogenesis’13 (Teilhard 
de Chardin 1955), i.e. the inner social organizational forces of human life able to 
countervail the entropic forces, are dangerously inhibited.
 Some Paths Towards a Solution
Tackling global warming requires tackling the caveats in the global financial archi-
tecture… the materialist bias of our societies…
The pyramid of unsustainability, with its ‘moral hazard’ process based upon 
price distortion mechanisms, is the expression of imbalances in the sociopolitical 
organizational process, i.e. the gap between political and economic democracy. 
Vested interests and increasingly unfair income distribution block the organiza-
tional responses to instability and inefficiencies, which are namely, reforms geared 
towards regulated markets and international cooperation. In particular, Triffin’s 
‘built-in destabilizer’ in the asymmetric dollar-based IMS, amplified by pro-cyclical 
financial markets, impedes an answer to financial needs and a price correction for 
solving the global warming challenge. Indeed, restoring climate sustainability 
requires restoring macroeconomic and financial sustainability, i.e. not only revers-
ing the absorption of global savings by US consumers but also channelling financial 
flows from speculative investments to real ones capable of ensuring profitable green 
energy production everywhere, however mostly in emerging economies and LDCs. 
This change would also solve the lack of macroeconomic growth by correcting the 
biased relative yield between financial and real investments, making real output 
attractive again and reaching a convergence between private and public returns.
Of course, such an ideal response would ideally need a consensual, coordinated 
change at multilateral and national levels, which would require a radical change of 
relative values in order to give priority to a holistic view of life and long-term social 
interests, i.e. to ensure the organization of the ‘Teilhardian noogenesis’. Being real-
istic, such a primary solution would take too much time and not prevent disasters, 
but economists could have a ‘quick fix’ at hand for helping social and private returns 
to converge through taxation/subsidy measures.
…by using precisely materialist incentives through market conformity measures…
If we admit this fact that the deepest origin of the problem is the generalized 
‘moral hazard’ induced by the materialism with which we shape our thinking 
13 Teilhard de Chardin’s concept of noogenesis refers to the evolutionary process by which a 
brighter scenario would be possible on Earth insofar as humankind could counteract the universal 
law of entropy by the human capacity to organize social progress and cooperation through ethi-
cal values.
3 The Systemic Nature of the Global Crisis and Some Principles for Tackling It
68
through a lack of ethics that leads to the predominance of insufficiently regulated 
market exchanges – something difficult to change in time for saving the planet – it 
is fortunately possible and faster to cure the ‘moral hazard’ issue by merely using 
the same materialist market mechanisms, however after correcting relative prices in 
order to activate decentralized incentives through fiscal policies with a revenue- 
neutral carbon tax (fair distribution of the costs across society) combined with a 
withdrawal of the subsidies for fossil energies and an introduction of subsides for 
renewable energies. The first priority is to scrap the annual $87 billion of implied 
subsidies for fossil energies (Stefanski 2017) and to increase progressively, albeit 
credibly, the prices of carbon emissions (including those included in all products). 
This is urgent for channelling financial flows to more profitable low-carbon output. 
In 1979, a similar correct response was already present in Nordhaus’ proposal to the 
Carter administration, which would have been able to stop global warming but was 
opposed by the Reagan administration. The alternative – an ethical change – is nec-
essary, but it relies on education and takes too much time for ensuring durable 
ownership.
The same mechanism of market failure that explains climate disasters is also 
responsible for other sustainability challenges with regard to social cohesion, lack 
of key public goods and macro-financial instability. All the global issues share the 
same systemic bias with regard to responsibilities, i.e. moral hazard. In particular, 
the most influential one, due to its being macroeconomic, comes from untamed 
financial markets based upon an asymmetrical international monetary system (IMS) 
that provokes global liquidity waves and spillovers through the ‘exorbitant’ role of 
the US dollar and the capital flows moved by big multinational banks. This very 
systemic caveat is the origin of a pyramid of costly global disturbances character-
ized by the fact that those responsible for the spillovers or disturbances are not those 
affected by the negative impacts of these behaviours. This creates a responsibility 
bias (‘moral hazard’): ‘the polluters are not the payers’, but they are the exclusively 
short-term beneficiaries.
Therefore, climate change risks and macroeconomic instability resulting from 
the asymmetrical IMS are closely linked. Those risks – which are apparently very 
different – not only intrinsically share the same systemic origin in their inner logic 
but also are linked overall by their respective solutions and by their urgency.
Both global warming and the destabilizing international monetary system share 
the same feature that condemns our world to unsustainability and eventual fatal 
destruction due to their reliance upon near-sighted free market forces. Our current 
sustainability crisis is the main symptom of the inability of pure free market regimes 
as well as centralized economic regimes to generate stability together with long- 
term social prosperity.
Indeed, basic economics teaches that ‘liberalism’ is inefficient when there are 
significant spillovers or clear characteristics of a public good, as is obviously the 
case both for the global environment and for the global monetary system and its 
liquidity management. Unregulated free markets and uncoordinated monetary poli-
cies impede sustainable solutions and a fair supply for ensuring sustainable stability. 
Opposing regimes with central planning, although theoretically able to better 
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control externalities than market economies, present even worse failures that result 
from rigid management, power concentration leading to weak incentives for innova-
tion and the negation of human rights, as demonstrated by numerous experiences.
The deterioration of the global environment comes from negative spillovers that 
by definition escape adequate pricing by free markets, feeding a systemic and dev-
astating moral hazard for governments, corporations and individuals, while on the 
financial side, a similar unsustainable situation is provoked by the asymmetries 
resulting from the use of a national currency – the US dollar – as the main interna-
tional reserve currency, which, combined with the untamed financial deregulation 
implemented for several decades, creates disturbing global monetary spillovers that 
explain the succession of increasingly large crises: unmanaged liquidity waves, 
financial asymmetries and persistent global payment disequilibrium.
…without starting with revolutionary changes but by organizing multilateral 
market conformity rules within existing multilateral organizations….
Although the causes of the systemic caveats are deeply rooted in our materialist 
cultures and will need long-term progressive changes and more ethical values, the 
good news is that the required urgent changes are still possible at the technical level 
by merely using market-conformity interventions. Indeed, they could be organized 
at the multilateral level by focusing on the key mechanisms that are provoking 
global unsustainability and without necessarily imposing centralistic regimes but 
rather simple consensual regulations that draw upon relative price incentives. Of 
course, a minimum improvement in international cooperation is required within the 
existing multilateral order. This necessary international consensus is bound to 
appear with the increasingly alarming degree of urgency combined with the grow-
ing awareness of the nonsense of nationalistic non-cooperative options: by defini-
tion, global systemic diseases require efficient global actions. The present opposition 
of some national leaders cannot be an excuse for no action since there are ways to 
exert pressure through the formation of large international coalitions that coordinate 
retaliation against free riders: countervailing duties on imports with high carbon 
paths and exclusion from multilateral financial resources, triggering heated domes-
tic debates inside the free-rider countries. The only immediate systemic solution to 
the two identified key diseases is multilateral regulation and management in order 
to correct market-price distortions by taking externalities (both positive and nega-
tive) into account. With regard to carbon emissions, there are some simple multilat-
eral options for pricing carbon in order to discourage its consumption while creating 
incentives for alternative green energies (relative price effects created by CO2 trad-
able permits or UN taxation reinforced by WTO custom duties according to carbon 
footprint, financial green guarantees/facilities, etc.) or, in the second place, EU 
regional options (custom duties and subsidies) to be bargained with other regional 
partners or a few reluctant economies. In addition, concrete financial innovation and 
regulation changes are indispensable for complementing the carbon pricing posi-
tively in order to make low-carbon investment more attractive, especially in LDCs. 
Indeed, the magnitude of the financial resources necessary for controlling the risks 
of climate change seems so high (around US$ 1 trillion yearly up to 2035, 2/3 of 
which in emerging/LDCs) that systemic changes are simultaneously required for 
the financial sector.
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Fortunately, these changes are necessary from both the social and the private 
profitability perspectives at a time of increasing financial uncertainty and inade-
quate sustainable investment in the real economy. According to Art. 2 of the Paris 
Agreement (COP21), there is a clear consensus between public and private actors 
for ‘making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas 
emissions and climate-resilient development’ (Dasgupta et al. 2018). This means 
that moving to a sustainable economy is not only a survival imperative but also a 
financial opportunity and therefore a decentralized incentive for financial reforms. 
This convergence opens an important window of opportunity for systemic changes 
in the international financial architecture.
…more precisely, the systemic solution to global warming requires a simultane-
ous systemic change in the international financial architecture…
Obviously, the public good nature of ensuring the transition to the new model of 
prosperity laid out in the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the implied mas-
sive shift of resources and output require collective action at the global level. Neither 
free market and national policy nor coercive centralization could alone ensure this 
successful transformation. This is precisely where a systemic change in decentral-
ized incentives together with global financial regulation in a new multilateral mon-
etary system is the necessary complement for ensuring global sustainability. No 
stability could result from free financial markets that cause damaging spillovers. 
Furthermore, globalized financial markets operate without multilateral agreement 
on an ultimate multilateral ‘safe asset’ issued by a genuine multilateral lender of last 
resort, i.e. a currency which would not be the debt of any country but of the whole 
system. Indeed, the IMS works with the dollar as a main international currency 
reserve, i.e. a debt – at sight of the US economy. This impedes a global regulation 
of liquidity since the US monetary policy is legitimately submitted to inwards- 
looking management and not to global stability.
Only international cooperation could elaborate and enact strong and better finan-
cial regulation, and this would take time. Nevertheless, the most direct and rapid 
way to act is by rebalancing the very asymmetrical – and thus unsustainable – inter-
national monetary system (IMS) by moving from the present dollar system to a 
multilateral reserve currency which is not the debt of any economy but by definition 
of the global system. In fact, the basis for such a systemic solution already exists; it 
is the special drawing right (SDR) created by the IMF in 1968 in order to become 
the main official reserve currency in a more symmetrical IMS.  Indeed, the SDR 
would reduce the asymmetrical effects of the dollar and its consequent spillovers, 
enabling a collegial management of global liquidity as a global public good for the 
sake of world stability. Private financial actors are favourable to such a kind of 
improvement in the level playing field in order to ensure less financial turbulence. 
However, in order to become the primary solution, the present SDR needs to be 
upgraded through some adjustments in the IMF status in order to transform this cur-
rency basket of the five main international currencies (the US dollar, euro, pound, 
yen and renminbi) into a genuine multilateral currency issued directly by the IMF 
which would thus become a multilateral central bank. This quality would allow for 
organizing the clearing of international payments above national central banks and 
for the creation of a genuine multilateral lender of last resort, issuing the safest asset 
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able to thus act upon the global monetary basis by buying or withdrawing eligible 
national bonds to national central banks (Ghymers 2018).
…which should make opposing interests converge in order to capitalize on profit-
able opportunities from a peaceful transition to a low-carbon economy…
Contrary to traditional views, it is unnecessary to rely mainly upon idealistic 
sponsors or massive ODA to LDCs in order to organize the financial changes because 
the economic crisis forces private capital to look for stable profitable investments. 
Sustainability – social and environmental – is becoming an attractive criterion for 
private returns, making it clearly feasible to establish their convergence with public 
(social) returns when the multilateral organization ensures a systemic correction of 
misleading incentives, opening the path to the ‘Teilhardian noogenesis’.
An interesting observation developed by the CEPII (Aglietta and Couder) points 
to the effects that the move to green energy could produce upon the international 
financial architecture. Indeed, the hegemonic key currency of the past, the pound, 
was closely associated with the role of coal in the economic supremacy of the UK, 
while the following one, the dollar, has been closely associated with the oil markets 
and their crucial role in the post–Second World War period. With the urgent need for 
green energy markets, a massive geographical decentralization of energy produc-
tion should also be able to reshuffle the key currency roles, making multi- polarization 
aspects essential for both financial and political stability in order to move to a mul-
tilateral key currency. Nevertheless, as clearly mentioned earlier, free financial mar-
kets are unable to ensure it due to their ‘built-in destabilizer’ logic. Due to the same 
inner reason of being a macroeconomic ‘built-in destabilizer’, the US dollar is 
unable to fulfil the role of a reliable international standard and issuer of ‘safe assets’. 
The recent evolution towards the abuse of power, both in US macroeconomic poli-
cies (one trillion dollars of additional debt per year under Trump’s presidency with 
visible pressures upon the FED to depreciate the reserve currency) and in other 
vulgar ‘weaponizations’ of the dollar, is accelerating the conditions for a consensus 
for changing the IMS in order to safeguard a financial and peaceful stability both for 
private and public agents. As explained, only a multilateral currency which is not 
the debt of any single economy can stabilize the whole system by offering the only 
neutral, safe asset capable of pricing all the other assets and exchange rates, preserv-
ing fully national sovereignties while collegially managing global liquidity as a 
public good, without any ‘weaponization’ or abuse.
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Chapter 4
The Double Democratic Deficit
Bettina De Souza Guilherme
Abstract This chapter will sketch how the EU has reacted to the financial crisis 
and in particular to the unfolding sovereign debt crisis, revealing major flaws in 
EMU’s architecture. It will not only address these design flaws but attempt to evalu-
ate the underlying causes, reasons and motives of the architects and decision takers 
by comparing the more “federalist” Werner Plan with the more “intergovernmental” 
blueprint of the EMU of the Maastricht Treaty, connect it with the paradigm change 
on economic governance discussed by Schulmeister in Chap. 2 and show the conse-
quences for the crisis and its management in terms of efficiency, equity and demo-
cratic accountability.
 Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2008, while having its origin in the US subprime crisis, 
quickly spread to Europe through free global capital movement and deregulated 
financial markets, and developed into a nearly existential crisis for the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). The crisis exposed major flaws of the architecture of 
Economic and Monetary Union, leading to its failure to prevent or to protect the EU 
and its citizens from the crisis; to manage the crisis in a credible, equitable and 
democratic way; and to deliver the promises of growth, employment and wealth 
improvements as a result of EMU. These failures brought about the greatest decep-
tion of Europe’s citizens in the European project with a loss of trust in the EU by 
26% from 57% in 2006 to 31% between 2012 and 2014, and even if it improved 
again since then, it triggered a wave of euro-scepticism, nationalism, separatism and 
populism and puts the question of Europe’s democratic accountability and legiti-
macy at the heart of future reforms of the EU.
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This chapter will sketch how the EU has reacted to the financial crisis and in 
particular to the unfolding sovereign debt crisis, revealing major flaws in EMU’s 
architecture. It will not only address these design flaws but attempt to evaluate the 
underlying causes, reasons and motives of the architects and decision takers by 
comparing the more “federalist” Werner Plan with the more “intergovernmental” 
blueprint of the EMU of the Maastricht Treaty, connect it with the paradigm change 
on economic governance discussed by Schulmeister in Chap. 2 and show the conse-
quences for the crisis and its management in terms of efficiency, equity and demo-
cratic accountability.
 EMU Crisis Management
 “Bailing Out of the Banks”: Yet Another Moral Hazard
As a first reaction to the shockwave triggered by the bankruptcy of the US bank 
Lehmann’s Brothers, Member States of the EU speedily went to the rescue of the 
financial market and “unconditionally” bailed out the banking sector. Ironically, 
neoliberalism’s failure and fall could only be prevented by “nationalizing” its debts 
and costs, which both created a “moral hazard” and jeopardized the sustainability of 
public finance by “ballooning” previously consolidated public debt levels and push-
ing EMU countries with previously high debts to the edge of sovereign default. This 
in turn brought about the cutting back of the welfare state and imposition of auster-
ity and liberalization policies and accumulated in the further pushing through of 
neoliberal reforms and the retrenchment of countercyclical policies by the submis-
sion of governments under the control of the very same financial markets which had 
caused the crisis and the “Troika” for countries most hit by the crisis. According to 
the European Commission report on public finance 2008, public debt in 2007 was 
actually down to a level of 66% of GDP in the euro area and 58% in the EU, and 
public deficits stood at 0.6% in the Euro and 0.8% of GDP in the EU (European 
Commission 2008). Indeed, Greece with a level of public debt to GDP of 94.5% was 
an outlier among the countries later undergoing adjustment programs. Portugal with 
63% was close to a public debt to GDP ceiling of 60%, Spain with 36.2% and 
Ireland with as low as 25.4% were by far outperforming Germany with 65%. 
However, when the housing and construction burst, bailing out the banks and the 
procyclical adjustment programmes brought about a dramatic deterioration of the 
debt to GDP level to 120% in Ireland in 2012 and to 101.3% in 2016 in Spain.
These figures teach us the following: firstly, decades of efforts of budget consoli-
dation can be wiped out at once by the destabilizing effects of liberalized and dereg-
ulated financial markets in an EMU with globally free capital movement in which 
the EU had given up “any instruments to control credit growth or allocate credit”. 
Second, the negligence of the destabilizing nature of deregulated financial markets 
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and the moral hazard arising from their bailing out had been among the “original 
sins” of the authors of the Maastricht Treaty. Third, the risks of the macroeconomic 
imbalances within EMU were as well ignored. The high level of growth in Europe’s 
peripheries in the first decade of EMU was (mis)perceived as the successful process 
of convergence. Benefitting from the common currency and interest rates, periphery 
countries enjoyed an unprecedented inflow of capital stimulating domestic demand, 
growth and fuelling housing and construction bubbles. The consequences of it was 
an increase in employment, demand and growth, but along with it wage and price 
increases in the periphery eroded their competitiveness, while at the same time 
blowing up their trade deficits and debts to the northern eurozone countries. 
Additionally, the housing booms proofed to be not sustainable and eventually burst 
in the aftermath of the US Lehmann’ Bank default. Fourth, the so-called sovereign 
debt crisis has been a consequence of the global financial crisis. Greece with its high 
public debt level prior to the crisis has rather been an “outlier” within the EMU 
adjustment countries. There is no doubt that the previously high debt and deficit 
level turned unsustainable when the financial crisis erupted. Nevertheless, it clearly 
demonstrates that the combination of internal imbalances within the EMU and high 
level of current account deficits and public debts increases the liquidity risks in a 
situation of sudden stops.
De Grauwe (2011) observes that at the same time highly indebted countries out-
side of EMU such as the UK have not been threatened with sovereign default given 
that they kept the control of their currency and interest rates and had their national 
banks as lender of last resort in place. This indicates that EMU’s design did not 
improve the crisis resilience of the eurozone countries but rather led to a weakening 
of it, which is a further cause for the deception of the trust in the EU.
 The EERP: EMU’s Only Countercyclical Fiscal Stimulus 
Programme – A Short-Lived Experienced
The second reaction to the financial crisis of the EU was the “European Economic 
Recovery Plan (EERP)” of the Member States, the EU Commission and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) in the form of stimulus programme of EUR 200 
billion, equivalent to 1.5% of EU GDP.  The EERP has been identified by the 
European Fiscal Board as the only coordinated counter-cyclical fiscal policy of the 
EMU within its 20 years of existence. However, in comparison with the US policy 
response, the EU stimulus programme was rather modest (De Grauwe 2010) and 
short-lived, with the return to fiscal austerity already in 2010 than in 2011 (USA) 
(Mody 2015).
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 Breaking the Sovereign Banking Nexus: Banking Union
The third reaction of the EU was its engagement to regulating financial markets by 
establishing the legal framework to create the “Banking Union” with the ECB in 
charge of the supervision of major banks, which was a real stepping stone forwards 
and could not have been envisaged prior to the crisis and the pledge to contribute to 
regulating financial markets globally in all the relevant global governance institu-
tions (UN Stiglitz Commission, G20 Summits). At the EU level, the introduction of 
the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) was proposed to compensate the costs they had 
caused, which did not happen so far given the strong resistance and lobbying efforts 
of the financial markets (see Schulmeister chapter on FTT). However, up to today, 
the Banking Union remains incomplete without the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS). Additionally, the considerable amount of non- performing loans 
(NPL) and the increased number of banks “too big to fail” in the follow-up of the 
crisis imply that the moral hazard of the financial markets persists.
 Monetary Policy
In the field of monetary policy, the ECB was initially rather cautious and reluctant 
to step into the role of lender of last resort while the FED’s policy was earlier and 
from the beginning more aggressive (Kang et al. 2016). “The US Federal Reserve 
lowered its policy interest rate (the Fed Funds rate) from 5.25% in September 2007 
to 0-0.25% in December 2008, (...) initiated quantitative easing and began ‘forward 
guidance’, making public its intention to keep interest rates low ‘for some time’”. 
“In contrast to the FED the ECB’s first reaction to the Great Recession was in July 
2008, with to ‘raise’ of the policy rate and only after the Lehman bankruptcy in 
September 2008, the ECB joined an internationally coordinated rate reduction on 8 
October” (Kang et al. 2016).
Evaluating the first phase of the EU’s reaction to the crisis and its manage-
ment  – before the sovereign debt crisis erupted  – we can identify the Banking 
Union as a clearly positive reform (yet not completed: missing EDIS, prevailing 
risks of non- performing loans and sovereign bank nexus and an even increased 
number of financial institutions “too big to fail”, thus implying a persistent risk of 
moral hazard of the financial market sector), yet costly policy errors both in the 
fiscal and in the monetary field due to blind adherence to the ordo-liberal paradigm 
and policies. While the EERP was initially largely successful, the early exit from 
it together with two quasi-parallel hikes of interest rates by the ECB – in April and 
July 2011 – lead to a double dip, aggravating the following recession of the euro 
area and in particular the situation of the countries entering into a sovereign 
debt crisis.
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 The Sovereign Debt Crisis: Assessing Causes
The trigger to the sovereign debt crisis was the announcement of the newly elected 
Greek prime minister George Papandreou in October 2009 that the public deficit, 
which had been communicated by the previous government, was not 6% but 12.7% 
(and later was corrected to more than 15% by Eurostat) of GDP. The consequence 
of this revelation was that Greece turned into the “scapegoat” for the crisis 
(Schulmeister 2018) and a systemic financial crisis was transformed into a sover-
eign debt crisis. De Grauwe (2010) highlighted that policymakers were using 
“incorrect analysis of the fundamentals” by “repeating continuously that the source 
of the debt crisis in the Eurozone is the profligacy of national governments”. As was 
stressed earlier, prior to the emergence of the financial crisis, the government debt 
to GDP ratio in the eurozone was declining thanks to the sacrifices of the population 
of the countries striving to achieve the Maastricht objectives to join EMU and later 
to respect the rules of “Euro club”. The efforts were to be rewarded by a common 
currency, stability, growth, convergence and increased wealth. The fact that during 
the same period, due to design flaws, internal imbalances occurred and led to an 
increase of private debt (households and financial institutions) provoked by the 
housing and construction bubble. These developments were however not given the 
necessary attention neither by the EU watchdog institutions (Commission, Eurostat) 
nor by the IMF.
Considering the amplitude and economic and social costs of global financial 
crisis, a paradigm changes, and major reforms of the global economic model and 
governance could have been expected, as was the case in the aftermath of the 1929 
crisis – finally leading to WWII and of the energy crisis in the 1970s. Such reforms 
have indeed been very much at the heart of the demands of the biggest protest and 
social movement mobilization all over Europe and the USA (Indignados, Occupy 
Wall Street) and worldwide since the 1960s with the Time magazine dedicating its 
“Person of the Year” award to the protestor in 2012. The fact that both the neoliberal 
economy and world order and the ordo-liberal architecture of the EMU proved to be 
“unsustainable” and were on a crash course without the intervention of states and 
politics – the actors whose room for manoeuvre was to be much reduced according 
to these paradigms – and had provoked major financial, economic, social, political 
and human cost remained largely unanswered, despite initial resolutions of the G20, 
the UN and the EU. It is even more amazing that the recommendations advanced 
after a near meltdown of the neoliberal system and the EMU, which had actually 
rather worked as a transmission belt of the crisis than as a protection, were more of 
the same: pushing for further neoliberal reforms and strengthening the rules-based 
system of ordo-liberalism by increased controls and sanctions and further limiting 
the discretionary powers of the Member States (Schmidt 2015). Indeed, the “Greek 
sovereign debt crisis” came just in time to blame the guilt and responsibility of the 
crisis on the profligacy of countries – “spending all their money on booze and 
women and then asking for support” as expressed in a FAZ interview by former 
Eurogroup president Dijsselbloem (Dijsselbloem, 2017) – and as a consequence 
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pushing the reform focus to increase fiscal discipline, improve the surveillance and 
strengthen possible sanctions for non-appliance with the adoption of the Six Pack 
and the Two Pack of the SGP, Fiscal Compact and the ESM.
Proposals of “risk sharing” were off the table since it seemed to be out of the 
question to justify a “transfer union”, even more so transferring taxpayer’s money 
to countries, which were not respecting the rules, lying to the other partners and 
indulging into fiscal excesses, while the bailing out of the banks had been decided 
within the shortest time and without much considering public opinion. Indeed, the 
possibility not to bail them out was never presented as an option, and the model of 
Iceland, where the citizens refused to go this way and had actually succeeded in a 
much smoother way to overcome the crisis, was largely suppressed and not pro-
moted but rather covered up by a silence both by the political elites and the media. 
It is certainly correct that Greeks had not only lived above their means (as, by the 
way, had the Spanish, Irish, Portuguese, English, Americans, etc.) but even worse 
also engaged in unethical and dishonest “creative accounting measures”, among 
which a derivative swap by Goldman Sachs to hide their true fiscal situation to the 
EU when joining EMU and later. On the other hand, as Bagehot indicates, “excess 
borrowing by fools would have been impossible without excess lending by fools: 
creditors and debtors are joined at the hip. A country that chooses to run current- 
account surpluses, indeed, one that has built its economy around generating 
improved competitiveness and increased external surpluses, has to finance the coun-
terpart deficits” (Wolf 2014, p.80). Following Bagehot’s logic, there is as much a 
responsibility of the creditor than there is of the debtor.
Furthermore, even given the case of a country, which obviously did not respect 
the rules (in reality, it was not the only one considering Germany and France 2003), 
Schauble’s and even Merkel’s public shaming and blaming and “punitive” approach 
and policies against Greece – up to the threat of expulsion from the euro area – are 
not only void of any spirit of European solidarity but on the contrary were awaking 
nationalistic and populist spirits, which were later further radicalized by the migra-
tion crisis. This reminds of Goethe’s Zauberlehrling “Die ich rief, die Geister, werd 
ich nun nicht los” (Goethe’s Sorcerer’s Apprentice: “the ones I called, the spirits, I 
cannot get rid off”), implying and leading to a division of “Europe’s demos or 
demoi” into Northern winners and savers against Southern losers “spending their 
money on women and booze”, causing lasting damage to the project of the EU. How 
different could Europe’s crisis management have been had Merkel expressed “Wir 
schaffen das (we can make it) – as she had done confronted by the migration crisis – 
and put her efforts into the elaboration of a more equitable crisis management and 
reform of the EMU, mobilizing the support for the European’ project, by explaining 
the reasons of the crisis and the need to reform the shortcomings. Such a behaviour 
would have been more in line with Habermas “civilizational achievements”. Europe 
managed to forge out of the ruins of the Second World War and could have pro-
pelled the EU to turn into “a place where the all the nations of Europe stand along-
side each other as equals in a democratically legitimate political union as opposed 
to creditor and debtor member states of a dysfunctional monetary union” 
(Folan 2015).
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Wolf interprets it as Germany’s “effort of self-exculpation: as the eurozone’s 
largest supplier of surplus capital, its private sector bore substantial responsibility 
for the excesses that led to the crisis”. One of the most outspoken critics of the 
German government’s position and behaviour in the Greek crisis is Jurgen Habermas, 
one of the most influential contemporary European intellectuals: “I fear that the 
German government, including its social democratic faction, have gambled away in 
one night all the political capital that a better Germany had accumulated in half a 
century,” (…) by threatening Greece with an exit from the eurozone over the course 
of the negotiations, Germany had “unashamedly revealed itself as Europe’s chief 
disciplinarian and for the first time openly made a claim for German hegemony in 
Europe” (Habermas  2015). For Habermas, the “European Council is effectively 
declaring itself politically bankrupt: the de facto relegation of a member state to the 
status of a protectorate openly contradicts the democratic principles of the European 
Union” and “forcing the Greek government to agree to an economically question-
able, predominantly symbolic privatization fund cannot be understood as anything 
other than an act of punishment against a left-wing government. It’s hard to see how 
more damage could be done” (Habermas 2015). What we were witnessing in this 
Greek drama at European stage was no less than the loss of national sovereignty 
revealing the existence of a “democratic deficit” at national level. Instead of recog-
nizing the apparent design flaws in the architecture of EMU and assuming the co-
responsibility for the faulted EMU architecture and for ignoring the risks, such as 
the “double moral hazard” caused by the financial market and by countries accumu-
lating unsustainable public debt level partly also as a consequence of the neglected 
risks of the internal imbalances and looking jointlyfor more “equitable” solutions in 
the common interest of a true Economic (and Monetary) Union, creditor countries 
deviated the attention from the systemic failure by initiating a highly mediatized 
blame and shame game. Article 122 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union was not invoked, which would have allowed for “financial assistance to the 
Member State concerned” in a situation, “where a Member State is in difficulties or 
is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or excep-
tional occurrences beyond its control”. Unfortunately, Europe’s political leaders 
chose instead to engage in humiliating public insults against the lazy South and 
hegemonic Northern European countries, creating division and hostility.
Additionally, the failure in the monitoring and surveillance procedures was 
exposed as Greece has been part of EMU, and none of “the institutions” (European 
Commission, IMF, Eurostat, ECB) detected that the Greek figures and finances 
were fraudulent, or if they did they failed to ring the alarm bells in time. Even with-
out the “creative accounting measures”, the public deficit of 6% and the public debt 
level of Greece above 90% of GDP were high and posed a risk. While the debt level 
was an official precondition for joining EMU, and M3 money supply had been 
monitored by the ECB until 2003, both indicators were later disregarded although 
they could have been very important indicators for the internal imbalances and the 
rising unsustainability. Instead, no safeguard measures or remedies against the risks 
of macroeconomic imbalances were in place, and the policies to improve 
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competitiveness through cohesion funds to prepare for EMU membership were not 
sufficiently followed up once a member.
Furthermore, the publicly exposed punitive attitude with demands to expel 
Greece, implying and even stimulating an imminent sovereign default, and at the 
same time the exposed reluctance and negligent delays to assist Greece with the 
purpose to win regional elections in Germany, caused the yields to spread (undoing 
one of the major benefits of being a member of EMU), provoked the risk of conta-
gion and the crisis to deepen and put the entire EMU at risk.
“Seen in this light  Eichengreen’s (2012: 132) puzzle as to “why the German 
government…finds it even more difficult to sell its constituents on the idea that 
taxpayer money should be used to recapitalise the country’s own banks than to bail 
out Greece and Ireland””, H. Thomson argues that “If periphery bailouts have been 
unpopular in Germany it is because they have not been understood for what they 
were, which was an opportunity for Germany to ‘Europeanise’ the problems of its 
own banking sector, (…), but explaining its utility to the domestic political audience 
would have lessened the opportunity both to impose the costs of the banking crisis 
entirely on the debtor states and to change economic policies in the periphery 
through new institutional rules” (Thompson 2015). The imposition of the bailing 
out of the banks was not only in Germany’s interest but as well shared by a number 
of other core eurozone’s countries which joined efforts and policy stances to prevent 
that the ordo-liberal design would end up discredited and the fiscal framework and 
rules overhauled as a consequence. On the contrary, the Greek crisis served them 
well to go even further in tightening the fiscal rules and imposing “one-size-fits-all” 
austerity measures through the Troika and to undertake simultaneous fiscal budget 
consolidation not only to all the countries undergoing adjustment programmes but 
to furthermore impose it to the entire eurozone through the revised fiscal framework 
(SGP reforms: six pack and two pack, fiscal compact, ESM) resulting in the deep-
ending and prolonging of the crisis.
Finally, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was finally set up to 
provide financial assistance to euro area Member States threatened by financial dif-
ficulties, was set up as an intergovernmental institution governed by the Eurogroup 
in the form of its Board of Governors, and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the EMU (Fiscal Compact) requires even more stringent fiscal rules 
to be anchored within the national constitutions of the euro area countries. As a 
result, the “Fiscal Compact” succeeded in increasing credibility and incentives of 
fiscal consolidation but at the same time reduced the possibilities of counter-cyclical 
pro-growth policies and investment. A further aggravating aspect of both the ESM 
and the Fiscal Compact is that they are based – not on community law – but on 
intergovernmental treaties, thus circumventing democratic accountability to the 
European Parliament.
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 Consequences of “Governing by Rules” and “Ruling  
by Numbers” (Schmidt 2015)
As a consequence of this newly reinforced governance framework, Europe engaged 
from 2011 in coordinated simultaneous fiscal contraction across Europe, promoting 
austerity measures and retrenchment of the European social model and resulting in 
a further deepening and prolonging of the economic crisis and greater inequality 
and poverty in Europe. While the fiscal deficit was successfully reduced, neither the 
SGP nor the adjustment programmes succeeded to considerably reduce the debt 
level of the crisis countries (but had rather led to an increase due to the fall of GDP 
growth as a consequence of the adjustment programmes), which remain in some 
countries unsustainable in particular should another crisis erupt any time near. In 
2013, the IMF revealed that “fiscal multipliers were substantially higher than 
implicitly assumed by forecasters” and an economic paper of the European 
Commission expressed concerns about the impact of simultaneous austerity policy 
on negative spillovers across the euro area and on output (Veld 2013), admitting that 
“Indeed, these negative spill-overs have made adjustment in the periphery harder, 
and have further exacerbated the temporary worsening of debt-to-GDP ratios in 
programme and vulnerable countries”. The clear implication, therefore, is that 
countries would have grown more and would have seen their debt-to-GDP ratios fall 
more, if they had engaged in less austerity (Griffith-Jones 2014). The Commission’s 
economic paper concludes “Optimal policy coordination in the euro area would 
have required a differentiation of consolidation efforts depending on the fiscal space 
to minimize the negative spillovers” (Veld 2013).
In June 2014, the European Council finally reacted: “fiscal consolidation must 
continue in a growth-friendly and differentiated manner. Structural reform that 
enhance growth and improve fiscal sustainability should be given particular atten-
tion [...] while making best use of the flexibility that is built into the existing SGP” 
(European Council 2014). On January 2015, the European Commission published a 
communication on “Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules 
of the Stability and Growth Pact” (European Commission 2015), with the purpose 
to provide guidance on the best possible use of the flexibility built into the existing 
rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (without changing the treaty) in order to 
strengthen the link between investment, structural reforms and fiscal responsibility. 
However, the European Fiscal Board’s president Thygesen expressed the paradoxi-
cal conclusion that the rules allowing flexibility proved to be too rigid and limiting 
were applied at the wrong time and had procyclical effects and failed to protect 
growth enhancing investment from budget consolidation (European Fiscal Board 
2019). The economic consequence for the entire eurozone was a prolonged and 
deepened crisis with major social and political costs that have transformed Europe 
and the political systems at national level. In the countries undergoing adjustment 
programmes, the effects were even dramatic and in some cases have even led to a 
humanitarian crisis.
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In order to counteract these developments and to boost investment, employment 
and growth in the EU, Jean-Claude Juncker launched an Investment Plan for Europe, 
called the “Juncker Plan”, which allowed the European Investment Bank to instru-
mentalize part of the EU budget as a guarantee to leverage private investment, which 
became a success story and gave rise to further proposals for investment supporting 
programmes such as InvestEU and the European Investment Stabilization Function 
(see Griffith Jones in Chap. 21).
Apart from the European Economic Recovery Programme and the Juncker Plan, 
an evaluation of the crisis resilience and crisis management shows thus a rather 
sombre picture. It is true that the total meltdown of the global financial system could 
be avoided as was the sovereign default of one or several of EMU’s Member States 
and with it the risk of its implosion. On the downside, we would have to point out 
the deepening and prolonging of the financial and economic crisis leading to 
Europe’s lost decade, reduced growth, serious problems of low investment (both 
public and private), under-target inflation and low productivity growth, the rever-
sion of the achieved economic convergence and high social costs in the form of 
mass unemployment, in particular affecting Europe’s South and youth (lost genera-
tion). Greece’s youth unemployment hit the record with 58.2% in 2013, which left 
many of them no choice than to emigrate (celebrated by some economist as the 
necessary labour mobility, lamented by others for the economic consequences of the 
brain drain). Other consequences of the crisis for the entire euro area are the dis-
mantling of the European social model and the increase in poverty and precarious-
ness. In this way it is the European social model with strong welfare states paid the 
price for the failure that neoliberism caused both in regard to the design of EMU and 
in particularly concerning financial market’s role and regulation.
Finally, the political costs of the crisis and the way it had been managed find 
reflection in the division of Europe in winners and losers, Northern and Southern 
and core and periphery EMU members, a loss of trust in the EU and EMU, but even 
more in mainstream political parties and systems at national level, which brought 
about historic mass protests and the rise of new social movements asking for a para-
digm and system change and more direct democracy. After these demands had been 
largely ignored, began the mushrooming of new parties, increasingly polarized, first 
radically left and finally the rise of populist, nationalist and Eurosceptic movements 
and parties.
These developments have lasting impacts on the political landscape nationally and 
at EU level and led to an increasing polarization and destabilization of the national 
political systems and also at the EU level and the weakening of multilateral gover-
nance. Additionally, the prolonged crisis, the publicly exposed conflict and lack of 
solidarity between the member states, as well the retrenchment of the internationally 
appraised European social model in application of typically IMF style adjustment 
programmes, led to a loss of credibility, influence and international role of the Euro 
and the EU. As a consequence, the European model of regional integration lost in 
attractiveness in various regions of the world. While the worst of the financial and 
economic crisis might be overcome by now, its political consequences are here 
to stay.
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 Going Back in Time: A Failure of Design?
Here we come to the Gretchen Frage: Why was the EU and in particular the EMU 
not able to deliver appropriate and timely solutions and policies, first to avoid the 
crisis and second to manage the crisis? What were the flaws of the architecture of 
the EMU and which were the underlying reasons for them? Were the design flaws 
caused by too much “federalism”, “European centralism” or “supranationalism” – 
in other words were there too many competences and decisions transferred to the 
EU level and were they too distant from the electorate? Or did the EU or EMU not 
dispose of enough and adequate competences and tools at its disposition, in other 
words was the crisis management too reliant on national and “intergovernmental” 
elements and negotiations putting national interest before the “general interests of 
the EU” and thus impeding a more “European and solidary” crisis response? But the 
reading of the crisis resilience and management requires a deeper analysis, looking 
into the drafting and development of EMU comparing it to its predecessor: the 
Werner Plan in order to assess the impact of the paradigm change from Keynesian 
to neoliberalism and/or ordo-liberalism for the design and functioning of EMU in 
particular in view of the crisis, its management and resilience. What were the moti-
vations of and finally the reasons for the misjudgement, omissions and errors made 
by the authors of the Maastricht Treaty? These questions are crucial to determine 
the necessary reforms of EMU.
Let us start by the most obvious design flaws of EMU exposed by the crisis: by the 
time the financial crisis swapped over to Europe, it became clear that the architects of 
the Maastricht Treaty had first and foremost totally neglected the risk for financial and 
monetary instability stemming from the deregulated financial markets and capital 
market liberalization. Second, even more so, when the existence and consequences of 
the internal imbalances became an obvious threat and with it, third, the realistic pos-
sibility of a sovereign default of EMU member states with, fourth, the risk of conta-
gion becoming undeniable and clashed with the, fifth, self-imposed constraints of the 
prohibition of bailing out a member state in balance of payment crisis.
When the architecture of the building of EMU entails a number of “fundamen-
tal” errors, its stability is jeopardized; furthermore, the misconceptions proved even 
worse; when the crisis broke out, EMU did not foresee any mechanism of stabiliza-
tion, mutual assistance or solidarity such as a euro-area budget, a European Monetary 
Fund, a procedure for orderly debt restructuring. For inexplicable reasons, existing 
treaty provisions (Art 122, 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU)), which would have given a leeway for Member States in an excep-
tional situation, were not seized. The rules based on prohibiting risk-sharing or soli-
darity in order to work to counteract the risk of “moral hazard” of any Member State 
indulging in fiscal profligacy and free-riding of the benefits of a common currency 
on the other hand were considered prevailing over articles allowing for measures of 
solidarity and support in a situation of exceptional crisis, which was certainly the 
case considering the dimension of this financial crisis.
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Incoherently, at the same time the “risk of moral hazard arising from deregulated 
financial markets destabilizing EMU” had not been previously considered and defi-
nitely not been treated the same way. Paradoxically, measures of mutual assistance 
still remained possible for Member States which were not part of EMU, while for 
the eurozone member, solidarity measures were interpreted as prohibited (no bail-
out) in the Maastricht Treaty leading to extremely difficult conditions for any crisis 
management. Institutionally, the following design failures can thus be identified. 
Schoeller (2017) identified the existence of the “twofold lack of institutions” with, 
first, no institutions regulating the mutualisation of risk (distributional problem) 
and, second, the institutions built to prevent moral hazard, basically the Stability 
and Growth Pact and the “no-bailout clause” failing. Building on the analysis of 
Schoeller, I would furthermore identify four key aspects: firstly, in intentional omis-
sion of institutions, tools and rules foreseen for mutual assistance for a country 
faced with balance of payments problems or, to be more precise, treaty articles, 
which could have served as a basis for measures in a situation of crisis, were inten-
tionally disregarded. On the contrary, the rules, which explicitly prohibit any soli-
darity action (risk sharing) – both by Member States and by the ECB – were strictly 
applied until the risk of contagion threatened to blow up the euro area. Secondly, the 
EMU did not foresee any lender of last resort or rescue, in spite of the fact that 
national central banks were no longer able to play this role and the Member States 
had lost the tool of devaluating their currency. The ECB is forbidden to directly sup-
port EMU Member States but intervened in the secondary market and only in a later 
phase turned itself into a quasi-lender of last resort though “independent” (neither 
acting on request of a MS nor being prevented by a MS nor a national Court of 
Justice).
Thirdly, the treaties did not foresee any institution, decision-making process and 
financial tools, measures or means (euro-area budget, European Monetary Fund, 
Stabilization scheme or instrument) dealing with an EMU crisis. Historically, all 
EU countries should have been part of EMU, in which case all decisions would have 
taken place within its legal framework and institutions. Given that some countries, 
such as the UK and Denmark, had negotiated an opt-out option of EMU, and other 
countries have not “yet” joined EMU, the so-called Eurogroup was established as an 
informal discussion body, consisting of the Finance Ministers of the countries 
belonging to the eurozone. As a consequence, crisis management was done by the 
famous Merkelian way of “meddling through” – under the extreme pressure of time 
and financial markets – and, in a purely intergovernmental way, setting up further 
intergovernmental institutions (Troika, ESM) by (ab-)using the communitarian 
institutions (DG EcFin and the ECB) in an intergovernmental way and establishing 
further intergovernmental treaties (Fiscal Compact), all of this by bypassing 
accountability and democratic control by the European Parliament. As a conse-
quence, crisis management under these conditions allowed the richer and more 
powerful northern countries to dictate the rules to follow not only during the crisis 
management but also to the future as a precondition for any potential assistance. 
Germany, which had until recently duly avoided a dominant behaviour, ended up as 
being regarded as Europe’s authoritarian hegemon. Schoeller (2017) presents the 
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Fiscal Compact as perceived as the legitimate counter price for Germany joining 
the ESM.
Fourthly, the informal intergovernmental Eurogroup turned together with its 
pendant, the Euro Summit (the heads of states and governments of the euro area), 
into the most powerful decision-taking institutions. This development may well be 
considered the origin and cause of the erosion, regression and asymmetry of democ-
racy at national level and EMU level. Whereby the decision-making process within 
the Eurogroup should have been consensual, which effectively allowed the stron-
gest Member States (mostly also being the creditor countries), the strongest power, 
to eventually delay decisions (among others for national election purposes), to stim-
ulate the discussion on a GREXIT and as a consequence of it speculation leading to 
higher yields until the risk of contagion threatened the breakup of the eurozone. The 
so- called consensus decision-taking gives single countries the opportunity to black-
mail the others to obtain the agreement. The structure and decision-taking proce-
dure gave rise to a hegemony, which is detrimental to the European integration 
process in which all countries should participate as equals. Additionally, the hege-
mon could then determine the creation and design of future risk management insti-
tutions such as the ESM and as a precondition the so-called fiscal compact, both 
negotiated outside of the EU legal framework and circumventing the co-decision of 
the European Parliament and the accountability to it.
Fifthly, the Eurogroup “instrumentalized” community institutions for the pur-
pose of intergovernmental governance and implementation: the European 
Commission and the ECB served the Eurogroup within the so-called TROIKA, add-
ing the IMF to elaborate and implement adjustment programmes for the debtor 
countries. These adjustment programmes, in particularly the one for Greece, should 
probably rather be described as “punitive measures” than “assistance programmes” 
and had little to do with any spirit of solidarity. The motive behind was to create a 
deterrent for the future so that no country would engage in financial profligacy and 
plan to be a free rider. In fact, for the same reason Germany stimulated the debate 
and speculation on a GREXIT.
In fact it was the lack of EMU crisis institutions, instruments, procedures and tools 
within the legal framework of the EU which led to the ascension of the Eurogroup to 
the most important player, with a totally opaque decision-taking procedure and quasi-
zero democratic accountability. One of the most outspoken critics of the euro area 
crisis decision-taking process is the former EU Commissioner Moscovici who called 
it “a scandal in terms of democratic processes by deciding in this way the fate of a 
nation, imposing detailed decisions on pensions, the labour market” (Moscovici 
2017). He also criticized the Eurogroup’s extensive decisions, its structure, lack of 
transparency and accountability: “I am talking about the basic details of the life of a 
country which were decided in a body, behind closed doors, whose work is being 
prepared by technocrats without the minimum control of a parliament. Without the 
media really knowing what is being said, without stable criteria or a common guide-
line” (Ibid). Furthermore, Moscovici highlighted that the Eurogroup is not a place 
where national interests are overcome but rather that it has become the arena in which 
they clash so that the general European interest does not prevail. Indeed, the two 
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institutions, which represent the community interest within the EU legal framework, 
one is the European Commission and the other one is the European Parliament, have 
largely been sidelined by the Eurogroup – an informal and deeply intergovernmental 
forum without any pre-established rules and regulations and without any proper 
accountability. Within the Troika, the European Commission seems to be rather in the 
role of implementing the guidelines given by the Eurogroup, than assuming its role as 
the guardian of the treaties. Considering the intrusive recommendations of the Troika, 
one also wonders to what extent the Collegium has been involved in the decision-
taking or whether the Commission’s DG EcFin had a dominating role without taking 
into account social impact assessments. The European Parliament expressed itself as 
“alarmed by the admission by the former President of the Eurogroup before the 
European Parliament that the Eurogroup endorsed the recommendations of the Troika 
without extensive consideration of their specific policy implications” and stressed 
“that, if accurate, this does not discharge euro area finance ministers from their politi-
cal responsibility for the macroeconomic adjustment programmes and the MoUs”. 
Additionally, the European Parliament’s resolution on the Troika pointed out “that this 
admission sheds a worrying light on the blurred scope of the ‘technical advising’ and 
‘Eurogroup agency’ roles devolved to both the Commission and the ECB in the 
framework of the design, implementation and assessment of assistance programmes.” 
(European Parliament 2014a).
The Eurogroup’s decision-taking process remains opaque due to its confidential-
ity and lack of democratic accountability, which has been strongly criticized by the 
European Parliament and by the EU’s Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly – “It is obvi-
ously difficult for Europeans to understand that the Eurogroup, whose decisions can 
have a significant impact on their lives, [isn’t] subject to the usual democratic checks 
and balances”, both calling for reform (Smith-Meyer and Heath 2017). In particular 
on the subject of the crisis and its resolution, the Eurogroup had not foreseen any 
guidance, rules and procedures but actually works as an intergovernmental institu-
tion on the basis of “consensus” votes. On the one hand, this proved to be very 
detrimental in the situation of an “imminent” sovereign debt crisis requiring urgent 
decisions under pressure of financial market speculation. On the other hand, in the 
case of the Greek crisis, the existing rules were bent in two ways, there was no 
“consensus” attempted with Greece on the adjustment programs, but Greece was 
rather pressured into a “take it or leave it”, with neither elections (of governments 
with a programme, which was clearly opposing the kind of policies imposed by the 
adjustment programs) nor a referendum with two thirds majority against the auster-
ity policies making any difference and with putting pressure on the Greek govern-
ment and prime minister, one being replaced by a quasi-imposed caretaker 
government, not even being able to negotiate the choice of measures to achieve a 
determined objective of the bailout programme. Given the loopholes of properly 
governing institutions, the entire EMU construction bears a major flaw in terms of 
democratic accountability and legitimacy. Neither the Eurogroup nor the Euro 
Summit are official institutions of the EU legal framework, but informal bodies, 
which allow them to circumvent democratic accountability to the European 
Parliament. Although as a consequence of the critiscism raised by the European 
Parliament, the EU Ombudsman and numerous academics, the president of the 
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Eurogroup engaged on a voluntary basis to participate regularly in exchange of 
views in the European Parliament, however this does not change the fact that the 
Eurogroup remains legally not democratically accountable to the European 
Parliament. This lack of “identifiable”, in the sense to know who is really taking 
which decision, and “accountable” institutions provoked a severe lack of demo-
cratic accountability at national and European level. Indeed, only in a few countries 
there was a real accountability of the “national” finance minister to a “national” 
parliament on the adjustment programmes. The parliaments of the crisis countries 
were usually obliged to adopt a Memorandum of Understanding of the EMU with 
the euro area Member State in crisis as a precondition for financial assistance in the 
way of a “take it or leave it” deal, leaving little or virtually no choice of the mea-
sures to achieve the economic objectives to them and, at European level, by circum-
venting the European Parliament through an intergovernmental crisis management 
thus creating a “double democratic deficit”. Social partners of the crisis countries 
were also not properly consulted on the Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), 
but the recommendations of the MoUs even interfered with traditional collective 
bargaining structures to the detriment of labour in violation of EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and ILO conventions.
In retrospect, it is clear that the failures and flaws of the European economic archi-
tecture had proven to be very costly economically, socially and politically with deep 
and long-lasting effects on the European social model and democracy, as discussed in 
other articles of the book. The loss of trust in the EU was historic and only outper-
formed by the loss of trust in national institutions and parties, which is an indicator 
that citizens are indeed able to identify the politicians responsible for these failures 
and errors. The article will now attempt to sketch the role of the architects, their ideo-
logical mindset and the impact of the paradigm change for the design of EMU by 
comparing it to its predecessor, the Werner Plan, looking for the causes of these major 
flaws, omissions, errors and neglect, which proved so costly for Europe and its citi-
zens. As discussed in other chapters of this volume, especially Schulmeister, the 
negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty fell into the era of neoliberalism and shows clear 
traits of it as the comparison to its predecessor, which had still fallen in the era of 
Keynesianism. Accordingly, the single currency should eliminate transaction cost 
linked to currency conversion, and instabilities linked to exchange rate fluctuations in 
the single market, free capital flow and deregulated and globalized financial markets 
would lead to greater resource allocation and efficiency. Monetary policy with the 
primary objective of prices stability should play the predominant role and fiscal and 
labour policy, in the form of labour mobility, and accommodative wage policies 
should accommodate it. Political intervention and fiscal discretionary policy should 
be limited and tied into a very strict “golden straightjacket” and closely monitored. 
Within the EMU of Maastricht, the design foresees a “supranational monetary union”, 
which effectively had been “delegated” to an independent European Central Bank 
(ECB) with a very clear and limited mandate giving primacy to “price stability”, on 
the one hand, and a predominantly “intergovernmental economic union”, which fore-
sees a loose coordination with “disciplining” surveillance procedures by the suprana-
tional Commission and sanctions decided by the EcoFin Council, on the other hand.
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When considering the dominant role and absolute independence of the ECB and 
the disciplining aspect of economic policy without any solidarity mechanism in the 
Maastricht Treaty, it comes as no surprise that the blueprint of EMU has been 
drafted predominantly by the governors of Europe’s central banks, under the leader-
ship of the Deutsche Bundesbank. John Singleton described EMU “as a triumph for 
central bankers, and proof that they had become an influential epistemic commu-
nity. Predominantly central bankers and not politicians or the European central 
bureaucracy drew up the plans for the ECB and the Monetary Union, and they did 
so in accordance with the latest monetary orthodoxy” (Singleton 2011). The result 
is an “ordo-liberal” version of how Economic and Monetary Union should be 
designed and vision of the world, which stands in clear contrast to its “federalist” 
predecessor drafted by Pierre Werner in the 1970s.
Yves Mersch (2010) encouraged revisiting the Werner Plan: “We can call it truly 
visionary. Although many of the proposals of the original Werner plan have been 
realized, some of the original thoughts were ignored or diluted and we might with 
the benefit of hindsight, ask ourselves whether this has not been a mistake” (Mersch 
2010). The comparison of the blueprint of the Werner Plan with the Maastricht 
Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union clearly demonstrates that the Werner Plan 
is at the same time the more European and federalist in terms of being suprana-
tional, democratic and inclusive, involving both the European Parliament and the 
European social partners (both sides of industry) in an institutionalized way and the 
far more comprehensive including a monetary, an economic, a political, a cohesion 
and a social dimensions. The Werner Plan was clearly a child of the Keynesian era 
and regarded the European social model as a vital dimension of economic integra-
tion (Danescu 2018).
Both drafts did foresee the free movement of capital, not only within the EU but 
globally. However, only the Werner Plan addressed concerns about the destabilizing 
impacts financial speculation could have for EMU and proposed financial regulation 
and the taxation of capital. The same is true for the occurrence of internal imbalances. 
The Werner Plan showed far more visionary about the risk of the destabilizing effects 
of imbalances, which could occur in an Economic and Monetary Union, which did not 
achieve sufficient convergence. This was also the reason why Werner did include eco-
nomic and regional convergence into his EMU plan. The Werner Plan was more com-
plete in terms of a symmetric construction of EMU, of institution building both in 
terms of clearly identifiable decision-taking institution and accountability and in 
terms of a stabilization function. Regarding the power balance between economic and 
monetary policy, the Werner Plan did include both an European Economic Union and 
a Community system for the central banks. For the European Economic Union the 
Werner plan envisaged “a gradual transfer of powers of decision-taking to the EU 
level and at the final stage the establishment of a “centre of decision for economic 
policy”. In parallel, Werner planed the gradual development of a “Community system 
for the central banks” and a “European Fund for monetary cooperation under the con-
trol of the Governors of the central banks.” The role of this fund was supposed to be 
to absorb the mechanisms for monetary support at short term and for financial aid at 
medium term, a stabilization instrument intentionally missing in the EMU blueprint. 
These institutions, while safeguarding their own responsibilities, were to be furnished 
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with effective powers of decision and to work together for the realization of the same 
objectives. The centre of economic decision was planned to be politically responsible 
to a European Parliament. 
TREATIES AND
REFORMS
INCLUDING
WERNER PLAN
Treaty of
ROME
Werner Plan Maastricht
Treaty
Reforms at the Crisis
2007/8 and following
Free capital movements
(inside and outside of
EMU, EU)
NO  ´´ 
Single currency re-
placing national
currencies
NO Community 
currencies 
should be 
completely and 
irreversibly 
convertible at 
permanently 
fixed rates of 
parity. 
Preference
for a single 
common 
currency. T

ESCB or ECB in
charge of Monetary
Union
No  
ECB independent  
ECB, price stability as
primary objective
 
ECB in charge of
Prudential super-vision
of banks
NO No No

ECB lender of last
resort
N0  ECB not
authorized to 
lending to any 
public 
institution or 
authority (local, 
national, EU)
+/-
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but indirectly
via secondary 
markets
Reference/ to the nexus
to the financial market
and regulation (later
banking union)
No  No
__-_
Banking Union 
regulation, supervision
but missing EDIS
Multilateral assistance
in payment difficulties
for members of EU/
EMU
  _NO
no bailout 
clause or EMU 
for EMU 
members,
ESM as an inter-
governmental 
organisation outside EU 
legal frame-work, 
assistance without  
accountability to the EP 
YES
multilateral 
assistance only 
for MS outside 
of EMU
YES:
Legally possible
but not applied:
Article 122
TFEU
Reference to the
Macroeconomic
imbalances
  - NO
no mentioning
MIP (Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure with 
a bias on deficit countries)
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Comprehensive 
approach 
encompassing 
Monetary, Fiscal &
Political governance
 
gradual and 
Parallel 
movement 
towards 
economic policy 
convergence and 
the imposition of 
monetary 
constraints with 
the parallel 
transfer of 
powers and 
corresponding 
development of 
EU institutions.
+/-
+
Monetary Union 
(suprationation
al)
YES
-NO
Economic Policy 
remained 
largely national 
and 
intergovernmen
tal
Economic policy national, 
but coordination (Europ. 
semester), monitoring 
through Commission tand 
possibility of (light 
sanction for non-
compliance) through 
Council (never applied)
2020 Recovery Package
Common rescue package 
financed by grants and 
loans and EU bonds, 
,temporary fiscal 
stabilization function 
through increase of 
budget, SURE, RRF, 
InvestEU,
TSI
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Horizontal democracy
social partner
involvement

Social Partners 
have an 
essential role in 
the 
establishment 
and during 
EMU decision 
taking, 
As a 
consequence of 
the UK 
resistance, not 
within EMU 
chapter 
(but in annex of 
Maastricht is a 
Social Chapter 
with an 
increased role 
for the Social 
partners). For 
this reason the 
adjustment 
programmes 
and the MoU 
could violate the 
social charter 
without 
violating EU 
primary law.
Social partners in the 
crisis or crisis 
management not in-
volved, MoUs often 
interfered in the national 
social fabric to the 
detriment of labour, 
imposing the 
retrenchment of collective 
bar-gaining to the 
company level and cutting 
of labour rights
Euro area economic
decision taking body
within the EU legal
framework
-

Centre of 
decision for 
economic policy 
Only ‘informal 
Euro Group’ and 
informal ‘Euro 
summit’, 
without rules 
and procedures, 
intergovernmen
tal decision-
taking
Informal Euro Group and 
Euro Summit turned ‘de 
facto’ into the most 
powerful institutions,
instrumentalization of  
the Troika and the ESM..
Accountability of fiscal
policy to the European
parliament
-  Lack of 
accountability of 
EP outside of decisions on 
crisis, its management, 
policies
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The comparison between the Werner Plan and the Maastricht Treaty puts in evi-
dence the influence and impact of the paradigm change from Keynesianism to neo- 
and ordo-liberalism in the construction of EMU, exchanging a “federalist” for an 
“intergovernmental” blueprint of EMU, which led to the elimination of crucial ele-
ments and building stones of EMU architecture, which would have been essential to 
make the EMU more resistant and resilient to crisis and would have allowed a more 
efficient, equitable and democratic crisis management. These elements which had 
been removed from the Werner plan and turned the Maastricht Treaty deficient 
reach from taking account of the risks of deregulated financial markets and internal 
imbalances, to political institution building and appropriate democratic account-
ability and to solidarity or “risk sharing” and stabilization elements such as a 
European Monetary Fund and an EMU budget. According to the McDougall report, 
which analysed the conditions necessary for the implementation of EMU from the 
Werner Plan, the EMU budget should have been between 2.5 and 10% of Union 
GNI. These intentional omissions of the Maastricht blueprint in turn proved to be 
the major flaws in the design of EMU when the financial crisis broke out and largely 
contributed to the sovereign debt crisis, became the source of policy errors in crisis 
management and led to a major EMU governance crisis due to publicly exposed 
conflicts.
The Werner Plan in contrast did foresee a two-pillar model with both a monetary 
union and an economic union called “centre of decisions for economic policy”, and 
both pillars “must work together for the realization of the same objectives” (Werner 
1970). In the moment of crisis, it was actually precisely the supranational pillar, the 
ECB, which after initial hesitations, was the one to provide support, stabilize the 
situation and bring resilience to the euro area, in particular from the moment on, 
when former ECB president M. Draghi pronounced his magic words on 12 July 
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2012: “within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the 
euro. And believe me, it will be enough” (Draghi 2012). From that date on, the ECB 
started to take over its responsibility as a lender of last resort and became the stron-
gest element warranting the survival of EMU.  His words put a halt to financial 
speculation and contained the sovereign debt crisis to restore confidence through a 
series of extraordinary measures to support euro area’s governments and banks, 
proof of the effectiveness of risk sharing. Had the countries of the Eurogroup 
behaved in similar unitary, determined and problem-solving-oriented manner, the 
probability of a sovereign debt crisis would have been much reduced and the crisis 
shorter, less profound and less painful and politically could have strengthened the 
EU internationally and externally. The ECB, being independent and supranational, 
had uncontestably made the greatest contribution to contain the crisis and had turned 
into one of the most powerful, and certainly the most independent central banks in 
the world. Powerful because, on the one hand, it turned into the real “European 
Central Bank,” and a “quasi lender of last resort” with an additionally extended 
mandate to the supervision of the banks. The ECB grew and gained power with this 
crisis, in which it had initially been too timid to assume its role to act with counter-
cyclical measures to contain and combat the crisis but turned into the strongest actor 
of crisis management in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
On the downside of the increased power, we note that the ECB started to over-
reach its powers by actively interfering, controlling and in some cases even sanc-
tioning economic and fiscal policies of Member States such as Greece, Ireland and 
even Italy (which was not even undergoing a Troika adjustment programme). The 
latter role has brought the ECB considerable criticism for its “overreach” and inter-
ference and apparent “conflict of interest” between its role as central bank and 
lender of last resort of all the MS, including the debtor countries, and its role, inter-
est and measures within the TROIKA and as a creditor. The ECB engaged actively 
in fiscal but also socioeconomic affairs of the Member States, impacting distribu-
tional aspects and the social fabric such as pushing for the transferal of collective 
bargaining from central or sectoral level to the enterprise level and other matters of 
collective bargaining and labour law, always in the direction of weakening the 
power and conditions of labour, which paradoxically implies that the “independent” 
central bank interferes in the “independent” social partner negotiations and struc-
tures in violation of the article 152 of the TFEU, which explicitly enshrines that 
“The Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its level, tak-
ing into account the diversity of national systems. It shall facilitate dialogue between 
the social partners, respecting their autonomy.” The consequence of this interfer-
ence within the adjustment programmes is the weakening of the bargaining power 
of the labour side, which economically translates in the result that the recent 
improvement of the labour market does not have the appropriate consequences on 
wage growth and thus contributes directly to the lower than target inflation rate of 
2%. The ECB finds itself confronted with the (self-inflicted) dilemma that while of 
the improved labour market trends are improving, this does not sufficiently translate 
into wage growth and consequently does not find reflection in inflation growth.  The 
underlying reasons for this development are the imposed structural reforms leading 
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to labour slack (underemployment of labour in involuntary part time and flexible 
and precarious jobs) and the interference in collective bargaining structures to the 
detriment of labour (ECB 2019).
The first institution to voice criticism about the conflict of interest, the overreach 
and the lack of democratic accountability given its increase in powers was the 
European Parliament, which had installed a Special Committee on the Financial, 
Economic and Social Crisis (CRIS) in 2010 and a Troika Inquiry Committee in 
2014–2015. The ECB can be considered the most independent of all central banks 
since the ECB has only a “formal” accountability requirement to the European 
Parliament, which consists rather in a transparency obligation while the EP has 
limited possibilities to “change” the policy of the ECB, mainly through the hearings 
of the president and the board of the ECB and through public pressure. In contrast 
to the European Parliament, the FED has a “dual” mandate, price stability and 
employment, and has a “factual accountability”. The Congress has the possibility to 
actually change the mandate of the FED, if it is not satisfied with the institution and 
its work (Hoffmann-Althelm 2017).
In Europe, a change of the mandate of the ECB would require a treaty change, 
which is very difficult to achieve since all MS have to agree. The result of the 
Maastricht Treaty in line with the objectives of neoliberalism is a shift of power to 
the markets by guaranteeing free capital flows and deregulated financial markets 
and to “limit the discretionary power of government(s)”, by a framework of strict 
budgetary and fiscal rules and criteria and the transfer of monetary competences to 
an independent central bank with a restricted mandate on price stability. 
Neoliberalism and ordo-liberalism left a clear imprint on the Maastricht design, by 
basically “eliminating” the economic union pillar from the original Werner EMU 
blueprint: its institutions, instruments and stabilization and convergence tools and 
democratic accountability to the European Parliament and horizontal democracy by 
a stronger involvement of the social partners from the more “federalist” Werner 
plan. In spite of forming an “Economic and Monetary Union”, any element of soli-
darity or risk sharing or stabilization function such as a euro area budget, a European 
Monetary Fund, Eurobond or an unemployment insurance scheme to assist in cases 
of balance of payment problems has been eliminated. According to the architects of 
Maastricht, the risk of a sovereign default should have been avoided by the prohibi-
tions of “bailouts” and the “disciplining role of financial markets”, imposing “own 
responsibility on the Member States” and with two ways of combating a sovereign 
default: first, by internal devaluation, in this way by the application of tough budget 
consolidation and rigid austerity measures, to the greatest extent by cutting wages, 
pensions and social benefits, thus on the back of the poorest strata of society, and, 
second, by bailing-in the creditors – that private creditors (banks) would take over 
the losses in case of sovereign default.
Although the bailing-in option had been Germany’s position all the way during 
and after the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty (Moody), Thompson (2015)
points out that Germany found itself in the delicate situation that these private credi-
tors, which were to shoulder the loss, were in the Greek case, mainly French and 
German banks. Additionally, nearly half of foreign claims on Portugal, Ireland, 
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Italy, Greece and Spain in the final quarter of 2009 belonged to the two countries. 
German banks were already vulnerable “to the prevailing problems of funding in 
the wholesale markets, as well as the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage-backed 
securities market”. “The German government had already taken measure to respond 
to the financial crisis by establishing a €480B federal bank rescue fund, and by mid-
February 2009, the cost of German financial stabilization amounted to 3.1 per cent 
of GDP, compared to 1.8 per cent for France and 0.9 per cent for Italy (IMF 2009: 
48). Additionally, Germany also had by the same time $556B of sovereign guaran-
teed bank debt, which was significantly higher than that reported by the IMF for 
other European states except Ireland (IMF 2009: 49) (Thompson 2015). On the 
background of these massive interests, Germany’s reaction to the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis becomes clearer. Germany was the country which most delayed an EU 
reaction and even stirred the crisis of confidence by public statements which envis-
aged the possibility of a GREXIT. Germany had prevented Greece turning to the 
IMF to request balance of payment assistance in the early phase of the Greek crisis 
but later was one of the strongest supporters of their involvement. The reason behind 
is that the IMF as a usual praxis initiates its involvement with a debt sustainability 
assessment and would have suggested an early debt restructuring, which had been 
the IMF’s position throughout its involvement. At the same time, Germany refused 
the possibility of a “European solution” but simply threatened a Grexit and delayed 
the decision-taking leading to the spread of the yields until it became clear that there 
was a clear risk of contagion to other periphery countries among which some “too 
big to fail”, which might put the existence of the eurozone at risk.
In the case of an early declaration of sovereign default by Greece and a later col-
lapse of the eurozone, the burden of the debts would have fallen on the private credi-
tors of the central or northern countries and would probably have resulted in their 
bailing out through their governments and figured among their public debt. It 
appears to be logically in the interest of Germany to support the bailout programmes 
to Europe’s periphery under the condition that the funds would be used to bail out 
the private creditors: “In outcomes, the first Greek bailout and the subsequent deals 
for Ireland and Portugal effectively moved liability for bad loans in the periphery 
from German and French banks to the IMF, EU, ECB and EFSF for which Germany 
and France bore a share of responsibility but not the whole. Put differently, these 
bailouts shifted the risk of default in the periphery from German and French banks 
to collective European and other taxpayers, and the burden of the internal imbal-
ances entirely to the debtor countries” (Thompson 2015).
Had the objective been an efficient and equitable bailout of Greece and avoiding 
the euro crisis, then “the haircut should have taken place much earlier so that private 
creditors would have taken the loss” (Rocholl and Stahmer 2016). The Swiss ESMT 
study on the Greek bailout assessed that less than 10 billion euros (9.7 billion) from 
Greece’s first two international bailouts of the amount of 216 billion euros ended up 
in the hands of the Greek treasury to help the economy to kick start. The lion’s share 
of the rescue money sent to Greece was used for debt repayments (86.9 bn), interest 
payments (52.3 bn), bank recapitalization (37.3 bn) and debt restructuring. 
Additionally, there come accusations that Germany had “massively profited from 
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the crisis in Greece” (Rocholl and Stahmer 2016). The German Green MP, Sven- 
Christian Kindler, expressed his disapproval: “It cannot be the case that the German 
government consolidates the German budget with billions in Greek interest profits”; 
“Greece needs air to breath and room for manoeuvre for investments and fighting 
poverty in the country”. Germany has received euro 3.4 billion in interest payments 
on Greek bonds that were both through the no-defunct bond-buying programme 
according to the figures that were obtained from the government on Thursday by 
Germany’s Green Party. Germany has also received a total of euro 400 m on a loan 
from the KfW development bank. Germany has so far repaid euro 527 m of interest 
payments to Greece in 2013 and euro 387 m in 2014. But those repayments were 
halted after Greece’s second bailout programme was agreed in 2015, leaving 
Germany accumulating the ongoing Greek interest payments (Allen and Chazan 
2018). Eurozone countries bought 210 bn euros of government paper, including 
Greek bonds, from 2010 onwards in a bid to provide greater liquidity to the bloc’s 
banks as the Greek debt crisis took hold (ibid).
Finally, debt restructuring for sovereign creditors was not achieved in the form of 
a haircut, as had been for private creditors after Deauville, but in a postponement of 
the majority of repayments on the euro 228 bin that Greece owes to the rest of the 
eurozone until after 2030. It also includes returning to Greece the annual profits that 
euro area central banks made on their holdings of the country’s debt, however only 
from 2017 financial year onwards. Tied to it remains the closer monitoring of 
Greece’s fiscal policy and its obligations signed in the MoUs. As Geoffrey Sachs 
said, “the German taxpayers believe that they have been extremely generous to 
Greece, giving Greece repeated financial loans. Yet this is partly a mirage. The tax-
payers have been generous to their own banks, not to Greece” (Sachs 2015).
De Grauwe (2015) highlights that the eurocrisis is in reality a systemic problem 
of the architecture of EMU. First, EMU ripped off Member States their capacity of 
exchange rate devaluations and of the automatic stabilizers for the recovery without 
any compensating EMU stabilization function nor solidarity mechanism in place at 
European level. Second, he underlines the destabilizing role of the financial markets 
for the stability of EMU, “When entering a monetary union, member-countries 
change the nature of their sovereign debt in a fundamental way, i.e. they cease to 
have control over the currency in which their debt is issued”. As a result, financial 
markets can force these countries’ sovereigns into default. In this sense, member 
countries of a monetary union are downgraded to the status of emerging economies. 
This makes the monetary union fragile and vulnerable to changing market senti-
ments. De Grauwe concludes that, thus, “in a monetary union, financial markets 
acquire tremendous power and can force any member country on its knees, (...) This 
has the effect of pushing the country into a bad equilibrium, characterized by pun-
ishingly high interest rates, chronically high budget deficits, low growth and a 
domestic banking crisis”. Third, he argues that given the degree of financial integra-
tion in the monetary union, other countries are affected by the risk of contagion. 
And at last, De Grauwe, after analysing the implications of this fragility for the 
governance of the Eurozone, concludes that additionally “some of the features of 
the new financial assistance are likely to increase this fragility. In addition, it is also 
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likely to rip member-states of their ability to use the automatic stabilizers during a 
recession. This is surely a step backward in the long history of social progress in 
Europe”.
 Democratic Legitimacy and Accountability
After sketching the EMU crisis response and exposing the design flaws of EMU 
architecture and their economic, social and political consequences, and after analys-
ing the impact of the ordo-liberal mindset of the epistemic community in charge of 
drafting the blueprint as well as the impact of the of the paradigm change on the 
design and on its more “federalist” or more “intergovernmental” features by com-
paring the Werner Plan versus the Maastricht Treaty, the chapter will last but not 
least turn to the core question of the democratic consequences and legitimacy crisis 
exposed by the crisis: the Double Democratic Deficit. The rapporteur of the 
European Parliament’s Special Committee on the Financial, Economic and Social 
Crisis (CRIS) report, and of the EP review of the economic governance framework: 
stocktaking and challenges, Pervenche Beres, expressed her opinion that “there is 
an increasing sense of a double democratic deficit in an enhanced economic gover-
nance framework of the Union at both the EU and at national levels. There is thus a 
need for both the European Parliament and National Parliaments to seek ways to 
increase their involvement, taking into account their respective roles” (European 
Parliament 2014b).
The “original sin” in terms of a weakening of the democratic legitimacy and 
accountability started when the Eurogroup, originally foreseen as an informal and 
confidential coordination club among euro area finance ministers, turned with the 
eurocrisis into the most powerful institution in the EU and led to a “shift away from 
the Community method towards intergovernmental coordination. The European 
Council and the Eurogroup have played a dominant role throughout the process and 
have often interfered in the prerogatives of the European Parliament, e.g. when it 
unilaterally decided that the EU budget would guarantee for the EFSM loans with 
the margin between the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) ceiling and the 
Own Resources ceiling. In the newly created institutional setting, the European 
Parliament and its national counterparts only play a marginal role and have thus 
been largely deprived of their constitutionally granted powers as regards budgetary 
autonomy respectively oversight” (European Parliament 2016). This put the spot-
light to the increasing erosion of democracy at EMU level, while at the same time 
euro area finance ministers argue that they are accountable only to national parlia-
ments in particular since the responsibility of the budget lies with them.
One of the most outspoken critics of the euro area crisis decision-making process 
is the former commissioner Moscovici, when he expressed that “It is a scandal in 
terms of democratic processes, not because the decisions were scandalous, but 
because by deciding in this way the fate of a nation, imposing detailed decisions on 
pensions, the labour market” (Moscovici 2015). He also criticized the Eurogroup’s 
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extensive decisions, its structure, lack of transparency and accountability. “I am 
talking about the basic details of the life of a country which were decided in a body, 
behind closed doors, whose work is being prepared by technocrats without the mini-
mum control of a parliament. Without the media really knowing what is being said, 
without stable criteria or a common guideline” (Moscovici 2015).
The German finance minister Scholz defended in a meeting in the Economic and 
Monetary Committee of the European Parliament that the national finance ministers 
are accountable to their national parliaments and thus democratic accountability is 
warranted. This argument is strengthened on the one hand by the fact that the 
national parliament is the one which has control on the budget foreseen and taking 
into account the ruling of the German Constitutional Court which anchors the role 
of the German national parliament for any major financial obligations or transfers. 
Yet his statement bears a certain weakness since the finance minister is only elected 
and mandated nationally to represent national interests but decides on policies of the 
entire euro area without being accountable to neither the European Parliament nor 
to the parliaments of the crisis country, while the institutions which represent the 
general interest of the EU were either “instrumentalized” for the purposes of inter-
governmental governance and submitted under the interest of the most powerful 
member states or cut out of the decision-making process creating an “imbalance 
between the decision-taking institutions at EU level” and leading to a regression of 
democratic decision-taking rights. For this reason, Commissioner Moscovici 
expressed his doubts about the Eurogroup’s capacity to negotiate a consensus in 
which the general European interest prevails: “The Eurogroup is not a place where 
national interests are overcome; it has become the arena in which they clash” 
(Moscovici 2015). This is even more true in the moment of an urgent crisis when 
considerable national interests are at stake. Interestingly, at global level, it is the 
debtor country, which penalizes the creditor countries and changes the rules, while 
at EMU level, it occurs the other way around. The common trait is that the most 
powerful states turn into hegemons to the detriment of a more democratic order or 
multilateral organization of equals. An interesting question to analyse in a future 
research is the correlation between democracy and supranationalism and multilat-
eral governance with the rise of the hegemons.
Indeed, considering the EU architecture, we can identify both intergovernmental 
institutions, such as the Council or national parliaments and supranational institu-
tions such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, the ECB and the 
European Court of Justice representing the community interest. Just like in the 
USA, the two houses, Senate and Congress, guarantee a balance between national 
interest and the community or general interests of the Union and in the case of the 
EP of the citizens too. Yet, within Economic and Monetary Union, this balance has 
not been ensured or not even constructed from the moment on that the possibility of 
an opting out had been granted and thus have led to the creation of the Eurogroup, 
leading to a situation that the more decisions had been taken on an intergovernmen-
tal basis, treaties have been signed and institutions have been founded on an inter-
governmental basis, the more democracy has been eroded at national and at EMU 
level. However, within the EMU construction, the Commission could not assume 
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the role it has been assigned within the EU Treaties: to defend the Community inter-
est and to defend the European Treaties and laws. As Commissioner Moscovici 
notes “Yet the voice of the Commission does not carry as far as the Eurogroup – an 
informal and deeply intergovernmental forum without any pre-established rules and 
regulations  – or it does not carry far enough, at any rate, to allow the general 
European interest to prevail” (Moscovici 2015).
The same lack of the priority or in some cases even vision of the “general 
European interest” together with the lack of capacity to negotiate a European com-
promise or grand deal is true for the national parliaments. The mandate of a member 
of a national parliament (NP) is to look after their national interest, which finds 
reflection in their divergent positions in the matter of economic governance. “There 
is no such a thing like a NPs’ unitary position on how to cope with the democratic 
weaknesses of the system of coordination of national economic policies. Next to the 
divide between Eurozone vs. non-Eurozone NPs, there are divides between parlia-
ments of rescued countries and parliaments of the states that most prominently 
offered financial assistance and between parliaments of ‘Southern Europe’, in 
favour of anti-cyclical policies, and parliaments of ‘Northern Europe’ supporting 
austerity measures” (Fasone 2019).
The European Parliament, in contrast to the national parliaments, is the locus, 
public space or agora, in which these deliberations and debates are being held and 
compromise positions are being negotiated, of which the numerous resolutions on 
the crisis and reform proposals are proof and may serve a precious advice for future 
reforms of EMU and its crisis management. In the European Parliament, directly 
elected members from all the Member States form ideological groups or parties and 
mostly vote along the ideological lines, which allows compromises that bridge the 
interest conflicts between creditor and debtor countries. However, given that EMU 
crisis management took place outside of the EU legal framework, the European 
Parliament was largely excluded from the real decision-taking process. P. Mocscovici 
resumed on the European Parliament’s role and influence in the crisis management: 
“It was the great absentee in the Greek crisis. But then, to whom should it have 
turned? To the Commission in its capacity as negotiator? To the president of the 
Eurogroup, who is not answerable to it? To the IMF, which is even less answerable 
to it? Or to the European Stability Mechanism, which is a purely intergovernmental 
organisation? And the secondary question is this: how much weight did the European 
Parliament carry in the Greek crisis by comparison with the German Bundestag or 
the Finnish Eduskunta?” (Moscovici 2017).
Commissioner Moscovici’s remarks reveal the further democratic regression 
provoked by the eurozone crisis having given rise to a quasi-oligarchic dominance 
among the MS, asymmetry and certainly an increasing disparity in democratic 
rights between creditor and debt countries. “Although there are exceptions, typi-
cally the parliaments of Eurozone countries receiving financial assistance or support 
(Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) have been those most concerned by 
a significant loss of influence in budgetary matters. By contrast, the legislatures of 
some Eurozone countries regarded as fiscally virtuous, like Austria, Finland and 
Germany, have seen their budgetary powers, at least, safeguarded domestically in 
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the constitutional framework emerging from the Euro-crisis” (Riekmann and Wydra 
2013). Eurobarometer opinion polls on “My Voice counts in the EU” reflect the 
same picture since the outbreak of the crisis: citizens of the creditor countries con-
sider with a large majority that their voice counts in the EU, while the citizens of the 
deficit countries have the opposite feeling that their voice does not count. As a con-
sequence, we would have to conclude that the EMU architecture and eurozone crisis 
led not only to a regression in terms of economic and social convergence but also in 
terms of democratic decision-taking and accountability rights within the eurozone, 
reminding of the initial stage of democracies in Greece, where democratic rights 
were limited to a citizen of a certain level of wealth (and at that time also sex and 
nationality) and early stages of European democracies.
As a consequence of the euro crisis, the national parliaments of the deficit coun-
tries mostly only had the choice between the lesser of two evils: sovereign default 
and leaving the euro area or adjustment programmes, which in the end turned out to 
be economically either doubt or harmful, procyclical, socially and politically pain-
ful and destabilizing by leading to an internal devaluation of 25% by imposing 
austerity and social cuts. Democratically, these MoUs were largely imposed by the 
Eurogroup via the Troika, in many cases without considering the local economic, 
social and political situation or priorities, without a proper impact assessment and 
broader democratic consultation. It is rather doubtful that the “general European 
interest” has been in the focus of the crisis management of the eurozone, when con-
sidering the following three points: First, the burden of adjustment was entirely put 
on the deficit countries: both in the obligation to bail out the banks and in terms of 
the policy mix they had to follow. The IMF had already in 2011 given the same 
advice as the European Fiscal Board emphasizes in 2019 that the countries which 
find themselves with more fiscal space should run an expansionary policy while the 
countries with excessive deficits and debts need to undertake measures of budget 
consolidation. In reality, Germany and the other countries which should have played 
the role of the motors of the European recovery preferred to prove themselves as 
examples in budget consolidation, leading Europe’s economy to the verge of 
recession.
Second, the Troika follows the instructions of whom and was/is accountable to 
whom? In other words, who decided these policies and on the basis of which rules, 
guidelines, principles and interests? Who carries the responsibility for their deci-
sions and as was the case with the past adjustment programmes for their heavy 
economic, social and political costs? In any sound democratic system, there would 
be checks and balances; in the case of decisions taken by elected representatives, 
they would either be rewarded through re-elections or sanctioned by losing the elec-
tions and their political mandate in the case that the policies were not considered 
successful or appropriate. If the decisions were based on the expertise of some tech-
nocratic entity to which the decision-taking or at least shaping powers have been 
delegated, these experts or technocrats would lose their credibility and reputation 
and would sooner or later also lose their function or the entire institution to which 
the decision-taking or shaping power was delegated would be abolished or at least 
diminished in influence. In the case of the eurocrisis decision, the situation is not so 
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clear. Some countries succeeded to push through decisions which were very much 
in their national interest, and from a national (short-term) perspective, these deci-
sions were beneficial (to their nation) and thus will be rewarded. Other nations did 
not really have much choice and influence, in which case there would either occur a 
sanctioning through elections or on the contrary a sympathy and identification with 
the national leader against certain other European leaders or the EU as a whole. The 
prolonged crisis, fall of investment and growth and the fact that the adjustment pro-
grammes did not lead to a debt reduction in highly indebted countries but had rather 
increased them and prolonged and deepened the crisis are rather interpreted as con-
sequences of not following the rules and insufficient reform efforts by the crisis 
countries than as wrong policy recommendations and procedures.
Transparency EU summarizes the malaise of the Eurogroup’s accountability 
regime with two quotes: one by German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, 
“Elections change nothing. There are rules”, and the other by the Finnish finance 
minister describing Germany’s raw power: “Schäuble has been the treasurer of 
Europe and the de facto finance minister for the eurozone”. It concludes “When 
votes and electoral outcomes can ‘change nothing’, while the finance minister of a 
‘creditor’ country is described as the ‘de facto finance minister’ of several ‘debtor’ 
countries, citizens (rightly) see ‘constrained government’ and ‘democracy without 
choice’, with negative consequences for their participation in elections and their 
satisfaction with democracy”. This is consistent with Seymour Martin Lipset’s 
warning that without democratic participation and accountability, a society loses the 
capacity “to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions 
are the most appropriate ones”. In other words, what is at stake in the debate about 
economic governance in the euro area is nothing less than the legitimacy, and viabil-
ity, of liberal democracy (Braun and Huebner 2019).
Third, the rise of the hegemon. Here, we touch a vulnerable point of the current 
decisions in the crisis management and in the shaping of the adjustment pro-
grammes. Clearly, the one institution with the strongest decision-taking power is the 
Eurogroup, on the basis of which decisions the Euro Summit takes the final deci-
sions. The Troika itself is consisting of three very different institutions with differ-
ent mandates: The Commission, the ECB and the IMF. Both the first two institutions 
are bound to the treaties and objectives of the EU, yet it seems that they have rather 
been “instrumentalized” by the informal Eurogroup without the adequate role 
assigned to them by the European Treaties, thus losing their “independence” vis-a- 
vis the Member States (in particularly the most powerful), by the fact that the 
Eurogroup is not an institution anchored in the EU treaties. The IMF has been added 
to form the Troika, for its “know-how”, already having the appropriate reputation 
about its Washington consensus style adjustment programmes, which would lead to 
more neoliberal reforms in the adjustment countries. While Germany had initially 
been fiercely opposed that Greece as a euro area country would go to the IMF to ask 
for assistance of balance of payment problems, in a later phase it was particularly 
Germany who was most in favour of adding the IMF to the Troika, when the deci-
sions on the first bailout programmes to Greece had already been taken. Indeed, the 
reason behind the change of attitude could be that the IMF usually assesses the debt 
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sustainability of any candidate for an adjustment programme. In a case like Greece, 
the usual advice of the IMF would have been a haircut of the creditors, meaning a 
bailing-in of the banks which had provided the easy credits. In the case of Greece, 
this would have been mainly French and German banks (ESMT’s Jörg Rochol).
The Commission had lost power within the euro area crisis management, in par-
ticular when we think of its “right to initiative”. It had rather the role of a technocrat 
organization which had to prepare economic justifications for political guidelines or 
orders which came from the Eurogroup or single members of the Eurogroup and 
later execute them and monitor the implementation, for which the European 
Commission is being blamed as being the disadvantage of a more “politicized 
Commission” and for not having guarded its respective role as a guardian of the 
European Treaties and the acquis communautaire, including the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the Social Rights. One cannot but wonder if the Commission 
did take these decisions by Collegium and about the role of the Commissioner in 
charge of social policy. On the one hand, the Commission is blamed for not having 
been sufficiently strict in terms of monitoring the fiscal policies and situation of the 
Member States before the crisis. The later aspect has led to two reforms: on the one 
hand, a strengthened role for the Commission in the surveillance of the fiscal poli-
cies and, on the other hand, also to the establishment of the European Fiscal Board 
and analogous independent fiscal boards at national level.
The European Court of Justice warned in its Pringle Judgement of a certain con-
flict of interest of its role as the guardian of the Treaties and the one in the Troika. 
Additionally, the “instrumentalization” of the Commission by the Eurogroup within 
the Troika has also led to an increasing asymmetry of accountability of the European 
Commission between the EP and the Council.
The ECB’s role was already addressed above; interestingly, the supranational 
pillar turned out to be the most effective regarding crisis management. However, on 
the downside was the “overreach” of an independent central bank on national gov-
ernments policy priorities, with the double problematic that it cannot be its role and 
mandate and in particular without the “appropriate” democratic accountability nei-
ther at national nor at EU level. Should the ECB entitled to determine which kind of 
fiscal priorities, social policies and wage policies and collective bargaining a 
Member State should execute? Where in this scenario is the sovereign’s will be 
playing a role and what meaning has the word democracy in within it? Additionally, 
a further criticism has been raised by Wehlan concerning the ECB’s decision and 
cutting liquidity to Greece at the moment of the referendum on the austerity pro-
gramme. It sheds a dubious light of political activism and interventionism on the 
ECB and exposes its conflict of interest as the central bank of all Member States, 
including of Greece, and its role as a creditor and supervisor of systemically rele-
vant banks and within the Troika.
Schmidt (2015) argues that eurozone governance combined excessive intergov-
ernmentalism with an increased supranationalism of the ECB pressing “Member 
States for more austerity measures and structural reforms in a quid pro quo for more 
vigorous monetary interventions” and the European Commission receiving more 
competences in budgetary oversight while the European Parliament remained 
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largely sidelined. “The resulting rules-based and numbers-focused government 
framework has not only generated problems for the European economy; it has also 
cast doubts on the European Union’s democratic legitimacy and its social solidar-
ity”. The eurocrisis has led to a regression of democracy in the EU, both at the 
national level of the periphery countries and at the regional level. Indeed, in parallel 
some core Member States parliaments have acquired increased power being able to 
impose to another MS policies and priorities, which have a strong impact on the 
lives of the citizens of other Member States. EMU has not only reduced the periph-
ery and (later) indebted countries to the status of emerging countries by depriving 
them of the instrument of exchange rate devaluations, reducing their possibilities to 
let the automatic stabilizers work for a more rapid and social recovery but politically 
and democratically has degraded them to the status of colonies of the larger hege-
mons, by eroding the democratic rights of the peoples to decide on their economic 
and social policies and in the case of a crisis, at least on the priorities of which 
measures to take, thus undermining their sovereignty.
The intergovernmental framework with the exclusion or submission of the insti-
tutions standing for the general interest of the EU instrumentalized supranational 
institutions for the national interests of the hegemonic Member States by protecting 
their own national banks from major haircuts in a crisis caused by a global eco-
nomic system and design of the EMU, which had largely been influenced by the 
same hegemons (and their banks), and even benefitting from the crisis through the 
interest. The involvement of the national parliaments of creditor countries in the 
decision-making process, including on the adjustment programmes, can in no way 
compensate the lack of decision power of the national parliament and social part-
ners in determining the measures to combat the debt crisis in an equitable way and 
adjusted to local realities, needs and democratic priorities and to assist their econo-
mies in their recovery but rather illustrate the increasing asymmetry and disparity in 
democratic rights within the European Economic and Monetary Union. The EMU 
architecture has thus even led to an erosion of democracy both at EU level and at 
national level.
 Conclusions
Ten years after the eurocrisis and more than 12 years after the global financial crisis 
broke out, EMU reforms have attempted to realize a banking union but have not 
completed it since it shies away from any risk-sharing instruments, schemes or tools 
such as a common backstop or a European Deposit Insurance Scheme. In the field 
of fiscal and budgetary policies, EMU actually strengthened the “risk avoidance” or 
ordo-liberal orientation and the straight jacket of the national finance ministers, giv-
ing greater surveillance powers to the European Commission, anchoring debt and 
deficit ceilings in national constitutions and facilitating sanctions at Council level. 
The “risk-sharing” or solidarity side of the economic governance framework with 
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the creation of a possible euro area budget, a stabilization function, an unemploy-
ment insurance or reinsurance scheme or an EMF has not been realized to this date.
The paradigm change from Keynesianism to ordo- and neoliberalism has largely 
influenced the architects and design of monetary union, in particular leading to 
changes and omissions in regard to the more federalist predecessor, called the 
“Werner Plan”, which had strong traits of Keynesianism. It is important to note that 
the paradigm change led to omission of central building stones of EMU which could 
have either helped to avert a crisis and increase crisis resilience or allowed a more 
efficient, equitable and democratic crisis management, such as the reflectance of the 
risks of deregulated financial markets, of internal imbalances, a euro area budget 
and other stabilization elements like the EMF, convergence policies, an evolution 
towards an economic union with the step-by-step transferral of decisions to the EU 
level and democratic accountability. While the EMU crisis management has avoided 
a sovereign default and the implosion of EMU, the new governance framework has 
prolonged and deepened the crisis and its economic and social consequences. In 
terms of equity, it has largely increased unemployment, poverty and income inequal-
ity; additionally it has led to a reversion of the achieved economic convergence. The 
measures implemented have not been able to reduce the debts of highly indebted 
countries and have worked largely procyclical, reducing growth and investment, 
also in the stronger economies, putting future competitiveness and the global role of 
the EU in question.
While economically the worst crisis is over, the political landscape has changed 
for good with an increase of political protest and historical mobilization of social 
movements, the mushrooming of new parties, the increasing polarization and radi-
calization of political parties. These developments can be interpreted as direct con-
sequences of the negative input, output and throughput democracy (Schmidt 2015) 
and increasing disparity of democratic rights within the EU and at EU level.
Disclaimer The opinions expressed in this introduction/volume are the sole responsibility of the 
authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament or of any 
other EU institution.
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Chapter 5
European Union’s Democratic Legitimacy 
after the MoUs: The Political Legacy 
of an Economic Crisis
Dimitris Katsikas
Abstract This chapter focuses on two significant aspects of crisis management in 
the Eurozone: (a) its democratic legitimacy and (b) its socioeconomic consequences. 
The two issues are very important, since both the socioeconomic effects of an 
adjustment program and its democratic credentials determine to a large extent its 
“ownership” by local societies and consequently its chances of success. Effectively, 
these two aspects refer to the “input” and “output” side of democratic legitimacy, 
that is, to legitimation through democratic processes and representation, and policy 
outcomes respectively. The analysis evaluates the first aspect of the legitimacy 
equation using criteria derived from democratic theory and applying them to the 
governance structure of the bailout programs. On the second aspect of legitimacy, 
that of outcomes, the socioeconomic consequences of the crisis management are 
reviewed, and their distributive aspects discussed. The chapter demonstrates that the 
EU’s legitimacy has suffered along both aspects as a result of the crisis and the way 
it was handled. This leaves the EU in a particularly vulnerable state in the event of 
a future crisis.
 Introduction
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) proved the biggest victim of 
the global financial crisis that broke out in 2008. This was due to two factors: (a) the 
incomplete nature of the EMU and (b) the lack of a supranational crisis mechanism. 
By now, it is commonly acknowledged that before the crisis, significant imbalances 
had emerged among the economies of EMU’s member states. Countries in the mon-
etary union’s periphery exhibited sluggish productivity growth which, coupled with 
high credit inflows, led to unsustainable current account deficits (Baldwin and 
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Giavazzi 2015). Investors from the capital-rich North directed their funds to profit-
able investments in the relatively capital-poor South. However, these capital flows 
did not fund productive investments; they were instead directed toward the non-
tradable sectors of these countries’ economies, raising wages and inflation, under-
mining further their already weak international competitiveness, and boosting asset 
and real estate prices, thereby creating financial bubbles; in some countries, they 
were also used to fund mounting fiscal deficits. When, in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, there was a “sudden stop” of the capital flows, these countries had 
to face a harsh adjustment process. The EMU could not deal with such imbalances 
because of its flawed governance; its monetary pillar, built around the European 
Central Bank (ECB), had a clear institutional framework, a strong policy mandate 
and statutory independence from political interference. On the other hand, the 
remaining governance pillars were weak. In fiscal policy, the Stability and Growth 
Pact lacked enforcement powers and proved unable to control fiscal laxity in many 
member states (Begg 2011). Moreover, there was no supranational coordinating 
mechanism for the EU-wide stance of fiscal policy and its synchronization with 
ECB’s monetary policy. In terms of broader economic policy surveillance, the 
Council’s voluntary Broad Economic Policy Guidelines proved completely ineffec-
tive (Pisani-Ferry 2006). As a result, the EU lacked effective institutions with a clear 
mandate to prevent excessive imbalances.
Still, these imbalances did not have to lead to a full-blown regional debt crisis, 
which threatened the survival of the EMU itself. A major reason for this develop-
ment was the absence of a crisis handling mechanism in the EMU, which led to an 
ad hoc, intergovernmental, and increasingly political handling of the crisis. In this 
context, “moral hazard” preoccupations prevailed; creditor countries worried that 
facilitating the recovery of crisis-hit countries would ease the pressure for fiscal 
adjustment and reforms. Such a rationale was also dictated by the politics of the 
time: bailing out crisis-hit countries that were depicted in the press as spendthrift 
and/or corrupt was not a particularly popular proposition, especially following the 
public bailouts of banks during the financial crisis only a couple of years earlier. The 
result was crisis management along an “individual responsibility” approach: every 
country needed to get its house in order (Katsikas 2012). This approach had two 
main characteristics:
 (a) Individual bailout programs for each country that could not fund itself in the 
markets. The bailout loans were accompanied by conditionality; countries 
signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), which spelled out the policy 
measures and structural reforms that had to be implemented in exchange for the 
funds. The design of the conditionality1 and the supervision of its implementa-
tion were the responsibility of the Troika, which comprised representatives of 
1 The design of the programs was decided together with the governments of the countries receiving 
the loans, which had the opportunity to propose measures of their own, particularly regarding the 
more detailed aspects of the policies put forward; having said that, the proposed measures had to 
be approved by the Troika.
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the creditors, namely, the European Commission, the ECB, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The reforms promoted had a liberal direction, aiming to 
improve the international competitiveness of these countries; in some cases, the 
MoUs also included comprehensive public administration reforms, with the 
aim to increase the efficiency and the fiscal sustainability of the state mecha-
nism. It is worth noting that similar policies were promoted by countries which 
did not sign a bailout agreement, but faced similar problems, as was the case 
with Spain, which signed a more limited bailout agreement for its financial sec-
tor, and to a lesser degree, Italy.
 (b) The cost of the adjustment process was entirely borne by the crisis-hit coun-
tries. The MoUs were the only way to deal with the crisis; there was no scope 
for any supranational mechanism of compensation for the economic and social 
losses of the adjustment process or for encouraging growth in the economies 
facing a deep recession, in large part, due to the promoted austerity policies. 
Some EU-wide growth funding initiatives, such as the Compact for Growth and 
Jobs agreed at the European Council of June 2012, were put forward but were 
never really implemented. An investment mechanism, the so-called Juncker 
Plan, was effectively put in place much later, after 2015, during the recovery of 
the European economy; it is worth noting that even this mechanism did not 
involve new public funding, but relied on the redeployment of already available 
funds in the EU budget and mainly the leveraging of new private funds.
This approach produced negative results not only for the affected economies but 
also for the cohesion and public support of the EU itself. The conditionality imposed 
through the MoUs in crisis-hit countries was extensive, ambitious, and in certain 
respects harsh, as was the case with the austerity policies promoted. This in turn 
caused or at the very least deepened the economic recession affecting the countries 
receiving the bailout funds. As a result, in the countries of the South, people living 
in adverse material circumstances felt alienated, disappointed, and increasingly 
angry by what they perceived to be a lack of solidarity by the European Union and 
the countries of the North, whom they often accused as responsible for the crisis. On 
the other hand, in the countries of Northern Europe, there was also a growing feel-
ing of hostility developing toward the European project, as citizens questioned the 
decisions of their governments to “bail out” the countries of the South, which were 
often portrayed as “reckless” and “irresponsible.” This rift, and more broadly the 
way the crisis was handled, ultimately undermined the legitimacy of the EU itself.
The aim of this chapter is to examine how the democratic legitimacy of the EU 
was affected by the crisis and the way this was handled, with a focus on the crisis-hit 
countries and particularly those of the European South. After a brief introduction in 
the issue of democratic legitimacy in the EU, different aspects of the crisis manage-
ment will be analyzed, and their impact on the democratic legitimacy of the EU will 
be evaluated.
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 EU’s Legitimacy Before the Crisis
The political authority to issue rules and policy dictates necessitates legitimacy, that 
is, a sense of obligation on the part of the subjects of authority to conform to its 
pronouncements (Flathman 1980). Authority is not obeyed because people consider 
its individual decrees and rules to be always in their individual interest but due to a 
sense of obligation and an acknowledgement of the legitimate right of authority to 
issue commands and pronouncements. In this sense, legitimacy is a prerequisite not 
only for the effective operation but also for the very existence of political authority.2 
In democratic regimes, this sense of obligation stems from the assurance that gov-
ernments represent the people and that they will exercise their authority in ways 
which serve the people’s interests in accordance with their values. These two aspects 
are often analyzed separately as two different forms of legitimacy: input and output 
legitimacy (Scharpf 1999; Schmidt 2013).3 Input legitimacy refers to processes 
which ensure the representation of the interests and values of the people in policy- 
making, primarily by establishing the accountability of policy-makers to the people, 
for example, through electoral processes. Output legitimacy refers to policy out-
comes; legitimacy is ensured when the promoted policies do in fact serve the com-
mon good and improve the lives of the citizens. Political authority in democracies 
necessitates both types of legitimacy, but there is a trade-off; if a political entity is 
somewhat lacking in one dimension, it can “make it up” in the other dimension 
(Schmidt 2015).
Before the crisis, EU’s record in terms of democratic legitimacy was mixed. Its 
input legitimacy was considered by many as lacking. Indeed, there was a lively 
academic debate about the so-called EU’s democratic deficit (Weiler et al. 1995; 
Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002, 2008; Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008). Follesdal 
and Hix (2006) summarized the arguments of the critics into five distinct claims, 
which referred to the strengthening of the executive power, at both the national and 
EU levels, at the expense of parliamentary control; the related weakness of the 
European Parliament and the absence of truly “European” elections; the distance of 
EU from the voters, who do not really understand and identify with it; and as a con-
sequence of all the above, a “policy drift” away from voters’ “ideal” policy prefer-
ences. Others objected to this critique; Andrew Moravcsik, one the leading scholars 
in EU studies, has rejected the democratic deficit theory as a myth, arguing that the 
EU is a limited-purpose organization which should not be held to an ideal standard 
of democracy more appropriate for nation states. Indeed, he believes that even 
2 This is true not only for democracy but for all kinds of government. What changes are the criteria 
based on which authority is judged; for example, in monarchies it could be blood lineage and the 
divine right, or in more primitive societies the sanctity of tradition. Having said that, the prolonged 
deterioration of people’s living standards will ultimately erode authority, irrespective of its source.
3 Vivien Schmidt has added another aspect of democratic legitimacy in her analysis, the so-called 
throughput legitimacy, which effectively refers to the quality of governance processes (e.g., trans-
parency, inclusiveness, etc.). This aspect is not examined here.
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within the confines of its limited mandate, the EU “is at least as democratic, and 
generally more so, than its member states” (Moravcsik 2008, p. 332).
While Moravcsik may be right that the EU has a more limited mandate compared 
to national governments and that on the whole its function is subject to a  – not 
inconsequential – array of democratic checks and balances, it is hard to deny the 
claim that the EU citizens do not understand or identify with the EU. Indeed, the 
very progress of European integration has been associated with the lack of citizens’ 
participation; European elites have been thought to enjoy a “permissive consensus” 
by the general public, which allowed them significant leeway in promoting the proj-
ect of European integration (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). Democratization 
always came afterward in an effort to catch up with the integration progress, which 
was mainly driven by economic considerations (Fossum 2016).
In this context, the European integration process before the crisis was mostly 
driven by output legitimacy. As long as integration yielded economic benefits for 
the member states, it did not become an issue of strong political contestation in 
European societies. The advanced economies of the North took advantage of the 
benefits offered by the European single market to boost further their competitive-
ness and leverage the international presence of their companies, while the poorer 
countries of the South received significant economic aid in the form of structural 
funds, intended to help their economies adjust and gradually converge to those of 
the North. Later, the new entrants from Central and Eastern Europe also became 
beneficiaries of such funding and through their participation in the single market 
were able to link their economies to global value chains and receive substantial 
investment inflows. In this sense, before the crisis, the less than perfect record of the 
EU in terms of input legitimacy did not pose a major obstacle in European integra-
tion because the EU was thought to deliver prosperity to its citizens.4
 EU’s Legitimacy After the Crisis
The crisis undermined the legitimacy of the EU in a number of ways. The handling 
of the crisis raised serious concerns regarding its conformity to democratic norms, 
weakening further the already challenged input legitimacy of the EU. At the same 
time, the intensity and extent of the crisis, related to the austerity policies promoted 
through the MoUs, severely undermined its output legitimacy.
4 Still, already before the crisis, problems in terms of legitimacy were becoming increasingly visi-
ble. The deepening and widening of the integration process that followed the Maastricht Treaty 
weakened the permissive consensus. European integration became increasingly intertwined with 
issues pertaining to core aspects of national sovereignty and identity, making it more controversial 
and politicized, and thus increasingly part of domestic party politics; as a result, it gradually started 
becoming subject to an intensifying “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe and Marks 2009).
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 EU’s Input Legitimacy and the Crisis
Turning first to the issue of input legitimacy, the MoUs and the Troika challenged 
democratic norms of policy-making at both the national and EU levels. More spe-
cifically, at the EU level, the institutional set-up and operation of the Troika and the 
policies promoted through the MoUs produced a number of challenges for demo-
cratic legitimacy. First, the Troika was an ad hoc institutional mechanism, created in 
haste to deal with the crisis. This created several problems: there were no estab-
lished procedures, in relation to the other EU institutions and in particular the 
European Parliament, which could increase the democratic accountability of its 
operation. Moreover, the IMF, being an international economic organization, had no 
obligation to inform or report to European institutions about its actions and deci-
sions in the context of the Troika. All in all, there was lack of transparency in 
Troika’s decision-making which undermined its accountability. Moreover, the 
Troika had no legal mandate stemming from the EU Treaties and no clearly defined 
objective. As a result, procedures were followed which did not have any legal basis, 
putting in doubt not only the legitimacy but also the legality of its actions; for exam-
ple, Eurogroup’s mandate to the European Commission to negotiate on its behalf 
the details of the bailout programs with the countries receiving the loans was legally 
unfounded, as such a procedure is not specified in EU law and because the Eurogroup 
is not an official EU body (European Parliament Report 2014, p. 16).5
Secondly, Troika’s composition was highly problematic: both the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank faced serious conflicts of interest. 
More specifically, as part of the Troika, the European Commission was acting as an 
agent of the member states, which had authorized it to negotiate and supervise the 
implementation of the bailout programs. At the same time, the European Commission 
is considered the “guardian of the Treaties,” the supranational organ entrusted to 
supervise the application of EU laws and norms. In other words, the European 
Commission came to act as both the agent and the “supervisor” of national govern-
ments, and more often than not, this conflict worked at the expense of the latter role, 
which however is the one institutionally assigned to the European Commission. 
Moreover, in terms of the MoUs’ policy content, the bailout programs’ conditional-
ity extended to policy areas such as healthcare, labor, and social policy, which for 
the most part are outside the remit of EU policy competence. In addition, many of 
the policies promoted violated either directly or indirectly, through their results, the 
principles enshrined in essential EU legal texts such as the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU or strategic policy agendas like “Europe 2020,” exposing once 
again the untenable position of the Commission as both the guardian and violator of 
EU principles.
Similar problems were also raised with relation to ECB’s role in the Troika, as its 
role extended well beyond its mandate regarding monetary policy. Indeed, the ECB 
5 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 changed this, as it provided an institutional basis for the operation 
of the Troika.
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was involved in decisions relating to fiscal, wage, and financial policies and struc-
tural reforms in a number of policy areas, all of which were well outside its author-
ity. These decisions had often significant distributional consequences (e.g., its 
decision not to bail in the senior-bondholders of the Irish banks in 2010), were 
employed by the Troika as leverage during the negotiations of the bailout agree-
ments (e.g., the threatened termination of emergency liquidity assistance in the 
cases of Ireland and Cyprus in 2010 and 2013, respectively, and its actual termina-
tion in the case of Greece in early 2015), and/or constituted direct interventions in 
the political system of the countries in crisis, as was the case with the letters sent by 
the ECB to the governments of Spain, Italy, and Ireland. These actions proved con-
troversial and had clear political ramifications, which undermined the status of the 
ECB and its credibility as a central bank independent from politics. What is more, 
the ECB’s accountability framework was not appropriate for this kind of political 
decision-making, which further undermined the legitimacy of these decisions 
(Transparency International EU 2017).
The problems with the Troika’s institutional set-up were not unrelated to the new 
mode of EU’s operation during the crisis. In the course of the crisis, decisions were 
increasingly taken in the context of a renewed intergovernmentalism, where the 
European Council took the decision-making initiative and the Eurogroup acted as 
its “legislative-executive arm,” setting out more detailed guidelines for the European 
Commission. The latter, in its role as the initiator of EU policies and the European 
Parliament as a co-decision agent and an accountability mechanism, were largely 
sidestepped. It is telling that both of EU’s funding mechanisms, the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
were created on the basis of intergovernmental agreements, outside the EU legal 
framework. The same is true for one of the most important reforms of the EU’s 
economic governance following the crisis, the so-called Fiscal Compact. 
Intergovernmental bargaining meant that the creditor countries, enjoying a highly 
asymmetrical negotiating advantage, came to dictate the terms of the bailout agree-
ments according to their national preferences (Schimmelfennig 2015). In this con-
text, established EU rules, norms, and practices often took second place in the 
negotiating table.
Beyond undermining democratic legitimacy at the EU level, the dominance of 
creditor countries’ preferences in the design and implementation of bailout agree-
ments affected negatively the input legitimacy of the MoUs in crisis-hit countries as 
well. The perception that the policies contained in the MoUs, and more generally 
the terms of the agreements, were dictated by the countries of the North and imposed 
on the countries in the South receiving the loans undermined from the beginning the 
“ownership” of the programs.6 According to the IMF itself, ownership is a key fac-
tor for the success of a bailout program (IMF 2006). If the prevailing perception in 
6 According to the IMF, “National ownership refers to a commitment to a program of policies, by 
country officials who have the responsibility to formulate and carry out those policies, based on 
their understanding that the program is achievable and is in the country’s best interests” (IMF 
2006, p. 1).
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a country is that conditionality is externally imposed, or that the program serves the 
interests of particular interest groups, in or even out of the country (Gould 2003), 
then opposition to the program conditionality is likely to be high, particularly when 
the proposed measures inflict economic losses on large parts of the population, as 
was the case with the MoUs’ austerity and internal devaluation policies.
Moreover, opposition can be high against structural reforms. Structural reforms 
have distributional consequences, which can produce resistance not only from those 
that know that they stand to lose but also from broader population groups, which 
face uncertainty over the distribution of costs and benefits and opt for the risk-averse 
solution of the status quo (Fernández and Rodrik 1991). The MoUs promoted 
reforms, which were unrealistically ambitious, anticipating major restructuring in a 
wide array of policy areas, ranging from the labor and product markets to public 
administration and the welfare state, in a short period of time. This created uncer-
tainty, disrupting further the depressed economies, undermined the effectiveness of 
the reforms, and created losers who resisted the MoUs’ conditionality. The com-
bined effect of austerity and structural reforms, in combination with the widely 
shared, and largely accurate, impression that the MoUs were imposed by the credi-
tor countries, completely undermined ownership of the promoted policies; in other 
words there was a lack of socio-political consensus for the promoted policies, which 
for large parts of the population rendered them effectively “unauthorized” (Bellamy 
and Weale 2015).
This impression was progressively strengthened by the fact that the same kinds 
of policies were promoted despite the alternation of parties with different ideologi-
cal orientation in government. It was as if it did not matter which government was 
in power; elections produced different governments, but not different policies. This 
effectively “hollowed out” the domestic political process, resulting in what has been 
termed “politics without policy” (Schmidt 2015) or “politics of constrained choice” 
(Laffan 2014). This political impression took on a substantive institutional manifes-
tation in the way national parliaments operated during the crisis. The functioning of 
national parliaments became hostage to a permanent “state of emergency,” which 
allowed incumbent governments to pass bills with limited parliamentary oversight 
under emergency procedures, which effectively forbade a comprehensive discus-
sion of the proposed measures; in effect parliaments became rubber-stamping insti-
tutions for policies decided in intergovernmental negotiations at the EU level, while 
in some cases they were completely by-passed, as was the case in Portugal where 
the MoU was not brought to parliament for ratification. The continuous erosion of 
MoUs’ input legitimacy undermined public trust in domestic political systems, 
which in turn created space for the emergence of populist and Eurosceptic parties. 
In other words, the way the crisis was handled undermined not only the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU but also that of the domestic political institutions, raising con-
cerns about the quality and operation of democracy in crisis-hit countries.
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 The Impact of the Crisis and EU’s Output Legitimacy
The erosion of input legitimacy due to the policies promoted under the MoUs could 
have been perhaps tolerated by the publics in crisis-hit countries, if these measures 
improved their economic situation. On the contrary, the policies promoted produced 
severe negative short-term economic consequences, which undermined the hitherto 
strong pillar of EU’s democratic legitimacy, that of output legitimacy.
The austerity and internal devaluation policies led to a sharp decline of dispos-
able income and economic activity, which sent the crisis-hit economies into 
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Fig. 5.1 Average growth rates in the EU Core and in the EU South (gross domestic product at 
market prices, chain linked volumes, percentage change on previous period, 2010–2018). Note: 
Core countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands; “South” 
countries include Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. (Source: Author’s elaboration of 
Eurostat data)
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Fig. 5.2 Unemployment rate, countries of the EU South and average EU Core (% active popula-
tion, 2008–2015). (Source: Author’s elaboration of Eurostat data)
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recession (Fig. 5.1).7 The negative income shock was combined with problems in 
the banking sector, already ailing from the global financial crisis, and long-term 
structural weaknesses that kept productivity and international competitiveness low. 
These problems made recovery difficult, particularly as the Troika persisted in set-
ting unrealistic fiscal targets, which did not take into account the effects of the reces-
sion, necessitating thereby new austerity measures, a process which drove economies 
into a downward economic spiral. As a result, unemployment rates rose fast, often 
reaching unprecedented levels, as was the case in Greece and Spain (Fig. 5.2). The 
situation in the labor market was in sharp contrast with that of the countries of the 
“core,” which experienced mild increases in their unemployment rate if at all (e.g., 
Germany’s unemployment rate kept falling from 2010 onward and throughout the 
crisis).
The large numbers of unemployed people in turn meant a deterioration of their 
material circumstances, made worse by the well-known weaknesses of the welfare 
systems in the countries of Southern Europe (Ferrera 1996). In addition to fragmen-
tation and operational inefficiencies, the welfare system in these countries struggled 
to cope financially, under circumstances of declining income flows as a result of 
reduced insurance contributions (due to the rising unemployment) and state funding 
(due to austerity policies), while needs for expenditures rose (e.g., for 
7 The graph does not include Ireland due to some uncertainty regarding its GDP statistics, particu-
larly during the recovery period after 2015. See, for example, Halpin (2016).
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Fig. 5.3 At-risk-of-poverty rate anchored at a fixed moment in time (2005) by age and sex, coun-
tries of the EU South and average EU Core (% of the population 2009–2018). Note 1: A fixed 
poverty line measures poverty compared to a fixed level of income which does not change through 
time. A fixed poverty line can be a very useful analytical tool in cases of big and rapid positive or 
negative changes in economic output in a country. In such circumstances there is a tendency for the 
entire distribution to move upward (or downward), leaving thus relative poverty largely unchanged. 
Accordingly, in such circumstances it makes sense to compare peoples’ level of living not with 
other people in the same society, but with the same peoples’ living circumstances of only a few 
years ago, before the boom (crisis) took hold.) . Note 2: The “average core” excludes France due 
data unavailability. (Source: Author’s elaboration of Eurostat data) 
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unemployment benefits). As a result, levels of poverty and/or social exclusion 
started to rise substantially, Greece being in a category of its own (Fig. 5.3). The 
result was a social crisis, which fed further people’s anger, contributed to the dele-
gitimation of domestic political systems and the quest for alternative solutions, 
often found in the rhetoric of populist parties.
Why did the creditors insist on policies that sent the crisis-hit economies in 
recession and stirred social and political turmoil? The answer lies in the way the 
crisis was handled; the intergovernmental and highly political handling of the crisis 
led to bailout programs whose overriding priority was the reduction of fiscal deficits 
and the sustainability of public debt. The reasons for this were twofold: firstly, the 
obvious desire of creditors to limit their funding to debtor countries, in order to 
safeguard their own fiscal integrity, but most importantly to address the concerns 
that dominated domestic political discourse about using taxpayers money to bail out 
the “irresponsible” partners in the South; secondly, to limit the “moral hazard” asso-
ciated with bailing out the countries in crisis, that is, the danger that they would 
become dependent on such financing and relax their fiscal consolidation and reform 
efforts.
The desire to limit moral hazard was evident in the rhetoric adapted to justify the 
proposed policies; the crisis was typically presented as one of fiscal profligacy on 
the part of the debtor countries, which does not stand up to scrutiny given the solid 
fiscal record of countries like Ireland and Spain before the global financial crisis. 
Nonetheless this became the dominant narrative in the early stages of the crisis and 
affected the design of the programs, which emphasized front-loaded austerity and a 
“big-bang” of structural reforms. This unavoidably led to a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach, which proved problematic because there was disregard for the distinct 
features of these economies, as well as for the different causes of the crisis in differ-
ent countries. As a result, Troika’s projections proved highly erroneous (typically 
over-optimistic) and led to the oft-cited IMF’s acknowledgement of its failure to 
calculate properly the fiscal multipliers (Blanchard and Leigh 2013), on which the 
design of austerity policies had been based. Similar mistakes were repeated in the 
area of structural reforms, where knowledge of local economic realities but also of 
political and institutional characteristics are more important. Rodrik (2016) has 
criticized the ambitious “big-bang” programs, which eventually resulted in micro- 
management of the economy and/or the public service, costing precious political 
capital while producing moderate economic results.
The internal devaluation policies are a case in point; one of the factors that may 
account for the very different trajectories of Greece and Ireland during the crisis is 
the fact that Ireland’s labor and product markets were considered flexible and 
dynamic before the crisis, which maximized the benefits of the internal devaluation 
policy that was adopted; in Greece on the other hand, the internal devaluation policy 
did not yield similar results, given the closed nature of the economy and the struc-
tural rigidities in the product and labor markets (see, e.g., Zografakis and Kastelli 
2017). Indeed, it seems that in Greece, the focus on internal devaluation led to a 
sequencing of reforms in the labor and product markets which proved 
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counter- productive in terms of economic results (Petralias et al. 2018), but highly 
disruptive in terms of its social and political repercussions.
All these problems were not new; they have all been documented before in the 
literature on the IMF, which has also been criticized for the “one-size-fits-all” 
approach (e.g., Stiglitz 2002; Ostry et  al. 2016) and for biased, typically over- 
optimistic, projections (e.g., Atoyan and Conway 2011). Despite this knowledge 
and previous experience, the same mistakes were repeated causing social, political, 
and institutional backlash which not only undermined the effectiveness of the 
reforms but also strengthened Eurosceptic rhetoric, attitudes, and parties.
 Conclusions
Before the crisis, EU’s democratic legitimacy record was mixed. Its input legiti-
macy was challenged from many quarters, but European integration continued to 
progress given the material prosperity it was thought to deliver to Europeans. The 
crisis delivered a blow to the democratic legitimacy of the EU.  Its already chal-
lenged input legitimacy suffered further, as the ad hoc, intergovernmental, and 
increasingly political handling of the crisis violated EU norms and institutions. The 
resulting policies were forced on crisis-hit member states, with limited parliamen-
tary scrutiny and democratic debate, hollowing out the domestic political systems. 
Such practices created space for anti-systemic and Eurosceptic populist parties, 
which gained strength in a number of member states.
In recent years, economic recovery has improved the image of the EU once 
again, confirming to some degree the output legitimacy hypothesis. However, sig-
nificant challenges remain. While the image of the EU has almost fully recovered, 
trust in the EU is still well below its pre-crisis levels for most countries (see Chap. 
16, of Verney and Katsikas, this volume). Moreover, the damage to the credibility 
and legitimacy of domestic political institutions is harder to overcome; the refugee 
crisis of 2015–2016 added strength to the rise of populist, Eurosceptic, and nation-
alistic parties, not only in the crisis-hit countries but also in the countries of the 
North. Moreover, the economic and social consequences of the crisis are still not 
fully overcome in most of the crisis-hit countries. This increases their vulnerability 
to the effects of a new international or European crisis; indeed, such fears are on the 
rise again given the slowdown in the world and European economy in 2018 and 
2019. In sum, while the EU was able to overcome the crisis, the way this was han-
dled has left a negative legacy of political mistrust toward both the EU and the 
domestic political systems, which has undermined their democratic legitimacy. 
Given the additional pressures that have arisen due to the refugee crisis and the 
growing discontent about the effects of globalization, this legacy may be more last-
ing and consequential than it currently appears.
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Chapter 6
Finance Capitalism and Democracy: 
The Case of the Financial Transactions Tax
Stephan Schulmeister
Abstract This chapter analyses the pros and cons of financial transaction taxes 
(FTT) as mechanisms to mitigate financial instability and the proposal of the 
European Commission to implement an FTT in the EU in September 2011 until its 
suspension, as well as the prospects for it to be adopted in the future.
 Introduction
The proposal of the European Commission to implement a financial transaction tax 
(FTT) in the EU (September 2011) can be considered an attempt to mitigate the 
contradiction between rising financial instability in the “real world” and mainstream 
economists’ unbroken belief in financial market efficiency. Such a tax would 
dampen asset price volatility, in particular caused by (ultra)fast trading techniques, 
yet it would represent a “softer” means of interference in market processes as com-
pared to direct regulations. Based on empirical research on asset price dynamics, the 
Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) had presented already in February 
2008 a comprehensive concept of a general FTT (Schulmeister et al. 2008). In con-
trast to a Tobin tax, the FTT should be levied on all transactions with any type of 
financial asset. The essential features of the WIFO proposal were as follows1:
• The FTT is levied on all transactions involving buying/selling of spot and deriva-
tive assets, traded either on organized exchanges or over the counter.
• The tax base is the value of the underlying asset, in the case of derivatives their 
notional/contract value.
1 The WIFO concept was not the first one, which would propose a general FTT. Pollin et al. (2003) 
proposed a “securities transaction tax” for the US markets, Summers and Summers (1989) had 
made “a cautious case” for such taxes. However, the WIFO concept was the most detailed and most 
comprehensive concept.
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• The tax rate should be low (between 0.01% and 0.05%).
This concept ensures the following: The “faster” an asset is traded and the higher 
is the leverage ratio, the more will the FTT increase transaction costs. Hence, an 
FTT with a low and uniform rate specifically dampens very short-term speculation 
in derivatives. High-frequency trading would become unprofitable even at a tax rate 
of 0.01% (or less). All other forms of short-term speculation would at least be 
dampened. As a consequence, asset price runs would occur less frequently and 
would become less persistent. Since long-term trends (“bulls” and “bears”) are the 
result of the accumulation of short-term runs, an FTT would also dampen the long 
swings of exchange rates, commodity prices and stock prices. As the financial crisis 
2008 was directly related to the “tilting” of the bull markets of stock prices, com-
modity prices and house prices into three bear markets, the concept of a general 
FTT got more attention than ever before in the subsequent years.
The struggle over the FTT developed in three phases. In the first phase (2009 to 
2011), the supporters of the tax went on the offensive. This phase ended with their 
(preliminary) “victory” in the form of the FTT proposal of the European Commission 
(EC) in September 2011. The second phase was shaped by the search for ways how 
to implement the FTT within the EU. It ended with the publication of a modified 
FTT proposal by the EC in February 2013 as basis for the implementation in 11 
Member States (EU11). In the last phase, a strong counter-offensive of big “finan-
cial players” like Goldman Sachs deepened the conflicts among the EU11 group. As 
a consequence, several member states called for more modifications of the FTT 
concept of the EC and finally gave it up.
 After the Financial Crisis: Pros and Cons of an FTT 
and the Fight for Public Opinion
Almost all NGOs active in the field of development aid and fighting poverty had for 
many years called for the Tobin tax. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, these 
groups switched to demanding a general FTT. Their campaigning was so successful 
that already in November 2010 61% of the respondents of a “Eurobarometer” poll 
supported the introduction of an FTT (EC 2011a). At the same time, the leaders of 
the two most important EU Member States, Chancellor Merkel and President 
Sarkozy, began to endorse such a tax. The “counter-attacks” against the FTT were 
put forward by economists of the IMF and – at first – also of the EC (IMF 2010; EC 
2010a, b). Their objections were derived from equilibrium theory in general and 
financial market efficiency in particular.
• Objection 1: An FTT reduces liquidity and therefore hampers the price discovery 
process. It is assumed that rational traders drive the asset price to its fundamental 
equilibrium known to everybody. In reality, however, information is (very) 
imperfect, uncertainty is particularly pronounced in financial markets, and trad-
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ing is not only based on rational calculations but also on emotions and social 
interaction (contagion, herding, market sentiments).
• Objection 2: The FTT does not specifically increase the costs of destabilizing 
trading. In fact, an FTT with the notional value as tax base increases the tax bur-
den the more the faster transactions are carried out and the higher their leverage is.
• Objection 3: The distortive effects of an FTT will be higher than those of other 
kinds of taxes, in particular of a VAT, because the FTT is a turnover tax. This 
analogy is misleading. Buying an asset does not represent an (intermediate) 
input, and selling an asset does not represent an (intermediate) output. A more 
precise analogy to an FTT would be taxes on gambling where usually any bet/
transaction is taxed.
• Objection 4: An FTT would raise the cost of capital because it has the same effect 
as taxes on future dividends. The assertion is wrong since a tax on dividends 
would affect any stock, whereas the FTT would affect only those stocks which 
are (frequently) traded. Compared to the trading volume of stock (index) deriva-
tives, the volume of stock spot transactions is low.
• Objection 5: Most financial transactions are not driven by (destabilizing) specu-
lation but stem from distributing risk. Before something can be distributed, it has 
to be produced. The production of risk and uncertainty in financial markets has 
risen due to the dominance of (automated) trading systems which disregard mar-
ket fundamentals and are therefore destabilizing.
• Objection 6: Derivatives should not be taxed because this would increase hedg-
ing costs. Hedging involves only two transactions, opening and closing a deriva-
tive (counter-)position. At an FTT rate of 0.01%, the hedging costs would be 
only 0.02% of the insured value.
 The Proposal of the European Commission and the Attempts 
to Implement the Tax
The European Commission changed its position towards the tax fundamentally 
between August 2010 (when it still rejected such a tax  – see EC 2010b) and 
September 2011 (when it proposed a common system of financial transaction tax – 
see EC 2011b, c). The reasons for this turn were predominantly political: NGOs 
continued to campaign intensively for the FTT, most people in the EU supported it 
(EP 2011), and the European Parliament as well as the German and French govern-
ment called for the introduction of this tax. The main features of the FTT proposal 
of the EC (ECP) are as follows (EC 2013).2
The tax base is defined comprehensively. Almost all transactions in financial 
instruments carried out by financial institutions (FIs) are subject to the tax. Tax 
2 For a more detailed summary of the EU proposal as well as a theoretical discussion of financial 
transaction taxes in general, see Griffith-Jones and Persaud (2012).
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revenues accrue to the FTT countries (FTTCs) according to the “residence princi-
ple” and the “issuance principle”. The residence principle means that all transac-
tions of FIs established in one of the 11 FTTCs are subject to the tax wherever the 
latter are carried out. The issuance principle means that also transactions in financial 
instruments, which are issued in an FTTC, are subject to the FTT even if none of the 
parties is established in an FTTC. For the minimum tax rates, the ECP proposes 
0.1% as regards financial instruments other than derivatives (i.e. spot transactions) 
and 0.01% as regards derivative transactions. Each party has to pay the tax at the 
respective rates, i.e. 0.1% or 0.01%, respectively.
In February 2013, the EC published its modified proposal for an FTT implemen-
tation in the 11 EU Member States joining the ECP, among them all big euro coun-
tries. Finally, it seemed as if the FTT would soon be implemented in 11 countries. 
But it should come quite differently.
 The Successful Counter-attack of the Financial Lobby 
Since 2013
Even though the modified proposal of the EC did not differ essentially from the 
original, the reaction of the financial lobby to its publication was completely differ-
ent from the situation in fall 2011. This time, the respective institutions had enough 
time to prepare a most powerful campaign. Its targets were as follows:
• Bomb the public and politicians with as many assertions about the disastrous 
effects of an FTT as possible within a short period of time. What counts is quan-
tity, not quality.
• Pretend that the interests of the national finance industry are national interests.
• Pretend that the interests of governments to finance their debts stay in conflict 
with the FTT proposal of the EC.
• Pretend that an FTT harms the interest of the (little) private investor in having 
his/her money “work”, in particular for his/her retirement.
• Ignore all arguments of FTT proponents concerning trading practices, “manic- 
depressive” asset price fluctuations and their impact on the real economy.
The most important intermediate target of the campaign against the FTT was to 
play off groups of actors and their interests against each other: national interests 
against the interests of “Brussels bureaucrats”, interests of EU Member States 
against each other, government’s interest in easy debt financing against the interests 
of the civil society, the interests of the latter against the interests of the (little) private 
investor, etc. The campaign of the financial institutions materialized primarily in 
pamphlets and press conferences of practically all big banks (Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, Citigroup, etc.) and lobby organiza-
tions (International Banking Federation, International Capital Market Association, 
European Repo Council, European Fund and Asset Management Association, etc.). 
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In all their messages, the financial lobby repeated over and over again: The tax 
would hamper liquidity, increase the cost of capital and of financing the government 
debt; the tax would reduce profits of banks and, hence, their tax payments; hedging 
costs would rise; and, as a consequence, overall financial stability would be reduced. 
These assertions were then used to drive a wedge between the 11 FTT countries, in 
particular between France and Germany: “Indeed, we think the FTT would de facto 
be a transfer of French taxes (on, e.g., derivative transactions of the French banks, 
which are the market leaders in Equity Derivatives) to other jurisdictions” (Morgan 
2013, p. 2).
The intention to play off governments against each other was facilitated by the 
fact that France and Italy introduced their own FTT in 2012 and 2013, respectively. 
The French tax is essentially a “stamp duty” on the change of ownership of French 
stocks, the scope of the Italian tax is wider as it also covers some derivatives. Once 
there were national FTTs introduced, the respective governments did no longer stick 
to the FTT proposal of the EC but wanted the latter to be changed according to their 
national FTT concepts. For example, the French government wanted the residence 
principle to be removed and derivatives to be excluded from the tax as both mea-
sures would hurt their national banks (in France, all big banks have specialized in 
“finance alchemy”, only Deutsche Bank). The financial lobby also mobilized the 
central banks. In May 2013, the then Governor of the Bank of England stated bluntly 
about the FTT: “Within Europe, I can’t find anyone in the central banking commu-
nity who thinks it’s a good idea”. At the same time, the Governor of the Banque de 
France and the President of the German Bundesbank criticized the FTT explicitly in 
the public (see Corporate Europe Observatory 2013).
In addition, the financial lobby opened a new “front”: An FTT would almost 
destroy the repo market (with a repurchasing agreement, a bank raises cash by sell-
ing a security – usually a government bond – to the lender and commits itself to 
repurchase the security when the repo expires, in most cases just after 1 day). This 
assertion turned out to become the most effective weapon against the FTT proposal 
of the EC:
• As the EC had not dealt explicitly with the repo market, the lobby could pretend 
that the proposal had overlooked how this market would be affected.
• Politicians who had supported the FTT proposal became uncertain as they were 
in fact not familiar with repos.
• At first glance, it does indeed seem inconsistent that unsecured credits remain 
FTT-free whereas collateralized borrowing is taxed.
• The most important types of collateral in repos are government bonds. Hence, 
the financial lobby asserted that the FTT would raise the costs of financing the 
public debt.
• In a similar manner, it was argued that also pension funds would see lower 
returns as consequence of higher repo costs.
All this reasoning hides the core properties of repo transactions and of the repo 
market as the core component of the shadow banking system:
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• Most repo transactions finance very short-term trading activities, in particular 
proprietary trading of banks.3 Intraday trading is financed by so-called tri-party 
repos where purchasing and repurchasing take place within hours.
• Repos facilitate leveraged trading to the extreme in the sense that one can pur-
chase an asset (almost) without cash by borrowing money to buy the asset and 
simultaneously posting the asset as collateral.
• Short-selling is fostered by the repo market. One lends money in the repo market, 
takes the security one intends to short as collateral and then sells the security.
• The extremely high leverage of repo transactions strengthens boom-bust cycles 
and increases systemic risks: Rising asset prices stimulate repo financing which 
feeds back onto the bull market and conversely in the case of a bear market.
• The possibility to reuse the collateral produces “repo chains” (e.g. bank A sells a 
security to bank B in return for cash, bank B sells the security to bank C, etc.), 
feeding back on the strength of bull or bear markets.4
It is no surprise that the increasingly short-term repo transactions developed in 
tandem with the increasingly short-term proprietary trading of banks. This type of 
trading is predominantly unrelated to market fundamentals (it is to a large extent 
driven by trading systems). The financial lobby rightly expects repo financing to 
become unprofitable due to the implementation of an FTT. This, however, would be 
an advantage to the economy as a whole as these transactions finance predominantly 
short-term and destabilizing asset speculation. The “production” of systemic risks 
by short-term repos is confirmed by their role in the recent financial crisis (e.g. 
Hördahl and King 2008; Gorton and Metrick 2010; Tuckman 2010; for a summary, 
see Gabor 2016): Banks and their “special purpose vehicles” created securities from 
loans which often were backed by subprime mortgages. These securities were then 
used as collateral for repos. In this way, “securitized banking” created liquidity 
which further fuelled the booms of asset prices.
When the confidence in the real value of mortgage-backed securities became 
weaker, the confidence crisis spilled over to the repo market as a whole. The subse-
quent “run on repo” caused interbank interest rates to shoot up, and the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers in September then accelerated the simultaneous fall of stock 
prices, house prices and commodity prices dramatically, turning the liquidity crisis 
of the banking system into a solvency crisis. All these aspects were neglected in the 
“scientific” documentation of the harmfulness of an FTT provided by the financial 
lobby. The most influential study became a research report of Goldman Sachs, in the 
following termed “GS study” (Goldman 2013).
This study is a perfect example how economists develop methods guided by the 
interest in reaching certain results, in this case “blowing up” the costs of the FTT to 
the maximum extent. The GS study summarizes the main results right at the 
3 According to survey studies of the Bank of England, two thirds of repo turnover concern over-
night deals (Hördahl and King 2008).
4 For the different channels through which the repo market produces (avoidable) systemic risk, see 
the excellent paper by Gabor (2016) and the literature quoted there.
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beginning: “On a 2012 pro-forma basis, the FTT would amount to €170 bn…for the 
42 European banks we have analysed…. By affected balance sheet category, the 
bulk of the impact stems from the European banks’ REPO books (€118 bn), fol-
lowed by derivatives (€32 bn), equities (€11 bn) and government bond books (€4 
bn). By bank, the impact extends across business models – investment, universal, 
global and domestic retail banks. Similarly, by geography, it has a reach well beyond 
the EU-11. Indeed, we show some of the most affected banks would be those in the 
UK and Switzerland. Individually, we show that the most affected banks are the 
French and German institutions. The six French and German banks show a 2012 
pro-forma FTT as a percentage of 2015E PBT (i.e., profits before taxes) ranging 
from 168% (BNP), up to 362% (DBK) and finally 423% (Natixis). But even pure- 
play retail lenders – the Italian/Spanish domestic banks for example – stand to be 
significantly impacted (16–130% of 2015E PBT)” (Goldman 2013, p. 4).
In order to arrive at these “magic” figures, the GS researchers invented a new 
estimation procedure: “…we attempt to gauge what the 2012 FTT (theoretically) 
payable by individual banks would be, were they asked to apply FTT retroactively, 
to 2012 balances. This is a theoretical, ‘all else equal’, exercise…” (Goldman 2013, 
p.  16). In other words, when calculating the costs of the FTT, GS researchers 
assumed that transaction volumes remain unaffected by the tax – they call this the 
“pro-forma effect”. The seriousness of this procedure can be illustrated using the 
following example. Trading volume in UK financial markets amounted to 563 times 
the British GDP in 2010 (even without repo transactions which are not covered by 
the BIS data base).5 On a “pro-forma” base, an FTT rate of 0.1% would generate tax 
revenues of 56.3% of GDP; at a rate of 1%, the British government might even 
receive revenues amounting to 5.6 times the British GDP.
The GS researchers justify the “pro-forma” estimation arguing that “the results 
allow us to identify the business areas/product lines where the FTT impact would be 
most pronounced…”. This is simply wrong: The structure of activities differs 
between European banks. Banks which are specialized on short-term trading and 
repo financing (“finance alchemy banking”) will reduce these activities in reaction 
to the FTT implementation to a much greater extent than the more traditionally 
operating banks (“boring banking”). To serve its “research interest”, GS researchers 
introduced the concept of an “effective annual tax rate”. This means that the esti-
mated annual FTT payments are related to the average repo value. In this way, one 
can document astronomically high “tax rates” as these rates become the higher the 
shorter the financing period of the REPO is. For tri-party REPOS which are turned 
over three to five times per day, GS Research arrives at an “effective annual tax rate” 
of the FTT of 360% (Goldman 2013, Exhibit 12 on p. 19). The absurdity of this 
procedure becomes evident if one considers the following example: A US house-
hold spends every day on average 100$ on consumption for which it has to pay 5$ 
5 Based on data from the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) and the BIS, overall transaction 
volume in 2010 on UK markets is estimated at 1270,4 tn. $.
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in sales tax. What sense does it make to calculate an “annual effective sales tax” of 
365 times 5% = 1825% instead of speaking of a general sales tax rate of 5%?
Another example for the predominance of the “research interest”: When discuss-
ing the FTT impact on the profits of European exchanges, the researchers did not 
stick to their “pro-forma” estimation but assumed an FTT-induced reduction of trad-
ing volumes. In this way, the GS reports arrive at the following conclusion: “…we 
estimate that the average European Exchange & IDB (i.e., interdealer brokers) 
under our coverage would see pre-tax profits decline by 22% as a result of the 
tax…” (Goldman 2013, p. 44). An exquisite example of manipulation concerns the 
impact of the FTT on retail investors: “Our analysis suggests that much of the bur-
den of the FTT would fall on retail investors rather than institutional investors… we 
estimate that a typical retail investor from the Euro-11 area could expect to incur an 
annual FTT charge of 33 bp, while a similar institutional fund manager would incur 
11 bp in tax. On this basis, a 30-year-old retail investor in the Euro-11 area who 
invested €1,000 a year until retirement at 65 could expect to see 14% of the princi-
pal investment consumed by the FTT” (GS Report, p. 54).
These calculations are biased in three respects. First, it is assumed that investors 
would not reduce the turnover of their portfolio due to the FTT. Second, it is – unre-
alistically – assumed that the retail portfolio returns over 35 years 6% p. a. on aver-
age. Both assumptions result in a high sum of cumulative tax payments (4875 €). 
Third, this sum is then related to the cumulative cash invested (35,000 €) leaving out 
the interest-compound effect. If one takes the latter – correctly – into account, the 
cumulative tax burdens amount to only 4.1% of the closing portfolio (this ratio is 
documented in Exhibit 34 but not mentioned in the main text).
The “dirty” campaign of the financial lobby was successful: The tensions 
between members of the “coalition of the willing” rose, in particular between 
Germany and France. On May 6, 2014, finance ministers of the EU11 declared: 
“…Our commitment to the introduction of a financial transaction tax remains 
strong…We agree on the following key elements…The progressive implementation 
will first focus on the taxation of shares and some derivatives”.
In plain language, this passage should read as follows: “The campaign of the 
financial lobby was too strong. This forced us to give up the ‘all institutions, all 
markets, all instruments’ approach proposed by the European Commission. Instead, 
as a first step we shall introduce a tax just on shares. We commit ourselves to call it 
‘financial transaction tax’”.
It took the finance ministers of the ECP more than 4 years to finally arrive at this 
result. In December 2018, the German and French minister proposed the French 
model as the “new European Financial Transactions Tax”: Only spot transactions of 
stocks issued in an EU country should be taxed. One year later, the German Finance 
Minister Olaf Scholz trimmed the concept further: Only transactions with stocks of 
companies with a market value of more than 1 bn € should be comprised by the new 
“FTT”. This would mean that only less than 0.3% (!) of all financial transactions in 
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the EU would be taxed6 and it would also mean the “FTT” would tax exactly only 
those trades which are less used for short-term speculation and more for holding 
wealth (compared to derivatives). It won’t be too difficult for pension and invest-
ment funds to carry out a campaign against such a one-sided “FTT”. In addition, 
countries like Belgium and Austria which have been always supporting a compre-
hensive FTT (including derivatives) will leave the “coalition of the willing”. This 
means that Scholz’ “FTT” cannot not be implemented as the so-called enhanced 
cooperation needs the participation of at least nine member states (as yet, only ten 
have remained in the group). As a first indication of this development, the Austrian 
Ministry of Finance published a study immediately after the publication of the 
Scholz proposal which sharply criticized the “FTT” which would only tax stock 
transactions. However, in case of a new financial crisis, the idea of implementing a 
general FTT will pop up again.
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Chapter 7
Regional Governance and Macroeconomic 
Crisis Management in Latin America
Maria Antonieta Del Tedesco Lins and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann
Abstract This chapter analyses the governance institutions in Latin America, i.e. 
norms, instruments and mechanisms designed to deal with macroeconomic and 
financial crisis management, and their use during the financial crisis which started 
in 2008 in the USA and reached the region mostly towards the mid-2010s. It argues 
that Latin American regional institutions never prioritized the harmonization or the 
development of common macroeconomic policies or mechanisms to deal with 
financial crises, and the few multilateral initiatives created were not successful.
 Introduction
As the 2008 financial crisis evolved, the governments of most countries in the world 
assessed its potential impact on their domestic stability and adjusted their macro-
economic policies accordingly, complementing or substituting for with various lev-
els of success. Some regions, such as Europe, have had or developed regional 
governance structures to deal with the crisis collectively, member-states measures 
given the existence of common regional arrangements, as discussed in several chap-
ters of this volume. In Latin America, most regional organizations did not have or 
did not develop such structures, and the management of the crisis was handled 
mainly at the domestic level; the reactions by Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, for 
instance, are analysed by Lins in Chap. 11 of this volume.
The absence or weakness of common regional structures to deal with external 
financial crises in Latin America is quite puzzling given that, at the one hand, the 
region has been fertile for the establishment of regional institutions and structures 
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of governance over the years, as discussed by Briceño-Ruiz and Ribeiro Hoffmann 
in Chap. 18, and, on the other hand, it has been particularly vulnerable to global 
macroeconomic instability and financial crisis such as in the 1980s and 1990s. This 
chapter does not explore the reasons for the lack of more robust regional frame-
works to respond to financial crisis; rather, it analyses if and how the (few) existing 
governance institutions played a role in the management of the 2008 crisis (Martins 
2017; Kacef and Monti 2010). We argue that, despite the existence of a myriad of 
regional institutions, the level of cooperation among their member-states and their 
capacity to act in crisis situations has been extremely limited. It is worth mentioning 
that most Latin American organizations have norms, instruments and mechanisms 
in the social areas which were or could have been used to control the damages of 
macroeconomic instability by compensating for the lost in jobs, revenues and rights, 
either temporarily or permanently (Medeiros 2016). This chapter does not delve 
into these governance structures, but we acknowledge their relevance as policy 
instruments to deal with macroeconomic and financial crisis from a broader 
perspective.
The chapter is structured in three sections, covering, firstly, the governance struc-
tures set by the main regional organizations active during and since 2008 such as 
Mercosur, UNASUR, ALBA, the Pacific Alliance and CELAC, and secondly, other 
multilateral institutions such the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF) and the 
Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (FLAR), followed by the concluding remarks.
 Regional Governance and Economic Crisis Management 
in Latin America by Regional Organizations
Despite the enormous variance in terms of issue areas covered and priorities, cur-
rently existing regional organizations have practically no norms, instruments and 
mechanisms to promote the harmonization, cooperation and integration in macro-
economic and financial matters. By the time the 2008 crisis burst, the main organi-
zations active in the region were the key organizations created during the so-called 
first and second waves of regionalism, i.e. Mercosur, the Andean Community 
(CAN), the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Caribbean 
Common Market (CARICOM), and ALBA, created in 2004 by Cuba and Venezuela 
to promote a counter-model of regional integration based on the twenty-first Century 
Socialism. In 2008, UNASUR was created, and soon after, the Pacific Alliance and 
CELAC (in 2011 and 2012, respectively). UNASUR and CELAC are exemplar of 
the regional trend in this period, which became to be known as “post-liberal” or 
“post-hegemonic”, given the lack of consensus on free markets as the main motor of 
regional integration. The Pacific Alliance, instead, must be seen as a reaction to the 
twenty-first Century Socialism and a regrouping by free-trade countries in the 
Andean region and Chile. The return to a pro-market approach also led to the cre-
ation of Prosur in 2019, but it is too soon to include this organization in the analysis.
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From among organizations, Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance have adopted a 
more liberal approach to development, even if Mercosur changed over time, as dis-
cussed in the already mentioned Chap. 18. UNASUR and CELAC were conceived 
as broad organizations, covering economic, social and cultural areas, but given their 
size of membership and diversity of policy preferences of their member-states, they 
have had a less coherent profile in their economic/development initiatives. One 
would expect that, independent their of more liberal or more developmentalist pro-
files, these organizations and their member-states would have an interest in creating 
buffers against global level instability and external shocks, but this has not been the 
case. Several reasons are pointed out in the literature, such as asymmetries of 
domestic macroeconomic indicators, lack of interdependence, political choices and 
ideologies, but the objective of this chapter is not to explore the causes but rather to 
map the existing mechanisms and to what extent they were used following the crisis.
Starting with Mercosur, despite many achievements in setting norms and stan-
dards, and establishing structures of governance in issue areas such as trade, migra-
tion and education, the regulation of services and capital has been a fiasco. The 
Protocol of Montevideo to foster the integration of financial services, concluded in 
1997, entered into force in Brazil and Uruguay in 2019, but it did not play a role so 
far. Mercosur has actually a bad record in fostering cooperation in macroeconomic 
and financial matters; the unilateral decision in Brazil to devaluate its currency, the 
real, without discussing with Mercosur member-states, in 1999, following the con-
tagion of the Asian crisis of 1997, has left a shadow in the region (Bouzas et al. 
2002, p. 17–19). When the international liquidity crunch came in 2008, Mercosur 
countries responded to the crisis according to their domestic priorities, and as a 
consequence, no common policies were set nor were any specific common interests 
discussed. Countercyclical policies were effective in Mercosur countries, as all four 
member-states combined monetary and fiscal policies in order to avoid a heavier fall 
in consumption and investment than that which the decline in external demand 
would have originally imposed on their economies. Like in most countries around 
the world, quite traditional instruments were used: expansion of liquidity, tax 
exemptions and stimulus to specific sectors and expansion of credit by state-owned 
financial institutions. Mercosur countries were free from rigid exchange rate poli-
cies, even if to very different degrees. A great virtue of the floating exchange rate 
regime is precisely its ability to absorb external shocks and thus allow the domestic 
economy to accommodate to the new global situation. This was an important ele-
ment of the varied reactions of Mercosur countries to the crisis. The four member- 
countries’ exchange rates depreciated in the initial moments of the crisis, but this 
was followed by quick monetary accommodation. The exception in this case was 
Argentina who, as a matter of deliberate policy, allowed the peso to continue to 
depreciate even after the worst period of the crisis had passed. Monetary measures 
were all devoted to the expansion of liquidity and the reduction of interest rates. In 
Brazil, federal banks pursed an aggressive increase in the availability of credit 
through several different instruments according to their specific jobs. Foreign 
exchange and trade policies were also dictated by the need to protect companies 
from the shortage in international credit lines. Independently of their relative 
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success, the point is that Mercosur member-states did not use the organization as a 
platform for discussion, coordination or the development of a common approach to 
handle the crisis.
UNASUR has provided space for a critical discussion about global financial 
architecture given its more developmentalist profile during the peak days of the “left 
turn.” Meanwhile, Venezuela and Brazil supported the creation of a Bank of the 
South as an alternative source for the financing of infrastructure to the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), such as the 
case of the New Development Bank (NDB) proposed by the BRICS countries in 
2014. The Constitutive Act establishing the Bank of the South was signed by Brazil, 
Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela in 2007, and the 
Constitutional Agreement was approved in 2009. The expectation was that it would 
have a capital of USD 7 bi from the founding members with contributions from 
Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela (USD 2 bi each), Ecuador and Uruguay (USD 400 
mi each), Bolivia and Paraguay (USD 100 mi each), but, unlike the NDB, it was 
never capitalized, and the project was suspended with the paralysation of Unasur 
(Calixtre and Barros 2010; Palestini 2016).
ALBA openly promoted a non-capitalist model of regional integration, rejecting 
free trade and key principles of the capitalist system such as private property and 
intellectual property. In addition to the oil regime and the creation of Petrocaribe, 
one of the most ambitious economic initiatives was the creation of a common cur-
rency, the Sucre, but to be used mainly as a mechanism of compensation for trade. 
Cusack argued that although trade via Sucre “grew rapidly from 2010 to 2012, 
rather than being balanced, this boom consisted largely of Venezuelan imports from 
Ecuador (…) And beyond 2012, it also became clear that the system was facilitating 
forms of corruption” (Cusack 2018, p. 127). Benzi (2017, p. 110) also argued that 
Sucre was undermined by corruption. Venezuela was a partner in 98% of Sucre 
trade, and the Venezuelan-Ecuador relationship alone accounted for 89% of Sucre 
trade (Cusack 2018, p. 129). Exchange between Cuba and Ecuador, for example, 
represented just 5.5% of Sucre Trade in 2016 (Cusack 2018, p. 130). Apart from 
Sucre, ALBA did not develop any mechanism that could be used to design a com-
mon approach to handle with the financial crisis.
The Pacific Alliance was created in 2011 by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, 
and its priorities are to foster trade liberalization and establish investment partner-
ships with Asia, especially China. An innovative initiative in the area of macroeco-
nomics was the creation of the Latin American Integrated Market (MILA), an 
agreement initially made between the Santiago Stock Exchange, the Colombia 
Stock Exchange and the Lima Stock Exchange, later joined by Mexico in 2014 to 
establish a regional market allowing for gains in scale by the trading of stock shares 
in each of the national markets.1 Martins (2017, p.110) argues that by 2015 MILA 
had not achieved the expected results; the impact of its creation in terms of 
correlation, risk and profitability was marginal and in terms of volume negotiated 
1 https://mercadomila.com/en/who-we-are/our-history/
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negative. Even if MILA’s record improved since then, this mechanism was not rel-
evant in terms of managing the impact of the 2008 crisis.
Finally, CELAC priorities have not included (macro)economic matters either. 
Moreover, as Sanahuja argues (Caetano and Sanahuja 2019, p. 31), CELAC can be 
well defined as another example of summit diplomacy in the region, where presi-
dents have a key say but little interest in institutionalizing common approaches. 
That said, CELAC has received technical support by CEPAL and SELAC to foster 
harmonization and the consolidation of regional trade and investment markets 
(Vadell 2018, p.16), but this process has been hindered by the extreme divergence 
among its member-states. As highlighted by Bonilla and Jaramillo (2013), CELAC 
included countries which had very different approaches to trade and macroeco-
nomic policies at the time of its creation, from the (neo)liberal Chile and Peru to 
(twenty-first century) socialists Venezuela and Cuba, and also countries from the 
Caribbean, which have also great variation of insertion in the global trade and finan-
cial markets. For that reason, it has also been deeply affected by the polarization 
around the Venezuelan crisis, and its last Presidential Summit took place in 2017, in 
Punta Cana, Dominican Republic, when only 11 from the 22 presidents were pres-
ent.2 CELAC has also promoted Ministerial Summits, but the last took place in 
2015. The third ministerial summit foreseen to take place in 2017 was cancelled. 
Macroeconomic dialogue was not a priority even during the good times of CELAC,3 
but this channel was the most appropriate to foster cooperation with the EU 
(Ghymers discusses a proposal to strengthen this dialogue in Chap. 22 of this vol-
ume). In fact, in addition to its role within the region, CELAC has been a platform 
for the region to dialogue and cooperate multilaterally with partners such as the EU 
and China. The EU has given special attention to CELAC given its preference to 
structure its bi-regional relations in formal agreement frameworks. EU-LAC 
bi- regional relations include Special Partnerships with Brazil and Mexico, bilateral 
dialogue and/or agreements with individual countries and sub-regions such as the 
Andean Community, Central American Common Market and Mercosur.4
2 http://observatorio.repri.org/artigos/celac-a-retorica-da-integracao/; http://observatorio.repri.org/
a r t i g o s / c e l a c - d e - l a - c o n v e r g e n c i a - a - l a - p a r a l i s i s / ; h t t p : / / r e v i s t a f a l . c o m /
la-celac-en-el-nuevo-escenario-regional/
3 The Plan of Action approved in 2013 established eight priorities: science, research, innovation 
and technology; sustainable development; climate change; regional integration and interconnectiv-
ity; social cohesion; migration; education; and labor, drugs, gender, investments and entrepreneur-
ship; and the Action plan approved in 2015 added higher education and citizenship security. https://
www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24235/read-the-assessment-of-programmes-and-actions.pdf. 
See as well http://alcuenet.eu/policy.php
4 The EU and LAC countries have created a think tank to forward studies about the bi-regional 
relations, located in Hamburg. https://eulacfoundation.org/en. Veja também https://eeas.europa.eu/
delegations/brazil/48562/rela%C3%A7%C3%B5es-ue-celac_pt
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 Other Multilateral Mechanisms to Manage Economic Crisis 
in Latin America
A matter of great importance in the debate between nations and as with multilateral 
institutions since the 1990s emerging economies’ financial crises, the struggle to 
maintain global financial stability has given rise to a series of regional initiatives. 
The global financial crisis outbreak (2007–2009) reinforced the concern with mar-
ket stability and brought to the floor the concept of global safety nets (Ocampo 
2006; Fritz and Mühlich 2019). Since the establishment of the Chiang Mai Initiative 
in response to the impacts of the 1997 Asian crisis, a number of collaborative initia-
tives between regional partners have taken shape.
Although some regional integration initiatives were already present in Latin 
America, they did not play a decisive countercyclical role in the most recent crisis. 
Rather, national states have conducted their own stimulus policies taking into 
account their economic possibilities and political dynamics. Latin America has not 
been particularly fertile in establishing regional financial arrangements – RFA. When 
compared to the European and even Asian cases, the few initiatives carried out in 
Latin America reveal its limited character, both in terms of the extent of participa-
tion and in terms of financial collaboration among its members. To fairly look for all 
possible forms of regional coordination in the face of economic crises, long existing 
institutions are worth mentioned: the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), the 
Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (FLAR), the Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration (created in 1961), the Caribbean Development Bank (1969) 
and the Financial Fund for the Rio de la Plata Basin, FONPLATA (1969) (Garcia 
2015). From them, CAF and FLAR – though not bringing together a considerable 
number of countries in the region – could have played a more integrative role in the 
face of the crisis.
A veteran institution of financial integration, since it was first created in 1968 by 
the Andean Group, CAF is formally an Ibero-American development bank.5 It has a 
contingent credit line, and its loan program has broadened to several sectors since 
the 2000s. However, the characteristics of CAF’s financing lines and projects indi-
cate that it operates mainly as a development bank and less as a regional relief fund, 
even considering its support to sovereign debt issuance and its increasing activities 
in global markets.
FLAR was created in 1978, by founding members Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, 
Peru and Venezuela. Its functions are typically those of a liquidity fund aimed at 
supporting countries in the face of problems in their balance of payments through 
loans and encouraging better management of international reserves, in addition to 
fostering financial cooperation between partners. Its institutional structure allows 
the fund to easily incorporate new members, and its very objectives could allow it 
5 CAF was created in 1970. It is owned by the 17 Latin American and the Caribbean countries and 
by Spain and Portugal. It has 13 private banks of the region as shareholders. https://www.caf.com/
en/about-caf/who-we-are/
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to turn into a powerful Latin American RFA (Lochagin 2015) should the largest 
economies of the region join. This could also enhance the FLAR’s funding 
capacities.
Given the limited role of formal regional institutions in the region in combating 
the effects of the global recession, it is interesting to look for other actions carried 
out jointly by countries in the region to deal with the credit crunch that mastered the 
late 2000s in global economy. In the absence of regional institutions with macroeco-
nomic cooperation programs, or multilateral financial arrangements or relief funds, 
some Latin American countries could have possibly established bilateral credit lines 
or other forms of bailout or mutual aid. The joint issuance of sovereign bonds by 
Argentina and Venezuela in 2006 – the Bonos del Sur – is an interesting case of 
credibility borrowing between countries. The markets saw this joint issue as a sign 
of Argentina’s creditworthiness, which eased the country’s access to debt financing. 
Phillips (2013) describes how the three different bonds (two Argentines and one 
Venezuelan) were initially issued as a package in the primary market but could be 
traded separately in the secondary market. Although there was no formal guarantee 
from the Venezuelan government to the Argentine issue, the market evaluated these 
bonds differently when compared to other Argentine sovereign bonds with similar 
maturity and yield. This was a very particular case that must be analysed in the 
perspective of Venezuela’s struggle for greater regional leadership, against the back-
drop of high availability of resources derived from oil and disputing this leadership 
with the Brazilian centre-left government.
 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has shown that, despite the plurality and achievements of regional 
organizations and regional institutions created in Latin America in the past decades, 
they have never prioritized cooperation and integration on macroeconomic and 
financial matters. The few existing initiatives such as Mercosur’s financial services 
protocol, UNASUR’s Bank of the South, ALBA’s common currency Sucre, Pacific 
Alliance’s integration of stock exchanges (MILA) and the Fondo Latinoamericano 
de Reservas (FLAR) were not used or not effective to buffer the 2008 crisis. Latin 
American countries handled the impact of the 2008 crisis mainly at the domestic 
level as they lacked viable mechanisms to react collectively.
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Chapter 8
Managing the Crisis in Greece: 
The Missing Link between External 
Conditionality and Domestic Political 
Economy
Dimitris Katsikas and Pery Bazoti
Abstract The handling of the Greek crisis was not successful. Despite the sacri-
fices that the Greek people had to endure, the country’s structural problems both in 
the public sector and the economy have not been resolutely resolved. This chapter 
offers an explanation for this failure. The main idea is to connect the externally 
imposed policy conditionality, with the particular characteristics of Greece’s domes-
tic political economy, seeking to integrate an analysis of impediments and opportu-
nities for structural reform. While the literature on external institutional constraints 
emphasizes the possibility for achieving convergence, the institutionalist literature 
points towards divergence among national political economies, as institutional 
change and policy performance are conditioned by crucial intervening variables, 
namely, aspects of the domestic institutional infrastructure. In this context, Greece 
is a paradigmatic case of long-delayed or stalled reforms despite external pressures 
that promoted them. While most attention has been paid to the weaknesses of the 
EMU, this analysis’ emphasis is on the role of crucial domestic factors. The analysis 
takes place in three steps: (a) the outline of Greece’s institutional profile and growth 
trajectory based on an analysis of formal and informal domestic institutions; (b) the 
description and analysis of the design, implementation and impact of the adjustment 
programs; and (c) in view of (a) and (b) an assessment of whether the adjustment 
programs implemented in Greece took into consideration the characteristics of the 
country’s political economy, and how and to what degree the failure to do so 
accounts for their results.
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 Introduction
Greece has undergone a deep, long-lasting crisis with unprecedented consequences 
for its political and socio-economic system. Already before the onset of the crisis, 
Greece was facing a mounting public debt and a number of structural economic 
deficiencies. When in 2009, revelations about Greece’s unexpectedly high fiscal 
deficit became known, the resulting loss of credibility, in combination with the 
country’s fiscal and economic woes and international investors’ low risk appetite in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis, shut the country out of the markets forc-
ing the Greek government to make an official request for aid. On 2 May 2010, 
Greece signed a bailout agreement for a 3-year, €110 billion loan, provided by the 
Eurozone member-states and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The agree-
ment came with strict conditionality in the form of a comprehensive policy program 
(Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)) that would be supervised by the so-called 
Troika (representatives of the IMF, the European Commission and the European 
Central Bank (ECB)).
The program called for an extremely harsh front-loaded austerity policy. The aim 
was to eliminate the deficit and achieve a sustainable primary surplus, in order to 
ensure the sustainability of public debt. At the same time, the memorandum required 
an extraordinary number of major structural reforms to streamline public adminis-
tration and improve the economy’s international competitiveness. However, things 
did not develop as predicted. The aggressiveness of fiscal adjustment led the Greek 
economy into deep recession, which in turn undermined the government’s fiscal 
consolidation efforts, leading to new measures and plunging the country into a 
downward economic spiral (Katsikas 2012).
The second bailout agreement, signed in early 2012, did nothing to change the 
mood in a country that found itself in a desperate social, economic and political situ-
ation. Thousands of businesses had gone bust, while unemployment reached 22% in 
the first quarter of the year. Frustration and anger simmered among the population. 
These feelings were openly vented at the elections of May, which changed funda-
mentally the political map of Greece. The once mighty, socialist PASOK, which had 
come to power in the October 2009 elections and had handled the crisis until that 
point, was relegated to third place, losing more than 30 percentage points in the 
polls. New Democracy, PASOK’s centre-right counterpart, did not fare much better; 
while taking first place, it recorded its worst electoral result ever. The winners of the 
election were radical parties on the left and the right, united by their opposition to 
the bailout agreement and the memorandum. Particularly impressive was the perfor-
mance of Syriza, a radical left-wing party, which took second place. The transfor-
mation of the Greek political scene was completed in January 2015 when SYRIZA 
won an early election and formed a coalition government with AN.EL., a populist, 
nationalist and ultra-conservative right-wing party.
The new government embarked on a new and ambitious negotiation with the 
creditors to formulate an entirely new type of agreement, outside the framework of 
the bailout programs. The handling of the negotiation by the Greek government was 
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extremely poor (Katsikas 2016) and resulted in the debacle of the summer of 2015, 
when the deadline for reaching an agreement expired, leaving the country without a 
program, and therefore without funding and the banks without access to ECB’s 
liquidity.1 Predictably, the country defaulted on an IMF payment, the banks were 
closed, and capital controls were imposed to prevent a bank run and capital flight. 
Despite the fact that the government won a hurriedly conducted referendum on a 
proposed draft agreement, with 61% of people rejecting the agreement (as was the 
government’s proposal), the immediate danger of a Grexit ultimately led the gov-
ernment to sign a new bailout program. The new MoU continued where the previous 
left off, adding new austerity measures to make up for the lost time in 2015. Since 
2017, the Greek economy has started growing again, and on August 2018, the third 
program was officially completed (the only one to be completed as planned). 
Although public finances have improved, the economic prospects of the country 
seem uncertain given the continued austerity of the post-bailout agreement with the 
creditors and the incomplete structural reforms program.
From this brief overview of the crisis, it is evident that its handling was not suc-
cessful. The fiscal balance has been restored, but this came at a great economic and 
social cost; meanwhile many of the country’s structural problems both in the public 
sector and the private economy remain unresolved. This chapter seeks to offer an 
explanation for this failure. The main idea is to connect the externally imposed 
policy conditionality, with the particular characteristics of Greece’s domestic politi-
cal economy, seeking to integrate an analysis of impediments and opportunities for 
structural reform. While the literature of external constraints emphasizes the poten-
tial for convergence, the institutionalist literature stresses the divergence among 
national political economies, as institutional change and policy performance are 
conditioned by crucial intervening variables, namely, aspects of the domestic insti-
tutional environment, including norms and practices.
The analysis will take place in three steps: (a) the establishment of Greece’s 
political economy profile and growth trajectory before the crisis; (b) the description 
and analysis of the design, implementation and impact of the adjustment programs; 
and (c) in view of (a) and (b) an assessment of whether the adjustment program 
implemented in Greece took into consideration the country’s institutional specifici-
ties and how to what degree the success/failure of doing so can account for the 
program’s results.
1 For a different view from the man who handled the negotiation, see Varoufakis (2018), and for a 
journalistic account that tells a very different story from that of Varoufakis, see Dendrinou and 
Varvitsioti (2019).
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 The Domestic Politico-Economic System
The present Greek political system was mainly consolidated in Metapolitefsi, a term 
referring to the period after the fall of the military junta in 1974 and the re- 
establishment of democracy. During this period, two parties dominated the political 
scene, the socialist-democratic PASOK and New Democracy on the centre-right. 
The two parties alternated in power, forming strong single-party governments, with 
smaller parties having a marginal role in governmental politics. During these years, 
the majority of the electorate was siding with one of the two dominant parties 
regardless of their policies. This kind of partisan identification reflected events of 
the Greek political history, mainly the Civil War of 1944–1949, when political divi-
sions deteriorated to a prolonged armed conflict, a painful legacy whose shadow 
still lingers today.
Under such polarized circumstances, the formation of single-party governments 
has been relying mostly on the ‘moving’ voters between the two parties. Despite 
being a minority in numbers, this part of the electorate has proven to be a critical 
driver of elections’ outcomes. Hence, political parties have traditionally sought to 
acquire control of this minority by creating and maintaining an extensive network 
of preferential relationships with potential voters, in exchange for their vote. 
Clientelism became the foundation of the Greek party system, in the form of privi-
leges granted in specific social groups and/or areas, and permeated the functioning 
of the state and the private economy. State power has been used by political parties 
as a means to extend benefits and privileges in exchange for electoral support, 
resulting in the state’s haphazard expansion into all areas of public life and the cre-
ation of what has been termed ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ (Lyrintzis 1984) or ‘clien-
telistic state’ (Sotiropoulos 2001).
This came mainly in the form of seeking employment in the public sector; a job 
in the public sector became exceptionally popular among citizens as it offered the 
advantages of job security and a relatively high wage. Consequently, it quickly 
became the subject of exchange in return for votes, at the expense of public finances. 
Although not disproportionally bigger than other OECD countries’ public sectors, 
the Greek public sector has been more expensive, due to both higher remuneration 
costs and its inefficient operation (Ladi and Katsikas 2017). The fiscal impact of 
clientelism is well illustrated by the presence of politically induced cycles in 
Greece’s public finance. A recent study by Chortareas et al. (2018) reveals that dur-
ing election years in the era of Metapolitefsi, there was an annual increase in gov-
ernments’ expenses by 1.7% and a deterioration of the primary balance of almost 3%.
The favourable conditions for civil servants were not unrelated to the presence of 
their particularly strong trade union, ADEDY. Before the crisis, trade unions, in the 
form of formal organizations and institutions, were the sole actors of an underdevel-
oped civil society. Confederations of unions, and mainly ADEDY, or GSEE, repre-
senting employees of large private sector companies, had an active involvement in 
the political system and had established a quid pro quo bond with incumbent 
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governments. This comes as no surprise if one considers that both political parties 
have infiltrated the labour and student movements (Sotiropoulos 2018).
Accordingly, a distorted collective bargaining process was forged. Unions pushed 
towards policies that were not aligned with the economic prospects and abilities of 
the state and the economy. General strikes and street protests were often used as a 
lever of pressure against incumbent governments. Such practices created an ineffec-
tive and fragmented labour market as the labour costs rose disproportionally to 
labour productivity and divisions between ‘insiders’ from influential labour unions 
and under-represented ‘outsiders’ (e.g. employees of small and medium-sized pri-
vate businesses and the self-employed) were deepened. In these circumstances, 
undeclared work thrived. Clientelism ended up substituting social insurance and 
meritocracy and left no room for the development of a modern welfare system.
The private economy could not remain unaffected in these conditions. Growth 
was mainly based on domestic consumption of non-tradables fuelled by domestic 
and foreign credit as a result of the low interest rates that followed Greece’s acces-
sion to the EMU and the liberalization of the Greek but also the European and 
international financial systems. This led to Greece’s twin deficits. On the one hand, 
successive governments’ ‘largesse’ led to a derailment of public finances, driving 
the fiscal deficit to an unprecedented 15.2% of GDP in 2009. On the other hand, 
Greece imported a large part of what it consumed, a tendency which led to an 
increasing current account deficit, which peaked at 14.9% in 2008.
The economy remained closed and introvert; exports of traded goods contributed 
less than 10% of GDP before the crisis, mostly in sectors of low technological con-
tent and value added (Zografakis and Kastelli 2017), while Greece ranked last in 
attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the EU-27 (Papazoglou 2014). This 
situation was partly due to inflated labour costs, as explained above; the loss of 
competitiveness, however, was also due to other factors, such as the small size of 
Greek businesses and the low levels of competition in domestic product (goods and 
services) markets (Papazoglou 2014; Vettas and Kouranti 2014). Many of these 
problems were due to the adverse regulatory environment in Greek product and 
labour markets, which suffered from excessive and low-quality regulation, which, 
more often than not, served particular private interests. According to the Index of 
Economic Freedom (2018), for the period 1995–2008, the Greek economy moved 
between the moderately free and mostly unfree categories.
Indicative, and a direct result of the lack of openness and the close embrace 
between political power and economic interests, was the pervasive presence of cor-
ruption. The average score of the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency 
International (2018) for the years 2000–2009 was 4.4, with 0 standing for highly 
corrupt and 10 for ‘clean’ countries. At 2009, the year of the outbreak of the crisis, 
Greece had a score of 3.8 and ranked 94th among 180 countries.
Despite the absence of high-quality inclusive institutions, Greece managed to 
grow. After a slowdown of the growth rate in the 1970s and a drawn-out economic 
crisis during the 1980s, the economy recorded substantial growth from the mid-
1990s up until the crisis; according to Eurostat data, between 1995 and 2007, 
Greece’s GDP was growing by 3.74% annually, a growth rate well above the EU 
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and Eurozone averages. However, this growth had a plateau given that it was driven 
by the effects on consumption and construction due to the partial liberalization of 
the economy, particularly in the financial system, during an era of global prosperity 
and de- regulation and the constant flow of EU structural funds. Favourable external 
conditions sustained the distortions and weaknesses of the Greek political and eco-
nomic institutions, creating a socioeconomic framework which was at the same 
time ineffective and stable but also highly vulnerable to abrupt changes in the exter-
nal environment.
 External Conditionality: An Overview of the Policy 
and Institutional Aspects of the Adjustment Programs
The main objectives of the three Economic Adjustment Programs were to restore 
fiscal sustainability and international competitiveness and to secure the stability of 
the financial system. To achieve these objectives, the MoUs agreed between Greece 
and its creditors included a wide array of measures both in the expenditure and rev-
enue side of the government’s budget, a major structural reforms’ program in both 
the public administration and the private economy and an ambitious plan of 
privatizations.
The focus of the first program was on restoring fiscal sustainability and therefore 
promoted tax increases and horizontal cuts in government expenses (e.g. through 
reductions in salaries, pensions and social benefits). These policies had an immedi-
ate effect, and by the end of 2010 the government was able to boast a spectacular 
reduction of the fiscal deficit by more than 5 percentage points. However, further 
progress in reducing the fiscal deficit, but also in the crucial task of restoring the 
country’s competitiveness, required complex, difficult and time-consuming struc-
tural reforms in both the state apparatus and the private economy. In addition to their 
complexity, these reforms elicited strong and well-organized opposition from inter-
est groups that stood to lose from their implementation. As a result, the structural 
reforms’ program soon came to a standstill. At the same time, despite the improve-
ment in public finances, the deep recession meant that public debt as a percentage 
of GDP rose to 172% in 2011, fuelling fears about an impeding Greek bankruptcy. 
Under these circumstances, markets’ expectations regarding the country’s economic 
course sank, and the sovereign debt crisis became a crisis of the banking sector as 
the Greek banks were heavily exposed to Greek public debt. The Troika gradually 
and reluctantly accepted the necessity of negotiating a second bailout agreement 
with additional funds, accompanied by an agreement to reduce Greek debt to more 
sustainable levels.
The second bailout program was signed in March 2012 by an interim three-party 
coalition government under Lucas Papademos, former ECB Vice President, which 
had formed following a governmental crisis in late 2011. The funds made available 
through the second bailout agreement were €174 billion; €117.8 billion were related 
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to the bail-in of the private sector creditors (PSI), while the remainder were meant 
to cover the operational financing needs of the Greek government and the repay-
ment of public debt falling due (European Commission 2012). The terms of the 
second loan agreement were more favourable than the first (whose maturity was 
also extended); the new loans had long maturities (15–30 years, with a grace period 
of 10 years for the European loan) and a reduced interest rate margin. At the same 
time, the PSI deal reduced the privately held Greek debt by €106 billion, while 
extending the remainder for up to 30 years, imposing on investors losses of up to 
75% in terms of net present value.
Despite the aforementioned benefits, the agreement sparked a domestic political 
crisis, due to the new round of measures mandated by the memorandum that accom-
panied the loan agreement. More specifically, the memorandum dictated a new 
round of austerity measures including the abolition of most tax exemptions, a new 
round of reductions in salaries, pensions and benefits and more cuts in several areas 
of public spending. However, what caused the greatest consternation were the inter-
ventions in the labour market. The minimum wage was reduced by 22% and by an 
additional 10% for young people up to the age of 25. At the same time, the new 
memorandum abolished the status of existing collective agreements as a minimum 
framework of reference for labour rights and wages, until new agreements were 
negotiated between employers and employees, opening thus the way for the replace-
ment of sectoral agreements by company-level and individual agreements. The 
memorandum also stipulated that personnel in the public sector would be reduced 
by at least 150,000 until 2015. Finally, the agreement included an extremely ambi-
tious privatization plan which was originally thought to bring to the public coffers 
€50 billion, a projection that proved wildly optimistic.
The government coalition of the radical left SYRIZA and the nationalist right- 
wing AN.EL. signed the third Economic Adjustment Program after a period of dra-
matic and ultimately failed negotiations with the country’s creditors, which led to 
the highly controversial and polarizing referendum of June 2015. The third loan 
agreement, signed in August 2015, was in line with the previous ones, adding new 
measures to make up for the off-track course of the Greek economy during the 
negotiations’ period. The new reform agenda was based on four main pillars. First, 
the restoration of fiscal sustainability with a gradual increase of primary surplus 
targets to 3.5% of GDP from 2018 onwards through a set of upfront fiscal measures 
such as VAT increases, a comprehensive pension reform meant to reduce the fiscal 
burden of future pensions and measures to enhance tax compliance. To ensure com-
pliance with the targets, the first program review in May 2016 added a mechanism 
which automatically triggered additional measures in case of fiscal imbalances. 
Second, the restoration of financial stability by addressing in a decisive way the 
issue of non-performing loans (NPLs) and by recapitalizing the banks by end-2015. 
Third, in order to strengthen growth and restore competitiveness, Greece undertook 
the responsibility to implement a new privatization plan, policies that would support 
further investments as well as a wide range of reforms in the labour and product 
markets. Finally, a key priority was the creation of a modern structure in public 
administration with measures aiming at enhancing its efficiency, fighting corruption 
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and ensuring the independence of key institutions such as the revenue administra-
tion and the statistics institute (European Commission 2016).
 Assessing the Compatibility of the External Constraint 
and Domestic Institutions
The policy conditionality promoted through the MoUs had all the characteristics of 
the ‘traditional’ IMF recipe: fiscal consolidation, liberalization of the economy and, 
due to the inability to engage in external devaluation, labour market reforms aimed 
at internal devaluation. This policy program failed to adequately take into account 
the particular characteristics of Greece’s political economy.
First, while there is no doubt that a certain degree of austerity would have to be 
implemented in the case of Greece, given its huge fiscal deficit, the fiscal consolida-
tion program was extremely ambitious. The first MoU called for an array of fiscal 
measures with a view to reducing the fiscal deficit by 11.2% of GDP by 2013, that 
is, a reduction of more than 3% of GDP per year, with primary surpluses projected 
thereafter. This kind of adjustment is not unprecedented but has been achieved in 
only a handful of cases, typically not in circumstances of deep recession, which 
Greece found itself in already from 2008, and in countries with very different char-
acteristics from Greece, namely, open and extrovert economies (Anastasatou 2017). 
The fiscal consolidation program underestimated the dependence of the Greek 
economy on the state budget and domestic consumption and therefore the conse-
quences that a drastic reduction in state spending and disposable income, as a result 
of austerity, would have on economic growth. Indeed, the program’s projections 
were constantly and overwhelmingly optimistic regarding a number of macroeco-
nomic variables, such as private consumption and investment and therefore GDP 
growth (Petralias et al. 2013).
The unprecedented decline of economic activity and the consequent dramatic 
increase in unemployment (Fig. 8.1) translated into reduced tax revenues and social 
security contributions, at a time that the government bill for unemployment and 
other social benefits was increasing. As a result, fiscal targets were missed, which 
led to the adoption of new austerity measures to make up for the deviations, which 
in turn deepened the recession.2 This downward economic spiral derailed the credi-
tors’ plans and made obvious the need for a second MoU, which however continued 
on the same policy path, as did the third.
In addition to miscalculating the impact of austerity on the Greek economy, 
given its structural characteristics, it seems that the designers of the MoUs also 
ignored two other features of the Greek political economy. First, the dependence of 
2 Governments also tried to meet the fiscal targets by reneging on their own obligations, by delay-
ing tax returns and payments towards domestic suppliers and by cutting down repeatedly the public 
investment account in the budget; these tactics deprived the economy from much-needed liquidity, 
deepening the downward economic spiral.
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both the private economy and the state on the domestic banking system for funding. 
Given the banks’ high exposure to Greek public debt, the impact of the sovereign 
debt crisis on Greek banks was tremendous as it cut them off from the interbank 
market and imposed on them substantial losses through the PSI. Moreover, as the 
economy deteriorated and uncertainty rose, there was a massive outflow of deposits 
and a dramatic increase in NPLs.3 The resultant credit crunch left Greek businesses 
not only without access to capital for investment purposes but lacking even working 
capital to meet their daily operational needs (see Fig. 8.2). In the rare cases that 
3 According to the Bank of Greece (2015), banks’ non-performing exposures (a measure similar to 
NPLs) in the first quarter of 2015 accounted for 40.8% of all loans and amounted to more than 100 
bn euros.
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funding was available, the high cost of capital discouraged most businesses from 
borrowing, despite their dire circumstances.4
Secondly, the MoUs did not take into account the limited support available 
through the weak and fragmented Greek welfare state, which traditionally catered 
mostly to the needs of pensioners. The insufficiency of social benefits (including 
unemployment benefits) meant that many people went for years with minimal or 
even no support at all.5 As a result, the economic crisis led to social degradation 
(Matsaganis and Leventi 2014; Katsikas et  al. 2015), as poverty rates soared to 
unprecedented levels (Fig. 8.3). The severe social crisis not only impeded economic 
recovery but fuelled even more the social and political reaction against the contin-
ued austerity policies and the MoUs in general, raising further the political cost of 
their implementation.
While austerity was driving the Greek economy into depression, an ambitious 
program of structural reforms was also under way. It had two main objectives: (a) to 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency (in fiscal terms) of the public administra-
tion and (b) to restore the economy’s international competitiveness. Pursuing the 
first objective called for a broad array of structural reforms with a fiscal impact, 
such as the establishment of a single payments authority for all public servants, a 
complete overhaul of the financial administration of the Greek National Health 
System, an overhaul of the Greek tax and pension systems and even reforms in the 
country’s judicial system.
The reforms promoted were appropriate and much needed in most of the cases; 
however, their design and implementation were far from optimal, partly because 
4 Between the summer of 2010 and October 2015, the average interest rate for credit lines to non-
financial corporations ranged between 6 and 8% (Bank of Greece). It is worth noting that for most 
of this period ECB’s official rate was below 1%.
5 It is telling that during the crisis, typically less than 15% of the unemployed received unemploy-
ment benefits.
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they did not adequately take into account the institutional capacity and characteris-
tics of the Greek public administration. A first problem was the sheer size and scope 
of the reform program, designed to be implemented in a relatively short period of 
time, which strained the limited resources of an already weak administration 
(Spanou 2018). This led to outright failures to promote certain reforms and partial 
and delayed progress in the implementation of others. The structural weaknesses of 
the public administration were compounded by the focus on fiscal consolidation, 
which affected adversely the priorities of many reforms (Spanou 2018).
Secondly, the design and handling of administrative reforms were often driven 
by a misunderstanding of the broader normative and political framework surround-
ing the operation of public administration. This became clear with one of the most 
controversial reforms, a commitment to reduce the number of public servants by 
150.000 by 2015. Leaving the arbitrariness of that number aside, the reform was 
based more on calculations about its fiscal impact and the desire to send a ‘message’ 
about the creditors’ determination to end the political protection enjoyed hitherto by 
civil servants. The announcement of the reform served only to create insecurity to 
civil servants amidst a deep economic crisis, which created a political backlash both 
by the public servants’ unions and the opposition parties. Threatening massive lay- 
offs in the public sector ignored the dependence of the ruling political elites on the 
goodwill of civil servants to produce results in an administration which lacked clear, 
common and high-quality operating procedures but also violated a ‘taboo’ of Greek 
society, which views lay-offs as a means of restoring efficiency, as ethically repre-
hensible. While the government was quick to give public assurances that personnel 
reductions would happen without resorting to lay-offs, the political backlash 
 sidetracked other necessary reforms, such as the introduction of a personnel evalu-
ation system or a mobility scheme.
Similar problems emerged with reforms intended to restore the international 
competitiveness of the Greek economy as the internal devaluation approach ignored 
the structural and institutional characteristics of the Greek economy. The small 
export sector, specializing mostly in agricultural and low-technology products, 
could not capitalize on lower labour costs to a degree that would have a significant 
impact on the economy. Indeed, in the early years of the crisis, there was hardly any 
increase in exports despite the fact that labour costs had been reduced considerably 
(Zografakis and Kasteli 2017). Since 2015, exports have been gradually increasing 
but not at a pace sufficient to sustain economic recovery, and the Greek economy is 
still a long way from being considered an open and extrovert economy (Fig. 8.4).
Indeed, given the structural and institutional characteristics of the Greek econ-
omy, such as the small scale of production, specialization in low value-added activi-
ties, high dependence on imports for intermediate products and the bureaucratic 
burden which impedes competition and productive investment, the belief that the 
reduction of labour costs alone would be sufficient to substantially improve the 
competitiveness of the Greek economy should be considered naïve at best.
Given these problems, a more rational scheme would involve early and ambi-
tious reforms in the business environment and the product markets, before moving 
to labour market reforms. Such a reform sequence is compatible with the findings of 
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empirical bibliography internationally (Bouis et al. 2012) but also for the case of 
Greece (Petralias and Katsikas 2018). Unfortunately, significant reforms in the 
product markets, such as the so-called OECD’s toolkit,6 which has been shown to 
have affected positively employment and prices (Petralias et al. 2018), were only 
introduced in 2014, as was the crucial reform of the regulatory framework for the 
licensing of productive investments, a reform which has yet to be completed.
 Conclusions
Greece’s crisis was one of the deepest and longest-lasting crises in the post-war 
period internationally. During a period that lasted more than 8 years, the country 
implemented three consecutive adjustment programs which imposed strict austerity 
policies and a host of ambitious reforms. While the fiscal balance has been restored, 
the economic and social cost incurred were tremendous, as more than 25% of GDP 
was lost and unemployment and poverty rates soared to unprecedented levels. At the 
same time, the sustainability of Greece’s debt has not been restored, because the 
huge drop in GDP has increased the ratio of debt to GDP well above its pre-crisis 
levels (181% in 2018). Moreover, despite progress in many areas of public admin-
istration and the regulation of the private economy, some of Greece’s most impor-
tant structural problems remain unresolved. These problems continue to undermine 
both the efficient and effective operation of the public administration and Greece’s 
6 The ‘OECD Competition Assessment toolkits’ are packages of measures that aim to reduce the 
regulatory burden in product and service markets, based on comprehensive studies of several key 
sectors. In the Greek programs, there were three waves of such studies, in 2013, 2014 and 2016. In 
total, the toolkits identified 1276 regulations which inhibited competition and proposed 773 mea-
sures relating to 14 major sectors of the Greek economy (SEV 2016).
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potential to become an extrovert, competitive economy. The country has gone 
through a period of tremendous social and political unrest, which led to a radical 
change of its political landscape and at times threatened Greece’s place in the 
Eurozone.
On balance therefore, one would be hard-pressed to argue that Greece’s bailout 
has been a success story. One of the most important reasons for this failure has been 
the lack of ownership of the policies promoted. This in turn is due not only to the 
character of the policies themselves (e.g. extreme austerity) but also to the shallow 
and incomplete understanding of Greece’s political economy. The policies pro-
moted magnified the economic and social crisis as they failed to take into consider-
ation the public administration’s and the economy’s structural and institutional 
features. Beyond its adverse economic impact, this failure also had significant polit-
ical repercussions, as it allowed populist parties to take advantage of people’s anger 
and frustration and dominate the political scene, increasing political uncertainty, 
undermining progress in much-needed reforms and ultimately delaying the coun-
try’s exit from the crisis.
The creditors’ attitude of zero tolerance for deviations from the program, which 
at times seemed to stem not only from ignorance but also ideological fixations, par-
ticularly on the crucial issue of austerity, did not facilitate incumbent governments’ 
efforts.7 On the contrary, it fed social discontent both against the incumbent govern-
ments and the European Union. It is telling that, in 2018, following Greece’s com-
pletion of the third adjustment program, three quarters of Greeks still did not trust 
the EU, the highest number among all member-states (Eurobarometer 90.3). All in 
all, it seems that too much economic, social and political capital was spent to achieve 
too little, too late.
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Chapter 9
The Crisis: Its Management and Impact 
on Equity and Democracy in Portugal 
and Possible Consequences for the EU
Kai Enno Lehmann
Abstract This chapter analyses the reaction of Portugal to the Euro crisis, in 
particular, the absence of popular revolt, and explores the possibilities to replicate 
the ‘Portuguese experience’ elsewhere.
 Introduction
To say the global economic crisis from 2008 onwards hit Portugal hard would be 
both a statement of the obvious, as well as an understatement. The country went 
through a deep recession, painful ‘structural reforms’ and suffered high unemploy-
ment and a ‘brain drain’ of mostly young people. In this sense, Portugal has been no 
different to the experiences of Spain, Greece or Italy from within the European 
Union (EU). Yet, unlike those three other countries, Portugal has not suffered a 
‘populist revolt’ from the political Right or Left. Instead, Portugal today is often 
seen as an example of a successful economic recovery without suffering social or 
political rupture.
The present chapter asks not only whether such a statement is accurate but what 
explains this apparent absence of a popular revolt. Looking at social, political and 
economic indicators, it will trace the evolution of Portugal over the last 10 years 
since the onset of the financial crisis. The central argument put forward here will be 
that, whilst it is useful to look at the Portugal case in the context of the global eco-
nomic crisis to see what ‘lessons can be learned’, we should be careful in drawing 
too many conclusions for other cases and replicating the ‘Portugal experience’ else-
where since much of what has happened in the country needs to be put into the 
context of its particularities. Therefore, any attempt to replicate its approach else-
where will most likely fail. Any lessons need to be ‘re-adapted’ to the particular 
circumstances of other countries.
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 The Context: Portugal Before the Crash—Not All Well, 
Even Then
There is a lot of literature today looking at the origins of the economic crisis of 2008 
or the origins of the Eurozone crisis (Giddens 2015; Krugman 2012; Lane 2012; 
amongst many). Whilst this literature is hugely informative, it frequently overlooks 
national particularities. In the case of Portugal, one of the key factors in this respect 
is the fact that, by 2008, the country had essentially been in economic crisis mode 
for many years.
As Reis (2013) argued, the country had been in economic difficulties since at 
least the year 2000, suffering a serious economic contraction between 1999 and 
2000.1 This was accompanied by rising unemployment and years of anaemic pro-
ductivity (ibid: 144). The then Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund, 
Olivier Blanchard, warned in 2007 that ‘Portugal is in serious trouble […] Growth 
is very low. The budget deficit is large. The current account deficit is very large … 
In the absence of policy changes, the most likely scenario is one of competitive 
disinflation, a period of sustained high unemployment until competitiveness has 
been reestablished’ (Portugal 2015: 6).
Subsequent history confirmed these warnings. Apart from a crisis of growth, the 
country was also dealing with a chronic budget deficit which, in 2005, already stood 
at 6.2% of GDP,2 way above the 3% stipulated by the rules of the Eurozone. In fact, 
according to Pereira and Wemans (2012), from the year of its re-democratization to 
the onset of the economic crisis, there had never been a surplus in the state budget. 
As such, it should come as no surprise that the Portuguese state accumulated high 
levels of debt over the decades. In fact, Portugal’s fiscal position since democratiza-
tion had been so perilous that, since 1976, the International Monetary Fund insti-
gated ‘fiscal consolidation programs’ for the country on three different occasions 
(Lourtie 2011). When, therefore, in 2009, the debt-to-GDP ratio was at 83.6% (a 
ratio which worsened steadily in subsequent years), it was, whilst alarming, not 
actually anything new.3 Rather, it followed a historical pattern which the country 
had gone through several times. Just as importantly, household debt in the country 
had also risen steadily prior to 2008. Whereas in 1995, it was 35.1% of GDP, by 
2008, it had already reached more than 90%.4 These figures hint at deep structural 
problems within the Portuguese economy which both pre-date, at least partially 
caused, and overlay the crisis from 2008. In order, therefore, to understand the 
extent and impact of the 2008 crisis, it is worth having a look at these issues.
1 See https://data.worldbank.org/country/Portugal. Accessed 15 May 2019.
2 See https://countryeconomy.com/deficit/portugal. Accessed 15 May 2019.
3 Data from https://tradingeconomics.com/portugal/government-debt-to-gdp. Accessed 15 May 
2019.
4 https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/portugal/household-debt%2D%2Dof-nominal-gdp 
Accessed15 May 2019.
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One such structural issue is the size of informal economy. According to some 
estimates, the informal sector in Portugal accounted for approx. 23% of GDP, sig-
nificantly above the share of most—though by no means all—EU member states 
prior to 2004 (Barbosa et al. 2013). To give just one example, in Austria, a compa-
rable country in terms of size, just under 10% of the economy was classed as infor-
mal in 2007 (ibid). This informality, in turn, has an impact on the tax base from 
which the Portuguese state can finance its activities. In 2008, on the eve of the crisis, 
the tax-to-GDP ratio was a touch over 21%.5
A second structural issue has been a long-standing problem with the quality of 
jobs created. According to the European Union itself, ‘[t]he prevalence of low quali-
fied workers in the Portuguese labour market has been considered as one of the most 
important constrains to national competitiveness and development’.6 Such jobs tend 
to be less secure and low-paid, making those holding them far more susceptible to 
economic shocks. An economy based on such type of employment simply lacks the 
resilience to be able to cope with economic shocks over which the country in ques-
tion itself may have very little influence. This lack of resilience is underpinned by 
an education system which does not adequately prepare Portugal’s young popula-
tion for the changing working environment (OECD 2015; Pereira and Wemans 
2012). Uneven educational attainment contributed to an entrenchment of a lack of 
social mobility and high levels of social inequality.
The critical point is to realize that, when the economic crisis hit the Eurozone in 
2008, Portugal was both already in economic difficulties as a result of a myriad of 
factors as well as ill-prepared to withstand any further shocks. In simple terms, the 
economy was not resilient enough to be able to cope with, or adapt to, the crisis 
which unfolded from 2008 onwards. As a consequence, Portugal was one of the 
countries hardest hit. This was most obviously shown in the country’s unemploy-
ment rate, which rose from a little under 8% in 2008 to just under 18% by 2013, 
underpinning in the process two of the structural problems touched upon above: the 
persistence of a large, informal economy as well as a brain drain from the country 
of primarily young people (Khalip 2015).7
This being the case, there was general gloom around Portugal’s prospects of escap-
ing this vicious economic cycle it seemed to be trapped in. This gloom was added to 
by problems within the political system which, once again, were long- standing. At 
national level, Portuguese politics since re-democratization has been marked by 
extended periods of—more or less stable—coalition and/or minority governments 
(Lloyd-Jones 2001; Lobo 2001). Particularly on the left of the political spectrum, the 
country has been marked by political fragmentation and instability (Bale 2008). This 
situation did not lend itself to long-term planning and strategic thinking to make the 
country more resilient and address the structural factors touched upon above.
5 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=PT. Accessed 15 May 
2019.
6 https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2009/portugal-quality-of-work-and-
employment-of-low-qualified-workers. Accessed 15 May 2019.
7 See https://tradingeconomics.com/portugal/unemployment-rate. Accessed 15 May 2019.
9 The Crisis: Its Management and Impact on Equity and Democracy in Portugal…
164
The impact of the economic crisis, then, has to be seen within this context: a 
country with a relatively young, and fragile, democracy which had proved itself to 
be incapable of developing and implementing policies capable of tackling the deep 
structural economic problems the county faced. It is here that we need to look at the 
role of the European Union within this scenario.
 The Response and Role of the European Union
The above argument has some critical implications for the role of the European 
Union in the crisis and prior to it. Historically, Portugal’s membership of the EU has 
been seen as enormously beneficial to the country in general and its economy in 
particular. For instance, from the year before its accession in 1986 to the eve of the 
economic crisis in 2008, GDP per head in the country rose from $2705 to 24,816.8 
Equally, for most of its life as an EU member, Portugal saw an inflow of foreign 
direct investment.9 As a result, public opinion surveys have consistently shown large 
support in Portugal for EU membership over the years, as well as for membership 
of the single currency, of which Portugal is a founding member.10
This public support, as well as the severity and long-standing nature of the crisis 
as described above, gave the EU some political cover and freedom to act, particu-
larly bearing in mind that Portugal has had experience of receiving outside ‘assis-
tance’ or ‘interference’ (depending on one’s point of view) in macroeconomic 
management in response to economic crises or challenges, as was the case in prepa-
ration of entry to the single currency during the 1990s (Bale 2008; Lloyd-Jones 
2001). The response of the EU to the crisis was what one ‘traditional’. In agreeing 
a so-called ‘bailout’ programme to stop the country falling into bankruptcy, the 
EU—together with the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, the ‘Troika’—required Portugal to undertake some significant macroeco-
nomic adjustments. In return for a three-year loan worth approximately 78bn euros, 
the country undertook to implement:
• A public sector wage freeze and limiting promotion opportunities
• An increase in sales tax (VAT) on some items, such as cars
• The privatization of parts of the national energy company as well as the whole of 
the national airline TAP
• The reduction of some pensions and the freezing of others and
• A further limiting of the amount of time unemployment benefit can be paid.
8 See https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/PRT/portugal/gdp-per-capita. Accessed 15 May 
2019.
9 See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS?locations=PT.Accessed 15 
May 2019.
10 For the historical series, see https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/
Chart/index. Accessed 15 May 2019.
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In putting forward these measures, the key objectives were to ‘maintain the 
stability of the Portuguese financial sector and to buffer the domestic impact of the 
crisis’ (Portugal 2015: 10). Unsurprisingly, as elsewhere in Europe, the measures 
put forward by the Troika were heavily contested. From an economic point of view, 
many have argued that the austerity measures contained in the bailout plan would 
have a detrimental impact both on the economy as a whole and people’s living stan-
dards individually (Pedroso 2014). Politically, there was strong criticism from many 
quarters about the fact that the European Union, at least initially, did nothing to 
address the flaws in the design of the single currency and associated fiscal processes 
despite the fact that, after Ireland and Greece, Portugal was the third Eurozone 
country needed to be bailed out in order to avoid sliding into bankruptcy (Costa 
et al. 2016). This suggests that there are evident, and profound, structural problems 
in the design of the EU’s monetary union, and these are those which need to be 
addressed in order to avoid future crises.
This ties into broader arguments made about the policy focus of the European 
Union. As outlined above, Portugal has suffered from long-standing structural prob-
lems in its economy which were somewhat masked by the macroeconomic perfor-
mance of the country since it joined the EU in 1986. As a result, the failure to 
address these structural problems was often overlooked, including by the EU. As 
Bittner (2010) has argued, the unwillingness and/or inability of the EU to address 
structural problems has been one of the most striking defects of its work over a long 
period of time, and the crisis which came about in Portugal (as well as elsewhere) 
was only one of the many manifestations of this failure (see also Lehmann 2018).
In the specific case of Portugal linked to this was also the worry of the country 
following in the footsteps of Greece, Spain and Italy—amongst others—which have 
had to content with the rise of populist parties from both the right and left in response 
to the economic crises the respective countries passed through after 2008 (Giddens 
2015). Yet, in Portugal, the surge of populist parties has not occurred. There has 
been an intense debate in the academic literature as to what, in contrast to several 
other European countries, explains this absence of populism in Portuguese politics 
and society at large. In this literature, one can detect several explanations, roughly 
grouped under demography, history, culture and specific local contemporary fac-
tors. It is worth looking at these briefly in turn.
 The Absence of Populism in Portugal?
The first factor explaining the absence of a strong, anti-establishment party in Portugal 
is the make-up of its political, and party, system. Critically in this respect, Portugal 
actually has a long history of having relatively strong ‘outlier’ parties. Ever since 
democratization from the mid-1970s onwards, the Portuguese Communist Party, for 
instance, has consistently polled in the region of 10% of the vote, be it in local or 
national elections (Llana 2015). That means that there is little room, on the Left at 
least, for a ‘protest party’. It already exists but is part of the political mainstream.
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Linked to this is Portuguese history. Unlike Greece or Spain, the country does 
not have a contentious recent history. It has not had the experience of a civil war, 
like Greece, or strong regional separatist movements which, in some cases, have 
included a long-lasting terrorist campaign, as in the case of Spain. Portugal’s history 
is, in this sense, more consensual, lacking both the precedents and incentives to 
pursue radical policies and radical politics aimed at overthrowing ‘the system’. The 
experience of relatively consensual coalition governments since 1974 plays into this 
context. Portugal is not a country to which ‘revolution’ comes easily (Morlino and 
Raniolo 2017; Lloyd-Jones 2001).
The second key factor when discussing the absence of explicitly populist parties 
is the way politics is done in Portugal (Magalhães 2011). Critically, Portugal’s 
mainstream political parties are primarily associations for the attainment of power. 
Yet, this also means that they have a strong sense of when to leave power in order to 
preserve themselves long term. In the specific case of the Portuguese bailout pro-
gramme, this meant, for instance, that the then Socialist government asked for a 
bailout from the Troika of European Union, European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, yet then resigned to call for a snap general election. 
This meant that, in some ways at least, the established parties remained untarnished 
by what was to unfold: The Socialists could credibly claim not to be directly respon-
sible for the consequences of the bailout and associated austerity programmes, 
whilst the Conservatives could credibly claim not to be responsible for the situation 
which led to the need for a bailout in the first place.
A third factor which explains the absence of an explicit populist movement in the 
country is demographic. In simple terms, those who might lead such a movement—
the young—voted with their feet (and not at the ballot box) and left the country. 
Youth migration has surged since 2010 (Heinke 2016), leading some to claim that 
Portugal’s younger generation has chosen ‘emigration, not revolution’ (Llana 2015). 
A potential revolutionary movement was therefore killed off, at least for the time 
being, by the very economic circumstances that might facilitate it. As a conse-
quence, what protests there have been in Portugal have come largely from the older 
generation, hit hard by pension reforms and cuts to public services such as health-
care (ibid). These protests might be vociferous, but they do not threaten the system 
as a whole.
Finally, in Portugal, it has been possible to claim that the intervention by the 
Troika has been a success and one achieved in a relatively short time. The country 
exited its bailout programme in 2014 with governments claiming that the country 
can, once again, ‘stand on its own two feet’ (Amaro 2017). Recent data suggests 
that GDP per head in 2018 was just under 19,000 euros in 2018, compared with just 
over 16,000 euros in 2013.11 Whilst the country was, at the time of the bailout, in a 
deep economic recession, GDP has now been growing at more than 2% per year 
since 2016. At the same time, unemployment has fallen from more than 16% in 
11 Data for this section from https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/portugal. Accessed 15 
May 2019.
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2013 to less than 10% in 2018. Linked to this, personal consumption has grown 
consistently since 2014, reflected in retail sales growth.12 The medicine might have 
been bitter, so the argument goes, but it has had the desired effect, a line which the 
EU has certainly been pushing hard (Centeno 2018).
Yet, the above only tells part of the story. Populism may not be explicit in the 
way it is in Greece or Spain or Italy. However, this does not mean that there are no 
populist tendencies. First of all, it is worth noting that, following the inconclusive 
legislative election of 2015, a relatively radical-looking left-wing government did 
take power, replacing the centre-right government which had implemented the aus-
terity measures described above (De Georgi and Santa-Pereira 2016). This does 
suggest that there was ‘punishment’ for these measures at the ballot box. Equally, it 
is worth noting that the government which took power, a minority administration 
led by Prime Minister Antonio Costa, has since relied on the support of the 
Portuguese Communist Party which, as argued above, has traditionally been the 
party of protest in times of crisis (ibid.). There was, therefore, protest, albeit within 
the context of the relatively benign conditions of Portugal.
It is also noticeable that the government has, since taking power in 2015, veered 
leftwards politically. Developing a strong anti-austerity narrative, some measures 
with a populist appeal—such as partially reversing public sector salary cuts—have 
sustained the government’s popularity whilst changing the tone of the domestic 
debate of one from crisis management to optimism (Jones 2017). In other words, the 
government has managed to adopt some populist measures and tactics (the impor-
tance of narrative, for instance) and applied it to the country’s specific circumstances 
whilst following a clear political line which was different from previous years and 
previous governments. In doing so, it attended to at least some of the demands that 
were made by civil society during the worst years of the crisis and the austerity 
which followed. It also provided a ‘human touch’ to its policies, focusing on such 
issues—the partial reversal of salary cuts, for instance—which make a clear, and 
almost immediate, difference to people’s lives. In other words, it has adapted popu-
lism to the particular circumstances of the system within which it worked 
(Lorenz 2018).
The critical point, then, is that Portugal was not that different from other coun-
tries in having within its society and political system populist tendencies (see also 
Freire and Santana-Pereira 2019), but how the system managed to absorb and utilize 
these tendencies without causing it to rupture. It had adaptive capacity. This adap-
tive capacity, however, will be tested in the coming years as Portugal faces up to 
some of the structural challenges discussed above which resulted in, and sustained, 
the crisis in the first place and which have the potential to alter the dynamics of 
society and the current political system.
12 Data from https://tradingeconomics.com/portugal. Accessed 15 May 2019. It is worth noting that 
the causal link between the policies of the troika and the more positive economic outlook has been 
questioned. See, for instance, Pedroso (2014); Jones (2017).
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 Future Challenges
In spite of the good news on the economic front, there have been some suggestions 
from analysts that the current recovery may not be all that it seems. The first reason 
for this is simply the impact the depth of the recession has had in terms of confi-
dence, both in the country as a whole and on the part of the population. Yet, trust in 
the sustainability of the economic recovery—and the government policies to ensure 
such sustainability—is absolutely vital. Portugal still has the third-highest debt ratio 
of the European Union, standing currently at 120% of GDP.13 In other words, the 
country is in no way ‘out of the woods’.
More critically still, however, than this snapshot are long-term trends. Most cru-
cial, perhaps, is the demographic development already touched upon above. The 
great exodus of the country’s young population during the crisis years represents 
Portugal with a significant demographic challenge: It has one of the oldest popula-
tions in Europe, with all that this implies for the Labour market but also for the 
health and pension system. Therefore, it has to either try and ‘repatriate’ and retain 
its youngsters or encourage immigration. Yet, this in itself may shift the very condi-
tions which have insulated the country from an explicit populist challenge (Khalip 
2015). Furthermore, the government will have to tackle, structurally, the country’s 
social security system to be sustainable in the long term.
Equally, the country’s economic base remains fragile. A significant part of the 
current recovery has been based on a booming tourism sector. Yet, this sector is 
notoriously fickle and subject to outside influences and factors over which the gov-
ernment itself may have little to no control. International competitiveness of 
Portuguese businesses remains a significant concern, linked to age-old problems of 
the education system, already referred to at the start of this text, which, in simple 
terms, does not produce enough people with the kind of skills which would allow 
for a profound reform of the economic system of the country. These challenges, in 
turn, are linked to the structure of the Portuguese state, which is still often seen as 
too slow and unresponsive, both to the demands of business and the population at 
large (IMF 2018; OECD 2015). In other words, having overcome the immediate 
crisis, the government is now facing up challenges very similar to those which pre-
vious governments faced and whose inability to confront these challenges signifi-
cantly contributed to the crisis in the first place.
Yet, it is unclear whether the current government has the capacity to deliver such 
reforms. In many ways, in fact, the current government was given sustainability and 
purpose by the gravity of the situation it found itself in upon assuming power. With 
the immediate emergency passed, the political dynamics inevitably change which 
may expose more of the differences between the partners in the left-wing alliance 
than had previously been the case. In recent months, there has been a noticeable 
emergence of tensions between those advocating a wholesale abandonment of aus-
13 Data from https://tradingeconomics.com/portugal/government-debt-to-gdp. Accessed 15 May 
2019.
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terity policies and those, around the current Prime Minister, advocating for a more 
moderate and incremental change of course away from the policies of the ‘bailout 
era’. It remains to be seen how these changes impact on the current left-wing coali-
tion elected in October 2019 (Ames 2019).
In this respect, Portugal faces very similar types of challenges to the ones that it 
has faced ever since re-democratization: Structural reforms which would allow the 
country to become far more pro-active in avoiding crises rather than react once a 
crisis has hit. The key challenge, then, for a system which has shown itself remark-
ably resilient is to become one whose conditions allow for crisis avoidance. This is 
critical since, as has been shown, the absence of explicitly populist parties does not 
mean the absence of conditions which can foster and incubate populism. In fact, as 
has been argued, the make-up of the current government and some of the policies it 
pursues are signals that populist tendencies exist within society which governments 
are happy to respond to. History over the last 45 years suggests that the country is 
very capable to controlling and channelling these populist tendencies in a construc-
tive and productive manner. Yet, with the challenges it still faces, vigilance is needed 
to ensure that this continues and can be used in such a way as to allow the country 
to address the strategic problems it clearly still has, even, or because of, years of 
crisis and austerity.
 Conclusions
Portugal has often been held up, not least by the European Union, as a posterchild 
of its policies in response to the crisis of 2008 and beyond. As shown, the data 
clearly illustrates the improvement the Portuguese economy has undergone during 
the last few years after emerging from a deep recession. The fact that it has done so 
without throwing the political system into turmoil through the emergence of explic-
itly populist parties from either the Left or the Right is a testament to the system’s 
robustness and adaptability. It is obviously, based on the historical evidence since 
re-democratization in 1974, a remarkably adaptive and resilient system. Yet, as I 
hope to have illustrated, it would be too simplistic to make a linear connection 
between the policies and Portugal’s economic upturn. In fact, many have questioned 
both this link and the depth and sustainability of this upturn.
The reasons for these doubts are founded in the historical realities of the country. 
As illustrated, Portugal has had a history of booms and busts over the last few 
decades, grounded in an inability to address the structural weaknesses of the 
 economy, ranging from education to productivity to the over-reliance on foreign 
capital and economic sectors more vulnerable to outside shocks. As yet, the country 
has shown relatively little, even in this crisis cycle, to suggest that it can overcome 
these cycles of boom and bust.
It is this lack of evidence in terms of profound structural reforms which means 
that the spectre of a populist surge cannot be discounted for definitive. So far, popu-
list tendencies and demands have been absorbed into the mainstream of this system. 
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Yet, the lack of change in the fundamentals of the Portuguese economy and society 
suggests that another crisis could well occur. Whether the resilience of the systems 
would hold again in such a scenario is open to question. Portugal, in short, needs to 
remain vigilant.
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Chapter 10
The 2011 Crisis in Italy: A Story of Deep- 
Rooted (and Still Unresolved) Economic 
and Political Weaknesses
Simone Romano
Abstract Italy went through an economic and political crisis in 2011. The trigger 
was the Sovereign debt crisis that shook the Eurozone due to its incomplete struc-
ture. The ingrained causes were the long-term structural problems that have plagued 
the Italian economy for a long time, leaving it vulnerable to external shocks. The 
reaction to the crisis took the form of austerity measures and reforms implemented 
by a technocratic Government. These policies, carried out with no external financial 
assistance, were meant to send a signal to markets and stop the spiral of distrust and 
negative self-fulfilling expectations, but they did not address the sources of the 
problems. Since then much has been done at both national and European levels, but 
it is still not enough to guarantee resilience. Italy needs to finally solve its structural 
problems, and the European Monetary Union (EMU) needs to complete its architec-
ture, starting with the completion of the Banking Union. Considering the increasing 
social discontent and political intolerance, failing to act now might imply severe 
consequences when the next crisis hits.
 When Did the Crisis Start? International Triggers 
and National Ingrained Causes
On the 16th of November 2011, the Government headed by Mario Monti took 
office, replacing the Cabinet presided over by Silvio Berlusconi. This change in the 
political leadership, due to the state of emergency and not to standard political 
dynamics, is the clearest symbol of the economic and political crisis which Italy 
went through in 2011 (Bosco and McDonnell 2012). It is certainly not the starting 
point though. That crisis was due to both cyclical and structural conditions and to 
national and international factors, making it a deep-rooted and complex phenome-
non, whose causes and origins are not easy to pinpoint.
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At the beginning of November 2011, the spread that measures the difference 
between the 10-year treasury bond yields of Italy and Germany was at 574 basis 
points, while at the beginning of that same year, it was 400 basis points lower. This 
worrisome dynamic was self-sustaining, fostering a vicious cycle of negative self- 
fulfilling expectations about the soundness of Italian public finances. These negative 
expectations contributed to plunge the country into a second and longer recession, 
after the one that followed the 2008 financial crisis, which, in turn, replenished the 
pessimistic predictions (Henningsen 2012). Albeit Italy had run larger budget defi-
cits and had borrowed with substantial higher interest rates in its recent years,1 the 
unfolding of the events in 2011 urged an unprecedented move, such as the change 
of government. Was the heavy public debt burden the driving cause of this negative 
spiral? Was the contagion of the crisis that had started in Greece the precedent year? 
Was it the lack of confidence towards the Italian government? Was it the structural 
weakness of the Italian economy? As a matter of fact, the 2011 crisis in Italy was the 
result of a complex combination of different causes, with short-run external triggers 
building on national long- run problems.
The international context played a key role in exacerbating the negative percep-
tion over a national economic situation that, albeit not sound and prosperous, in 
other circumstances would have been judged far away from the possibility of a 
sovereign default. The so-called Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2011 started in Greece the 
precedent year and was triggered by the Greek reckless handling of public finances, 
hiding a prolonged period of overspending through “books-cooking” practices. This 
crisis though, as described by Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015), was not only explain-
able in terms of sovereign debt (un)sustainability, but it was rather originated by 
growing and undisputed imbalances that developed over time in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception. The unfolding of the crisis enlightened 
the flawed nature of the EMU due to its incomplete construction: without adequate 
tools at the European level to curb the contagion, when the Greek problem exploded, 
the financial markets promptly started fearing about the resilience of other national 
economies that for many reasons seemed less equipped to counteract the negative 
shock spread by the collapse of the Greek economy throughout the Eurozone.
As Fig. 10.1 illustrates, while for Portugal, Ireland and Spain the main problem 
was the soaring level of deficit due to the bailout of key actors of their banking and 
financial sector, for Italy, the Achilles heel was the high level of public debt 
(Fig. 10.2).2
1 While the peak for the interest rates on the Italian Government Bond registered in December 2011 
was around 7%, the interest rate on the same security was around 21% at the end of 1981 (IMF 
Database). In that year, Italy had a public deficit of around 10% of GDP, so higher than the ones 
registered in the period 2009–2011, when the peak was around 5% (EU Commission dataset).
2 The higher level of primary deficit (and so of public debt) registered in Italy in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis was not due to discretionary fiscal stimulus or bailouts, but mainly it was 
the result of the slowdown of the economy and its consequent pressure on public budget through 
automatic stabilizers.
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The mounting lack of confidence towards the resilience of the Italian public 
finances was fuelled by national characteristics as well: the widespread mistrust 
towards the Government and its capability of guiding the country in such a difficult 
moment and the long-term structural weaknesses of the Italian economy, such as the 
low productivity growth and the high level of unemployment, tax avoidance and 
corruption. All of this quickly fostered the view that Italy could be one of the next 
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EMU member countries to face a situation similar to the one that was happening in 
Greece, spreading fears about its ability to honour its sizeable sovereign debt.
Against this background, with the spread sailing straight to the 400 basis point, 
on the 5th of August 2011 the European Central Bank (ECB) sent a letter, meant to 
be secret, to the Italian government. The missive, signed by both Trichet and Draghi, 
urged the Italian government to act baldly and swiftly. Among the urgent measures 
advised by the ECB were the increase in competition to foster efficiency and 
strengthen economic growth, large-scale liberalization and the decentralization of 
wage bargaining. Albeit the government headed by Silvio Berlusconi promptly 
reacted, starting immediately to implement some of these measures, many European 
political leaders—above all the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy—thought it was not enough. This judgement was shared 
by investors, which were increasingly reluctant to buy Italian Treasury Bonds, driv-
ing up interest rates and spread. The publication of the Trichet–Draghi letter in the 
late September by an important Italian newspaper did not help to cool the situation 
off, eroding the thin confidence on which the cabinet was hinging. At this point, a 
strong signal was needed: the change in government was the inevitable last resort.
The described unfolding of events demonstrates the key role played by both the 
flaws in the architecture of the EMU that paved the way for the 2011 crisis, and the 
long-standing fragility of the Italian economy. The next two paragraphs briefly 
extend the analysis on both factors.
 Deep-Rooted National Weaknesses
The Italian economy has been dragged down for long time by structural problems 
that all Governments, regardless of their political colour, have struggled to solve or 
even just to address.
Italy is one of the countries with the highest level of value-added tax (VAT) 
avoidance in Europe, and it has faced the problem of generalized tax evasion for a 
long time. This phenomenon coupled with the wide dimension of its black economy 
subtracts important resources from the public budget, exacerbating its fiscal sustain-
ability issues.
The narrow fiscal space that these factors shape is detrimental for economic 
growth. Italy has difficulties in attracting private capitals: the scarce efficiency in its 
bureaucracy and judiciary system together with the high level of corruption scares 
away international investors, while the uncertainty stemming from its chronic political 
instability discourages national investment. Since the lack of investment depresses the 
productivity growth, Italy needs public investment, but the government cannot afford 
to step in because of its tight budgetary constraints (Henningsen 2012).
All of this is coupled with an inefficient labour market where, moreover, the por-
tion of graduates in the work force is very small if compared with other advanced 
economies. The sluggish or flat economic growth resulting from these factors 
increases the debt burden, requesting a very tight budgetary policy to maintain its 
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dynamics under control. This policy does not sustain aggregate demand and growth, 
further fuelling the vicious circle.
 International Context
The EMU is a unique case of a currency union without a centralized fiscal policy 
design. This implies that the common monetary policy can deal only with union- 
wide shocks, while the reaction to idiosyncratic shocks is left in the hands of 
national policies. Even though these national policies may be not enough, the 
Eurozone lacks union-wide stabilizers: the labour and capital mobility among mem-
ber countries has been scarce, the level of coordination on the union-wide fiscal 
stance has not been sufficient and the EMU still lacks common fiscal capacity. In 
such environment, a sizeable national shock can easily become systemic as the 
Greek case of 2010–2011 clearly demonstrated.
This background is particularly worrisome in the light of the enhanced economic 
interdependence among member states due to the currency union and the common 
market: inside the EMU, many banks, funds and firms hold sovereign bonds of other 
member countries, and many firms do business with their counterparts in other 
member states. Hence, if a member state is to default on its debt or to face a deeply 
troublesome economic situation, its economy would not be the only one to be 
severely hit, but the shock would spread to other member countries through both 
financial and trade channels.
As a consequence, national Governments could be called to intervene to help 
distressed financial institutions or to avoid an ulterior slowdown of their economies. 
Many of these Governments, though, have budgetary positions which are already 
worrisome, as it was the case in 2010–2011, when many of them were already in 
dire straits. At this point, financial markets, which are forward looking for their own 
nature, started pricing in the higher risk. In 2011, these jitters were further fuelled 
by the famous and improvident Deauville beach walk, when President Sarkozy and 
Chancellor Merkel decided that the private sector had to bear part of the burden in 
case of sovereign defaults. Albeit the decision could be right in principle, the timing 
was highly inappropriate and ended up igniting the financial contagion that trans-
formed the Greek sovereign crisis into a union-wide crisis, hitting Italy as well 
(Haas and Gnath 2016).
 The Policy Responses: Austerity and Reforms
When the Monti cabinet took office, the situation was highly distressed. Markets 
had lost confidence in the Italian capacity to honour its debt: the prices of the Italian 
Treasury bonds were collapsing, increasing the interest rate on the debt and, in turn, 
narrowing further the fiscal space. Time was ticking and a strong signal was needed 
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to calm the markets and show that the new Italian leadership was able to steer away 
from disaster.
The strong response took the form of the so-called “Salva Italia” (Saving Italy) 
decree, launched by the Cabinet just roughly 2 weeks after its appointment. The 
timing of the decree, the fact that the budgetary law there contained was the fifth of 
the year and the sizeable net balance (with a net surplus of 20 billion euros) well 
describe the scope and the urgency of this manoeuvre.
The decree comprised three chapters: public budget, social security and growth. 
The spending cuts were crafted to reach the amount of 12–13 billion euros in 
3  years, while the increase in taxes was designed to bring new revenues in the 
amount of 17–18 billion in the same time span. Of this grand total of 30 billion 
euros, 20 of them were thought to be used to reduce the deficit (and so preventing 
the debt from soaring), while 10 were destined to growth-enhancing measures 
(Baldini 2014).
On the spending reduction side, the Salva Italia decree provided for a radical 
change in the role of the provinces as territorial administrations, diminishing their 
competences as a first and quicker step towards their complete abolition.3 On the 
same line, the decree reduced the number of employees of all the authorities, while 
many of the existent authorities were abolished.
Remaining in the first chapter, on the revenue side, the real estate taxation, 
already introduced, was anticipated (so as to start in 2012 and no longer in 2014), 
and it was extended to first homes as well. Furthermore, a luxury tax was introduced 
on cars, boats and private aircrafts. The VAT was designed to increase from 21% to 
23% in 2012 but, in the end, only increased to 22% during the Government headed 
by Enrico Letta, in 2013.
The most important measure for its long-term impact was contained in the sec-
ond chapter: social security. The retirement reform known as Fornero law (from the 
name of the Ministry who crafted it) changed the former defined benefit pension 
scheme into a defined contribution pension scheme. It also raised the retirement age 
and provided incentives for people who postpone their retirement. This translated 
into a substantial long-term structural improvement of the Italian budgetary posi-
tion, quickly making it one of the most honourable member countries for the EU 
Sustainability Index produced by the Marktwirtschaft Stiftung (2014), which takes 
into account not only the outstanding level of debt, but also its projection into 
the future.
Regarding the third chapter, the measures to spur economic growth were inspired 
by the need to improve the budgetary position as well, resulting in the usage of 
widespread liberalizations as the main tool. Just as a matter of example, the limits 
regarding the opening times for any kind of shop or commercial activity were abol-
ished, and the territorial criteria determining the number of pharmacies were modi-
fied as to increase competition. Beyond liberalizations, the decree established as 
deductible the regional income tax paid by firms and employers on workers, and 
3 As of today, the provinces, albeit further modified, still exist and function.
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aimed at refinancing many public infrastructure projects considered key for future 
development (Culpepper 2014). Albeit for timing and scope the strongest response, 
the Salva Italia decree was not the only clear signal that the emergency cabinet sent 
to markets, investors and other political leaders. In fact, while already started by the 
former government, the parliament speeded up the approval of the balanced budget 
constitutional amendment, and the government proposed a spending review, meant 
to save up on unproductive expenditures, with a cut in the civil servants and military 
forces (among others).
To better understand the Italian response to the crisis, it is important to stress 
that, differently from Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, Italy did not receive any 
financial assistance from the EU Commission or the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). This implies that it did not have any external authority directly involved in 
the policy design. In the immediate aftermath of the Salva Italia decree, the spread, 
thermometer of the market sentiment towards Italy, decreased and reached 374 
points. At the end of the year though, it increased again, reaching 500 points. In 
2012, the spread followed a fluctuating trend, with a new peak over 500 in the sum-
mer of 2012. This shows that while the austerity measures pushed by the Monti 
cabinet managed to avoid the worst from happening, breaking the negative spiral 
that threatened to plunge Italy into a sovereign debt crisis, they did not succeeded in 
solving the problem at its source but, truth be told, they were not meant to do so.
The problem with the Italian economy has been the passiveness used to address 
the underlying structural problems. This made a “shock therapy” in necessary the 
worst moment: in the context of 2011, with a huge slack in the economy and an 
accommodative monetary policy, the fiscal multiplier was bigger than usual (Chinn 
2013). In these conditions, a stark package of austerity measures, albeit necessary 
in that moment of emergency, had a very negative and long-lasting effect on the 
already troubled Italian economy, prolonging the time needed to recover from reces-
sion and shaping what has been happening in the years up to now, both on the eco-
nomics and politics. Even though a strong tightening of the public budget was 
inevitable in that difficult moment, a technocratic Government could have been 
braver in designing the measures, looking only at their long-time effect, with no 
need to consider the inevitable political discontent that they were to originate.
Despite the efforts, the 2011 crisis in Italy and the Eurozone was not over until 
the summer of 2012. In fact, the spread in the Eurozone as a whole (and so in Italy 
as well) decreased in a lasting and sizeable way only after the famous “Whatever it 
takes” speech pronounced by the ECB President Mario Draghi in July 2012. These 
words made history as the perfect example of the forward guidance tool aimed at 
shaping expectations, declaring that no matter the challenges, the ECB was ready to 
do whatever was needed to save the Euro and, quoting President Draghi, that would 
have been enough. As a matter of fact, it was.
The fact that only the intervention of a European power was able to solve the 
problem demonstrates how the 2011 Sovereign debt crisis was not only an issue of 
national public finances, but rather an EMU-wide problem. There is no doubt that 
Italy had a structurally flawed economic situation with a too high debt burden. This 
entailed that, sooner or later, in order to avoid a crisis, it would have been necessary 
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to “put the house in order”. The “house in order” approach indeed was—and still 
is—necessary to prevent the spreading of new crises in a currency union shaped as 
the EMU, calling each member state to be responsible and conscious of the spillover 
effects of its national economic policies. This said, what happened in the period 
2010–2012 clearly demonstrated that the “house in order” approach, albeit necessary, 
is not sufficient, and a completion of the EMU architecture is desperately needed.
 The Economic and Political Legacy
Seven years have passed from the peak of the crisis. Since then, much has been done 
to avoid repeating past mistakes, both at national and European levels. Nevertheless, 
it is not enough: many of the problems that led to the 2011 crisis, at both levels, are 
still unresolved. On the Italian side, it suffices to think that in the weeks that pre-
ceded the drafting of this paper, Italy lived a sort of strange deja-vu, with a growing 
attention (or rather mistrust) from financial markets and other member states 
towards the conduct of economic policy carried out by the Government. Once again, 
the capability of the Cabinet to face the economic challenges, linked with the very 
high level of public debt and the stagnating economic growth, was questioned. This 
led investors to ask for a higher premium when buying Italian bonds, ending up 
increasing the interest rates and pushing the spread beyond 300 points. The similar-
ity with what happened in 2011 clearly indicates that the underlying structural prob-
lems have not been resolved.
The Governments that followed the Cabinet headed by Mario Monti were suc-
cessful in maintaining the debt dynamic under control and bringing Italy outside 
recession, but the country has not succeeded in recovering the pre-crisis level.4 
While many other Western and European countries have experienced a period of 
substantial growth in the last 2–3 years, with the pace of crisis-hit countries like 
Spain or Ireland outperforming Italy substantially, Italian economy did not manage 
to fuel a convincing growth.5
This further confirms that the structural problems that paved the way for the 2011 
crisis are still unresolved. The productivity growth is still very low, and the level of 
investment, both public and private, is not sufficient. The unemployment, above all 
among young people, is still very high,6 creating a concrete risk of hysteresis that, 
together with ageing, can lower further the productivity and any prospect of growth. 
4 The level of real GDP in 2016 was still much lower than in 2006, roughly at the level of 2001. 
Please refer to the table in the appendix for all the detailed figures.
5 Both Ireland and Spain experienced an annual growth rate of their real GDP that was higher than 
3% in the period 2015–2017, while the Italian rate in the same period was hardly higher than 1% 
(OECD StatExtra Database).
6 The unemployment rate had been higher than 10% until the end of 2017, while the youth unem-
ployment rate has been higher than 30% (Eurostat and OECD).
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Corruption, inefficient bureaucracy and public administration are still there as well, 
together with the high public debt burden.
To worsen further the situation, the two crises and the long recession that fol-
lowed left a heavy legacy that adds on to old structural problems. The long-lasting 
decline of economic activity implied a very high share of firm destruction. This 
exacerbated the unemployment problem and contributed to the mounting problem 
of non-performing loans (NPL), which jeopardized the resilience of the whole 
Italian financial system. The Italian banks were not heavily engaged in derivatives, 
and this left them in a better shape in 2008 if compared with other international 
counterparts. The deep and long recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis 
brought many borrowers to default on their debts or to be delinquent with their pay-
ments. This situation put a strain on the balance sheets of many Italian banks, creat-
ing a concrete threat for the resilience of the Italian banking sector. In turn, this 
problem affected the capability of financial institutions to lend to the real economy, 
curbing further economic growth.
While the worst phase of the NPL issue seems behind our backs as the peak of 
the 2011 crisis, the Italian economy is still in a bad shape. This long-standing diffi-
cult economic situation has important consequences that go beyond the economy, 
affecting the political and social spheres as well. The lack of a proper economic 
recovery together with the unpopular austerity measures approved as a solution to 
stop the contagion of 2011 created a fertile ground for the spread of populism. The 
absence of tangible positive results in face of the sacrifices that the austerity mea-
sures imposed to a big part of population has led people to become increasingly 
angry and disappointed at elites and the establishment. In an enduring period of 
uncertainty such as the present one, people have started seeking prompt protection 
and fast solutions. While standard political parties failed to understand and address 
these needs, the populist forces responded directly to the people requests, offering 
simple solutions and wide protection regardless of their real feasibility. This paved 
the way for the first openly populist Government in Italy, one of the founder and 
main member states of the EU. As demonstrated by the first 6 months of the populist 
Cabinet, this is not only an Italian problem but it spills over to the EU and the 
Eurozone. For the future of the EU construction, it is of paramount importance not 
to label this as a bump in the road or something strictly related to Italian dynamics. 
On the contrary, this has to be considered a wake-up call: the way the double crisis 
was handled had flaws and, in order to thrive, it is important to rethink social and 
economic policies at all levels.
Widening the focus to the European level, it is clear that the 2011 crisis has 
spurred an effort to provide the EMU with new and more adept instruments to face 
critical situations. To this end, the creation of the Banking Union and the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) are the two most important pillars. While in the after-
math of the crisis the pace for their creation was impressively quick and efficient, 
the impetus has lost momentum afterwards. The Banking Union provides the per-
fect example. What happened during the crisis highlighted the inadequacy of the 
national character of banking supervision in a common financial market where the 
main actors had a systemic importance. To this end, the Single Supervisory 
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Mechanism (SSM) was created, shifting the competence for supervision of the sys-
temic actors directly to the ECB. On top of this, the Single Resolution Mechanism 
was created, to handle in a homogenous way the solution of troubled systemic finan-
cial institutions. Although this effort has gone in the right direction, the construction 
has been left incomplete and, as it stands, it cannot function properly (exactly as it 
happened with the creation of the EMU). The third block of the Banking Union, the 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), needs to be created to diminish the 
probability of bank runs and self-fulfilling crises. Political divide between prioritiz-
ing risk reduction over risk sharing, or the way around, still hinders the creation of 
this third pillar, leaving the EMU exposed to shocks. The situation seems better on 
the ESM side, where a concrete reform of the international treaties shaping the ESM 
is currently under discussion, adding important features to the mechanism, such as 
its role of backstop for the Single Resolution Funds (SRF).
 What Have We Learned or What We Should Have Learned?
The dynamics that led to the crisis of 2011, the unfolding of the events and the years 
that followed teach us important lessons for both Italy and Europe. At the Italian 
level, these years have stressed the importance to address the structural problems 
that have been ignored or badly addressed for too long, both in the economic and the 
political system. Policy uncertainty, lack of social capital, low productivity, increas-
ing inequality, corruption and tax avoidance have been hampering the growth poten-
tial and policy stability for many years now. Addressing them only in a state of 
emergency, as it was the case in 2011, brings negative consequences that, consider-
ing the current economic and social situation in Italy, could be even worse. Moreover, 
these factors undermine Italy’s economic and social resilience, making it very vul-
nerable to external shocks.
At the European level, the events of the last 7 years have showed the need to 
wisely complete the structure of the EMU, providing it with all the mechanisms that 
a currency union requires in order to function well. On a practical level, the first 
moves need to be the completion of the Banking Union, the revision and enhance-
ment of the ESM and the provision of a fiscal capacity or any kind of fiscal stabiliza-
tion tool at the European level (Shambaugh 2012).
None of these tasks is easy, none of them is free of high political costs, but if we 
do not act now, the cost in the future could be very high. A wise proverb states that 
the roof has to be repaired when the sun is shining. Now, with the positive economic 
moment of the last couple of years that is starting to fade, there is no longer room to 
postpone difficult decisions. Italy and the EMU have survived previous severe crises 
as the one in 2011, but, if they do not act baldly and swiftly to make their systems 
more resilient, they might be in deep trouble when the next crisis hits. The political 
and social capital has clearly eroded since 2011, and the economic situation, above 
all in Italy, offers less room for manoeuvre than in 2008. Errare humanum est, per-
severare autem diabolicum.
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Chapter 11
Latin American Economic Crises 
and Populist Bids: Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico
Maria Antonieta Del Tedesco Lins
Abstract Through a comparative case study analysis, the chapter seeks to retrace 
the recent history of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in dealing with economic crises. 
Despite their different institutional arrangements and macroeconomic trajectories, 
the comparison shows that domestic concerns were the main drivers of economic 
policies. Particularly regarding each country’s approaches to exchange markets and 
capital controls—here called financial policy—the chapter evaluates the extent to 
which they contradict international perceptions and even the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF’s) stance on financial regulation and the management of capital flows. 
A close relationship between domestic political demands and the design of eco-
nomic policy indicated that even in the face of some similarity between the chal-
lenges posed to the three countries and more than responses to changes in the world 
economy and the quest to keep these economies integrated, economic policy aimed 
to accommodate internal political pressures.
 Introduction
Crises are a common feature to barely all analyses of Latin American economic his-
tory. The 1980s’ debt crisis besides blocking the region’s access to international 
financial markets led to economic stagnation, hiking inflation and poverty increase. 
Since the late 1980s, debt renegotiation, programs of macroeconomic adjustment 
and liberalization policies opened a new phase for the region. Hand in hand with the 
economic transition was the political one. Democracy building on the onset of mili-
tary regimes and the reign of long-lasting ruling parties was a remarkable challenge 
to be conciliated with macroeconomic and institutional reforms. Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico, the three largest economies in the region, shared this experience but, 
although having adopted several similar policies in their economic reform programs 
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since the 1990s, they cannot be considered resembling fragments of a common 
model. Their respective political idiosyncrasies have led to quite diverse economic 
policy arrangements ever since. The chapter recovers the economic and political 
trajectories of these three countries since the early 1990s, against the backdrop of 
the 1980s’ debt crisis, its impacts and the ensuing liberalization reforms. Financial 
and exchange rate policies are in the spotlight to analyze the countries’ perfor-
mances throughout the different crises and their financial insertion in the world 
economy. In all three cases, monetary, exchange rate and financial openness policies 
were instrumental in determining both the intensity of each country’s financial inte-
gration and the degree of vulnerability to which they were subject when the global 
financial crisis hit. It is argued that despite their very diverse political trajectories, 
flirts with populism inspired economic policy in critical moments in the three cases.
The 1980s’ Latin American foreign debt crisis and the ensuing lost decade reflect 
the previous period during which the presence of military dictatorships in several 
countries of the region is key to understanding economic policy focused on main-
taining high rates of output growth, despite rising inflation, especially in Argentina 
and Brazil. High liquidity in international financial markets in the run-up to the oil 
crisis granted these countries the access to credit from abroad at floating and ini-
tially low interest rates, allowing them to postpone necessary reforms and preserve 
growth. The fight for economic normalization in Latin American countries follow-
ing debt renegotiation in the late 1980s was uneven and consisted of two big chal-
lenges: macroeconomic stabilization and long delayed structural reforms as 
necessary conditions to resume growth. Most of the reforms were inspired by what 
was labeled the Washington Consensus, a set of liberalizing measures which, in the 
three cases here, were coupled with the adoption of pegged currency exchange 
regimes. These profound macroeconomic transformations both led the three coun-
tries to a new phase of increasing integration into the world economy and gradually 
triggered the financial crises that followed. However, the intensity of their crises in 
1994 (Mexico), 1998–1999 (Brazil) and 2001–2002 (Argentina) was quite diverse 
and proportional to the commitment to the hard-pegged exchange rate regime of 
each one (Wiesner 2008; Kaminsky et al. 2009).
The literature on Latin American financial systems and central bank reform tends 
to emphasize international actors and pressures as key determinants of policy 
change. In contrast, and furthering the argument that economic policy had pinches 
of populist inspirations in a number of episodes of recent history, this chapter argues 
that domestic concerns were the main drivers of financial policy making after the 
2008 crisis even in countries with different institutional arrangements and macro-
economic trajectories such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. Through a comparative 
case study analysis, the chapter seeks to retrace the three countries’ approaches to 
exchange markets and capital controls and evaluate to which extent they contradict 
international perceptions and even the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) 
stance on financial regulation and the management of capital flows. Populist eco-
nomic policies can be traced despite a number of government shifts after 
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democratization—broadly situated in the late 1980s.1 As the following discussion 
intends to put, populist temptations prevailed mostly in Argentina and Brazil.2
The text is divided into three main sections besides this introduction and the 
concluding remarks. Next section recovers in broad lines the Latin American debt 
crisis, distinguishing each country’s political situation before 1982, thereafter and 
leading to the liberalizing reforms of the 1990s. The third section focuses on the 
three nations’ respective financial crises during the 1990s and 2000s and their politi-
cal and economic consequences. The fourth section scrutinizes the reactions of 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico to the 2008 global financial crisis, a period during 
which three very distinct political orientations were in place in each of the three 
countries.
 From Over-Indebtedness to Economic Collapse: Latin 
American Saga
The literature on the legendary Latin American debt crisis usually points to the 
national state as the main source of instability (e.g. Skidmore and Smith 2005). 
Bresser-Pereira (1992) summarizes the different positions on the Latin American 
crisis and groups them into two explanatory theories from which arise reform pro-
posals: the neoliberal and the fiscal crisis approaches. The neoliberal view, giving 
birth to the so-called Washington Consensus, was the international financial bodies’ 
common view and enjoyed strong influence over Latin American leaders. The het-
erodox approach stressed the state’s inability to follow previous development pol-
icy. The neoliberal approach identifies two major causes for the crisis in Latin 
America: the extreme growth of the state manifested by too much intervention in the 
economy with emphasis on protectionism; and the economic populism that would 
prevent the state from controlling social demands in accordance with the sanitation 
needs of public finances. Following this logic, the crisis must be initially countered 
by a rebalancing of public accounts and stabilization before a market-oriented 
growth policy is launched, where the state would have its space reduced. The return 
of the development process would be a logical consequence of adjustment.
1 Latin America experienced new forms of populism at the turn of the twenty-first century, with the 
rise to power of governments that made up the so-called ‘Pink Tide’—a period characterized by the 
presence of several center-left governments in the 1990s and 2000. But right-wing populism would 
still come back in more recent versions, as the world has been experiencing a surge of these “not 
so new populisms.” They arise as a reaction to the deepening globalization and its effects on 
national production, population flows and capital movements, among other social and economic 
transformations, but their emergence do not replace the so-called “old populisms.” This chapter is 
aligned with the definitions of populism presented by Rodrik (2018) and Grigera (2017).
2 A thorough analysis of the economic policy shifts in Mexico and Brazil after their elections in 
2018 and 2019 goes beyond the chapter’s time frame.
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The approach to the fiscal crisis suggests that the loss of the state’s ability to save 
and invest, which stems from stabilization programs, precludes it from resuming its 
control of long-term development policies. The shift from public to private invest-
ment is not automatic, and the economy stagnates until the private sector sees no 
greater interest in investing. Government deficit as a structural problem leads to a 
broader crisis of the state coupled with the loss of credibility of governments in 
power as the crisis deepens. Despite the direction of causality between the state 
crisis and adjustment policies being reversed among them, arguments from both 
approaches can be used to understand the crises that followed.
Mexico was not under military rule in the 1970s and 1980s but faced a crisis of 
a similar kind to the other two countries. With the exception of Colombia, all Latin 
American countries that took massive credit during the 1970s went bankrupt in the 
1980s (Damill et al. 2005, p. 189). In the early 1980s, falling international oil prices, 
rising US interest rates and the high level of accumulated foreign debt from the 
previous period led the Mexican economy to extreme external vulnerability. It was 
the dawn of insolvency crisis. During Miguel de la Madrid’s government 
(1982–1988), an intense debate about the orientation of economic policy took place 
confronting structuralist positions with groups clearly in favor of liberal reforms 
(Maxfield 1992). According to Santín Quirós (2001), the government’s political 
support coalition was mostly “financial.” The nationalization of the banking sector 
carried out by the Mexican government in 1982 was conceived against a crisis back-
drop and was defined within an unambiguously liberal inspiration, from the appoint-
ment of the president de la Madrid’s economic team, through a design of reform that 
was frankly favorable to the financial sector, both regarding the amounts paid by the 
state for the nationalized financial institutions and the main framework to redress 
the national financial system (Santín Quirós 2001).
In Brazil, the 1974 presidential transition had a broader political significance, as 
a group with a project of political distension who would lead to the gradual opening 
of the regime came to power. Economic policy was executed considering this politi-
cal circumstance for the new government could not achieve a worse economic per-
formance than those obtained by its predecessors. The world economy’s cyclical 
reversal forced Brazilian policy makers to face different problems: conforming to a 
new international reality; adjusting domestic macroeconomic situation, given that 
inflation was accelerating; and maintaining high growth rates. With the outbreak of 
the Mexican crisis in 1982, it was no longer possible for the military to postpone a 
request for IMF financial aid. This point in time can officially be considered the 
beginning of Brazilian debt crisis (Garriga and Lins 2014, p. 60). What followed 
was a struggle for macroeconomic stability amid a complete imbalance in external 
accounts and a long series of failed economic plans under the IMF’s agenda. This 
process generated a decade and a few years lost.
The 1980s began with Argentina facing serious deadlocks. The retreat of military 
regime was marked by a hard defeat in the Malvinas war against Britain. Election in 
1982 brought a civilian back to power, Raúl Alfonsin (1983–1989), with an expecta-
tion that his mandate could confront major problems: inflation rates of over 200% a 
year as early as 1982, rising to 400% the following year, and the undisputable 
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inaptitude to manage and repay private foreign debt. The next inescapable step 
would be to turn to the IMF and face structural adjustment policies as a conditional-
ity of obtaining a loan (Skidmore and Smith 2005). Referring not only to the 1980s’ 
chronic Argentine indebtment but also to the succeeding crisis of 2002, Damill et al. 
(2005) state: “for around three decades external debt was almost constantly one of 
the main issues of economic policy.”3
Hence, those who agree with the diagnosis of the fiscal crisis see the Latin 
American debt crisis as the major consequence of the financing model adopted as 
economic stimulus in the previous period, which resulted in excessive indebtedness 
and also prolonged maintenance of the import substitution policy (Griffith-Jones 
and Sunkel 1986, inter alia). Structural problems persisted throughout the 1980s, 
despite all attempts to adjust. The crises’ fiscal feature translated into public 
accounts deficits but also brought financial and political components to all 
those crises.
Adjustment programs have not been effective in rebalancing external accounts 
and controlling inflation nor have they ensured output growth that would lift coun-
tries out of crisis with even the IMF policies not being strictly followed by govern-
ments. Argentina and Brazil have reached hyperinflation, which has profoundly 
deteriorated personal income, particularly in the lower classes. Although not attain-
ing Argentine and Brazilian levels, inflation in Mexico also remained very high, 
particularly after 1982. Thereafter, overcoming the 1980s’ crises should be achieved 
by combining macroeconomic stability and the pursuit of greater international inte-
gration of countries, which was accomplished in the following decade.
 Liberalization Policies Cum Financial Crises in the 1980s 
and 1990s
From debt renegotiation and restructuring, Latin American countries have been 
implementing reforms in their economic policy framework. The rhythm and inten-
sity of the reforms were defined by each country’s political trajectory and the read-
justment needs. Regarding financial liberalization, quite different patterns were 
taken. Net inflows of foreign capital in emerging markets resumed and increased 
substantially in a short period of time since 1990.
Several similarities that marked the three largest Latin American economies dur-
ing the 1980s and through part of the 1990s seem to vanish as Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico delineated distinct economic policy paths since the late 2000s. The unfold-
ing of the late 1990s–early 2000s and 2008–2009 crises was quite particular in each 
one of the three countries due to both their general economic conditions and the 
political choices that have been made during and after the crises. Generally 
3 In the original: “Por cerca de tres décadas la deuda externa fue casi ininterrumpidamente una de 
las preocupaciones centrales de la politica econômica.” (Damill et al. 2005: 187).
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speaking, since 2007 Argentina has adopted a model of state-led economic strategy 
quite diverse than both Brazil and Mexico economic models. While Argentina was 
taken away from the international financial markets and was implementing an 
increasingly protectionist and interventionist economic policy, both Brazil and, to a 
greater extent, Mexico maintained a stable macroeconomic pattern, at least until late 
2010s, in the Brazilian case.
 Mexico
Mexico began to open to global financial markets as early as the late 1980s, under 
the IMF structural adjustment programs. The Mexican authorities have since 
launched financial reforms that spanned the domestic financial system and opened 
the capital account. In addition, interest rates were liberalized, selective credit poli-
cies were eliminated and a system of multiple banks was established until the priva-
tization of banks in the early 1990s. The opening of the capital account allowed the 
presence of foreign investors in public securities markets and capital markets and 
gave Mexican companies the opportunity to issue bonds in foreign markets. The 
inflow of foreign direct investment was stimulated by an institutional reform in 
1993. The Mexican case presents some peculiar features. The banking system was 
nationalized during the 1980s amidst the debt crisis. Financial institutions’ re- 
privatization and the financial reforms led by the Salinas government (1988–1994) 
were clearly motivated by neoliberal ideas and can be seen as a coordinated attempt 
to build legitimacy and political support for the government (Santín Quirós 2001; 
Sandoval 2011).
Similarly to Argentina and Brazil, stabilization centered around monetary and 
exchange rate policies since the 1980s. The external financing constraint and fiscal 
problems imposed limits to growth, and inflation control became the top priority. A 
crucial reform in conducting monetary policy was introduced in 1993 via constitu-
tional amendments. This change effectively institutionalized the operational auton-
omy of the Mexican Central Bank as constitutional independence. Priority was 
given to the stabilization of the Mexican currency’s purchasing power. However, the 
heightened confidence in the monetary authority was not strong enough to prevent 
the currency crisis of 1994.
Since 1992, the Mexican currency was clearly over-valued. Along with a deterio-
rating balance of payments, political instability set off a speculative attack against 
the peso. The rigidity of the adjustment mechanism that had been adopted made 
adjustment in the face of market pressures a difficult proposition. When new Zedillo 
government (1994–2000) tried to change the mechanism of bands, performing a 
more or less controlled devaluation, the decision set off a wave of panic. Confidence 
in the Mexican economy deteriorated even further with an intense capital flight 
(Garriga and Lins 2014). The Mexican crisis was an important but not yet the final 
chapter in the epic of fixed exchange rate regimes in Latin America. This concurred 
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with the implementation of the Real Plan in Brazil and with an extremely prosper-
ous—albeit unsustainable—time in Argentina’s convertibility regime.
 Argentina
In Argentina, financial openness was a key element of the Convertibility Plan 
adopted in 1991. To protect against inflation, the economy had been steadily “dol-
larized” since mid-1980. The adoption of the currency board and, therefore, the 
establishment of legal tender status for the dollar led to total freedom for capital 
flows in the country. Besides the previous rules facilitating transactions in dollars, 
the Convertibility Law allowed the establishment of contracts in any foreign cur-
rency. Deregulation of the capital account in 1991 complemented this move to con-
vertibility (Klagsbrunn 2010; Damill et al. 2011).
The literature describes two major growth episodes since the 1990s. The first 
period, from 1992 to 1998, may be considered as the apex of the convertibility 
model. The economy was organized around market institutions, and modernizing 
reforms were introduced. However, contrarily to the success obtained by the 1991 
monetary reform, the process of fiscal reordering process was much less evident. 
The long persistence of the exchange regime, high interest rates and insufficient 
financial development would be the explosive ingredients that, in addition to the 
international financial turmoils, would detonate the crisis (Crisitini 2008, Labaqui 
2014; Damill and Frenkel 2012, 2013; Damill et al. 2011; Fanelli 2013). In January 
2002, the country lost 50% of its foreign reserves—that occurred even with the 
establishment of the corralito, limiting banking withdrawals—and the currency lost 
40% of its value in the month the crisis began and 265% in the following 6 months 
(Kaminsky et al. 2009).
After the 2001–2002 crisis, Argentina witnessed episodes of intense growth. 
Policy patterns in Argentina, however, changed over time as state interventionism 
became more prominent under President Cristina Kirchner’s consecutive mandates 
(Labaqui 2012). Government control spread to all spheres of economic life, includ-
ing increasingly less reliable official statistics.
Argentina benefited from the world economy’s prosperity period until 2007, par-
ticularly due to the rising price of commodities, which gave the country some com-
fort in the external accounts to set up the guidelines of economic policy in accordance 
with domestic policy priorities. However, and as expected, Argentina has been 
almost completely excluded from the international financial markets since 2001. 
Despite broad acceptance among Argentina’s creditors of the 2005 and 2010 restruc-
turing offers, a group of holdout creditors successfully litigating against Argentina 
in US courts has effectively posed an obstacle to the country’s ability to issue debt 
abroad. The risk is that these disgruntled creditors will cease any assets distributed 
overseas as part of their standing legal claims for repayment. As a result, since the 
mid-2000s, Argentina has engaged in “creative” and interventionist funding schemes 
such as the nationalization of pension funds (Labaqui 2014).
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 Brazil
The Brazilian liberalization process was discreet compared to those of Mexico and 
particularly Argentina. Brazilian authorities began in the late 1980s–1990s opening 
different segments of financial markets (currency, fixed income and equity) to the 
entry of foreign capital. The banking system was not completely opened and trans-
actions in other currencies were never permitted (Gottschalk and Sodré 2008; 
Freitas and Prates 2001). With monetary stabilization, a profound restructuring of 
markets took place, leading to the disappearance of several institutions and the pro-
motion of higher market concentration.4 The whole process led to a decrease in the 
number of public banks given the privatization of state banks and the strengthening 
of federal banks that remained in operation. The entry of large foreign banks and a 
greater concentration among domestic private ones drove to more competition amid 
larger financial institutions. These moves to reorganize the financial system, cou-
pled with fairly rigid financial supervision and a relatively low degree of openness, 
ensured that the amount of international transactions of the financial system did not 
set up high vulnerability and dependence on external funds.
Either to attract portfolio investments in periods of current account deficit or to 
keep the process of reserve accumulation at times of international liquidity, high 
interest rates were a constant element of Brazilian economic policy, both during the 
pegged exchange regime and when flotation was embraced. Between 2003 and 
2007, Brazil witnessed increasing portfolio capital inflows (see Fig. 11.1).
Brazil never granted de jure autonomy or independence for its central bank. After 
modifying the exchange regime and adopting the inflation targeting system in 1999, 
the Brazilian central bank worked “autonomously” for about 10 years. This can be 
explained by the priority given to inflation control due to its huge political and eco-
nomic importance in a context of benign global economic conditions.
 Policy Responses to the 2008 Crisis
On the eve of the 2008 global crisis, Argentina was experiencing twin surpluses (fis-
cal and current account) since its post-2002 resurrection. The economy was boosted 
by both the commodities boom and the new type of macroeconomic populism5 
4 Price stabilization after 1994 led to a deep reduction in banks’ earnings from inflation and index-
ation praxis. Large private banks such as Econômico (August 1995) and Nacional (November 
1995) went bankrupt. State government banks were privatized, and federal banks were recapital-
ized and reformed (Mettenheim 2010).
5 The idea and paradigm of “macroeconomic populism” were defined by Dornbusch and Edwards 
(1992), and has been widely applied to economic policy experiences in Latin America. As they 
define: “Macroeconomic populism is a policy perspective on economic management that empha-
sizes economic growth and income redistribution and deemphasizes the risks of inflation and defi-
cit finance, external constraints and the reaction of economic agents to aggressive non-market 
policies.” (op.cit, 247).
M. A. D. T. Lins
193
established since 2007 (Labaqui 2014; Damill and Frenkel 2013; Fanelli 2013). The 
Brazilian economy too was undergoing a prosperous phase when the crisis deep-
ened in 2008. After a few years of fiscal discipline that restored international cred-
ibility and helped the country regain a certain level of stability, Brazil was in the 
midst of an expansionary turn in economic policy, characterized by measures to 
stimulate domestic consumption and investment in specific sectors. Therefore, 
countercyclical policies marked the expansion and specialization of some policies 
already in place, such as credit expansion by state-owned financial institutions and 
tax exemptions to particular industrial sectors related to domestic consumption or 
potential exporters (Wise and Lins 2015).
In contrast, Mexico was severely hit by the crisis, a temporary reversal of an 
upward growth trend from 2002 to 2007. This was a result of higher oil prices, 
exports to the USA, larger remittance inflows and consequent currency apprecia-
tion. All contributed to over expenditure before the 2008 global crisis. The proxim-
ity to the US economy, that had fueled Mexican exports, meant that the effects of 
the crisis were deeper, notably through currency depreciation. However, Mexico 
rebounded relatively quickly from the initial shock. According to the IMF’s 
Assessment on the Mexican financial system, the commitment to the inflation tar-
geting and floating exchange rate scheme, combined with the effort to maintain 
fiscal discipline, were key factors explaining Mexican rebound since 2010 (IMF 
2012). Financial sector restructuring after 1995, its lower external exposure and a 
quite moderate central bank reaction to the crisis were peculiar characteristics of the 
Mexican case (Esquivel 2015).
Despite their different reactions to the crisis, the three countries were capable of 
holding high amounts of foreign reserves in absolute terms. Yet, when considering 
the rate international reserves to GDP, Argentina’s figures declined significantly 
since 2007 to recover after 2015 (Fig. 11.2). Capital flight from Argentina started in 
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Fig. 11.1 Portfolio equity net flows, current US$ millions. (Source: World Bank)
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early 2007 precisely when underestimation of inflation rates became a public and 
ongoing practice, and from then on, the credibility of the economic policy went 
steadily declining. The falling prices of the country’s government bonds in interna-
tional currency and the higher spreads measured by markets relatively to non-risk 
assets illustrate the process (Damill and Frenkel 2012).
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico experienced very unstable portfolio investment 
inflows after the crisis. Besides the fluctuations in international markets, the ability 
to attract foreign capital was extremely uneven among the three countries, as 
Fig.  11.1 depicts. Since late 2011, large emerging economies showed a trend to 
growth at a slower path. Shifts in industrialized countries’ monetary policies, and 
consequently higher interest rates in safe markets, brought less capital to large 
emerging economies than before. At the same time, these economies started manag-
ing capital account more closely, in order to protect themselves and/or with other 
policy goals (Gallagher and Tian 2017). Brazil has been a pioneer in using taxes to 
control capital outflows. Mexico, on the contrary, has been rewarded by risk agen-
cies for its conservative approach to economic policy. Shortly, in different extents, 
emerging economies implemented new policies or reformed old ones, bringing new 
facts to the markets and new configurations to their own policy frameworks.
 Policy Changes
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico took advantage of long and pronounced increases in 
commodity prices during the 2000s. Regarding financial flows, Brazil and Mexico 
were able to attract capital and issue bonds in external markets, when considering 
the various differences among these assets. Argentina was gradually isolated from 
the international financial markets both by the lost credibility of government bonds 
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and by the constraints imposed on the private sector access to external credit 
markets.
Since 2007 Argentina had been experiencing stronger state intervention which 
also included government intervention at the federal statistics institute, the nation-
alization of private pension funds and other previously privatized corporations,6 a 
conflict between the administration and the central bank, and a confrontation with 
the agriculture sector (Labaqui 2012; Damill and Frenkel 2013).7 These facts sub-
stantially deteriorated the risk perception of international markets and contributed, 
along with the crisis, to the severe capital outflows the country experienced since 
late 2007, whose adverse impacts on the balance of payments were offset by the 
benign effects of international commodity prices. Labaqui (2012) describes how 
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner tried to regain the confidence of interna-
tional financial markets’, and thus reduce Argentine bonds’ spread, by normalizing 
external debt payments (albeit not engaging with holdout creditors). She then pro-
ceeded to try to convince skeptical observers and investors about the economic sta-
bility of the intra public sector financing scheme by using resources that originated 
from the nationalized pension funds to pump up national reserves. From there on, 
Argentina experienced a sequence of discretionary policy changes and institutional 
uncertainty.
In Brazil, the political scenario was mainly favorable to the government in 
2008–2009. President Lula was in the middle of his second term and, despite major 
corruption scandals involving his party and important political leaders connected to 
him, popular approval of the government remained high. Gains that had been 
achieved by the lowest income groups provided an important source of political 
support to the government, as well as the image of Brazil as an emerging power. The 
worsening economic situation after the crisis was hence not a politically acceptable 
alternative for the country.
In fact, since the beginning of Lula’s first term, a particular group dissatisfied 
with the direction of economic policy within the president’s Workers’ Party had 
been criticizing its “neoliberal” features. Once macroeconomic stability was 
achieved, for this group, it was time to change policy goals and directions. Pro- 
growth measures should be combined with stability in normal times. When the cri-
sis came, pro-growth measures were already in place and, while they were being 
implemented, a broader set of new measures was created, as a program intended to 
6 Examples are the airline Aerolineas Argentinas and the oil company YPF.
7 “Enfoquemos ahora en mayor detalle el canal financiero. Los cambios en el contexto financiero 
global se reflejaron principalmente en una variable: las salidas de capitales privados. La denomi-
nada “huida hacia la calidad” afectó a muchas economías en desarrollo, particularmente en el 
último trimestre de 2008. En el caso argentino, varias fuentes internas de incertidumbre se adi-
cionaron al impacto de los shocks externos negativos. Cuatro factores se destacan como los más 
importantes. Ya hemos comentado la manipulación de las estadísticas oficiales de inflación desde 
comienzos de 2007 y el conflicto entre el gobierno nacional y los productores agropecuarios. Se 
agregarían luego la nacionalización del sistema privado de pensiones a fines de 2008 y, finalmente, 
el conflicto relacionado con la utilización de reservas de divisas del Banco Central para hacer 
frente al servicio de la deuda pública, en 2009.” Damilll and Frenkel (2013), p. 18.
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be a new industrial policy, which increased tax benefits to selected sectors and 
incentives to producers with export potential.8 With the transition from Lula’s to 
President Dilma Rousseff’s administration, there was an important shift in the eco-
nomic team. In light of the poor economic performance since 2011, state interven-
tionism gained more ground to the detriment of the commitment to macroeconomic 
stability. The relationship between the executive and the central bank took on a 
more “intimate tone,” largely at the expense of the monetary authority’s credibility. 
Rousseff’s first mandate favored a long waited—by the developmentalist group in 
PT—shift in the relationship between the central bank and the Finance ministry. 
Under Lula, the arm wrestling between the two institutions has mostly been won by 
the central bank. Its governor Henrique Meirelles and his team enjoyed a de facto 
operational autonomy and kept the commitment to the inflation target.
Mexico, despite the various previous internal reforms and the pro-market 
approach of its policy framework, as mentioned above, was far from shielded from 
the adverse impacts of the crisis. Mexican political scene is much more complicated 
than the relatively short list of presidents in recent years might lead one to believe. 
Democracy is relatively new and younger than that of Argentina and Brazil, consid-
ering the transition of power from the previously hegemonic PRI to the PAN with 
the election of Vicente Fox in 1999. This event broke the cycle of over 70 years of 
PRI administrations.9 However, 12 years of PAN administrations did not bring about 
fundamental change despite the party’s more conservative (right-wing) platform 
compared to that embraced by the PRI.
Indeed, during most of the twentieth century, Mexico experienced a very particu-
lar political regime, which some political scientists have called “exceptional.” While 
many Latin American countries were plagued by political instability, coups and 
military crises of governance, the Mexican political system was largely stable, while 
dominated by the PRI.  These 70  years of authoritarianism and clientelism had 
effects on the practice of politics that the 12 years of the PAN administrations failed 
to overcome. When the global crisis erupted, Mexico was highly dependent on the 
US economy and torn by violence from confrontations related to drug trafficking. In 
December 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto returned the PRI back to power, bringing with 
him a “well trained” team of technocrats to the Finance Ministry and central bank, 
most of whom had been educated in the USA.10 This was a totally different approach 
to Mexico’s economic policy design than those found in Argentina and Brazil at 
that time.
To sum up, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico presented very different political sce-
narios when dealing with the impact of the 2008 crisis. These differences are rele-
vant in regard to both the general political orientation of the parties in power and the 
8 Plano Brasil Maior (Greater Brazil Plan), launched in August 2011. (http://www.brasilmaior.
mdic.gov.br/inicio).
9 Partido Acción Nacional – PAN (in Spanish), National Action Party and Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional – PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party (in Spanish).
10 See The man from MIT. The Economist, March 22, 2014.
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more immediate motivations of economic policy in the post-critical phase of the 
global crisis.
 Conclusion
Through a comparative case analysis study, this chapter sought to understand how 
the three largest Latin American economies dealt with their economic crises in the 
past four decades. The argument was that, despite the close relations maintained by 
these countries with multilateral organizations such as the IMF, and the intense 
financial integration process that marked the period and brought profound changes 
to the region, domestic political choices prevailed over possible international pres-
sures on crisis management and policy making.
Since 2000, among the three countries, Argentina suffered the most instability 
and output volatility as a result of the crises. Its own crisis in 2001–2002, when the 
macroeconomic framework broke and strong uncertainty, recession and inflation 
increased, and during the attempt to stabilize and reform made by Mauricio Macri 
government (2015–2019). In Brazil, the severe crisis that deepened from 2014—
precipitated by the Rousseff’s government “growth at any cost” policy—was used 
as a pretext for conservative forces in Congress to engender a parliamentary coup 
that led to the impeachment of the president, and even more instability. Mexico 
maintained a more disciplined economic policy, anchored in its institutions, such as 
the independent central bank. But that was not enough to prevent a growing social 
discontent that led to the election of a left-wing populist proposal presented by 
Antonio Manuel López Obrador in 2017.
In the three cases, a close relationship was observed between domestic political 
demands and the design of economic policy. Although there were similarities 
between the challenges faced by the three countries, such as the need to respond to 
changes/shifts in the world economy, each country’s economic policy sought, above 
all, to accommodate internal political pressures. 
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Chapter 12
The Fall of a Giant: Greed, Corruption 
and Abuse of Power Undermining 
Democracy in Brazil
Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann and Bettina De Souza Guilherme
Abstract This Chapter explores the impact of the financial crisis on Brazilian 
democracy. We argue that while Brazil is one among many countries facing sys-
temic effects of the 2008 crisis, domestic factors are also important to understand 
the level of the crisis, and the fragility of democracy at the present. Domestic factors 
explain, therefore the differences between Brazil and other countries in Latin 
America and in Europe.
 Introduction
Brazil has gone through major changes since the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury, including economic growth and political activism at the global level, symbol-
ized by its participation in the BRICS group of countries, and the role of the latter 
in the changes of the post–Cold War global order. These positive trends were 
abruptly interrupted, if not reverted, in the period following the global financial and 
economic crisis of 2008. In the first years following the crisis, the country was not 
affected, but by the end of 2012, reduction of growth and rise of inequalities marked 
the end of the boom. With the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, a 
U-turn in economic policy towards a neoliberal approach took place, pushed by the 
opposition as an alternative about how to deal with the economic crisis, but the 
A. Ribeiro Hoffmann 
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Coordinator of the second phase of the Jean Monnet Network “Crisis-Equity-Democracy  
for Europe and Latin America”, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
e-mail: a_ribeiro_hoffmann@puc-rio.br 
B. De Souza Guilherme (*) 
Founder and Co-coordinator of the Jean Monnet Network “Crisis-Equity-Democracy  
for Europe and Latin America”, IRELAC, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: bettina.desouza@europarl.europa.eu
202
economic results have been meagre and the political effects have been dramatic, 
leading the more profound and serious threat to democracy since the end of the mili-
tary regime in the 1980s.
In this chapter, we focus on the political crisis. We argue that the global financial 
crisis was a trigger of the crisis, but that domestic factors are key to understand the 
depth of the crisis, and the fragility of democracy at the present, and therefore the 
differences between Brazil and other countries in Latin America or other regions 
such as Europe.
With that aim, we firstly situate the current political crisis in the recent history of 
Brazilian democratization, relying on the seminal work of Brazilian political scien-
tist Leonardo Avritzer, specially his last book, published in 2019. We analyse the 
key political changes and popular reaction from 2013, when popular demonstrations 
erupted, to the election of extreme-right President Bolsonaro in 2018. We highlight 
key facts such as the imprisonment of former President Lula and the assassination 
of Rio de Janeiro Deputy Marielle Franco to illustrate the degradation of the rule of 
law and the fragility of democracy. We conclude by pointing to some major chal-
lenges ahead.
 Pendular Democracy: The Democracy Paradox from 2013 
Demonstrations to the Election of Bolsonaro
The crisis of the Brazilian democracy is not a minor ‘detour’, rather a demonstration 
of some of the structural instabilities of Brazilian institutions and inequalities of 
Brazilian society. Avritzer (2018) analyses the developments from the 2013 demon-
strations to the election of President Bolsonaro, and argues that the process of con-
struction of Brazilian democracy can be characterized as ‘pendular’ both in 
empirical and normative terms. In this sense, the current period is seen as a setback 
and reversion from the previous phase of consolidation of democracy and is charac-
terized by another cycle of democratic instability as those that peaked in 1954 and 
1964, when two models of development were in contest, a more developmentalist 
and a more liberal. A key difference, however, is that while during those crises the 
divergence between Brazilian domestic society reflected Cold War opposing eco-
nomic models, the current global context is of neoliberal hegemony, and the align-
ments seem to reflect the contest between the USA and China for leadership 
(Acharya 2018; Ikenberry et al. 2018).
Despite this difference, as Avritzer identifies a ‘democracy paradox’ in the fact 
that the current cycle of discontent (‘mal-estar’) with democracy began with dem-
onstrations for better public service, social justice, anti-corruption and more democ-
racy in June 2013, and triggered a set of actions and events, which had the reverse 
effect. This is not a unique phenomenon, but can be observed as well in other coun-
tries (i.e. Arab Spring, USA), where major social movements had appeared and 
were expected to lead to a major leap forward of democratizations and answering 
the call for a better global governance and more equity, but indeed brought about 
instability, unrest and setbacks for democracy and social justice. It is not rare that 
A. Ribeiro Hoffmann and B. De Souza Guilherme
203
the momentum created by indignation, anger and social protest end up being 
hijacked by one of the movements for the realization of its particular objectives as 
was the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, or diverted by a counter-movement to the 
new social movements (case of Trump’s populism as a reaction to Occupy Wall 
Street).
 2013 Demonstrations
In the case of Brazil, the original protests of June 2013 were organized by the 
Movimento Passe Livre (MPL) in protest of a minor increase of the metro and bus 
tickets in several Brazilian cities and promoting free transport in Brazil. After an 
initially repressive reaction by the police and security forces and the unjust stigma-
tization as vandals by the traditional press, the mobilization through social media 
more than outperformed the expectations of the organizers. While the MPL as well 
as the participants refused any participation of political parties, they did not engage 
in ‘framing activities’ to discuss and find an agreement on the main demands as in 
Spain (indignados) and the USA (Occupy Wall Street). However, the aims of the 
June 2013 protests were not to bring the government down but to request more and 
better public services (transport, education, health service) and to fight corruption: 
thus to improve governance.
The 2013 demonstrations led to a twofold weakening of the Dilma Rousseff 
government. First by revealing criticism and a diminishing support within the clas-
sical electorate of the PT shown by the rise of a considerable protest movement 
demanding more and better public service during the PT government. Second, it led 
to the appropriation of (traditional left wing) social movement repertoire such as 
demonstrations and social media by (centre-)right wing movements officially with 
the ‘noble’ motivation to combat corruption and ended up bringing down the left- 
wing government of the Labour Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores—PT) which was 
in power since 2003. The social movements protests of the years 2015 and 2016 
were clearly directed ‘against’ the government and PT, and as later revealed finan-
cially supported by some industrialists and finance representatives, and stimulated 
and supported by the special anti-corruption taskforce Lava Jato, Judge Sergio 
Moro and the traditional media, in particularly the media conglomerate Globo, 
which gave broad coverage to the demonstrations against the PT and in particularly 
against Dilma Rousseff and Lula.
While these 2015 and 2016 social movements were ‘officially’ protesting against 
corruption, their main purpose and motivation was to bring down the PT govern-
ment. This became clear when there were neither ‘paneladas’ nor demonstrations 
when acting president Michel Temer was wiretapped in a conversation with news-
paper JB revealing his implication in a network of corruption, indicating persons of 
confidence to receive the corruption money who were filmed receiving the bribe the 
following day. Just as well astonishing was the silence on the revealed implication 
of family members of the later president Bolsonaro in corruption and relationships 
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with militias who were involved in the murder of Marielle Franco. The political 
crisis led to the non-acceptance of the election results of 2014, when President 
Dilma Rousseff was re-elected.
During 2013, a major media campaign against President Rousseff and PT 
evolved, blaming them for corruption and incompetence to improve economy. The 
surprise and narrow (51,64%) victory came as a major shock. The opposition 
refused to accept the results of the elections for the first time since 1989, and started 
to boycott all proposals from the government to improve the economy following the 
strategy of ‘the worse the better’ (quanto pior melhor) and of searching reasons to 
impeach the president. In this context, the ‘national pact to stop the bleeding’ and 
the Operation Car Wash were created.
 Dilma’s Impeachment
The impeachment process followed clean procedures at the formal level.1 The dete-
rioration of the economy resulted not necessarily by ‘bad administration’ but from 
global level structural factors such as financial crisis, the fall of global demand for 
primary resources and the fall of petrol price. Dilma’s government lacked willing-
ness and capacity to build coalitions with other parties and lost political support in 
Congress and Senate. Dilma herself lacked charisma and lost support of her own 
electorate after hiring orthodox finance minister Levy and engaging into budget 
consolidation measures after the re-election.
Economic downturn, Car Wash Operation and street movements during 2015 
and 2016 culminated with the impeachment of Dilma in August 2016. Vice President 
Temer became interim President and changed completely the government pro-
gramme; he announced a neoliberal strategy ‘Bridge to the Future (Ponte para o 
Futuro)’ in line with the decade-old Washington consensus and a conservative 
approach in politics, the picture of a white-(old)-men-only government being quite 
symbolic. According to Carta Capital of 23 September 2016, Michel Temer 
explained on 21 September 2016 to a group of entrepreneurs and investors in 
New York that the reason for the impeachment was that Dilma Rousseff refused the 
proposals of the neoliberal programme. In a television interview in SBT at the end 
of 2018, Michel Temer admitted that he considered Dilma Rousseff as correct and 
honest person and did not have the impression that she was somebody to take over 
the government to enrich herself with public property. His statements and the 
1 The main milestones of the impeachment process were: Dec 2015—acceptance of case by the 
Congress (Pres. Eduardo Cunha after the PT had voted for lifting his immunity in a major corrup-
tion case for which he was later condemned; April 2016—Approval at the Congress by the 
Commission (11/4 38x27) and the Plenary (17/4 367x137); May 2016—Approval at the Senate by 
the Commission (12/5 55x22) and the Plenary (10/8 59x21); August 2016—Judgement at the 
Senate presided by the President of the Supreme Court (31/8 61x20 but 42). Note that the Supreme 
Court supervised the procedure but never examined the merit (cause) of the impeachment.
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wiretapped conversation of the Senate PMDP party leader Juca lead to the conclu-
sion that the main purposes of her impeachment were not to fight corruption, but to 
stop or limit the investigations of Lava Jato and to bring about a complete policy 
change, thus the dismantlement of the young welfare state introduced by Lula and 
Dilma into a neoliberal system, what they would not have succeeded by democratic 
elections.
 Temer’s Government and the Neoliberal U-Turn
Temer was elected as a vice president, however, for a political programme in line 
with the former government, explicitly opposing the austerity programmes con-
tained in the ‘bridge for the future’. Temer’s government quickly went about to 
adopt policies to reduce workers’ rights and protection with the pretext of modern-
izing and increasing Brazil’s attractiveness for investors, weakening the trade 
unions, and with an extensive possibility of ‘outsourcing’, deregulated the labour 
market. While Temer’s finance minister had promised the creation of six million 
new jobs in Brazil, the policy change resulted in an increase of informal work and 
of unemployment from 11.2% (in May 2016) to 13.1% (in April of 2018). A further 
measure of the dismantlement of the welfare state were cuts of the social pro-
grammes such as the Bolsa Familia, Minha Casa Minha Vida and the programme 
Universidade para Todos (ProUni). In November 2016, Temer’s government suc-
ceeded to reduce the minimum quota of 30% of participation of the company in 
petrol exploitation and lift the exclusive exploitation right for the deep sea (pré-sal). 
Last but not least, the Temer government succeeded in their attempt as both the 
Congress and the Senate adopted the so-called ‘Teto de gasto’ by a constitutional 
amendment which limits the budget for 20 years to only increase along the inflation 
rate. All these reforms and sacrifices (of the poorer part of the society) should lead 
to the economic recovery, which so far turned out rather modest GDP growth of 
1.06% for 2017 and 1.12% for 2018. In the same period, inequalities increased; 
according to the Instituto Brasileiro de Economia da Fundação Getulio Vargas 
(FGV IBRE), Brazil reached in March 2019 its record rate of inequality of 0.6257%, 
the highest level of inequality of any democracy in the world.
Foreign policy orientation was also completely reformulated under Temer, from 
a south–south approach to an alignment with the USA. During the governments of 
President Lula, from 2003 and 2010, growth was accompanied by an active foreign 
policy (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2016); since the re-election of Dilma, foreign policy 
had become practically paralysed (Saraiva 2014; De Oliveira et al. 2018), as well 
captured in Mello’s article title, which states that Brazil changed ‘From Euphoria to 
Inertia’ (Mello 2018). The same trend is analysed by Milani et al. (2017), who intro-
duce the concept of ‘graduation dilemma’ to address structural constraints to 
changes of the international position of second-tier non-nuclear states, such 
as Brazil:
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At the outset of the 21st century, Brazil was praised for being a responsible rising power. It 
was held aloft as a development model for other nations of the Geopolitical South, as well 
as an example of incremental political transition from a civil — military dictatorship to a 
rights-based society. Brazil’s fight against hunger, its inclusive public policies, the increase 
in the number of public universities, the recognition of a diversified multiracial society, 
multilateral leadership, a political vision of regional integration processes, and its outreach 
to African countries, inter alia, contributed to Brazil’s world-wide acclaim. Developing 
countries sent envoys to Brasília to analyse the gradual results of social policies being 
implemented…. In 2017, however, the situation is totally different from that at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century. Although Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula da Silva and 
Dilma Rousseff had their respective differences and relevant distinctive traits, the three 
presidents did not deviate from the 1988 Constitution and subsequent political pact that 
supported Brazil’s re-democratization and macroeconomic stabilization. Nevertheless, in 
2015–2016 the sense of progressive advancement was disrupted. Something has happened 
in Brazil in the last two years, and the country now faces one of the greatest institutional, 
political and economic crises of its Republican period. (Mello 2018, p. 4)
Temer’s policies did not manage, however, to revert the economic downturn, and his 
approval rate was only 5% by the end of his term. According to an opinion poll of 
the CNI-Ibop at the end of 2018, 74% of the interviewed persons considered Temer’s 
government negative. Moreover, and ironically, he was accused of corruption. In the 
context of the revelation of Temer’s involvement with corruption, there is a twofold 
puzzle: first why did the chamber of deputies and senate the federal, both institutions 
that had violently and explicitly been demonstrating zero tolerance for Rousseff, not 
immediately start an impeachment? Second, where were the social movements 
against corruption which had been protesting in millions against Dilma Rousseff 
under the allegiance of creative accountancy (pedaladas), when everybody could 
‘hear’ president Temer being implicated in corruption and ‘see’ the video where his 
person of trust was collecting and transporting a suitcase with corruption money.
Concerning the first puzzle we have to be aware that most of the deputies which 
had voted for the impeachment of Dilma would be against the impeachment of 
Temer, because they would have to admit that they had made a mistake and might 
face the consequences by not being re-elected. Additionally, a considerable number 
of deputies were implicated in corruption charges and did not want to risk losing 
their political mandate, which would lift their immunity, in the case of new elec-
tions. Third, according to the journal Estadao de SP of 7 January 2018, the govern-
ment of Temer liberated a record of R$ 10.7 billion for parliamentary amendments 
to buy the support of the deputies against an impeachment and in favour of the 
unpopular bills adopted during the Temer’s era. These budgetary amendments dedi-
cate investments in the electorates of the deputies for infrastructure or other needs.
The second puzzle is the relative ‘non-reaction’ of civil society and the voice of 
the street, in particularly of the ones, which were protesting with pans and the big 
anti-corruption movements ‘vem pra rua’ (come to the street). However, reading the 
leaked information of the Lava Jato Telegram conversations reveals that some of 
these movements had been ‘instrumentalized’ for a regime change rather than for 
the fight against corruption. Additionally, some of these movements appear to be 
financed by major oligarchs who are sympathetic with the economic agenda of 
Temer. Some interpreted it with the demoralization of the population and the giving 
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up of hope in positive change, considering all politicians as corrupt. But the come-
back of the military also signalled that protest was not totally absent, but rather that 
control has increased.
 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro and the Comeback 
of the Military
Carnival 2018, which is of major importance in Brazilian culture, surprisingly 
turned out to be the main manifestation and expression of indignation, outrage and 
protest. In particularly in Rio de Janeiro, two of the major Samba Schools Beija Flor 
and Tuiuti thematized the corruption and deception and exploitation of the workers 
in their performances, showing Temer as a vampire, surrounded by dancers with 
suitcases full of corruption money, workforce as exploited slaves and so on. The 
audience joined the dancers, and the songs are being played in Samba bar as a sign 
of resistance. Shortly after the Carnival had ended and around the date of Lula’s 
arrest, Temer’s government announced the military intervention in Rio de Janeiro, 
officially to contain violence, in reality to intimidate the population and to oppress 
any resistance to the arrest of Lula and against the government measures. This mili-
tary intervention did not decrease violence, but on the contrary, according to Pablo 
Nunes, coordinator from the Observatório da Intervenção (2018 report), resulted in 
the increase of 17% of homicides and 174% of shootings, and achieved a historic 
record of 1532 deaths caused by public security agents which implies an increase of 
34% in relation to 2017.
 The Election of Bolsonaro
The economic crisis and change of approach that began in Temer’s government 
evolved into a crisis of democracy that led to the election of extreme-right President 
Jair Bolsonaro in the end of 2018. Bolsonaro’s government was elected with the 
support of three main groups, which can be referred to as the ‘neoliberals’, the 
‘military’ and the ‘ideological’ (Pinto 2019). The ‘neoliberals’ are represented by 
Minister of Economics Paulo Guedes, who has a de-regulation, privatization and 
free-trade agenda. This agenda is not new in Brazilian politics, as it was advanced 
in the beginning of the 1990s by President Fernando Collor, and parts of the agenda 
by most governments since then. The ‘military’ is a less homogeneous group, 
including lower-patent pro-Bolsonaro groups and high-ranking groups with a some-
times divergent approaches to international security matters such as Venezuela, UN 
peacekeeping and domestic security matters such as the Amazon. The ´ideological’ 
is an even less homogenous group, labelled here mainly for the dogmatic approach 
to normative issues including environment, human rights, religion and gender, often 
inspired by Olavo de Carvalho, a Brazilian living in the USA referred in the media 
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as Bolsonaro’s ‘guru’, and the US-based ‘alt-right’ movement. Carvalho has kept 
contact with other right-wing politicians and instigators in the world such as Steve 
Bannon, Victor Orban and Matteo Salvini, in addition to Donald Trump. This group 
has also influence in the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Araújo. These groups and their 
political agendas do not share a coherent political project, rather they advance 
mostly in clientelist fashion, specific interests which are often contradictory. Despite 
this weakness and mounting discontentment, Bolsonaro’s government has been suc-
cessful to be proactive and keep the opposition in a defensive position.
 Lula’s Imprisonment and the Assassination of Marielle: Rule 
of Law Under Threat
Two developments during the political crisis evolving in the last years are key to 
understand the depth of the democratic crisis in Brazil and the threat to the rule of 
law, namely, the imprisonment of former President Lula and the assassination of 
Rio de Janeiro-elected Deputy Marielle Franco.
As already discussed, the campaign against corruption during PT governments 
was empowered by the creation of the so-called operation Car War (Operação Lava- 
Jato), instituted by the Federal Public Ministry (Ministério Público Federal). Despite 
the successes in many investigations, the operation has been criticized in terms of 
the use of plea bargaining (delação premiada) and its bias against PT and former 
President Lula, which included a strategic cover by the media such as Rede Globo, 
a powerful conglomerate by Marinho family (Bottino 2016; Cioccari 2015). Lula 
was sentenced in two cases and accused in five other penal cases, and is in prison 
since April 2018.2 Lula’s imprisonment has launched a campaign to set him free 
(Lula Livre), led by PT and Brazilian artists such as Chico Buarque, who was a 
symbol of the resistance against the military regime and includes the support from 
a broad range of intellectuals and institutions worldwide such as the UNHR High 
Commissioner in 2018 and the UNHR Council in 2019; Lula was also nominated a 
candidate to Nobel Peace Prize for his Fight Against Hunger and Poverty, following 
a petition led by Perez Esquivel.
The second development which is key to understand the crisis of Brazilian 
democracy is the assassination in March 2018 of then elected member of the Rio de 
Janeiro city Council, Marielle Franco, and the interconnected relations between 
Bolsonaro’s family and the militia. As David Miranda, also member of Rio’s City 
Council and husband of American journalist Glenn Greenwald, stated: ‘Finding 
who ordered her death is key to the most important political cause of our time: 
2 The cases were (1) July 2017—sentenced for money laundering and passive corruption by then 
Federal Judge Sergio Moro TRF-4 (beach apartment Guaruja worth USD 1mi bribe); January 
2018—appeals court upheld decision; April 2018—started sentence in Curitiba; and (2) February 
2019—sentenced by Federal Judge Gabriela Hardt (renovation Works in ranch in Atibaia Worth 
USD 460,000 bribe).
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stopping authoritarianism in Brazil’.3 Miranda claims that Marielle ‘was executed 
by a group known as “The Crime Bureau” – a shadowy and elusive organisation 
which commits murder at the bidding of politicians, criminals, right-wing paramili-
tary “militias” – and whoever else has a few hundred thousand reais to pay for the 
murder of someone they don’t like’. Even if the formal investigation remains incon-
clusive, Miranda’s accusation is supported by academic and investigative journal-
ism research.4 A direct link between Bolsonaro’s family and Marielle’s assassination 
was not proved, but the President’s son, Flávio, supported politicians who cele-
brated her death and is also linked to the militia in other affairs.5 Lima (2019) argues 
that it is important ‘to understand the historical continuance of lethal violence as 
one of the most striking social characteristics of Brazil…[and that ].. preventing and 
tackling of homicides  - understood in a broad sense that includes all intentional 
murders - are political and institutional operations ensuing from a symbolic simula-
crum that causes incremental initiatives to fail to reach the architecture of institu-
tions of criminal justice and public security’. This simulacrum leads the police and 
other institutions of the criminal justice system to continue operating from a core of 
criminal policies that do not comply with the democratic public security project, 
that is, with the protection of life and civil and human rights envisioned by the 1988 
Constitution (Lima 2019, p.1).
 Conclusions: Challenges Ahead
We have argued in this chapter, in line with Avritzer (2018), that from a long-term 
perspective, Brazilian democracy has followed a pendular trend, but we have high-
lighted the relevance of the impact of the global financial/economic crisis and the 
(mis)managements of Brazilian government as key triggers for the current rupture. 
The U-turn to a neoliberal approach since the impeachment of President Rousseff 
has had a crucial impact not only on the growth and economic inequalities, but also 
on the Brazilian democracy. We have also argued there that three main challenges 
can be highlighted, which require different short- and long-term reaction and mea-
sures, namely, a politico-institutional, an economic and a socio-cultural challenge.
The politico-institutional challenge is not new; some of the weaknesses of 
Brazilian political institutions have been discussed in the academia and in the politi-
cal parties during the last decades, and proposals for political reforms have been 
advanced. Some of these weaknesses are the weak presidentialism and the large 
amount of political parties. The judicialization of politics or politicization of the 
3 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/14/marielle-franco-murder-brazil
4 https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/01/29/politica/1548794774_637466.html; https://theinter-
cept.com/2019/01/17/marielle-franco-brazil-assassination-suspect/
5 https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/eleicoes,flavio-bolsonaro-defende-destruicao-de-placa-
pro-marielle-por-correligionarios,70002532531; https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/01/22/polit-
ica/1548165508_401944.html
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judiciary became a caricature in Bolsonaro’s government, but is also not new. Newer 
phenomena are the participation of Armed Forces in the government (active and 
retired military), the reversion of evolving relations between civilian and military, 
and the direct involvement of the militia in the government, as exemplified in the 
case of Marielle.
The economic challenge is the reversion of the neoliberal approach to develop-
ment embraced by Bolsonaro’s government, which added a denial of the climate 
change and the impact of the increase of a strategy of growth based on extractivism 
and agribusiness to the cost of a sustainable development approach. Finally, socio- 
cultural challenges and the appeal of an extreme-right populist regime to the popu-
lation are explored by Salgado in this volume, but we would like to emphasize here 
the challenges posed by the expansion of a new (conservative) social base grounded 
in the Pentecostal churches, and the ‘contamination’ of cultural policy and therefore 
the support to a conservative approach to culture.
Disclaimer The opinions expressed in this introduction/volume are the sole responsibility of the 
authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament or of any 
other EU institution.
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Chapter 13
Venezuela in Crisis: Governability, Equity 
and Democracy
José Briceño-Ruiz and Kai Lehmann
Abstract This chapter aims to answer the following questions: What is the nature 
of the crisis confronted by the country and what are the conditions which led to, and 
sustain, it? What do these conditions mean for any attempts to address this crisis? 
Finally, what can be done in practical terms to address this crisis especially consid-
ering the country’s increasing isolation not only in the region but in the world?
 Introduction
That Venezuela is in crisis is beyond dispute. This crisis has economic, political and 
social dimensions and is accompanied by an internal political polarization that 
makes a peaceful agreement or transition difficult to achieve. The involvement of 
external actors (Cuba, the United States, the Rio Group China and Russia) has made 
the Venezuelan situation a regional and global issue. This chapter aims to answer the 
following questions: What is the nature of the crisis confronted by the country and 
what are the conditions which led to, and sustain, it? What do these conditions mean 
for any attempts to address this crisis? Finally, what can be done in practical terms 
to address this crisis especially considering the country’s increasing isolation not 
only in the region but in the world?
We argue that the room of maneuver of regional institutions, and the interna-
tional community as a whole, is very limited. The defense of democratic institu-
tions, the avoiding of a military solution and the assistance to the Venezuelan people 
to deal with the economic crisis are certainly worthy goals. Nevertheless, the mech-
anisms to promote them have been not easy to implement.
It is vital that the countries of the region cooperate—be it through existing 
regional and sub-regional structures or through ad-hoc arrangements. However, the 
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region is not homogeneous, and schemes such as the Union of South Americas 
Nations (UNASUR) have been accused to favor the Venezuelan regime (Burges 
2018). A new regional bloc, the Forum for the Progress and Development of South 
America (PROSUR), was created in March 2019 (Calvacanti 2019), but excluded 
Venezuela. The Organization of American States (OAS) has also failed to find a 
solution to the crisis. This has led to the creation of the Lima Group with the partici-
pation of various Latin American and Caribbean countries and Canada.1 More 
recently, after the proclamation of Juan Guaidó as interim President, in January 
2019, a Contact Group was created by Mexico, Uruguay, the Caribbean Community 
(Caricom) and the European (EU) (European External Action Service 2019). 
However, the capacity of all these institutions to deal with the Venezuelan crisis is 
limited.
 The Context: What Type of Crisis in Venezuela?
It is not difficult to attest to the existence of a crisis in Venezuela. This is acknowl-
edged by both supporters and critics of the Venezuelan regime. The crisis is multi-
dimensional in the sense that it encompasses economic, social, political and 
institutional aspects.
 The Economic Crisis
In March 2013, a few days after the death of Hugo Chávez, Moises Naím described 
what were already the evident distortions of the Venezuelan economy: “Venezuela 
has one of the largest fiscal deficits in the world, the highest rate of inflation, the 
worst adjustment of the exchange rate, the fastest increase in debt and one of the 
biggest drops in productive capacity, even in the critical oil sector. In addition, dur-
ing the Chávez era, the country fell to the bottom of the lists that measure interna-
tional competitiveness, ease to do business and attractiveness for foreign investors, 
and rose to the top among the most corrupt countries in the world” (Naím 2016).
Despite these warnings, the Venezuelan government did not implement a serious 
economic plan to resolve the crisis. Rather, the Maduro administration continued 
exchange controls, control of prices and interest rates, and increased public expen-
diture. International organizations such as the World Bank or the International 
Monetary Fund, as well as various ratings agencies, estimate that the country has 
the highest inflation rate in the world: 3,300,000% in 2018. The International 
1 See https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/en/announcements/news/declaration-lima-group for its open-
ing statement on Venezuela.
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Monetary Fund foresees a rate of 10,000,000% for 2019.2 The indicator to compare 
recessions is GDP (gross domestic product). According the International Monetary 
Fund, Venezuela’s GDP will fall 25% in 2019.3 “That is a significantly sharper con-
traction than during the 1929–1933 Great Depression in the US, when US GDP is 
estimated to have fallen 28%. It is slightly bigger than the decline in Russia 
(1990–1994), Cuba (1989–1993), and Albania (1989–1993)” (Hausmann 2017).
To this fall in economic activity must be added the fall in oil production. A recent 
report from Andrew Stanley and Frank Verrastro of Center for Strategic and 
International Studies in Washington asserts that: “In the last 3 years (…) Venezuelan 
oil production plummeted by over 50% from 2.3 million barrels per day (b/d) in 
January 2016 to 1.1 million b/d in January of this year. Production continues to col-
lapse and is now well below the 1 million b/d mark following the implementation of 
U.S. sanctions on PDVSA, and more recently in the aftermath of widespread electri-
cal blackouts” (Verrastro and Stanley 2019). Table  13.1 shows the decline of 
Venezuelan oil production and evidences that in November 2019 the country pro-
duced around 717.000 barrels per day.
Consequently, the fall in government revenues is not only due to the collapse of 
prices in the international oil market, but also to a collapse in production. The 
absence of any policy to prepare for a price fall is a factor that also indicates deep 
structural problems in the Venezuelan economy, such as an absence of a policy of 
economic diversification, investment in the productive sector and, in general, a total 
2 “El FMI prevé hiperinflación del 10.000.000% en Venezuela y una caída del 25% del PIB”. 
https://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20190409/461567333424/fmi-venezuela-inflacion-pib-
nicolas-maduro-juan-guaido.html
3 “El FMI prevé hiperinflación del 10.000.000% en Venezuela y una caída del 25% del PIB”. 
https://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20190409/461567333424/fmi-venezuela-inflacion-pib-
nicolas-maduro-juan-guaido.html
Table 13.1 Venezuelan crude oil production
Source: www.CEICDATA.COM | Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
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absence of long-term planning, problems identified, but not addressed, long ago 
(Karl 1997). This failure also explains why countries like Ecuador, Trinidad and 
Tobago or Saudi Arabia have not entered into a crisis similar to the Venezuelan one 
despite the collapse in oil prices.
Another manifestation of the crisis is indebtedness of the country. Hausmann 
affirms that “Venezuela is currently the most indebted country in the world. There 
is no other nation with an external public debt as high as a proportion of its GDP or 
its exports, or that faces a higher debt service as a proportion of its exports” 
(Hausmann 2017). According to CEIC’s data, Venezuela’s External Debt reached 
USD 110.2 billion in March 2019 (CEIC 2020).
The Venezuelan government’s political strategy has been to pay its debt commit-
ments at almost any cost, even if that implies new loans or issuing new bonds. Two 
examples serve to illustrate this point: the first was the purchase by Goldman Sachs 
in May 2017 of bonds for an amount of 2800 million dollars that expire in 2022 with 
a discount of 69%, which implies that the U.S. Company disbursed only 865 million 
dollars. The second was a loan of 2 billion dollars made by the Russian company 
Rosneft with the commitment of a collateral of 49.9% of the stock of the company 
in Citgo as loan guarantee in benefit of the Russian. Citgo is a Venezuelan firm 
based in the United States.4 Despite these efforts, the default arrived in 2018. 
According to the Venezuelan consulting firm Aristimuño Herrera & Asociados, the 
Venezuelan debt in default in 2019 amounted USD 17.048 million (elimpulso.
com 2019).
 The Social Crisis
A study by three of the most prestigious Venezuelan universities (Universidad 
Central de Venezuela, Universidad de Carabobo and Universidad Simón Bolívar) 
reports that in 2017, around 25.8% of the Venezuelan households lived in poverty, 
while 61.2% were in extreme poverty. The report also showed that 8.130 millions of 
Venezuelans had two or less meals per day in 2017. The result of this is that people 
have lost weight, around 11 kilos in the first two decades of the twenty-first century 
(UCAB et al. 2017).
The shortage in foodstuff and medicaments is explained by the Venezuelan 
dependence on imports and the attack to the private sector during the Chávez era. 
Between 1999 and 2012, imports went from 16.7 billion dollars to 59.3 billion dol-
lars (Hernández 2015). However, as a result of the fall in income of the Venezuelan 
government and its strategy of paying the debt at any cost, there has been a severe 
reduction in imports. According to Hausmann (2017), “imports of goods and ser-
vices per capita fell by 75% in real terms (adjusted for inflation) between 2012 and 
4 https://www.reuters.com/article/venezuela-pdvsa-idUSL1N1EI1FO
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2016, with an even greater decline in 2017”. To this is added the reduction of agri-
food national production due to the existence of an adverse economic and institu-
tional context.
These crises have led to massive migration of Venezuelans to other Latin 
American countries, the United States and Spain. It is estimated that around four 
million Venezuelans have decided to leave their country. Colombia has received 
around 2.5 million Venezuelan in the last 2 years. Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina 
and Chile have also been affected by the massive arrival of Venezuelan to their ter-
ritories, as have Spain and the United States, particularly the state of Florida.
The implication of such a chaotic wave of migration in the recipient countries is 
significant, in particular in terms of incorporation of such population in the labor 
market as well as in the provision of social services like education and health. The 
risk of xenophobic behavior in the recipient countries is high. Thus, this wave of 
migration is the first regional effect of the Venezuelan economic and political crisis 
(Goldberg 2019). All these scenarios have led to describe the situation as a humani-
tarian crisis.
 The Political Crisis
Hand in hand with an economic crisis goes a political crisis. Venezuela has been 
marked in recent years by violent oppression of opposition protests, the imprison-
ment of political opponents of President Maduro and the gradual, but now almost 
complete, destruction of the democratic political system and any semblance of 
checks and balances within the state, with the judiciary dominated by appointees 
loyal to Maduro and the National Assembly dominated by the opposition, sidelined 
through the creation of a so-called “constituent assembly” entirely in the hands of 
Maduro’s Venezuelan Socialist Party (McCoy 2017). Independent media have 
essentially been destroyed, often through somewhat innovative methods of, for 
instance, giving preferential access to paper to government-friendly outlets, while 
forcing critical newspapers to cease production, paper being essentially unavailable 
on the open market (Nagel 2014).
The most recent chapter of this political crisis began in a public appearance in 
front of thousands of Venezuelans in Caracas Juan Guaidó, proclaimed himself as 
Venezuela’s interim president, based on articles 233 and 333 of the Venezuelan 
Constitution, because on January 5, the National Assembly declared that Nicolás 
Maduro had usurped the presidency (see Briceño-Ruiz, 2019).
After winning the May 2018 Presidential elections—considered illegal by both 
national and international observers (Rendon 2018)—Maduro was sworn in in front 
of the Supreme Court (TSJ) on 10 January. For Guaidó, by being sworn in by the 
Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice to validate an election that had been consid-
ered null and void, Maduro had usurped the office of the presidency, in violation of 
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article 333 of the Venezuelan Constitution.5 In this case, according to article 232 of 
the Venezuelan Constitution, elections must be called before the lapse of 30 con-
secutive days, and in the meantime, the presidency of the republic is held by the 
president of the National Assembly (Herrero and Casey 2019).
Since then, the crisis in Venezuela has not stopped. A failed attempt to send 
humanitarian aid to the country took place on 23 February 2019. At the end of April, 
some military, among them the Director of Bolivarian Service of Intelligence 
(SEBIN in Spanish), decided to recognize Guaidó as President, and the main oppo-
sition leader, Leopoldo Lopez, was released after 4  years in jail. After hours of 
silence, Maduro appeared on TV denouncing a coup d’État organized by the United 
States. However, it was known later that the action was a plot in which participated 
the Minister of Defense Vladimir Padrino López, the Chief of the Supreme Court 
Maikel Moreno and the Director of Counter-Intelligence José Hernández Dala. For 
reasons unknown to the public, the key actors decided to abandon the plot and 
declared the support to Maduro (Bronner and Rosati 2019). Despite the failure of 
this action, Guaidó remained as interim President for more than 50 countries, but in 
January 2020, a political maneuver of some dissidents from the opposition appointed 
Luis Parra as new President of the national Assembly. Other governments did not 
recognize this election due to the lack of transparency.
The crisis remains, and the external variables play an even more crucial role. The 
Trump administration has upped its rhetoric, declaring that “all options are on 
table”, potentially increasing the risk of a military intervention (Parvaz 2019). 
However, the United States is not the only external actor in play. Cuba is accused of 
controlling the intelligence services and to monitor any attempt to act against 
Maduro in the Army. It is argued that around 20,000 Cubans are in Venezuela, 
including troops and intelligence services. Russia has given military assistance by 
sending a limited number of troops. There are also allegations that the Colombian 
guerrillas FARC and ELN and the Hezbollah are present in Venezuela. This has 
caused reactions in most of Latin American countries, particular the Venezuelan 
neighbors that foreseen as a menace the presence in Venezuela of all those actors 
(Specia 2019).
 The Response of the International Community
There has been considerable concern on the part of the broadly defined international 
community with the deteriorating situation in the country. At a humanitarian level, 
several agencies, including from the United Nations, have expressed alarm at the 
deteriorating social indicators and public health crisis (UNHCR 2018). Regional 
5 This articles state that: “it should not lose its validity if it were to be put aside due to an act of force 
or were to be repealed by any other means than what it provides for. In such a case, any citizen 
granted or not with authority, shall have the duty to help to reestablish its effective validity” 
(Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela 2000, article 333).
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organizations, such as UNASUR or OAS, have raised the alarm and, in the case of 
UNASUR, offered to act as mediators to resolve the political crisis in the country 
(Sabatini 2017). During the 2015 parliamentary elections, there was a significant 
presence of international electoral observers, as the one of authors witnessed first- 
hand.6 There have been bilateral tensions, especially between Colombia and 
Venezuela, in relation to refugees and alleged criminal activities on and across the 
border between the two countries, tensions which go back many years (Haddad and 
Lehmann 2017). New regional initiatives such as the Lima Group, created in 2017, 
and the Contact Group, established in 2019, have unsuccessfully tried to resolve the 
crisis. The issue has been even discussed in the UN Security Council. Most recently, 
Norway has been a mediator to facilitate talks between government and opposition 
(Dobson 2019).
Therefore, it is not the case that the crisis in Venezuela has gone unnoticed. It has 
received considerable political attention internationally. Equally, it has been ana-
lyzed exhaustively from a large number of different angels. For instance, there have 
been detailed analyses of the causes of the economic crisis from both a political 
economy angle as well as a historical perspective (Carroll 2013, as one example). 
As we shall see later, these different frameworks make a significant difference to the 
analysis. Current period in Venezuelan history, starting with the election of Hugo 
Chavez as President in 1998, has been analyzed in detail by both academic and 
journalists, investigating, among other things, Chavez’ politics, his personality, the 
background to “Chavismo’s” rise to power and ability to maintain it, its policies and 
their consequences, etc. (ibid., InSight Crime 2018a, b).
Similarly, it is true that, within these analyses, one can find no shortage of sug-
gestions on how to overcome the current problems, or at least shift the current situ-
ation to a state which may, in time, allow the country to come out of its current 
predicament. Most prominent in these analyses have been those in the economic 
field which have looked at the question of how the country can overcome its current 
economic crisis as well as its structural economic problems. These range from 
hyperinflation to an extreme over-reliance on oil as the country’s export item to a 
lack of productive capacity to make the country self-sustainable to the collapse of 
its social infrastructure. Within the political sphere, there have been several attempts 
to break the deadlock between government and opposition, ranging from mediation 
attempts led by UNSUR and, at some points, the Catholic church to the imposition 
of sanctions on members of the Venezuelan political and economic elites to the 
suspension of Venezuela from MERCOSUR to the threat, uttered by U.S. President 
Trump, of military intervention (Sabatini 2017; New York Times 2016; Jacobs 2017).
Yet, what is striking is the utter failure of any and all of these initiatives to even 
minimally move the situation forward. In fact, Maduro’s position, and those of the 
“Chavista” regime he leads, seems to be stronger today than they have been for 
several years, at least in the short term, despite the multiple crises he is confronting 
6 One of authors (Kai Lehmann) personally spoke with several observers during a visit to Caracas 
during the 2015 elections.
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(Latouche 2018a, b). This suggests that one of the key problems faced by the inter-
national community at large is the fact that it has not managed, in any way, to 
change the conditions which both led to, and sustain, the economic, political and 
social crises which are ravaging Venezuela. The question, then, becomes what needs 
to be done to be able to have any influence on Venezuela and how this can be done. 
It is this which we will turn to now.
 The Reasons for Failure—And (Limited) Options for Action
The key problem the international community has in responding to the crisis in 
Venezuela is one of extreme incoherence. Both the international community but, 
crucially, domestic actors in Venezuela almost comically, hopelessly, disagree on 
just about every aspect of the crises described above: What is the crisis? Who is 
responsible for it? What are the objectives when addressing the crisis? What are the 
actual options for action on the part of the international community and what are the 
chances of success for any given mediation?
One point where one might find some agreement on the need for immediate, and 
relatively uncontroversial, action is the humanitarian aspect linked to the incredible 
flow of refugees out of Venezuela, the country being estimated to have lost approxi-
mately four million people in the last few years.7 While this helps Maduro to keep 
control domestically, the refugee movement is actually a potential source of action 
and change in the longer term. Firstly, Venezuela is running out of people. This is 
only sustainable for so long, though we do not know when a tipping point of the sort 
described above will come. At some point, however, Maduro will have to address 
the flight of human capital (Bahar 2018).
Secondly, the problems the refugee movement are creating region-wide are at 
least beginning to bring about a regional response, albeit tentatively, hampered, as 
explored elsewhere in this volume by Lins & Hoffmann and Hoffmann & Briceño- 
Ruiz, by the effective collapse of the formal structures of existing South American 
regional organizations (Goldberg 2019). Nevertheless, regional action may create 
more pressure on Maduro to change course or, at least, cause friction within and 
between his allies between the more pragmatic and the more hardline members of 
his inner circle. This new dynamic could then be exploited to pressure for change.
Thirdly, the refugee movement includes some of those economic and political 
leaders from Venezuela that may, one day, have the capacity to rebuild the country 
(see Winter 2018). The presence of literally millions of Venezuelans spread through 
the region, while creating severe tensions, may also create a groundswell of opinion 
that “something must be done” to address this situation (Marques 2018; Valencia 
and Taj 2018). This may not happen, but it could, and will, depend to a significant 
7 See https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/venezuela-exodus-surpasses-4-million- 
190607140601790.html
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extent on the capacity of the Venezuelan diaspora to organize itself and create, in 
effect, a plan for “the day after Maduro”. Finally, in relation to this point, the urgent 
humanitarian need evident in the refugee movement opens space for broad political 
agreement on the need to respond vigorously to this need (if only to relieve pressure 
in the receiving countries).
This, in turn, could transform the political atmosphere in the region toward a 
reanimation of regional cooperation in this as well as other matters. In other words, 
the dynamics of the political situation in Latin America will be influenced one way 
or another which, in and of itself, will influence the calculations by political actors 
inside Venezuela. In relation to this, such focus on humanitarian needs—a need 
which is overwhelming—also allows for the opening up of space for the involve-
ment of civil society. There is no doubt that dealing with the humanitarian conse-
quences of the current crisis requires the involvement of organizations that work 
“on the ground” and can more easily reach those in most need. This, also, will give 
these organizations a stake in the future development of the country and might open 
up space for the involvement of such groups in any discussions about the future of 
Venezuela.
A second issue which can and should be taken up by the international commu-
nity is planning for a worsening of the situation. A solid political institutional struc-
ture at regional level is vital since the consequences of a total collapse of Venezuela 
will be felt in the whole region. Therefore, one very useful service the international 
community could provide right now is to gently probe and assist South American 
countries to re-activate regional cooperation efforts. In this sense, however, the 
attempt to replace UNASUR with PROSUR without the existence of regional con-
sensus will be a counterproductive policy. Seeing that there are profound disagree-
ments between member states about whether and how to move forward with the 
organization, it is vital that the international community give support—logistical, 
political, etc.—to the informal cooperation efforts being made now. This means 
engaging, for instance, with Ecuador, Colombia and Brazil, who have taken a lead-
ing role in addressing the refugee crisis engulfing their countries. What help would 
they need to start and maintain political and humanitarian process which can con-
tribute to at least addressing some of the most immediate causes and consequences 
of the crisis?
However, the involvement of the international community must not be limited to 
the humanitarian issue. The international community should continue to find a polit-
ical solution to crisis. On the one hand, it is crucial to put aside radical views 
demanding military intervention. On the other hand, it is need to promote the re- 
establishment of the democratic institutions severely weakened in the last few years. 
In particular, the demands for free elections and balance among the public powers 
are goals that international community must propose. It is true that ideological divi-
sions in Latin America and the growing interventionism of foreign power make this 
goal not easy to achieve, but giving up is not an option.
In many ways, none of these suggestions are particularly satisfactory nor are 
there any guarantees that they will lead to the desired outcome. The most likely 
scenario appears to be the continuation of the current status quo, always with the 
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fear that there will arrive a tipping point at which the system will change quickly 
and radically, if not necessarily, desirably.
 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have argued that the crisis in Venezuela is multifaceted and the 
consequence of the interplay of a host of interdependent factors and conditions: 
economic, social and economic. Considering this complex interdependence, the cri-
sis defies simple solutions. With this in mind, the options of the international com-
munity to influence developments in Venezuela are very limited. The best one can 
hope for is to try and change some of the conditions over which said community can 
have some influence. In practice, this means focusing not on the government of 
Maduro or the internal situation in the country but on the external consequences that 
have manifested themselves all across South America.
Assisting the region in dealing with the enormous flow of refugees, preparing for 
the possible consequences of the total collapse of Venezuela and the sketching out 
of some possible future scenarios for the rebuilding of this ravaged country are, at 
the current time, the options from a very limited menu of choices with the aim of 
re-establishing some kind of coherence to the country in the future. Obviously, this 
does not mean stopping the pressure for the re-democratization and re- 
institutionalization in Venezuela. However unsatisfactory this might seem bearing 
in mind the scale of the catastrophe unfolding in the country, it is the best that can 
be done now.
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Chapter 14
The Rise of Right-Wing Populism 
in Europe: A Psychoanalytical 
Contribution
Paula Sandrin
Abstract This chapter aims to provide a psychoanalytically informed interpreta-
tion of the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. It argues that explanations for the 
growing support for right-wing populist political parties and groups in European 
countries which stress the role of economic, migratory, and political factors can be 
deepened by a reading which takes into account the role of affects in politics.
 Introduction
The tide of right-wing populism in Europe has been steadily rising in the twenty- 
first century. In the last 2 years alone, we have witnessed election victories or sig-
nificant increases in the share of votes by right-wing populist parties in several 
European countries. In the French presidential elections of May 2017, far-right 
presidential candidate Marine Le Pen, of the National Rally, got 34% of votes, the 
party’s best electoral result ever. In September 2017, the far-right Alternative for 
Germany (AfD) won 12.6% of the vote and entered the Bundestag for the first time, 
with an anti-euro and anti-immigration platform. This election happened in a con-
text already marked by anti-migrant demonstrations by far-right political move-
ments, such as Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident). 
In October 2017, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), founded by a former SS 
officer in the 1950s, won 26% of the vote and joined the then governing coalition. 
Also in 2017, the far-right Volya Movement entered the Bulgarian parliament for 
the first time and, in the Netherlands, the anti-Islam Party for Freedom became the 
second-largest party in the House of Representatives. In March 2018, the anti- 
establishment Five Star Movement became Italy’s largest party and formed a coali-
tion government with the far-right League party. In April 2018, Prime Minister 
Victor Orbán, leader of the Hungarian right-wing populist Fidesz party, who has 
been in office since 2010, won his third consecutive term. In Poland, the right-wing 
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populist party Law and Justice (PiS) has been in power since 2015. In Sweden, the 
far-right Sweden Democrats have steadily increased their share of the vote since 
2010, gaining 17.6% in the 2018 elections, and becoming the third largest party in 
the country’s parliament.
Several explanations have been put forward to account for this trend. First, the 
economic impacts of globalization and neoliberal policies, advanced by national 
governments and the European Union (EU), have generated a mass of discontented 
“left-behind”, which becomes easy target of right-wing populists. This economic 
malaise is compounded by the rise in immigration, which creates anxieties about the 
potential (further) loss of jobs and pressures on the welfare state; about threats to 
national security (when migrants are perceived as likely terrorists and criminals); 
and about the loss of national identity. This situation is made even worse by the 
state’s inability to manage the economy and control national borders, due to the loss 
of sovereignty entailed in EU integration process and as a result of neoliberal glo-
balization. Traditional political parties are perceived as unable or unwilling to 
change this state of affairs, leading to frustration and opening the way for populist 
parties.
This chapter aims to provide a psychoanalytically informed interpretation of the 
rise of right-wing populism in Europe. It argues that explanations for the growing 
support for right-wing populist political parties and groups in European countries 
which stress the role of economic, migratory, and political factors can be deepened 
by a reading which takes into account the role of affects in politics. This chapter 
will, first, review the three main accounts—economic, migratory, and political—of 
the surge in support for right-wing populist political parties and groups in Europe, 
discussing their shortcomings. It will, then, put forward the argument that it is nec-
essary to take into account the role of affects in identification processes, including 
identification with right-wing populist ideologies, in particular a sense of loss (of 
national sovereignty, security, identity, and economic prosperity) which leads to 
resentment.
 It’s the Economy,1 Stupid: The Role of Economic Factors 
in the Rise of Support for Right-Wing Populism
This type of explanation has been advanced to account for several unexpected phe-
nomena, such as the election of Donald Trump in the US, the decision of the UK to 
exit the EU, and the rise in support for right-wing populist parties and groups across 
Europe. The current global trade and financial order, marked by neoliberal global-
ization, has led to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Eurozone crisis and 
has significantly impacted on the economic well-being of many societies.
1 The famous phrase “It’s the economy, stupid” was created by Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential 
campaign strategist James Carville.
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Globalization has contributed to unemployment due to the reallocation of indus-
tries from developed countries to places with cheaper labor costs. Neoliberal ideol-
ogy of consumerism and competition and neoliberal economic policies of austerity, 
privatization, corporate trade, and financial deregulation, coupled with the weaken-
ing of labor unions, have led to the concentration of capital, rise in housing costs, 
cuts to welfare provisions, stagnation of wages, precarious jobs, and unemploy-
ment, all contributing to a growth in inequality, disempowerment, disenfranchise-
ment, and dissatisfaction (Monbiot 2016). Such dissatisfaction is, then, mobilized 
by right-wing populist parties.
For example, in Germany, economic disparities between East and West have 
been invoked as a likely explanation for Euroscepticism, right-wing extremism, and 
anti-migrant sentiments, which are manifested more strongly in the country’s poorer 
former East. In the UK, the BREXIT vote has been attributed to the poor economic 
conditions of some of country’s regions. Left-wing commentators argued that many 
of those who voted Leave were “the ‘left-behind’ – often citizens of post-industrial 
towns across the Midlands and the North” (Russell 2016). They were “ordinary 
working class folks […] simply fed up with the erosion of their living standards, the 
disintegration of their communities, and the lack of responsiveness of their political 
representatives and the unaccountable technocracy that has ‘taken control’ over 
their lives” (Roos 2016). The vote to leave the EU, thus, cannot be attributed to 
“stupidity, racism or lack of information” but to “a combination of hopelessness and 
isolation coupled with a collapse in material living conditions” (Russell 2016). 
Hence, Brexit was “first and foremost a political statement by the dispossessed and 
disempowered” (Roos 2016). Even though “feelings of powerlessness, discontent 
and alienation [..] had very little to do with Brussels”, the EU referendum allowed 
those dissatisfactions to be voiced (Russell 2016).
Although Russell (2016) thinks that discontent in the context of BREXIT had 
little to do with the EU, neoliberalism as an economic theory and a set of policies 
have also influenced European Union economic thinking, even though Union repre-
sentatives have presented the EU’s social market economy as a resistance force 
against Anglo-American neoliberalism. German ordo-liberalism of Walter Eucken 
and Wilhelm Röpke has increasingly influenced EU’s economic and monetary poli-
cies, gaining ground against alternative economic traditions from the 1980s onward, 
when neoliberal ideology began to spread across the globe (Dardot and Laval 2013). 
As recognized by Frits Bolkestein, former European Commissioner for Internal 
Market and Services, “the Economic and Monetary union […] is one of the most 
important policy instruments for stabilising the vast free-market economy that 
Europe constitutes and, as such, is a typical product of ordo-liberal thinking” (in 
Dardot and Laval 2013: 217).
Naomi Klein explained Trump’s election, Brexit, and rise of right-wing popu-
lism in Europe as reactions to the effects of “neoliberal policies of deregulation, 
privatisation, austerity and corporate trade”, which have led to a decline in living 
standards, lost jobs, lost pensions, lost safety nets, and a “precarious present”. “For 
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the people who saw security and status as their birthright – and that means white 
men most of all – these losses are unbearable. Donald Trump speaks directly to that 
pain. The Brexit campaign spoke to that pain. So do all of the rising far-right parties 
in Europe” (Klein 2016). Thus, neoliberal globalization, marked by “constant 
threats of relocation, redundancies, and, ultimately, loss of employment”, heightens 
“the fear of losing the conditions necessary for the reproduction of material life” 
(Lordon 2014: 35 and 36). This fear is then invoked and captured by right-wing 
populist parties which promise to placate it by transforming it into hatred, and 
directing it toward several targets: the EU, migrants and refugees, and against tradi-
tional national political parties. These targets of hatred and resentment are not 
mutually exclusive.
Thus, economic bureaucracies, “whether Washington, the North American free 
trade agreement, the World Trade Organisation or the EU”, have been in the line of 
fire of right-wing populist politicians. The EU has been lambasted for being a 
bureaucratic elitist institution, distant from the concerns of “the people”, robbing 
sovereignty, contributing to economic malaise, and being a catalyst for migration—
either because of the freedom of movement or because of refugee quotas. Marine Le 
Pen’s 2017 party program blamed globalization, neoliberalism, the EU, and immi-
gration for undermining the country’s national sovereignty, security, identity, and 
economy. Matteo Salvini, former Italian interior minister and leader of the far-right 
League party, claimed that the 2019 European parliamentary elections would be “a 
referendum between the Europe of the elites, banks, finance, mass migration and 
precariousness versus the Europe of peoples, work, tranquility, family and future” 
(Salvini in Heath et al. 2018).
This explanation, which stresses the economic impacts of neoliberal globaliza-
tion, however, fails to explain why the “left-behind” are not the only ones support-
ing right-wing populist parties. In the UK, 39% of the top quarter of UK earners 
voted Leave (Curtice 2016). The Brexit campaign was led by wealthy politicians, 
and several rich counties also voted Leave (Milburn 2016), possibly moved by 
“imperial and colonial nostalgia” and fantasies about making Britain great again by 
setting up trade relationships with the Commonwealth, “our extended family in the 
world”, “our Kith & Kin”, according to Nigel Farage, former UKIP leader (Ashe 
2016). In the US, 48% of the top third of US earners voted for Trump, whereas the 
majority of those in the bottom fifth of US earners (53%) voted for the Democratic 
candidate Hillary Clinton (Curtice 2016). In fact, we can identify a coalition between 
“winners” and “losers” of neoliberal globalization, united on an anti-immigration 
platform and sharing a sense of loss of national identity, security, and sovereignty. 
Therefore, the economics-based explanation must be complemented by other 
approaches.
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 They Steal Our Jobs, Rape Our Women, and Refuse 
to Integrate: The Role of Migration in the Rise of Support 
for Right-Wing Populism
When discussing the effects of globalization on individual and collective identities, 
Stuart Hall (2014) diagnosed three outcomes. First, cultural flows among nations 
and global consumerism can lead to cultural homogenization, creating global forms 
of identification and erasing national identities. Second, migratory flows can lead to 
the production of new hybrid identities, espoused by diasporic communities, who 
share and belong to different cultures and histories at the same time, widening the 
possibilities of identity. Third, migratory flows can also lead to the strengthening of 
identities. Dominant ethnic groups, feeling threatened by the presence of “others” 
in “their” territory, react defensively. Minority groups, in response to experiences of 
racism and exclusion, also strengthen their identities. In this last case, instead of 
creating homogenous or hybrid identities, globalization can lead to a polarization 
among groups who appeal to the “essence” of identities under threat by the presence 
of a different other.
The strengthening of national identities has clearly been the response given by 
right-wing populist parties in Europe to increasing migration flows resulting from 
globalization, the Syrian Civil War, and/or economic deprivation, political instabil-
ity, and violence in the wider neighborhood. These parties tend to frame foreigners 
as threats to national security (for being violent sexual abusers, dangerous crimi-
nals, terrorists); to national welfare (for stealing jobs, putting pressure on the wel-
fare state, being benefit scoundrels); and to national identity (for not integrating). 
The impacts of migration on the economy and national security are sources of con-
troversy. The links between immigration and decline in economic well-being and 
between immigration and national (in)security are far from certain (see OECD 
2014; Ousey and Kubrin 2018). These shaky grounds on which articulations about 
the threat posed by foreigners rest do not prevent right-wing political parties from 
inciting, invoking, and mobilizing such fears in their political discourses.
This leaves us with the relationship between immigration and (loss of) national 
identity. Why is the presence of difference considered so threatening to the nation? 
These are key issues which will be developed further in the following sections. At 
this moment, it is sufficient to say that the presence of difference can feel so threat-
ening because modern nations are all cultural hybrids (Hall 2014). As imagined 
political communities (Anderson 2006) and products of specific historical contexts, 
nations must be politically and socially reproduced and performed through foreign 
and domestic policies “in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the 
‘inside’ are linked through a discourse of ‘danger’ with threats identified and located 
on the ‘outside’” (Campbell 1998: 75). In addition, narratives about national unity 
and national homogeneity are only made possible by the forgetting of violent pasts 
and violent presents which suppress(ed) and exclude(d) (ethnic, racial, religious, 
linguistic) differences (Hall 2014).
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The increasing visible presence of “others” due to globalization, the free move-
ment of people, and the migration and refugee crisis expose the cracks, fractures, 
and inconsistencies of an already precarious project. This presence destabilizes cer-
tainties which were constructed and maintained through discursive practices always 
opened to contestations. As will be discussed below, destabilization of the nation as 
an object of identification elicits such strong emotional responses, which are suc-
cessfully mobilized by right-wing populist parties, because the nation has had a 
central role in structuring subjectivities and socio-political realities. The nation pro-
vides meaning to our existence, connecting our lives to a national destiny which has 
preceded us and which will outlast us (Hall 2014) and functions as object of affec-
tive investment (Solomon 2015; Stavrakakis 2007).
 They Do Not Represent Us: The Role of Traditional Political 
Parties in the Rise of Support for Right-Wing Populism
This situation of economic precarity and fears of foreigners’ threats to national 
security, welfare, and identity is compounded by the feeling that traditional political 
parties are unable or unwilling to address such anxieties and fears. Mainstream par-
ties of both right and left of the political spectrum would be unable to provide 
meaningful solutions because state sovereignty has been eroded by neoliberal form 
of globalization and EU integration process. The state can no longer control the flow 
of capital, goods, services, and people; it can no longer control its borders. In addi-
tion, established parties would be unwilling to change this anxiety-inducing state of 
affairs because they have embraced neoliberalism not only as set of economic poli-
cies, but as a rationality, which concludes that globalization is irreversible and that 
there is no alternative. The differences between right and left have become minimal. 
These “post-democratic” political parties identify “democratic form with the ‘neces-
sities’ of globalized capital” (Stavrakakis 2007: 264): “The absolute identification 
of politics with the management of capital is no longer the shameful secret hidden 
behind the ‘forms’ of democracy; it is the openly declared truth by which our gov-
ernments acquire legitimacy” (Rancière in Stavrakakis 2007: 264).
According to Mouffe (2005), political mobilization requires the clear establish-
ment of opposing poles with which people can identify. In order to act politically, 
we need to identify with a collective identity which provides meaning to our exis-
tence and functions and an anchor of affective investments. Therefore, politics 
needs to have a partisan character, clearly discerning between two poles of identifi-
cation which offer real alternatives. It is in this context marked by a lack of political 
alternatives, by a “centrist consensus” (Mouffe 2017), that right-wing populist par-
ties are able to capture the political imaginations and mobilize the affects of the 
population by offering a clear alternative; discernible poles of collective identity; an 
“us v. them” no longer based on the opposition between right and left, but based on 
“the people” and detached and distant elites who no longer represent us, and between 
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“the people” and immigrants (Mouffe 2005: 70). A political context marked by the 
hegemony of neoliberal globalization, immigration, and the sameness of traditional 
right and left-wing political parties constitutes fertile ground for fringe political par-
ties who present themselves as the only real alternative to mobilize those fears of 
loss of economic prosperity, (national) sovereignty, identity, and security.
But why is the message of right-wing populists so appealing to some? What are 
they appealing to and why do their narratives of national loss resonate among cer-
tain segments of the population? In order to answer these questions, we need to 
discuss the affective dimension of identification processes, including identification 
with certain conceptions of the nation advanced by right-wing populist groups.
 The Nation as a Privileged Object of Identification: The Role 
of Affects in the Rise of Support for Right-Wing Populism
The nation, as a specific object of identification, emerged at the end of the eigh-
teenth century as a result of several historical processes, such as the emergence of 
print capitalism and the Enlightenment (Anderson 2006), the French and Industrial 
Revolution, the Revolutions of 1848, and the emergence of mass electorate and 
workers’ movements (Hobsbawm 1983), which destabilized the previous political 
and social orders and their traditional sources of legitimacy. This vacuum was occu-
pied by the nation, which became a new source of legitimacy to states.
Most historical, sociological, and post-structuralist accounts of the nation 
(Anderson 2006; Hobsbawm 1983; Campbell 1998) stress its lack of essence and 
foundations; its contingent character; its historical, political, and social constructed-
ness; and reproduction through linguistic and non-linguistic practices (including 
narratives about national histories, heroes and memories; public ceremonies, holi-
days and monuments; national anthems and flags; domestic and foreign policies) 
which allow the nation to come into being as an entity with supposedly ancient roots 
which survive into the present and (hopefully) will survive into the future. These 
symbolic and material practices which attempt to produce historical continuity 
between the past, the present, and the future contribute to the framing of the nation 
as possessing essential or natural attributes which survive through time. Through 
boundary-making practices (including foreign and migration policies), which 
delimit who is in and who is out, who belongs and who does not belong, the nation 
is produced and reproduced.
In spite of this constructed and performed character, the nation as an object of 
identification persists and commands deep affective attachments. As will become 
clear, “the durability and salience, the depth and longevity, of national identifica-
tions” (Stavrakakis 2007: 192) cannot be attributed solely to the historical, political, 
and social conditions which allowed nations to emerge, nor to the array of linguistic 
and material practices which produce and reproduce it, but also to their affec-
tive appeal.
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According to psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, both the subject and the Symbolic 
order (the order of language and representation) are characterized by a lack (of 
essence) (Stavrakakis 1999). Meanings we attribute to ourselves and to our objects 
of identification (including the nation) are established by the relationship between 
signifiers. These signifiers form chains of signifier which also relate to other chains 
(Stavrakakis 1999: 57). This means that, in principle, an infinite number of mean-
ings can be produced and that meaning (attributed to ourselves and to our objects of 
identification) is always unstable. However, meanings can be partially and tempo-
rarily fixated in nodal points (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 112), which are privileged 
discursive terms which arrest the endless flow of signification by binding “together 
groups of words and concepts into meaningful statements and narratives” (Solomon 
2015: 64).
The individual only becomes a subject when s/he enters the Symbolic order, 
which provides several resources with which the subject can identify. The subject 
hopes that those resources will fully represent him and provide him with a stable 
identity, but this is impossible, because these resources do not hold stable meanings. 
This frustration compels the subject to keep on identifying, in the hopes that full 
representation will finally be achieved. What the subject desires through these iden-
tification processes, however, is not only discursive coherence and closure, but to 
recapture what Lacan calls enjoyment, or “pre-symbolic jouissance”, a “state of 
bliss, unity and fullness”, which is posited as lost and sacrificed when the subject 
accedes to the Symbolic (Stavrakakis 1999: 48). Thus, objects of identification 
which circulate in the Symbolic order, including the nation, are invested with affects 
because they promise to recapture this lost enjoyment.
There are types of enjoyment, according to Lacan, two of which are relevant 
here: enjoyment as fantasy and enjoyment of the body (Stavrakakis 2007: 196). In 
fantasy, it is offered the possibility of recapturing lost enjoyment through identifica-
tion with social-symbolic signifiers, such as the nation. All nationalist projects make 
reference to a mythical past in which things were better and which can be retrieved 
if we get rid of others who are framed as obstacles to this achievement. These others 
can vary according to historical, social, and political contexts, but they are crucial to 
maintain the appeal of the nation. They are crucial because the instability, inconsis-
tency, and incoherence of discourses and the impossibility of attaining wholeness 
and completeness through identification with discourses are attributed to others, the 
thieves of our enjoyment, instead of being attributed to the lack in the subject and 
the lack in the Symbolic or, in other words, to the absence of essence, foundations, 
stability, consistence, and coherence of our individual and collective identities and 
of our social and political realities. Thus, fantasmatic frames or narratives mask the 
lack in the subject and the lack in the Symbolic by attributing the impossibility of 
enjoying a full identity to external (or internal) others who prevent us from doing so 
(be they the EU, Muslims, Jews, traditional political parties, migrants, or refugees).
In enjoyment as fantasy, Eros, the libidinal drive of love, and Death, the drive of 
destructiveness and aggressiveness, are two sides of the same coin (Stavrakakis 
2007: 198). As Sigmund Freud explained in Civilization and its Discontents, in 
order to inhibit, weaken, and disarm the aggressive and destructive drives, which 
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threaten to disintegrate society, civilization employs several mechanisms, including 
directing the derivatives of the death drive outward, toward other objects (as in 
sadism) or the external world in general, as a kind of non-erotic aggressivity and 
destructiveness (as in enmity among nations, hatred and hostility towards foreign-
ers, or other groups of people) (Freud 1962: 61, 65–67 and 70). Thus, “it is always 
possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there 
are other people left over to receive the manifestation of their aggressiveness” 
(Freud 1962: 61).
As we have seen, signifiers never fully deliver on their promise of discursive 
coherence and of an encounter with enjoyment. What they deliver is a partial enjoy-
ment of the body, momentary experiences in which the subject seems to achieve the 
desired full identification and enjoyment, such as in wars and national football 
teams’ victories (Stavrakakis 2007: 197). All national projects organize rituals—
ceremonies, festivals—in which this momentary encounter with enjoyment is made 
possible. These rituals vary according to nations and historical moments, but they 
organize enjoyment as a knot between Eros and Death, or libido and aggression, in 
unique ways. There is, thus, a “very visceral dimension of identity. Nationalism 
works through people’s hearts, nerves and gut. It is an expression of culture through 
the body” (Jusdanis in Stavrakakis 2007: 200).
Therefore, the appeal of the nation comes from the promise to provide stable 
signification and representation; enjoyment as a sense of wholeness and complete-
ness; and the momentary delivery of full identity and enjoyment in certain circum-
stances. What is at stake in identification processes, thus, is discursive coherence 
and stability and affects. In times of crisis, when the stability and fixity of our social 
constructions unravel, when certainties shatter and the lack in the Symbolic becomes 
visible, new identities can be articulated, such as the hybrid types discussed by Hall 
above. However, these moments of rupture can also lead to the strengthening of the 
identity under threat and resentment of the others deemed responsible for the unwel-
comed instability. “Even relatively stable identity formations when encountering a 
dislocatory event, when entering a state of crisis or a ‘critical juncture’, often lose 
the appearance of stability and fullness. Under such conditions they can only attempt 
to retain their hegemonic status by blaming someone else” (Stavrakakis 2007: 195).
We can read the Eurozone crisis and the migration and refugee crisis as disloca-
tory events which rendered visible the contingent character of socio-political reali-
ties taken for granted (such as that EU integration inexorably brings about economic 
prosperity, peace, and stability, for example). These are moments in which new 
political possibilities and new identities can be articulated, but also moments in 
which the old ones dig in their heels and offer fantasmatic narratives which promise 
to restore a previous state of affairs which was lost, or could be lost, as a result of 
these dislocatory events, by taking back control (from the EU, from traditional 
political parties) and protecting our economy and our borders (from migrants and 
refugees).
Considering that the nation as an object of identification has had a central role in 
structuring subjectivities and socio-political realities and has been invested with 
visceral affects, these right-wing populist discourses resonate with certain segments 
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of society because they (1) place the nation under threat in privileged position, incit-
ing and invoking, in a time of crises, fears of instability and uncertainty of subjec-
tivities and socio-political realities; and (2) tap into, and promise to satisfy, 
deep-seated desires for stability and wholeness which have historically been articu-
lated around the nation as a nodal point.
These discourses resonate more strongly with those segments of the population 
which are abler to identify with articulations of the nation as a homogenous and 
nativist entity: white men, or the “Endangered White Male”, in the words of Michael 
Moore (2016). After all, one can only fear and feel for the loss of the nation if one 
identifies with it and invests its affects in it. Thus, the rise of right-wing populist 
parties, Brexit, and the election of Trump cannot be simply explained by the (eco-
nomic) discontent of “ordinary working class folks”, since support for right-wing 
populist parties, Brexit, and Trump is not restricted to these segments of society and 
since fears and resentments are articulated around (the possible loss of) the nation, 
located at the intersection between economic, political, and identity factors. 
“Working-class folks” who fear for the loss of the nation and support right-wing 
political parties and groups are mostly white and part of those resented for the 
demise of the nation are non-whites, who must be kept out for they do not belong to 
“the people”, to the territory, and to “us” and, therefore, are not entitled to the same 
protection. These non-whites can also be losers of globalization, can also be left- 
behind, but their predicament do not elicit much sympathy from the segment of 
white left-behinds who identify with homogenous versions of the nation mobilized 
by right-wing political parties.
It is important to clarify what is understood by racism in this context. “Racism is 
a global hierarchy of superiority and inferiority along the line of the human that 
have been politically, culturally and economically produced and reproduced for 
centuries by the institutions of the capitalist/patriarchal Western-centric/Christian- 
centric modern/colonial world-system” (Grosfoguel 2016: 10). Those placed “above 
the line of the human” are considered entitled to rights (including citizenship, jobs, 
and access to the welfare state) while those placed below the line of the human are 
not. In this definition, the marker of racism does not need to be only skin color, but 
also ethnicity, language, culture, and/or religion (Grosfoguel 2016). Thus, although 
“the others” present in right-wing populist discourses are varied (including people 
placed above the line of the human, such as EU and traditional political parties’ 
members) and are also dependent on historical, social, and political contexts, they 
include segments of the world population which historically have had their human-
ity questioned and, as such, barred from rights. That is why, contrary to what some 
left-wing commentators reviewed here argued, racism cannot be ruled out as a layer 
of explanation for support for right-wing populist parties. This is not to say that 
those whose desires are oriented toward the discourses of right-wing populists are 
intrinsically racist, because there are no intrinsic essences to the subject or Symbolic 
objects of identifications, as has been argued. However, through several historical 
processes, some bodies become saturated with affects. Fear, hatred, and resentment 
circulate and are distributed across several figures which come to embody the threat 
of loss (of conditions of material and symbolic reproduction) and which are aligned 
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together through a “metonymic slide” (Ahmed 2014: 44) between signifiers: the 
migrant, the refugee, the terrorist, the rapist, the invader, the violator. This circula-
tion of affects produces the boundaries between “us” and “them”, and moves us 
away from those bodies which are bound together.
Thus, the explanation advanced here for the rise in support for right-wing popu-
list parties and groups in Europe stresses the economic distress and precarity brought 
about by neoliberal globalization, which was worsened by neoliberal solutions to 
the Eurozone crisis; the historical appeal of the nation as an object of identification 
which has been promising stability and enjoyment and is now being framed as under 
threat by multiple crises by right-wing populist parties’ discourses; and the increas-
ingly visible presence of others who have been historically racialized and are, thus, 
ideal for scapegoating. This scapegoating helps sustain the appeal of right-wing 
populist parties’ discourses because the lack in the subject and the lack in the 
Symbolic are masked by attributing inconsistencies and lack of enjoyment to his-
torically racialized others.
 Concluding Remarks
This chapter aimed to interpret the growing support for right-wing populist parties 
and groups in Europe taking into account not only “material” and “discursive” fac-
tors—economic precarity, the surge in the number of migrants and refugees, the 
sameness of traditional political parties, the structures of populist discourses—but 
also “affective” factors. It has argued that we cannot account for this growing sup-
port by only emphasizing the deleterious economic and political effects of neolib-
eral globalization and migration patterns, although these are certainly part of the 
interpretation, since these effects have generated affects (anxiety, fear, hatred, 
resentment) which are successfully mobilized by right-wing political parties. We 
must also take the strong attachments to the nation as an object of identification and 
the historical dehumanization of certain groups of people seriously if we are to 
understand why populist discourses resonate among some segments of the popula-
tion and if we are to devise an effective and ethical counter strategy.
This effective and ethical counter strategy would have to involve political dis-
courses which are appealing to large segments of the population and which are 
inclusionary and pluralist. In order to achieve that, we need to find ways to “expand 
the chain of significations associated with the people” (Stavrakakis 2017, p. 8), to 
“integrate heterogeneous identities and demands in a broader chain of equivalences” 
(Stavrakakis et al. 2017, p. 8), and to articulate “an expanding plurality of social 
demands” (Stavrakakis et  al. 2017, p.  8). In concrete terms, the concept of “the 
people” would need to be widened to include traditional working classes, and pre-
carious middle classes also affected by austerity, feminist, and anti-racist move-
ments. Naturally, these do not constitute detailed roadmaps or strict guidelines on 
how to establish hegemony, since the “chain of equivalence through which the ‘peo-
ple’ is going to be constituted will depend on the historical circumstances. Its 
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dynamics cannot be determined in isolation from all contextual reference” (Mouffe 
2018: 43).
There is one thing we can be sure, though: this effective and ethical counter strat-
egy should not present the political arena as a battle between “the Reasonable, the 
Moderate and the Good” versus “the Unreasonable, the Radical, and the Evil”, for 
it has been precisely this type of political discourse that has alienated many voters 
and opened the way for right-wing populist parties that claim to actually listen to the 
woes of the population. Instead, this progressive political discourse should attempt 
to articulate a response to these very real fears and anxieties which is attuned to dif-
ferent historical, geographical, and cultural contexts, inclusive, pluralist, and 
agonistic.
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Chapter 15
European Economic Governance 
and Rising Sovereignism
Eleonora Poli
Abstract Europeans have experienced a variety of challenges in recent years. The 
rise of sovereignism is one of them. Against this backdrop, this chapter analyses the 
link between the economic crises and the development of right-wing populist par-
ties. It assesses that while the European economic governance, through a set of 
mechanisms and institutions, acquired a renovated economic and financial equilib-
rium, it failed to deal with other salient imbalances concerning wage and fiscal poli-
cies across European Union (EU) member countries allowing sovereign parties to 
gain more legitimacy.
 Introduction
Europeans have experienced a variety of economic challenges in recent years. The 
multifaceted economic crisis that started in the aftermath of the 2008 Credit Crunch 
had important economic but also political consequences all over the Eurozone and 
in the European Union (EU) in general. Not only a crisis of competitiveness and 
productivity was followed by a banking crisis and, in member countries with high 
public debt, a sovereign debt crisis, but such downturns highlighted a problem of 
institutional imbalances at the very heart of the EU, caused by the incompleteness 
of the economic and monetary union (Christakis 2017, 1–43). To face such an 
unprecedented economic downfall and overcome the limitation of the institutional 
setting, the EU achieved more integration by reshaping and reinforcing its system of 
economic governance. The aim was that of building a better economic and mone-
tary architecture than the one emerged during the 1990s. Yet, as this paper argues, 
more integration was probably not enough to appease social dissent, feeding the 
ranks of right-wing populist parties, here defined as the “sovereignists”.
The development of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to financially 
assist Eurozone Member States in trouble or the Banking Union, the Fiscal Compact 
and the European Semester were all measures meant to increase control over 
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national budgetary, financial and economic policies in order to overcome structural 
imbalances. Yet, while the European economic governance, through such mecha-
nisms and institutions, acquired a renovated economic and financial equilibrium, it 
failed to deal with other salient imbalances concerning wage and fiscal policies 
across EU member countries. In other words, as the paper will highlight, while the 
EU was busy in guaranteeing the future of the euro and the European economic 
system, it failed in securing citizens about their economic welfare, economic per-
spectives and future wellbeing. Moreover, since the economic crises did not hit all 
countries equally or uniformly, with some European countries experiencing good 
economic performances over the years and other that did not, austerity policies 
together with the absence of harmonised economic rules created even more dispari-
ties across member states. At the same time, “more integration” lacked democratic 
accountability as it resulted in more power exerted top-down by the Commission 
and the European Council, often bypassing national and European Parliaments.
This chapter argues that economic shortage and lack of democratic accountability 
are keys in explaining the relative success of right-wing populist parties. Many of 
which are now part of the Identity and Democracy Group (ID) within the European 
Parliament, as it will be discussed in more details below. Indeed, while populism is 
not a novelty in the EU, the increasing support towards the sovereignist parties 
experienced in the years after the crises has been unprecedented, and it has recently 
resulted in the creation of the above-mentioned new Eurosceptic group within the 
European Parliament (75 seats). Certainly, the ID group does not have a majority in 
the EU Parliament and, so far, its impact on the EU policymaking has been 
marginalised by the majority, formed by traditional political forces. Yet, the 
re-emergence of populist extreme right-wing sentiments in Europe cannot be 
undervalued.
Several experts have linked the upsurge of such forces to various factors such as 
globalisation, a mix of anger against political elites, fake news, migration and rapid 
social changes as well as a diffused perception that Brussels is an inefficient bubble, 
intrusive and out of touch with ordinary citizens. Yet, leaving aside cultural and 
security reasons, with three European citizens out of five worried about their eco-
nomic future and two out of four believing their voice does not count in the EU, this 
paper argues that the European governance and the way economic resources have 
been distributed among citizens and countries might well play a role when it comes 
to voters’ support to those parties (European Commission 2018).
The chapter is structured as follows. The first part will analyse the characteristics 
of the sovereignist parties in the EU and what differentiate them from traditional 
nationalist or right-wing movements. The section will introduce an analysis of 
whether, why and how the European Economic governance might have fuelled their 
electoral support. Against this backdrop, the second part will instead provide an 
overview of the economic governance reforms applied by the EU in the aftermath 
of the crisis. Specifically, it will try to highlight how greater integration has also 
resulted in more discontent across those citizens who felt the EU was already not 
answering to their needs. Finally, the paper will explain the link between the success 
of ID parties and the reforms of European economic governance, arguing that 
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despite differences in economic performances, such reforms acted as a catalyst for 
the support those parties still enjoy.
 Populism: The Mother of All European Sovereignist Parties
Populism is not a novelty in the European political panorama. It is an unpleasant 
reflection of history. All the European “isms” one can think of—from German 
Nazism, to Italian Fascism, up to Spanish Franchism or Soviet Communism of 
Eastern European countries—detained elements of populism, even though they 
were based on different ideological backgrounds. Although in Europe, populism has 
been recently associated more with radical right-wing than left-wing ideas, in other 
parts of world, such as in Latin America, populism is often a product of the political 
left. When it comes to populism, political philosophy is not fundamental. Populist 
parties build their identity upon a thin host ideology, which can either be on the left 
or on the right of the political spectrum. There are no sets of economic, health or 
security policies, which can be defined as populist per se, while it is easy to identify 
a communist economic plan or a fascist security programme.
As underlined by philosopher Isaiah Berlin, populism is indeed characterised by 
a Cinderella complex (Krastev 2008, 43). Like the famous Cinderella’s shoe, a defi-
nition of populism will fit perfectly just one party or movement, but not all of them. 
For this reason, one should think of European populism as a box and focuses on its 
perimeters instead of attempting to find out what is inside of it. The common stand-
ing that characterises all populist movements and parties across EU member coun-
tries is that the people are the central point of reference of any political discourse or 
action. Secondly, building on a diffused resentment felt by groups of the society 
who feel excluded from the advantages of globalisation, populism comes with a 
Manichean vision of society (Van Kessel 2015). Against this backdrop, the good 
people are to be protected by the corrupted elites, in the shape of Brussels bureau-
crats, traditional politicians, the European establishment, etc.
Populist parties push forward a simplification of reality, which is particularly 
useful in political campaigns as it allows communicating directly to the voters and 
providing them with what appears as an easy solution to existential problems 
(Müller 2017; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). This simplification can also be defined 
as a moralisation. Indeed, by simplifying the political landscape, populist parties 
surge themselves as the representative of purity, against the evil and corrupt estab-
lishment. To date, considering the outcome of the 2019 EP elections, it is evident 
that anti-establishment and radical right-wing movements have shaped the recent 
upsurge of populist sentiments in the EU. Going beyond the national and regional 
differences that still characterise the EU, in the aftermath of the 2019 EP elections, 
around 16 out of 28 member countries have at least one party, whose characteristics 
correspond to the above-mentioned ones and the ID group is represented by parties 
coming from 9 different countries.
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Country Party
N. seats in national 
parliament
N. seats in 
the EP
Political 
group
Austria Freedom Party (FPO) 31 3 of 18 ID
Belgium Flemish Interests (VI. Belang) 18 3 of 21 ID
Bulgaria Bulgarian National Movement 
(IMRO)
2 of 17 ECR
Czechia Freedom and Direct Democracy 
(SDP)
22 2 of 21 ID
Denmark Danish People Party (DS) 16 1 of 13 ECR
Estonia Conservative People’s Party of 
Estonia (EKRE)
19 1 of 6 ID
Finland Finns Party (PS) 39 2 of 13 ID
France National Rally 7 23 of 74 ID
Germany Alternative for Germany 94 11 of 96 ID
Greece Golden Dawn (XA) 0 2 of 21
Hungary Fidesz 133 13 of 21 EPP
Italy Lega Nord 182 28 of 73 ID
Poland Law and Justice (PIS) 235 26 of 51 ECR
UK Brexit Party 0 29 of 73
Spain Vox 52 3 of 54 ECR
Sweden Sweden Democrats (SD) 62 3 of 20 ECR
Source: Author’s elaboration of European Parliament’s data
While academics do not agree whether this form of right-wing populism is only 
a communication strategy or a specific political style, what is certain is that right-
wing populist parties in Europe, defined here as sovereignist, are all characterised 
by five fundamental elements (Pajnik and Sauer 2017; Wodak 2019). First, sover-
eignist parties are different from nationalist or fascist parties. Although they put the 
nation as the main actor able to solve citizens’ problems and support “fortress” 
security policies and welfare chauvinism, their political campaigns lack a deep ide-
ological backing (Halikiopoulou 2019, 1–15; Kriesi and Takis 2015). Moreover, 
differently from nationalist parties, they do not always oppose the nation against the 
rest of the world, but they often build on the vertical collusive relationship between 
“the people” and “the elite” (Rooduijn 2019, 362–372). Against this backdrop, sov-
ereignist parties do not develop coherent policies, being able to change their own 
nationalistic perspectives, when forms of cooperation are preferable. They are anti-
pluralist groups with an anti-elitist and anti-intellectual attitude (Wodak 2015). 
Finally, they are normally led by a charismatic leader, who is portrayed as a national 
hero or a strict but fair father, whose success is fuelled by a collective sense of 
insecurity.
Against this backdrop, the next section will argue that there is a link between the 
EU economic governance and sovereignism. It will highlight that, despite the differ-
ent GDPs and economic performances of EU member countries, the European eco-
nomic policies adopted in the aftermath of the crises as well as the lack of democratic 
accountability of the European decision-making process became catalysts for social 
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discontent and rising insecurity, allowing ID sovereignist parties to achieve an unex-
pected electoral support.
 European Economic Governance and Citizens’ Welfare
According to the European Commission, the European economic governance has 
been developed as a tool to “monitor, prevent, and correct problematic economic 
trends that could weaken national economies or negatively affect other EU coun-
tries”. Yet, its institutional framework, which emerged in the following of the 
Maastricht Treaty, has been often defined as incomplete and imbalanced (Chang 
2019). Before the reforms introduced in the aftermath of the crises, the European 
economic institutions did not provide Eurozone Member States with a lender of last 
resort, and there were no clear European mechanisms for preserving financial stabil-
ity or dealing with potential adverse shocks. This resulted in the multiple crises 
experienced so far.
Rising from the 2008 Credit Crunch, the economic crisis developed in Europe 
followed three different paths. There has been a crisis of competitiveness and pro-
ductivity, a banking crisis and, in countries with high public debt, a sovereign debt 
crisis. At the same time, while the European monetary policy provided Eurozone 
deficit Member States’ economies with a huge expansionary push, the absence of a 
banking union resulted in Member States respectively protecting and promoting 
their banks, fuelling various bubble, especially in the property market. Moreover, 
the lack of common fiscal and wage policies allowed some countries, such as 
Germany, to boost their own competitiveness by pursuing a policy of disinflation. 
The latter contributed to increment macroeconomic imbalances within the Eurozone. 
This happened in a context where countries had already divergent economic perfor-
mances (Börzel and Risse 2018). In 2007, according the European Commission 
published data, the volume of German real GDP growth was 3.3, while in the EU 28 
it was 3.1, in Italy 1.5, in Finland 5.2, in Slovakia 10.8 and in France 2.4.
Despite the above-mentioned divergences, the need to overcome the economic 
crises and save the euro resulted in the EU system of economic governance being 
radically reshaped and reinforced, achieving an unprecedented integration. The 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was established in 2012 as a permanent 
intergovernmental organisation to provide financial assistance and fiscal liability to 
Eurozone Member States under attack on the bond markets. Although the ESM has 
allowed to overcome one of the imbalances of the European economic system and 
save the euro, national parliaments have no control on its board of Governors, as the 
latter was established through an intergovernmental Treaty. Similarly, the Fiscal 
Compact, signed by all EU Governments with the exception of the UK, imposed 
strict budgetary rules on Member States, binding them to the activation of specific 
mechanisms to correct any significant deviations (Christakis 2017, 1–43). Again, 
the Fiscal Compact lacks democratic accountability as it provides the Commission 
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with the power to unilaterally propose sanctions for Member States not respecting 
these commitments.
The creation of the Banking Union increased the instruments of the ECB to keep 
the “euro” alive, breaking the vicious cycle of speculation about both Member 
States and banking sectors’ solvency so as not to endanger the financial stability of 
the Eurozone as a whole. On the other hand, the European Semester attempted to 
boost compliance of national budgetary and economic reforms with European 
requirements reinforcing the monitoring of member state policies by the 
Commission.
The above mechanisms had certainly the merit to save the euro and stabilise EU 
and Eurozone economies. To be fair, the urgency caused by the unprecedented eco-
nomic crises of the last years made it impossible to have the above reforms properly 
discussed and checked by democratically elected national institutions and digested 
by citizens. While the restructurings were aimed to allow EU member countries, 
and in particular, the Eurozone, to achieve more integration, overcome the eco-
nomic deadlock and provide more financial stability, the lack of direct communica-
tion channels between the EU decision-making process and the wide electorate 
made the former appearing as a distant actor with an unprecedented authority over 
national policies (Börzel 2016, 8–3; Schimmelfennig 2014, 321–337).
Moreover, such reforms did not solve the crises of competitiveness and 
productivity affecting the EU. These were seen as issues to be solved at national 
level, preferably by applying austerity policies and “internal devaluation” (Van 
Gyes and Schulten 2015. Schulten and Müller 2015, 331–363).
Although the EU has no formal competences on wage policies and collective 
bargaining, the necessity for member countries to respect rigid parameters imposed 
by the Fiscal Compact and the European Semester resulted in a so perceived top- 
down approach, whereby the EU recommended the reforms needed, especially in 
countries with lower economic performances. In a nutshell, the effectiveness of the 
reformed European economic governance in saving the “euro” and the European 
integration project has been at the expenses of democratic trends in some EU coun-
tries, creating a fertile common ground for sovereignist parties to emerge. More 
economic integration allowed for substantial powers to be transferred from the 
national to the European level, making the decision-making process mostly based 
on an “executive federalism”. While the European governance fixed the debt and the 
banking crisis, the crisis of competitiveness did not receive an adequate answer. On 
the contrary, it stimulated new forms of competition among Member States, whereby 
surplus Member States could pressure the ones in deficit. To reduce national debts 
and remain in the rigid EU parameters, the majority of European governments 
enforced strict fiscal consolidation programmes with significant cut on education, 
health care, worker’s rights and family policies. According to Eurostat data, since 
2010, the percentage of people at risk of poverty raised by 2% in EU countries in 
general. In Germany, it passed from 8.9% in 2010 to 10.6% in 2017. In France, from 
7.8% it reached 8.4%, and in Italy, from 11.8% it touched 12.4%. One exception to 
this trend is Finland, where it went from 8.4% to 7%. Yet inequality growth in all 
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EU countries, specifically in Finland and in Germany, where by 2010 to 2016, the 
middle class was squeezed respectively by 6.9% and 5.7% (Eurostat 2020).
The absence of a European wage policy resulted in all EU countries reducing the 
extent of their national collective bargaining, contracting wages and workers’ rights. 
Indeed, the growing competition at the EU level among Member States made irrel-
evant any centralised bargaining as companies could move in other countries or hire 
remotely workers from other member states. These trends were catalyst of popular 
support to populist and more specifically sovereignist parties. They amplified two 
key factors that according to Frieden (2018) were at the basis of their success. On 
the one hand, they undermined an effective democratic accountability of the EU 
economic policies. On the other, they amplified the perception that the EU was not 
tackling citizens’ rising insecurity and inequality.
 Sovereignism and the Economy
Sovereignist parties did not gain political power in all the EU countries, and the ID 
group is represented only in nine states. Yet, even in those, such as Germany and 
Finland, with relative good GDP performances, sovereignist parties were able to 
win. They did so by highlighting the need to take back control from undemocratic 
Brussels institutions as well as to fight against rising inequality within and across 
countries. Those are the two fundamental factors that the European economic gov-
ernance has, even if indirectly, contributed to fuel.
As populist movements normally do, ID sovereignist parties do not have any 
answer to solve the above issues, but they mount on citizens’ economic insecurity, 
pushing forward a “fear propaganda”.
To date, 51% of the European citizens are indeed afraid of the state of the society, 
and 67% believe that the world used to be a better place. Citizens fear about their 
future economic conditions and the loss of their cultural identity, or they have sim-
ply nostalgia of a mystified past. In not all countries citizens are concerned by the 
same issue or in the same way. Still the economic factors, the need for protection 
and anxiety about the state of society are deeply connected to a dissatisfaction with 
the quality of EU and Member States’ democracies and the idea that European insti-
tutions are too complicated and fail to provide what is needed (De Vries and 
Hoffmann 2019). Indeed, 48% of the European citizens tend not to trust the EU, 
38% believe the EU is not positively influencing their lives and 30% think we need 
less integration (European Commission 2018; European Parliament 2019; De Vries 
and Hoffmann 2019).
Sovereignist parties appeal to all social groups with specific economic concerns 
(Kriesi and Takis 2015). First, they receive support from the working class by build-
ing on a well-diffused negative condition of labour-market competition, mounting 
their exposure to immigrants’ workforce who are allegedly keen to work longer 
hours and with lower salaries (Dancygier and Walter 2015, 133–56). This, together 
with the need to stop “welfare tourists”, is the battle horse of the Austrian Freedom 
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Party (FPO) (Reuters 2017). Secondly, they received support by a declining middle 
class who is worried to lose its current social and economic status (Antonucci 2019; 
Hillje 2018; Michel 2017). For instance, supporters of the National Rally or 
Alternative for Germany (AfD) or even the Italian League fear unemployment, the 
worsening of working conditions and the weakening of social safety nets. AfD and 
FN voters believe that the future generation will be financially worse off than that of 
their parents (Hillje 2018).
Anxiety about other countries’ economic performances is also an issue. Indeed, 
the absence of European common policies to overcome the crisis of competitiveness 
and productivity was detrimental, especially for Southern European countries, 
which experienced low growth. This allowed northern European sovereignist par-
ties to create a new argument to discredit the EU and its economic governance 
around the capacity of Southern Europeans to repay their debt. Parties such as 
Alternative for Germany or the Finns Party constructed part of their European 
agenda on that, maintaining that their countries should protect their own citizens 
and fight against any form of bail out policy for rescuing the euro and underper-
forming EU member countries (The Finns Party 2019; Kim 2018). As far as rising 
inequality is concerned, those parties did not replace traditional left-wing agenda. 
They offer broader forms of protection in terms of tighter security with tax reduc-
tion, to compensate the loss of social status. They do not confront the EU and its 
economic governance to ask for more social guarantees or effective welfare poli-
cies. They indeed replace the idea of social equity with protectionism and the prom-
ise of lower taxes, combined with an ideological appeal to nationalism and a 
nostalgic desire to “make the country great again”.
In conclusion, the economic crisis and the consequent EU institutional response, 
through the reforms of the European economic governance, did not directly cause 
the rise of sovereignist parties, but they acted as a catalyst of their success. They 
basically favoured the development of two key conditions: lack of democratic 
accountability and rising inequality, which fuelled citizens’ insecurity at the basis of 
populist parties’ fear propaganda.
 Conclusion
Beyond the cultural backlash, which posits the origin of the radical right vote mainly 
to the diffusion of liberal values or the migration crisis, European economic gover-
nance is relevant when it comes to understand the success of the above-mentioned 
parties (Rydgren 2008, 737–765). Indeed, the inability or impossibility of national 
governments to face rising national inequality issues resulted in the politicisation of 
the European economic governance and its lack of democratic accountability, which 
became central to sovereignist parties’ agenda (Börzel and Risse 2018, 23; Norris 
and Ingehart 2018). While economic and social inequalities grew larger, the migra-
tion crisis increased social pressure and concerns about additional strains on exist-
ing welfare systems (Meuleman et al. 2018). Unhappiness about the status quo was 
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coupled by anxiety about the future and efforts made by EU institutions to reach 
more economic integration, as a way out of the crisis appeared useless by many. 
Europe ceased to be perceived as a “win-win” project for all. While austerity policy 
became the new scapegoat for all, the high social costs and increased economic and 
financial disparities among Member States boosted myopic national egoism. In this 
respect, the EU economic governance did save the Euro and provided financial sta-
bility to Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries, yet it lacked adequate measures to 
tackle rising citizens’ economic insecurity, which were left in the hand of national 
governments. Yet, the need to respect strict budgetary rules resulted in traditional 
parties failing to deliver what was needed and provided sovereignist parties with the 
perfect political and economic background to emerge as alternative political forces.
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Abstract The crisis that started in Greece in 2010 gradually spread to other 
Eurozone member states. Things were worse for the crisis-hit countries of the 
Eurozone periphery, some of which implemented harsh adjustment programmes in 
the context of financial assistance agreements, while others adopted similar policies 
even though they had not officially entered a bailout agreement (e.g. Spain and to a 
lesser degree Italy). In this environment of deteriorating material conditions, 
Euroscepticism reached new heights. This chapter examines the impact of the crisis, 
and the way it was handled, on regionalism in Europe, through its effects on 
Euroscepticism. The authors compare Eurobarometer data from European Union 
(EU) member states, in order to develop a comparative outlook on attitudes towards 
European integration during the crisis. The analysis employs data at discreet time 
intervals, in order to capture the evolution of attitudes from the pre-crisis environ-
ment in 2008, to the peak of the crisis in 2012, its gradual resolution in 2016 and its 
official ending (with the exit of Greece from its third bailout programme) in 2018. 
This analysis is complemented by an overview of the political developments in 
crisis-hit countries with the objective of documenting and analysing the emergence 
and, in some cases, dominance of Eurosceptic parties. The objective is to present a 
comprehensive overview of political developments and the public attitudes that 
shaped them, vis a vis the EU, during the crisis and offer a tentative conclusion on 
their impact on the European integration process.
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 Introduction
The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis was the most important economic challenge the 
European Union (EU) has ever faced. The economic decline was mainly driven by 
the deep recessions experienced in the crisis-hit countries of the Eurozone periph-
ery, particularly in the European South. Some of these countries (Greece, Portugal, 
Cyprus and Ireland) implemented harsh adjustment programmes in the context of 
sovereign bailouts. Spain adopted similar policies in parallel with a bailout of its 
banks by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and so did Italy, although to a 
lesser extent, as a result of pressure both from the markets and the EU. Thus, in all 
six countries, austerity policies were delivered as EU-mandated. In this environ-
ment of deteriorating material conditions, intra-European political divisions arose, 
as EU member states divided into creditor and debtor camps. The latter blamed the 
former for the imposition of harsh austerity policies and the consequent economic 
deterioration. Meanwhile, the creditors resented providing bailout funds to coun-
tries, which in their view were guilty of irresponsible fiscal behaviour and/or poor 
economic performance. In these circumstances, EU cohesion looked very fragile; 
popular support for the European integration project weakened and political parties 
critical of the EU gained in electoral influence.
The aim of this chapter is to examine the impact of the crisis and its management 
on Euroscepticism. Although the word was first used in the 1980s, the phenomenon 
of Euroscepticism—which can be defined simply as opposition to European inte-
gration—is as old as the process itself. Defined by what it is against rather than what 
it stands for, Euroscepticism is a rather all-encompassing term which embraces 
opposition to integration originating from multiple ideological viewpoints and 
expressing different intensities of disagreement, from simple criticism to outright 
rejection of the project. Study of the subject has tended to focus either on 
Euroscepticism’s popular or public dimension, i.e. mass attitudes, or else on its 
expression within political party systems. This article will adopt both lenses. More 
specifically, it will first examine the impact of the crisis on levels of public support 
for European integration, comparing two regions of the Eurozone: its periphery and 
its West European core. It will then move on to investigate the changing strength of 
party Euroscepticism in the crisis-stricken Southern periphery. The objective is to 
present an overview of some important developments and the shifting public atti-
tudes that shaped them in relation to the EU during the crisis and offer a tentative 
conclusion on their impact on the European integration process.
 The Crisis and Public Support for the EU and the Euro
During the years of the Eurozone debt crisis, public support for European integra-
tion declined (Serricchio et al. 2013, Nancy 2016). However, the impact was not 
uniform across countries or through time. This section aims to provide a temporal 
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and comparative overview of trends in public support for the EU during the period 
2008–2018. The analysis compares countries grouped in ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ cat-
egories in order to capture the different dynamics of popular Euroscepticism in the 
crisis-hit and creditor regions. Our ‘periphery’ group consists of Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Ireland, and the ‘core’ group consists of Austria, 
Belgium, France, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands. The analysis proceeds by 
comparing aggregate averages for each of these two groups and then looking at 
individual country results. It employs data at four discrete time intervals, from the 
pre-crisis period (2008), through periods of crisis intensity (2012) and gradual 
recovery (2016),1 to the crisis’ ‘official conclusion’ with the completion of Greece’s 
third bailout programme in 2018. The data comes from the European Commission’s 
biannual Eurobarometer surveys and specifically from reports 70.1 (10/2008), 78.1 
(11/2012), 86.2 (11/2016) and 90.3 (11/2018).
In assessing support for the EU during the Eurozone crisis, we employ the well- 
known distinction made by David Easton. He defined ‘diffuse support’ for any 
political system as ‘support that underlies the regime as a whole’. In his view, such 
‘generalized attachment’ to a political system is more enduring and ‘will not be eas-
ily dislodged because of current dissatisfaction with what the government does’. In 
contrast, ‘specific support’ refers to popular satisfaction with the outputs and perfor-
mance of a political system and can be expected to be more easily affected by pass-
ing developments (Easton 1975, pp. 445–6, 437). Here, we opt to test the impact of 
the crisis on diffuse support for European integration. This decision is premised on 
our expectation that specific support is far more likely and indeed expected to suffer, 
given the adverse consequences of the crisis and the way this was handled; what is 
more interesting, however, is whether people’s reactions reflect a broader disaffec-
tion with the EU and not simply the rejection of specific policies or institutions. 
To test for the effects on diffuse support, we employ three questions: first, a ques-
tion concerning the EU’s image which clearly complies with Easton’s definition of 
ways to measure diffuse support as ‘evaluations of what an object represents – the 
general meaning it has for a person  – not what it does’ (Easton 1975, p.445). 
Secondly, ‘Trust in the EU’, which is often employed in related research and is 
generally considered a valid way to measure diffuse support for the EU (Ioannou 
et al. 2015). Thirdly, a question about the single currency was chosen as this was the 
aspect of European integration which was most questioned during the crisis. The 
crisis was centred on the Eurozone, and much of the criticism targeted its imbal-
anced architecture and incomplete governance, which made its handling more dif-
ficult and prolonged its duration. It is for this reason that in the countries that 
suffered from the crisis, the question of ‘exit’ from the Eurozone was often raised. 
Accordingly, a question on support for the euro, which is the central pillar and basic 
constituent element of the Eurozone, was an obvious choice. These questions are 
1 In 2014, both Ireland and Portugal successfully completed their bailout programmes, while the 
Eurozone economy as a whole turned once again into positive growth rates.
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available for all four surveys and can thus be used to trace the evolution of attitudes 
during the crisis.2
 The EU’s Image
Before the crisis, the EU’s image was overall positive, with few negative views,3 but 
a substantial degree of ambivalence, as more than one in three EU citizens adopted 
a neutral stance (Fig.  16.1). The breakdown of views between the two country 
groups shows that the majority of citizens in the Eurozone periphery were positively 
disposed towards the EU (51%), and their ‘approval rate’ was higher than that of 
their counterparts in the core (43%). The percentage of negative opinions about the 
EU in the periphery was both very low (13%) and below that of respondents in the 
Eurozone core. In terms of individual countries,4 Ireland recorded the highest sup-
port levels with 63% of respondents having a positive image of the EU, while other 
2 More specifically, the questions were: (a) EU Image: In general, does the EU conjure up for you 
a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative, or very negative image?
(b) Trust in EU: I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain 
media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend 
to trust it or tend not to trust it: The European Union.
(c) Single currency: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me 
for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: A European economic and monetary union 
with one single currency, the euro.
3 For this question, positive/fairly positive and negative/fairly negative answers are grouped into 
two groups respectively (positive/negative).
4 Although reference to data for individual countries is made throughout the text, the full presenta-
tion of such data is not possible due to space limitations.
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Fig. 16.1 EU image: Core vs periphery. Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurobarometer data (sur-
veys 70.1, 78.1, 86.2 and 90.3)
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periphery countries also recorded approval rates close to or above 50% (but with a 
lower score of 41% for Greece). Among the core countries, Austria and Finland had 
the lowest levels of support, with less than one in three respondents holding a posi-
tive image of the EU.  In other core countries, support levels were similar to the 
periphery (close to or above 50%).
After the outbreak of the crisis, the picture changed completely. In 2012, positive 
views had declined across the board. In the periphery, the percentage of positive 
image responses had almost halved, whereas in the core, the drop was close to 30%. 
As a result, in the periphery group as a whole, negative responses exceeded positive 
ones, while they were evenly balanced in the core group. A closer look at individual 
countries demonstrates the intensity of the change. The lowest levels of support 
were recorded in Greece, where positive responses dropped to a mere 18% while 
50% of respondents gave negative answers.
Spain, Portugal and Cyprus also recorded a negative balance of answers, with 
negative views in the latter two being well over 40%. On the other hand, Ireland 
held onto a small positive balance of 6% and Italy to a larger one of approximately 
13%. Even in these countries however, the turnaround in public opinion was dra-
matic; for example, in Ireland, positive image responses fell from 63% before the 
crisis to 37%. Although less striking, the drop in positive views of the EU was also 
considerable in the core; Austrian and Finnish respondents, already more reserved 
in their support before the crisis, now gave more negative than positive answers. The 
remaining four countries retained a positive balance, but by a narrow margin.
The gradual resolution of the crisis, from 2014–2015 onward, changed the pic-
ture again. By autumn 2016, 2 years into economic recovery, European citizens’ 
image of the EU started improving, particularly in the crisis-hit countries. Thus, in 
the periphery group, positive views increased from 27% to 36% with a correspond-
ing drop in negative responses. In the core countries on the other hand, the improve-
ment was minimal, with positive views increasing from 30% to 32%. However, the 
group averages hide significant differentiations. In the periphery, Portugal and to a 
lesser extent Ireland, almost recovered their pre-crisis positive image levels, whereas 
Cyprus and particularly Greece remained more sceptical. Italy, while recording a 
marginally positive balance of answers, was the only country in this group where 
the popular image of the EU continued to deteriorate in 2016. Interestingly, this was 
also the case for France in the core group. Austrians displayed stability in their 
opinions, whereas citizens of the remaining core countries had a modestly improved 
image of the EU. By 2018, the EU’s image had improved substantially in all coun-
tries of both groups, including Italy and France. In some countries, like Ireland and 
Portugal, positive image responses now surpassed pre-crisis levels.
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 Trust in the EU
Turning to the question of trust, as with the image of the EU, pre-crisis replies indi-
cate overall support for the EU among European citizens. In both groups, a majority 
of respondents tended to trust the EU (Fig. 16.2). Again, slightly more respondents 
in the periphery tended to trust the EU compared to those in the core countries (58% 
vs 54%). At the individual country level, the picture is more differentiated. 
Respondents in the periphery showed substantial levels of trust towards the EU 
(ranging roughly between 60% and 65%), except the Italians, where a majority 
(53%) tended not to trust the EU even before the crisis. In the core countries, mis-
trust prevailed in Austria (54%) and Germany (52%), while the French were equally 
split on the question. On the other hand, Belgium and the Netherlands showed high 
levels of trust (over 60%), while Finland recorded a positive, albeit marginal, 
balance.
Once again, the outbreak of the crisis changed the picture completely. In the 
crisis-hit periphery, the deterioration in trust was dramatic; the balance moved 
deeply into negative territory, with over 70% of respondents replying that they did 
not trust the EU in 2012. In the core countries, the direction of change was similar, 
but its intensity was less dramatic; trust levels receded to 42%. Looking at individ-
ual countries, in Greece, the country which suffered the deepest crisis, the loss of 
trust was truly overwhelming; 82% replied that they did not trust the EU, while 
Spain, also undergoing a deep crisis, recorded similar levels of mistrust (78%). In 
the remaining crisis-hit countries, approximately two thirds of respondents gave 
negative answers. In five of the core countries, a majority of respondents mistrusted 
the EU. The exception was Finland, where answers were evenly split.
The economic recovery had a positive impact on levels of trust in the EU, but not 
of the same magnitude as with the EU’s image. Initially, the recovery of trust was 
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Fig. 16.2 Trust in EU. Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurobarometer data (surveys 70.1, 78.1, 
86.2 and 90.3)
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most evident in the crisis-hit group, which by 2016 recorded an overall improve-
ment of 10 percentage points, while trust levels in the core remained unchanged. 
Looking at individual countries reveals significant differentiations once again. As 
was the case with the EU’s image, Ireland and Portugal were the countries that came 
closest to their pre-crisis levels of trust; on the other hand, in Italy and Cyprus, trust 
continued to decline in 2016. Greeks remained overwhelmingly sceptical, with 80% 
of respondents stating they did not trust the EU. The picture in the core was also 
complicated in 2016. Some countries (Germany, Finland and Belgium) saw a mod-
est recovery in trust levels, but in the Netherlands, the situation remained unchanged, 
while in Austria and especially France, trust levels declined further (72% of respon-
dents mistrusted the EU in France). By 2018, the picture had improved substantially 
in all countries; but while trust levels had fully recovered to 2008 levels in core 
countries, in the periphery they remained more than 10 percentage points below the 
pre-crisis period.
 Support for the Single Currency
Before the crisis, support for the Euro was high across the board, with respondents 
in the core group being more enthusiastic than those of the periphery group 
(Fig. 16.3). Apart from Ireland, where 92% of respondents supported the euro, in 
the other periphery countries, support ranged roughly between 60% and 70%. On 
the other hand, in all the core countries, support for the euro was above 70% and in 
some cases (Belgium, Netherlands and Finland) above 80%.
As with the previous two questions, the crisis brought a decline in popular sup-
port for the euro. However, contrary to the other aspects reviewed previously, the 
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Fig. 16.3 Support for the Euro. Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurobarometer data (surveys 
70.1, 78.1, 86.2 and 90.3)
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impact here was limited. In the periphery group, average support for the euro fell by 
just 5 percentage points to 65% and in the core group by 6 percentage points to 
73%. Individually, all the core and four of the periphery countries displayed a mod-
est decline. In crisis-hit Ireland, the decline was more substantial (18 percentage 
points—but compared to the very high pre-crisis level noted above). Intriguingly, in 
Greece, which was then teetering on the verge of Eurozone exit, support for the euro 
actually rose to 67% from 58% before the crisis.
The economic recovery saw the popularity of the euro returning to pre-crisis 
levels, or even surpassing them, particularly in the crisis-hit countries. In the latter 
group, support for the single currency was stronger in 2016 compared to 2008. 
Support in Greece continued to rise, while Ireland and to a lesser degree Cyprus 
moved close to their pre-crisis levels. Only in Italy did support for the euro continue 
to decline, falling to 59% in 2016 from 65% in 2012. The only other two countries 
where support for the euro continued to fall were Austria (where nonetheless 
approximately two thirds of respondents continued to be pro-euro) and marginally, 
France. In the rest of the core countries, there was a modest increase in support, 
bringing them closer to their pre-crisis levels. By 2018, most countries recorded a 
substantial increase in support compared to 2016; as a result, at this point, all coun-
tries in both groups exhibited similar or higher levels of support for the euro com-
pared to the pre-crisis period.
 The Crisis and Public Support for the EU and the Euro: 
Implications for European Integration
The data presented above shows that the three different measures employed to 
gauge support for the EU were affected differently during and/or after the crisis. 
What explains these trends and what are the implications for European integration? 
First, support for the euro proved surprisingly resilient. A somewhat unexpected 
result, given the widespread critique of the functioning and institutional set-up of 
the Eurozone, is that the single currency has come stronger out of the crisis, at least 
in terms of popular support. Even more unexpected is that this support seems to be 
stronger in the crisis-hit countries, where criticism of the monetary union has been 
fierce. Studies have attributed this resilience of support to the stability benefits of 
the euro (Roth et al. 2016) and the prevalence of utilitarian criteria in citizens’ judg-
ments, given the increased salience of economic and redistributive issues during this 
time (Hobolt and Wratil 2015). It seems that European citizens thought the crisis 
could be best addressed in the EU/Eurozone framework compared to any other 
alternatives (Ibid). In the case of Greece for example, as Clements et al. (2014) note, 
despite citizens’ dissatisfaction with the EU, they recognized that staying in the 
euro was the most realistic option.
On the other hand, contrary to expectations, our other measures of diffuse sup-
port proved more vulnerable to the crisis, and both declined substantially after 2008. 
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In both cases, the shock of the crisis was greater in the periphery than the core. 
However, both indicators closely followed the evolution of economic trends, show-
ing a strong recovery after the crisis peaked. Again, however, there was a difference. 
Our aggregate figures show that by 2018, in our core countries group, diffuse sup-
port had returned to pre-crisis levels. In the periphery group, although the trend was 
moving in that direction, this was not yet the case. In particular, there remained a 
distinct ‘trust gap’ in the periphery, where in Autumn 2018, a majority of 55% of 
citizens still mistrusted the EU.
Perhaps this is to be expected, given that trust is a concept which denotes a 
deeper bond, acquired through time and experience. Once lost, recovering it is usu-
ally a difficult and long-term process. Research has shown that material consider-
ations are an important factor in public support for the EU (e.g. Gabel 1998; 
Boomgaarden et  al. 2010). For South European societies in particular, European 
integration traditionally represented a promise of material benefits and convergence 
with the living standards of the more affluent North. The austerity policies promoted 
during the crisis kick-started a negative economic spiral which plunged the econo-
mies of the South into deep recessions. For many people, the deterioration of their 
personal circumstances was so dramatic that it completely derailed their previous 
life expectations. In this context, the policies promoted by the EU were viewed as a 
‘betrayal’ of hopes and promises.
Such an interpretation is consistent with the fact that trust declined most dramati-
cally during the crisis in Greece and Spain, two countries which shared two impor-
tant features: (a) the biggest surge in unemployment (reaching a staggering 27% in 
both countries) and (b) the most active and massive political mobilizations (the so- 
called ‘indignados’ movements) against the politics of austerity promoted by the 
EU. Both of these features are related with lower levels of trust in the EU; empirical 
analysis of Eurobarometer data for the periphery countries during 2008–2016 has 
shown that at the peak of the crisis, the unemployed were more likely not to trust the 
EU, while after the outbreak of the crisis, including the recovery period, individu-
als’ financial situation and life satisfaction became more important criteria for trust 
in the EU (Katsikas 2017). Moreover, people who actively engaged in political dis-
cussions were more likely to mistrust the EU (Ibid), a finding consistent with the 
emergence of new Eurosceptic parties in these countries—the topic to which we 
will now turn.
 The Rise of Eurosceptic Parties in the Southern Periphery
How were these shifting patterns of public Euroscepticism reflected in national 
politics? Prior to the crisis, attitudes towards European integration had been 
described as a ‘sleeping giant’ (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004): a question of low 
political salience which generally did not affect political behaviour. Other issues 
were deemed more important to voters when deciding which political party to sup-
port. Meanwhile, as noted in a seminal article by Paul Taggart (1998), Euroscepticism 
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tended to be marginalised within national party systems: a politics of protest usually 
limited to minor opposition parties. In this section, we will investigate to what 
extent this picture changed during the crisis decade (2008-18), under the pressure of 
the decline in diffuse support for European integration which we saw above.
The Eurozone crisis turned European integration into a salient issue with a direct 
and visible impact on citizens’ pockets. The management of the crisis proved con-
troversial in both core and periphery countries, offering opportunities for Eurosceptic 
parties to gain a new prominence. Thus, in some of our core countries, electoral 
campaigns based on opposing bailouts of indebted peripheral states with ‘our 
money’ proved effective vote mobilizing tools. For example, in Finland in 2011, 
hostility towards the second Greek bailout helped the True Finns5 to more than qua-
druple their electoral support, emerging as third party nationwide with a vote share 
just 1.3 percentage points behind the frontrunner. In Germany two years later, the 
anti-bailout AfD (Alternative for Germany), just 5 months after its foundation, won 
over two million votes in a federal election, bringing it only marginally below the 
5% parliamentary threshold. Meanwhile in the periphery, the Eurozone crisis and 
the popular backlash it generated created major opportunities for parties campaign-
ing against EU-led austerity. For reasons of space, our focus in this section will be 
on the four main countries of the Southern Eurozone (Italy, Spain, Greece and 
Portugal). As we have seen, it was in the crisis-hit Southern periphery, deeply 
affected by EU-mandated economic austerity, that the impact on diffuse support for 
the EU was greatest and more lasting.
 The Marginality of Party Euroscepticism in the Pre-Crisis 
Southern Periphery
In three of our four South European countries, before the crisis the national party 
system was dominated by two pro-integrationist parties belonging to the two main 
political groups at European level, the European People’s Party and the Party of 
European Socialists, respectively. In all three national systems, the two major par-
ties usually alternated in power. In the last national elections before the outbreak of 
the Eurozone crisis, their combined vote shares accounted for 83.8% in Spain 
(2008), 77.4% in Greece (2009) and 65.7% in Portugal (2009). This meant that any 
Eurosceptic parties could only be minor forces, consigned to permanent opposition.
In these three countries, the Eurosceptic space was traditionally a left-wing 
monopoly. The Eurosceptic forces represented in the three countries’ national par-
liaments included two hard-line communist parties in Greece and Portugal, which 
would have preferred their countries not to participate in the EU. Another three radi-
cal left parties (the Left Bloc in Portugal, SYRIZA in Greece and the United Left in 
Spain) did not oppose their countries’ membership but wanted radical reform of the 
5 Now known just as ‘The Finns’.
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EU and particularly its neoliberal economic policy. Then in 2007, just before the 
crisis, LAOS, a radical right party advocating a Europe of the Nations, also entered 
the Greek Parliament. Meanwhile in Italy, since the party system crash of the early 
1990s, a bipolar system had developed with power alternating between two party 
camps of the centre-left and centre-right, whose combined vote share in 2008 was 
84.3%. Each of these Italian coalitions was dominated by a party belonging to the 
two main pro-integrationist European party groups. While recent Italian centre-right 
governments had included a Eurosceptic party, the Northern League’s stance on 
European issues did not seem to impact on national European policy.
 Eurosceptic Breakthroughs
The Eurozone crisis transformed this picture in a way which is only comprehensible 
in the light of the decline of diffuse support for the EU recorded in the previous sec-
tion. The way the crisis opened up electoral space for Eurosceptic forces in Southern 
Europe can be seen first, in a series of parliamentary breakthroughs. These included 
three new parties: the Independent Greeks in 2012, the Five Star Movement in Italy 
in 2013 and the Spanish Podemos in 2015. Of varying ideological orientations, 
these parties also expressed different degrees and types of Euroscepticism. In 
Greece, an existing fringe group, the Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, also entered parlia-
ment on the back of the reaction to the country’s second EU/IMF bailout in 2012. 
Secondly, some parties which already existed in national parliaments were able to 
extend their appeal to new constituencies. In 2011, the United Left in Spain increased 
its vote by 80%. Most notably, however, SYRIZA in 2012 more than tripled its 
share of the vote in Greece. Thirdly, as a result of this expanded electoral appeal, 
Eurosceptic parties moved ‘from the margins to the mainstream’ (Brack and Startin 
2015). In 2012, SYRIZA emerged as second party, becoming the official opposition 
in Greece. The following year, the Five Star Movement became the most voted party 
in Italy, a feat then achieved twice by SYRIZA in the two Greek parliamentary elec-
tions of 2015.
The exception was Portugal, where none of these phenomena occurred. As we 
have seen, in this country, levels of diffuse support for the EU recovered rapidly, 
already approximating pre-crisis levels by 2016. During the crisis period, there were 
no breakthroughs by Eurosceptic parties in Portugal. In the 2011 election, held 
shortly after the signature of the country’s EU/IMF bailout, the joint vote share of 
the two Portuguese Eurosceptic parties actually decreased. Subsequently, the com-
bined electoral support for these two parties has not reached the level of the last 
pre-crisis election in 2009. Despite this, however, Portugal also participated in the 
second major Eurosceptic development in Southern Europe during the crisis decade: 
the opening up of government to Eurosceptic party participation.
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 Eurosceptic Impact
The first indication that the crisis was opening new governing opportunities for 
Eurosceptic parties in the Eurozone’s Southern periphery came in Greece. In 2011, 
LAOS was included as a junior partner in a government coalition. Four years later, 
Portugal experienced a major rupture in its post-dictatorship politics, when its radi-
cal left-wing Eurosceptic parties, previously regarded as non-coalitionable, were 
invited to support a minority socialist government with a programme of rolling back 
economic austerity. Even more striking, in Greece in 2015, SYRIZA not only 
became the senior coalition partner but also preferred as its governing ally the 
Eurosceptic Independent Greeks from the far right rather than a pro-EU party closer 
to it on the left–right spectrum. In 2018 in Italy, the Five Star Movement, with a vote 
share 13 percentage points ahead of the second party, also became the senior gov-
ernment party and also chose a Eurosceptic coalition partner, the now re-named 
League. Thus, overturning the patterns of the pre-crisis period, in three out of our 
four Southern periphery countries, Eurosceptic parties became government partici-
pants in the period 2011–2018.
This impressive growth in Eurosceptic party strength in Southern Europe marked 
a significant rise in opposition to the EU. But to what extent did this pose a signifi-
cant threat to the integration project? As indicated above, the Eurosceptic forces 
were a variegated group with different viewpoints and aims in relation to integra-
tion. The common target of the South European Eurosceptic parties was the auster-
ity policies which had so undermined public support for the EU in this region. But 
for most of the ‘breakthrough’ parties, their scepticism about EU policy did not 
extend to rejection of the Union itself. The exception was the Greek Golden Dawn, 
whose economic and political programme was incompatible with EU membership. 
However, Golden Dawn talked very little about the EU, so its hard-line opposition 
was not very visible. In any case, because of its general anti-system nature, this 
party remained in opposition and on the political margins. What though was the 
impact of the Eurosceptic parties in power?
In Portugal, the Eurosceptic forces were junior partners who supported the gov-
ernment but did not participate in it. Moreover, the socialist party had made it a 
pre-condition of government formation that the programme to reverse austerity 
would comply with the requirements of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. As a 
result, while the Eurosceptic parties came in from the cold in the sense of being 
accepted as legitimate government partners, their government participation did not 
generate Eurosceptic policy outcomes. In contrast, in the other two countries, the 
Eurosceptic parties dominated government and, in both cases, engaged in confron-
tational politics with the EU. In Greece in 2015, this concerned whether the country 
should repay its debt as well as the terms of continued financial assistance. What 
proved crucial in this case was the strength of Greek popular support for the euro 
noted above. After a 6-month standoff, the government changed course and accepted 
a new bailout rather than risk a disorderly Eurozone exit which would have been 
highly unpopular with the electorate. With the Italian government formed in 2018, 
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the confrontation concerned compliance with the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. 
After several months, when faced with the prospect of an EU Excessive Deficit 
Procedure, the Italian government agreed to reduce its budget deficit. As a result, it 
is a striking point that during the period of the Eurozone crisis and despite all the 
political discontent it generated in the region, there was no South European rupture 
with the EU or the single currency.
 Conclusions: Crisis, Euroscepticism and the Future 
of European Integration
Usually, political dissatisfaction with government policies and performance is not 
expected to undermine support for a political system as a whole. But in 1975, David 
Easton wrote that ‘there may be instances … in which the sudden frustration of 
expectations can so jolt the deeper loyalties of the members of a system that their 
diffuse support falls into a precipitous decline’ (p.445). It appears this happened 
during the Eurozone crisis. European integration, previously of low salience to vot-
ers, began to impact on citizens’ lives in highly visible and unpopular ways. The 
management of the crisis generated resentment in both the core and the periphery of 
the single currency area. It did not simply leave citizens dissatisfied with the poli-
cies implemented, but also resulted in a sharp and steep drop in affective support for 
the European Union itself. In a climate of widespread criticism of the EU, the way 
was opened for the rise of the political opposition in the form of Eurosceptic parties. 
As we have seen, in Southern Europe, this led to the formation of Eurosceptic gov-
ernments but did not, during the duration of the crisis, produce major Eurosceptic 
policy outcomes.
In the case of the Eurozone crisis, once the immediate cause of discontent—the 
economic pressures—began to ameliorate, Eurosceptic sentiment among the public 
also began to dissipate. Thus, on this occasion, the loss of legitimacy proved poten-
tially reversible when the problem which had caused it ceased to be so acute. No 
doubt it was important that this reversal happened fairly fast before Eurosceptic 
sentiment became more deeply entrenched. The scale and rapidity of the decline in 
popular support for the EU after 2008 should serve, however, as an important warn-
ing. The experience of the Eurozone crisis suggests that future EU policy failures 
could have the potential to undermine the viability of the system as a whole.
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Chapter 17
A “Pink Tide” Then a “Turn to the Right”: 
Populisms and Extremism in Latin 
America in the Twenty-First Century
Carolina Salgado and Paula Sandrin
Abstract This chapter gives a brief historical account of previous and current 
waves of populism in Latin America and their intermeshing with systemic factors, 
and discusses the historical relationship between populism, democracy and neolib-
eralism, giving particular focus to Bolivia, Chile and Brazil.
 Introduction
A quick glance at Latin America’s current political landscape could give us the 
impression that the “pink tide” of left-wing governments of the early twenty-first 
century, which brought to power Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in 
Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua and Luís Inácio Lula 
da Silva in Brazil, has reached its limits, and the region is now experiencing a “turn 
to the right” evidenced by the election of Chile’s Sebastián Piñera in 2017, 
Colombia’s Iván Duque in 2018 and, most infamously, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, also 
in 2018. The ousting of Bolivia’s Evo Morales could be read as the clearest signal 
of the pink tide’s evanescence. Similar to the election of Donald Trump in the United 
States and the growth of the right-wing populism in Europe, Latin America would 
be experiencing a surge in support for right-wing populist parties and movements.
Notwithstanding such picture of the last round of Presidential elections, in this 
chapter, we argue that one cannot homogenize the turn to the right in Latin America. 
In order to develop the argument, theoretically and empirically, the chapter is 
divided in two parts: in the first part, we give a brief historical account of previous 
and current waves of populism in the region and their intermeshing with systemic 
factors, and discuss the historical relationship between populism, democracy and 
neoliberalism in the region, giving particular focus to the current political land-
scapes of Bolivia and Chile. In the second part, we explore the conditions of possi-
bility of the extreme right’s operationalization of political power in Latin America, 
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drawing on Brazil as a case study. Through the distinction between access and exer-
cise of power, we look at how the extreme right in Brazil managed to gather the 
necessary popular support to come to power, how it has been exercising power for 
the first year of Bolsonaro’s term and outline why his government cannot be 
described as another version of right-wing populism.
Before we proceed, it is important to clarify the concept of populism we are 
using, since i. the term can acquire quite different meanings depending on context, 
political orientation and theoretical affiliation, and ii. a clarification is important for 
differentiating populism from extremism. For example, in Europe, the word popu-
lism seems to bring to mind nativism and xenophobia, whereas in Latin America, 
the word is more usually associated with clientelism and economic mismanagement 
(Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017:2). Indeed, two key features of populist discourses, 
“regardless of [their] specific political orientation, [are] the central role of the refer-
ence to the signifier ‘the people’ and its opposition to the dominant ideology” 
(Stavrakakis 2014:505). The framing of the political debate is dichotomous. Thus, 
the two operational criteria or discursive conditions necessary to identify a party or 
a movement as populist are the prominence of (or the privileged position occupied 
by) the core signifier “the people”, around which other signifiers are articulated; and 
the division of the socio-political field between two opposing groups: the people 
and the elite (Stavrakakis 2017:4).
 Populism, Democracy and Neoliberalism in Latin America: 
A Brief History
When discussing Latin America’s history of populism, it is common to discern three 
waves of the phenomenon (Kaltwasser 2014a; Kaltwasser 2014b; Mudde & 
Kaltwasser 2017). The first, between the 1940s and 1960s, saw populist leaders tak-
ing office in Argentina (Juan Domingo Perón), Brazil (Getúlio Vargas) and Ecuador 
(Jose María Velasco Ibarra). In an era marked by migration to urban areas and 
industrialization, these leaders implemented social programs and corporatist proj-
ects designed to incorporate previously marginalized segments of the population 
into the citizenry. During this first wave, the state was expanded, the economy was 
partially nationalized and protectionist trade policies were implemented. In this 
context, “the people” was often depicted as a “virtuous and mestizo community 
composed essentially of peasants and workers, but not of inhabitants of indigenous 
and African descent” and “the elite” as “an oligarchy which, due to its alliance with 
foreign imperialist forces, was not qualified for promoting national sovereignty” 
(Kaltwasser 2014a:5). This first wave came to a halt with the military regimes of the 
1960s and 1970s.
The second wave of populism, characterized by the support for neoliberal ideol-
ogy and policies, began in the early 1990s and had as figureheads Carlos Menem in 
Argentina (1989–1999), Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil (1990–1992) and 
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Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1990–2000). In a context marked by, on the one hand, 
Latin America’s 1980s’ debt crisis and hyperinflation, and, on the other hand, the 
end of the Cold War, transition to democracy and the Washington Consensus (on the 
merits of privatization, deregulation, liberalization and fiscal discipline), these lead-
ers reproduced the consensual mantra of the time, that is, that liberal democracy and 
market economy were the only viable political and economic models. “The elite” 
was equated with defenders and supposed benefiters of state-led development, 
deemed responsible for catastrophic economic management, whereas “the people” 
were seen as “a passive mass of individuals whose ideas and interests could be 
inferred by employing opinion polls” (Kaltwasser 2014a:5).
These leaders presented themselves as political outsiders, forged alliances with 
business communities and had the support of foreign and domestic groups for the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms (Kaltwasser 2014b:159). At first, these lead-
ers were able to garner popular support by solving problem of hyperinflation, restor-
ing economic stability and effectively directing collective discontent with these 
countries’ dire economic situation against political and state actors seen as the 
“establishment” (Kaltwasser 2014b:148). In addition, these second-wave populist 
actors appealed to the poor in the informal sectors, by promising to incorporate 
them into the market economy and by employing targeted spending programs 
(Kaltwasser 2014a:5). These free market policies, however, led to unemployment 
and a growth in inequality, generating further discontent and paving the way for the 
third wave of populism in Latin America.
The pink-tide governments in Latin America in the early twenty-first century, 
particularly those of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, presented “the people” as “all 
those who are excluded and discriminated against (such as indigenous groups and 
impoverished sectors)” and “the elite” as “as the defenders of neoliberalism and the 
political actors who support a Western model of democracy that is not suitable for 
Latin America” (Kaltwasser 2014a:6). By “Western model of democracy”, these 
leaders meant deliberative and liberal conceptions of democracy, “in which citizens 
are treated as passive entities, mobilized periodically by elections, in which they do 
nothing more than select their representatives” (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017:17), 
while they favored majoritarian and participatory conceptions of democracy 
(Kaltwasser 2014a:7). In this sense, they presented their populist platforms as dem-
ocratic forces which, by mobilizing, giving voice, representing, incorporating and 
integrating excluded sections of society, increased democratic accountability and 
contributed to a more inclusive political system (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017:83).
These left-of-center governments, as well as governments of other political ori-
entations in Latin America during the first decade of this century, benefited greatly 
from the global natural resource boom caused by China’s economic growth. As 
global suppliers of agrarian and mineral commodities, Colombia, Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Mexico reaped material benefits from growing Chinese demand as oil 
exporters; Chile and Peru as copper exporters; and Brazil and Argentina as iron ore 
and soybeans exporters (Kaltwasser 2014b:160).
Although presenting themselves as critics of neoliberalism and imperialism, 
pink-tide leaders did not differ from their neoliberal counterparts in Peru and 
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Colombia when it came to mining, oil and industrial agriculture, a contradiction that 
led to former Ecuadorian Minister of Energy and Mines, Alberto Acosta, to claim 
that Correa’s government had “replaced Uncle Sam with Uncle Chen”, relying on 
China “to sustain social programs and political position at the expense of real devel-
opment” (Zaitchik 2019). In fact, the exploitation of natural resources led to dis-
putes between populist leaders and indigenous communities they claimed to 
represent and include, particularly in Ecuador and Bolivia.
In spite of the social and environmental effects of these development projects 
based on the export of raw materials and commodities, socio-economic indicators 
improved during the boom years as a result of redistribution policies: between 2002 
and 2012, some 70 million people were lifted out of poverty, according to the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Greater access to consumption and employment maintained support for these gov-
ernments while the bonanza lasted. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 began to 
have impact on Latin America a few years later, through the collapse of natural 
resources’ prices. Growth slowed and many of those who had been lifted out of 
poverty saw the erosion of their gains.
This frustration and discontent eroded the support for pink-tide governments 
and, from 2015 onward, conservative politicians espousing a neoliberal ideology 
acceded to power once again in many Latin America countries: Mauricio Macri in 
Argentina in 2015, Michel Temer in Brazil in 2016, Sebastián Piñera in Chile in 
2017 and Ivan Duque in Colombia in 2018. The election of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil 
in 2018 and the ousting of President Morales in Bolivia in 2019 would signal the 
move toward the far right of the political spectrum, bringing a combination of neo-
liberal economic policies and more authoritarian and repressive forms of politi-
cal rule.
Our argument in this chapter is that, although we can discern a growing support 
for far-right, anti-democratic currents in Latin America, these currents seem stron-
ger only in a handful of countries (Brazil and Bolivia, in particular). In other places, 
the picture is more mixed, as the victory of leftist Andrés Manuel López Obrador in 
Mexico’s 2018 presidential elections, the electoral defeat of center-right Mauricio 
Macri in Argentina to Alberto Fernández, from the left-wing faction of the Justicialist 
Party in 2019, and protests against the center-right government of Sebastián Piñera 
in Chile in 2019 testify. In order to clarify this complex political landscape, we pro-
pose now to analyze, in the next section, the cases of Bolivia and Chile and, in the 
following one, the case of Brazil in more detail, for the latter seems to be the extrem-
ist outlier in the region.
 The Contradictory Cases of Mass Protests in Bolivia and Chile
The 2019 mass protests in Bolivia and Chile appeared to signal opposing tendencies 
in the region. In Bolivia, mass protests led to the downfall of one of the most promi-
nent opponents of neoliberalism in Latin America, whereas in Chile, the protests 
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indicated a general discontent with neoliberal policies implemented by center- 
rightist President Sebastián Piñera and some of his predecessors. Hence, govern-
ments from opposing ends of the political spectrum faced popular unrest.
Evo Morales’ 14-year presidency collapsed amid accusations of election fraud 
and the President’s disrespect for the 2016 constitutional referendum, in which the 
majority of the population voted for presidential term limits. Violent confrontations 
ensue between his supporters, who praised Morales for the reduction of poverty and 
inequality and the political and socio-economic inclusion of indigenous groups, and 
his opponents, who claim to be defending liberal democracy and fundamental free-
doms. Hence, in the Bolivian case, different conceptions of democracy were at 
loggerheads.
It is important to note that those opposed to Morales included right-wing conser-
vative politicians (such as interim President Jeanine Anez), part of the business 
community, urban unions, middle-class professional organizations, students and 
environmentalists (Iamamoto 2019). Therefore, even though his opposition indeed 
included right-wing groups, it also included sectors identified with the Left who 
distanced themselves from Morales due to his disrespect for the popular vote and 
his extractivist development model. In fact, some indigenous groups, whose socio- 
political marginalization and impoverishment were abated during Morales’s term, 
had been criticizing and opposing Morales’ extractivist policies and their socio- 
environmental impacts on their traditional modes of living since at least 2011. In 
that year, lowlands’ indigenous groups organized a series of demonstrations to 
oppose the construction of a highway passing through a national park and indige-
nous ancestral territory (Iamamoto 2019).
If Bolivia in the 2010s was a “poster child” of pink-tide opposition to neoliberal-
ism, Chile has long been considered a model of political stability and pro-market 
policies in Latin America, being lauded by conservative politicians such as 
Argentina’s Mauricio Macri and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro as an example to be fol-
lowed. The country has been praised for its “responsible” monetary and fiscal poli-
cies, the strength of its financial and banking sectors, its economic growth and 
high-performing stock market, as well as for being one of the world’s most open 
economies (Kowalczyk 2019).
Even Concertación and Nueva Mayoría, the center-left coalition that governed 
Chile for most of the post-dictatorship period (1990–2009; 2014–17), followed the 
general guidelines of the free market economic model, in spite of the implementa-
tion of gradual reforms aimed at alleviating the consequences of the economic 
model inherited from the Pinochet dictatorship (Meléndez & Kaltwasser 
2017:524–525). During the periods governed by the center-left coalition, house-
holds in extreme poverty declined from 10.6% to 3% and those in poverty from 22.7 
to 6.2. In addition, the coalition managed to slightly reduce the country’s inequality, 
which had risen sharply during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–1989) 
(Kowalczyk 2019).
Supporters of Chile’s neoliberal model often point out to the extraordinary period 
of economic growth experienced by the country—between 1990 and 2019, Chile 
suffered only 2 years of recession; the 21% growth in average real income between 
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2000 and 2018; and the “very respectable” 65% increase in the real minimum wage 
over the same period (Saldías 2019) as proof that neoliberal policies can also gener-
ate inclusiveness.
Although incomes have risen, one of the highest inequality coefficients in the 
world has made Chile one of the most expensive countries of Latin America. Higher 
costs of living coupled with low social spending and the privatization of water and 
social services (including education, health care, transportation and pensions) have 
led to long working hours, lack of affordable social services and security, low pen-
sions and growing household debts (Kowalczyk 2019). The downside of free- market 
policies has meant stress and desperation for most Chileans. While Chile’s protests 
erupted as an immediate response to a raise in the Santiago Metro’s subway fare and 
increased due to the government’s use of disproportional police violence, they also 
signaled widespread dissatisfaction with the high cost of living, growing indebted-
ness, privatization and inequality brought about the neoliberal economic model.
With these two contradictory cases of mass protests as reactions to neoliberal 
policies enforced by populist governments in mind, the next section analyzes the 
case that can be considered the region’s outlier. Because of its distance from the 
concept of populism we are employing in this chapter, and its subsequent closeness 
to right-wing extremism, we address the current political scenario of Brazil through 
a theoretical framework that distinguishes the access to from the exercise of politi-
cal power.
 Understanding Right-Wing Extremism Through the Access 
and Exercise of Political Power
This section brings about a twofold argument: Bolsonaro’s government constitutes 
a right-wing or conservative strand of extremism, produced by an alliance between 
upper classes’ neoliberal leanings, evangelical social conservatism and military 
authoritarianism (Goldstein 2019:258), which has an anti-democratic character, 
being more a child of right-wing dictatorships of the 1960–1980s than previous 
waves of populism in the region surveyed in the previous section. In this sense, we 
argue that Bolsonaro’s far-right government is an outlier in the region and is not 
representative of a broader right-wing populist current in Latin America. In this sec-
tion, we outline why this is so, exploring how the extreme right in Brazil operation-
alized such alliance in order to gather the necessary popular support to come to 
power and how it has been exercising power for the first year of term.
In Latin America, we have a shortage of studies within social and political sci-
ences about the strategies and mechanisms of the extreme right. According to sev-
eral analyses mainly concerning phenomena from the twentieth-century Europe like 
Fascism, Nazism, extremism, radicalism, totalitarianism and authoritarianism 
(Adorno 1951; Arendt 1951; Lipset & Raab 1978; Chomsky & Herman 1979; 
Bobbio 1996; Paxton 2004), the extreme right differs from the right-wing populism 
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in at least one crucial, structural dimension: the ultimate refusal of democracy. In 
his chapter about the distinction between extremists and moderates, Bobbio 
says that:
“it is hardly surprising that extremists of both the left and the right despise democracy for 
the virtues it fosters and requires for its survival. Their terminology agrees in defining 
‘mediocracy’, meaning government both by the middle classes and by mediocrities. 
Democratic mediocrity was a typically Fascist theme, but it can be found in revolutionary 
radicalism of any form” (1996:25).
In line with such reasoning, the German political scientist Uwe Backes affirms that:
“extremism thus aims at “monism” and “monocracy” in the sense of the enforcement of a 
bundled claim to power which – if at all possible – eliminates any competition, does not 
tolerate variety and opposition, seeks to render it harmless at the very least, stops political 
change, obstructs and suppresses the autonomous commitment of groups and individuals at 
least when this stands in the way of the ambitions of the rulers” (2004:249).
Significantly, these analyses present reasoning that account for the wave of right- 
wing dictatorships in Latin America between the 1960s and 1980s, and it is beyond 
the present scope to deepen the discussion of the left/right variants of extremism, 
conceived by Bobbio as antithetical terms. However, it seems useful for the present 
argument to inquire, at first: looking at the Brazilian 2018 presidential election, can 
we place Jair Bolsonaro at the extreme right of the political spectrum, and if so, on 
which bases? Secondly, looking at the first year of his mandate, can we say that 
Bolsonaro’s government is extremist, and if so, what does it imply?
These questions shed light on an important aspect already identified as such in 
recent literature on the impact of the right on Latin American democracy: “on the 
one hand, the stabilization of democratic access to political power, and on the other 
hand, the development of institutions that seek to democratize the exercise of politi-
cal power” (Luna & Kaltwasser 2014:16; Mazzuca 2010). The research agenda on 
the exercise of political power originates from the theoretical framework of 
Guillermo O’Donnell et al. (2004) entitled the quality of democracy, which expands 
Robert Dahl’s definition of polyarchy (1971) toward a distinction between demo-
cratic regime and democratic state, and has been proved useful to better access the 
democratization processes in Latin America from the 1980s.
Whereas the Brazilian 2018 presidential election has developed within demo-
cratic rules, it seems that current interpretations about the first year of Bolsonaro’s 
mandate that emphasize its anti-democratic character (Ballestrin 2019; Brum 2019; 
Chauí 2019; Goldstein 2019) are looking at the means to exercise political power. 
Then, to assume Brazil as an anti-democratic state is a natural development of a 
patrimonialist status of the current administration, embracing Mazzuca framework 
about the exercise of political power that says:
“The qualitative component of the administration is the specific mechanism or set of mech-
anisms by which state resources are transformed into goods and distributed. Within a given 
state, these mechanisms may vary across sections of the territory, social groups, and policy 
realms, but a key distinction is whether goods and services are provided according to uni-
versal/general standards, like merit and need, or particularistic decisions based on personal 
connections and the ruler’s discretion. Particularistic criteria are naturally associated with 
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the portion of state resources that is appropriated by the rulers. (...) Following Weber again, 
extreme forms of appropriation and particularism in the exercise of state power define the 
patrimonial type of administration, or patrimonialism” (2010:343).
In those interpretations, we find terms such as post-democracy (Crouch 2004), de- 
democratization and democracy without demos (Rancière 2010) to set some sort of 
connections between the global phenomena of the far-right’s rise in an attempt to 
derive a spatio-temporal understanding for the current political scenario of Brazil. 
They advance relevant features of the present generation of right-wing extremists, 
such as: to play on popular fear and ethnic tensions (Barber 2019); ideological 
polarization on topics like abortion, gender or immigration; cultural and artistic 
censorship; rejection to secular humanism or anti-intellectualism (Bobbio 1996:23); 
“monitory democracy” (Keane 2009; Stavrakakis 2016); “moralization of politics” 
(Rubim 2009); and anti-pluralism and tribalism (Galston 2018:106).
By contrast, we propose a reflection alternative to the debate around democracy 
and (anti)democratic means. Certainly, Brazilians have been experiencing a harsh 
cutback in the quality of democracy since January 2019 but, at the same time, we 
argue that so far it is not in the interest of upper economic classes to undertake 
regime change. Therefore, the proposal consists in switching the focus from politi-
cal to psychological conditions of access and exercise of power resorted by 
Bolsonaro and his class coalition. The essence of their acts and discourses mainly 
propagated through social media consists in manipulating fearfulness, risk and 
threats in a way that directly hits the psychological structure precisely of the poor 
people. We call the politics of social antagonism (Nunes 2019) the whole project 
that has been undertaken in Brazil at least since September 2018, which will be 
further explored in the case study.
 The Politics of Social Antagonism in Brazil
As analyzed in details in Chap. 12 in this volume by Guilherme and Ribeiro 
Hoffmann, Rousseff’s impeachment, in August 2016, delimited the turn to the right 
through Michel Temer’s neoliberal economic agenda and insensitivity to social 
issues. We see a clear distinction between Temer political personality and the over-
all agenda of his term, and Jair Bolsonaro exercise of political power. Therefore, 
accounting for what we call the politics of social antagonism, we look at the bases 
for Bolsonaro election and the means for governing over 2019.
Right-wing extremism is ostensibly related to anti-democracy for those reasons 
that have to do with the history of Europe during the 1930s. However, another cru-
cial aspect to identify in right-wing extremism is the leadership rhetoric before com-
ing to power. By the beginning of the presidential campaign, Bolsonaro had around 
12% of voting intentions: how did he and his class coalition manage to get the 
necessary support of the mass to win the pool? It is important to bear in mind the 
evolving atmosphere of political, social and economic convulsion in Brazil since at 
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least June 2013. Then, although being a phenomenon without a consensual day 
zero, “bolsonarism” is one among manifold causes and circumstances for the elec-
toral victory. For this reason, we focus on the project of a given class coalition that 
is bigger than “bolsonarism” and Bolsonaro himself (Nunes 2019).
We argued that a radical triangle of fearfulness, risk and threats was manipulated 
through discourses of “lives are risky, caution is warranted”, “the world is a danger-
ous place, we have terrorist threats, criminal violence, illness, immigration”, and 
“the only source of reliable aid and support in difficult times is our own family. We 
must respect our elders´ religious and beliefs” (Barber 2019). Such existential inse-
curities that emerge in liberal democratic regimes, which “rest on a philosophy of 
individual freedom (…) can also induce people to seek psychic security through 
submission to external authority” (Galston 2018:108). Bolsonaro was named by a 
coalition consisted of landowners, military, Evangelicals and upper economic 
classes as the one with answers to wide existential insecurities—simple answers, 
like punishment, penalties, prison, gun bearing, reduction of criminal age, imposi-
tion of conservative values through censorship in culture and education and, above 
all, the suppression of minorities considered the opponents of the “traditional soci-
ety” within an era of deteriorating conditions of social reproduction.
These conditions are the outcome of a triple crisis that Western liberal democra-
cies are experiencing, gradually, since the 1980s, which are intrinsically connected 
with each other: financial, environmental and of representativeness. As explored in 
details in many chapters of this volume, the financial crisis of 2008 has highly con-
tributed for the far-right pattern of “repressive egalitarianism”, an expression coined 
by Theodor Adorno in 1951.1 In Latin America, a continent with sharp inequalities, 
the repressive egalitarianism translates into both a reactionary politics of recogni-
tion and a regressive politics of redistribution (Nunes 2019).
The first is implemented through the suppression of minority rights, which were 
acquired by means of inclusion and meritocracy policies, undermining precisely 
such progressive feature of neoliberalism (Nunes 2019). The second is confirmed 
by the fact that Bolsonaro and his Minister of Economy, Paulo Guedes, have never 
proposed a structural change. Rather, they aim to preserve and expand the free mar-
ket economy on the basis of attracting foreign capital in strategic sectors, deregulat-
ing labor relations, privatizing strategic and non-strategic state-owned companies, 
and putting regulatory agencies at the service of the free market.
Overall, in 2019, Brazilians saw several demonstrations of extremism in politics, 
economy, culture and public security “on behalf of the real yearnings of the conser-
vative people in Brazil and other countries of Latin America” to recover the “tradi-
tional order”, which is based on “the principles of God, homeland, family, property, 
individual freedom, and the right to self-defense”, according to Carta de Foz, the 
final document launched in the occasion of the first Conservative Summit in the 
1 The logic of repressive egalitarianism, according to him, is when fascists “emphasize their being 
different from the outsider but play down such differences within their own group and tend to level 
out distinctive qualities among themselves with the exception of the hierarchical one” (Adorno 
1991:146).
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Americas, an event designed by the Bolsonaro family and their political party 
(PFL), held in Foz do Iguaçu on eighth December 2018.
The conservative yearnings, then, have materialized, for instance, through the 
censorship (resource cuts via public notices and show cancellations) of national 
agencies like ANCINE and FUNARTE to movies and performances with gender 
and LGBT themes,2 the extinction of the Ministry of Culture,3 prohibitions in the 
Book Biennial,4 the attack to the feminist philosopher Judith Butler in São Paulo,5 
the proliferation of attacks on African-based religions,6 and the deep funding cut of 
the public universities.7 In parallel, the sustained version of neoliberalism is, accord-
ing to Marilena Chauí, the new totalitarianism, in which “the society becomes the 
mirror for the State, defining all social and political spheres not only as organiza-
tions, but taking the market as a central reference, as a specific type of organization: 
the company” (2019).8
The conditions of possibility for the operationalization of political power by the 
extreme right in Latin America, such as those entrusted by Bolsonaro, can be clearly 
seen in Latinobarometer 2018, closing the crisis circle with the aspect of 
representativeness:
2 h t tps : / /www.nexo jo rna l . com.br /expresso /2019 /10 /05 /A-sombra -da -censura - 
nas-a%C3%A7%C3%B5es-do-governo-na-%C3%A1rea-cultural.
3 https://blogs.oglobo.globo.com/afonso-borges/post/e-assim-em-janeiro-de-2019- 
foi-extinto-o-ministerio-da-cultura.html.
4 https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2019/09/08/autores-e-editores-fazem-manifesto-
contra-censura-na-bienal-do-livro-do-rio.ghtml; https://www.nexojornal.com.br/
expresso/2019/09/06/O-que-h%C3%A1-de-ilegal-na-censura-de-Crivella-na-Bienal-do-Rio.
5 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ilustrissima/2017/11/1936103-judith-butler-escreve-sobre-o-
fantasma-do-genero-e-o-ataque-sofrido-no-brasil.shtml; https://epoca.globo.com/cultura/noti-
cia/2017/11/filosofa-judith-butler-e-agredida-em-congonhas-antes-de-deixar-sao-paulo.html.
6 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ilustrissima/2019/09/relatos-apontam-proliferacao-de-ataques-
as-religioes-afro-brasileiras.shtml; https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/
denuncias-de-ataques-religioes-de-matriz-africana-sobem-47-no-pais-23400711.
7 https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/politica/2019/05/01/interna_politica,752508/
corte-geral-de-30-nos-orcamentos-das-universidades-federais.shtml.
8 It is worth mentioning that the market is also the engine of Bolsonaro’s policies that affect the 
environment. Notwithstanding we affirm that left and right do not differ much in relation to the 
exploitation of natural resources (see page 4), in 2019, Brazilians witnessed an exacerbation of 
skepticism about climate change. While the “Green Economy” is growing worldwide, the 
Bolsonaro government was responsible for several square kilometers of fire in the Amazon. 
Discussions and accusations took place between scientists and the Minister of the Environment, 
Ricardo Salles, culminating in the exoneration of the former director of the National Institute for 
Space Research (Inpe), Ricardo Galvão. For more information, see: https://g1.globo.com/natureza/
noticia/2019/08/11/nos-usamos-publicacao-cientifica-nao-balela-diz-ex-diretor-do-inpe-a-minis-
tro-do-meio-ambiente.ghtml.
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Among these eight institutions and the 18 countries surveyed, Brazilian respon-
dents ranked the country in fifth place in trust in the Church9 and third in trust in the 
Army. By contrast, they ranked Brazil in 16th position in confidence in Congress 
and the last position (along with El Salvador) in confidence in political parties. 
Marta Lagos, the Director of Latinobarometer in Chile, analyzed: “The fragmenta-
tion of the party system speaks of a high rate of leadership expiration and the emer-
gence of new figures that increasingly represent small groups of citizens. (…) The 
second dimension is the elites. Corruption has deeply penetrated presidents, parlia-
ments, members of the executive branch in many countries, undermining the image 
of democracy, confusing the population. A corrupt regime cannot be a democracy” 
(2018:5–6).
9 There is a huge debate in Brazil with regard to the turning to politics of certain religious groups, 
as well as their power of influence and electoral decision. Notably, the Evangelical Neopentecostals, 
represented by the Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus and Assembleia de Deus, drove the growth 
of around 10% in the number of elected parliamentarians in 2018. For more information, see: 
http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2018-10/em-crescimento-bancada-evangelica-
tera-91-parlamentares-no-congresso; https://www.nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2019/07/13/O- 
fortalecimento-evang%C3%A9lico-no-Brasil-e-na-Am%C3%A9rica-Latina.
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 Conclusion
In this chapter, we advanced the argument that the turn to the right in Latin America 
mirrors, in some respects, global trends, although it is far from uniform, being stron-
ger in some countries more than others. In a region known for a rich tradition of 
populist governments and movements, of both left and right variants, we argue that 
it is important to take into account systemic factors which have impacted on the 
region as a whole (such as Global Financial Crisis of 2008, commodities’ prices 
boom and bust) and their differential political effects, while not losing sight of local 
specificities.
In our view, the three case studies, Bolivia, Chile and Brazil, allow us to see 
clearly the multiplicity of political struggles taking place in the region, since they 
concern the deposition of a left-wing populist leader (Bolivia), protests against a 
right-wing conservative government (Chile) and the election of a right-wing extrem-
ist (Brazil), all taking place within a year. We addressed a particular understanding 
that populists, left-wing or right-wing, in Europe or Latin America, mobilize the 
term “the people” in a variety of ways, delimiting the boundaries of who the people 
are, who is in and who is out (Fitzi et al. 2019). Populists say they represent “the 
people” (in Latin America, “el pueblo”/“o povo”) against others, be they corrupt 
elites, transnational corporations, international finance institutions, globalists, left-
ists, migrants, refugees and so on.
Nonetheless, the question of why the poor vote for the right is not new, albeit still 
complex, for academic researchers within social and political sciences (Frank 2007; 
Huber & Stanig 2009; Suryanarayan 2019; Galston 2018). The majority of studies 
highlight strategies of conservative political parties, as well as non-electoral means 
of the right to broaden its influence and increase its scope of political action 
(Domínguez 1997; Middlebrook 2000; Payne 2000; Eaton 2011; Luna & Kaltwasser 
2014). A mix of neoliberal ideology of individualism, competitiveness and personal 
responsibility, and evangelical social conservatism at the structural level have been 
generating support among the middle and lower classes in those three countries for 
less state intervention in the economy, more violent and punitive measures to main-
tain law and order, and freedom of speech to manifest racist, homophobic and sexist 
positions.
Against this background, we raised the questions of what identifies right-wing 
extremism as such, and how a move toward the far right could have taken place in 
Brazil. We drew on a theoretical framework that distinguishes the access to from the 
exercise of political power, and we claimed that more attention should be given to 
psychological rather than just to political conditions for the establishment of a far- 
right government. Applying the theoretical framework, we called the politics of 
social antagonism the project that encompasses a class coalition strategy to come to 
power, and the following measures to implement its economic, political, cultural 
and security agendas.
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Chapter 18
The Crisis of Latin American Regionalism 
and Way Ahead
José Briceño-Ruiz and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann
Abstract This chapter analyses the crisis of Latin America regionalism focusing 
on the changes and continuities of regional organizations such as UNASUR, 
Mercosur, ALBA and Pacific Alliance and discusses future scenarios.
 Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to understand how the global crisis that started 
in 2008 in the USA and national crisis in countries such as Brazil and Venezuela 
have affected Latin American regionalism. The chapter also explores how Latin 
American regionalism could be reconfigured under the new conditions. The prevail-
ing narrative about the impact of the crisis in Latin American regionalism is nega-
tive given the expected impact of the current trends on asymmetries among and 
within countries. The previous period of post-liberal and post-hegemonic regional-
ism, despite its fragilities, was one of diminishing poverty and inequalities, and 
increasing inclusion and participation of traditionally excluded sectors of the soci-
ety in the political processes. The current turn to neoliberalism together with rise of 
democratic instability and extreme-right movements have not only uncovered the 
fragilities of the achievements of the last decade, but also put into question the strat-
egies pursued by the previous governments, creating a paralysis, a vacuum of 
forward- looking alternatives.
In this chapter, we firstly assess the development of the Southern Common 
Market (Mercosur), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), The 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of the Americas (ALBA) and the Pacific 
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Alliance during the last decade and how they have reacted and adapted differently 
to global and local level pressures. However, these organizations are also deeply 
intertwined, as they exist in a complex network of overlapping memberships and 
mandates, and therefore, we analyse these interconnections and common trends for 
Latin American regionalism as a whole in the last section of the chapter. We also 
reflect on the alternative future scenarios.
 Mercosur: From Open Regionalism to Post-Liberal 
Regionalism and Back?
From the regional organizations analysed in this chapter, Mercosur is the only one 
that was created in the early 1990s, during the so-called second wave of regional-
ism. Its main objective, as stated in the constitutive Treaty of Asuncion, was to cre-
ate a common market in order to accelerate economic development with social 
justice and achieve a better insertion in the global economy. Mercosur was con-
ceived as part of a strategy of incorporation into the processes of globalization in 
line with the concept of open regionalism, as an intermediary stage for the expan-
sion of domestic markets and internationalization of local firms, as well as a plat-
form to negotiate the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (Bianculli 2016). 
Other, implicit, objectives were to lock-in democracy and de-securitize relations 
after the end of the Cold War (Oelsner 2014).
For about a decade, Mercosur was considered successful in fulfilling these aims, 
until an economic crisis which led to the devaluation of Brazilian currency in 1999, 
and a generalized crisis in Argentina in 2001. Despite a brief period of ‘soul search-
ing’ (Bouzas 2002) thereafter, Mercosur’s project was renovated; its free-trade-ori-
ented agenda was transformed, and a model of social development was implemented, 
in line with the centre-left leaning governments at the time. Over almost 30 years of 
existence, Mercosur promoted norms and regulations in several issue areas, with 
different record of success in terms of achieving agreements on common positions 
and implementation. Mercosur was considerably successful in promoting free 
mobility of goods and persons, health and education regulations, and human rights, 
for instance, but less successful in promoting the free mobility of services and capi-
tal, and the protection of democracy. It has not played an important role in security 
and defence, but, overall, Mercosur remained until recently a tacit agreement among 
its member-states governments and societies (Ribeiro Hoffmann 2020).
The declaration from Paulo Guedes, Minister of Economics of President 
Bolsonaro in Brazil criticizing Mercosur, has raised the suspicion about the fate of 
this organization.1 The leadership, or at least strong support, of Brazil to Mercosur 
1 https://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/2018/10/30/declaracoes-de-paulo-guedes-sobre-merco-
sul-surpreendem-membros-do-bloco.ghtml; https://g1.globo.com/economia/blog/joao-borges/
post/2018/11/02/paulo-guedes-pretende-fortalecer-politica-de-comercio-exterior.ghtml.
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is a key condition for its relevance as a regional organization in Latin America, even 
if Brazil cannot be defined as a regional hegemon in traditional terms, its size mat-
ters (Soares and Hirst 2006; Merke 2015). While other organizations in the region 
such as UNASUR include ‘secondary powers’ or ‘middle powers’ in addition to 
Argentina, such as Chile, Peru and Colombia (Ruvalcaba et al. 2016) that combined 
have leadership capacity to advance a common project, this is not the case of 
Mercosur. One way to analyse the impact of the crisis on Mercosur is, therefore, 
through the changes in Brazilian interests and foreign policy towards this 
organization.
Despite the traditional strength of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Itamaraty), and its historical preference for continuity, Brazilian foreign policy has 
become more susceptible to changing governments during the last decade, with an 
increased role of presidents in the agenda setting, a phenomenon referred to as 
‘presidential diplomacy’ (Burges and Chagas 2017, Malamud 2014). Brazil’s activ-
ism in South America is strongly associated with the government of President Lula 
and his Foreign Ministry Celso Amorin, who advanced South–South relations at 
global level, and in South America, by strengthening of Mercosur and creating 
UNASUR, as will be discussed below. This activism declined under the government 
of President Dilma Rousseff and even further after her impeachment in 2016, as 
Mello (2018) summarizes:
(…) since Rousseff’s first administration (2011–2015), one could notice a continuous 
decline in Brazil’s international image and projection, which had received a significant 
impulse during Lula da Silva’s two mandates as president (2003–2010). Despite the fact 
that his successor preserved Lula’s conceptual guidelines, foreign policy implementation 
progressively lost momentum and proactivity in the international front as well as centrality 
within the domestic political agenda. (…) The prolonged political crisis that led to the 
impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in August of 2016, putting her vice-president 
Michel Temer at the head of the Executive, brought important repercussions for the conduc-
tion of Brazilian foreign policy. While still being sworn in as the interim minister of Foreign 
Relations, José Serra – a prominent politician connected to the opposition and former can-
didate in the presidential elections of 2002 and 2010 – pronounced a speech that seemed to 
indicate a profound reorientation in the strategies and priorities of Brazil’s diplomacy 
(Mello 2018, p.1–2).
The new foreign policy orientation under President Temer included the alleged 
 ‘des- ideologization’ of foreign policy (meaning the alignment of Party the Labour 
governments with other centre-left governments in the region); the promotion of 
free trade and the opening of markets for Brazilian exports; a strategic partnership 
with Argentina and efforts to revitalize and ‘correct’ Mercosur. Trade liberalization 
was a goal which meant a renewed relationship with traditional partners such as the 
USA and Europe; a focus on ‘new partners’ in Asia, particularly China and India; 
and a new approach to ‘Modern Africa’ focusing on commercial, investment and 
technology partnerships, correcting previous ‘South-South strategy’ (Mello 2018).
This new orientation, even if not abandoning Argentina, signalized a bilateraliza-
tion of relations. The suspension of Venezuela from Mercosur and isolation of the 
country in other organizations, as discussed below for the case of UNASUR, 
reverted the previous approach of inducement change via engagement. Under 
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Bolsonaro’s government, these trends were radicalized. His Minister of External 
Relations, Ernesto Araújo, equated ‘globalism’ and the ‘global order’ with social-
ism in his inauguration speech and criticized newspapers such as the Foreign Affairs 
and the New York Times as vehicles of this (undesired) global order. He also stated 
that despite being against ‘globalism’, Brazil is a universalist country that wants to 
build something ‘good and productive’ with each partner; among the partners he 
included Israel, USA, Latin-American countries ‘which liberated themselves from 
the Foro de Sao Paulo’, ‘those who fight against tyranny in Venezuela’, the ‘new 
Italy’, Hungary and Poland. As for the UN system, he proposes a reorientation to 
strengthen sovereignty instead of NGOs interests, and to revitalize trade negotia-
tions.2 Mercosur’s future will depend on the reaction of its other member-states to 
this new situation, and the disposition to cooperate with a government which has a 
conservative socio-cultural platform, a discourse against human rights and the fight 
against climate change. The return of Kirchnerism to power in Argentina through 
Alberto Fernández in 2019 makes this scenario even more complicated due the deep 
ideological differences with Bolsonaro.
 UNASUR: A Process in Deep Crisis
Despite the reiterated description in the media of UNASUR as a ‘Chavist’ or 
‘Bolivarian’ initiative, the origins of UNASUR can in fact be traced back to the 
Brazilian project of creating a South American Free Trade Area that would be the 
result of the convergence between Mercosur and the Andean Community. This proj-
ect was fostered by Minister Celso Amorim, during the government of President 
Itamar Franco, in 1994, in line with the ‘4 + 1’ strategy advanced to negotiate the 
FTAA, that is, to engage with external markets from group positions and avoiding 
bilateral negotiations with the USA.  Following President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso convened, in 2000, a Summit of South American Head of States and 
Governments in Brasilia, in which he proposed the creation of a South American 
Community of Nations (SACN). This latter would be a minimalist project that 
aimed to promote a convergence between the Andean Community and Mercosur. 
The SACN also promoted cooperation in infrastructure, with the creation of the 
Initiative for the Integration of the Infrastructure of South America  (known in 
Spanish as IIRSA), established South America as a zone of peace and combat coop-
eration to terrorism. This regional initiative was established in Cuzco, Peru, in 
December 2004 (Briceño-Ruiz, 2010).
However, with the election of left-wing governments in Argentina and Brazil, 
and the activism of Venezuelan foreign policy under Hugo Chávez, the scenario 
changed. Chávez rejected SACN for two reasons: firstly, he considered that a new 
South America bloc could not be the result of the convergence of the Andean 
2 h t tp : / /www.i tamaraty.gov.br /p t -BR/discursos-ar t igos-e-entrevis tas-categor ia /
ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-discursos/19907-discurso-do-ministro-ernesto-araujo-durante-
cerimonia-de-posse-no-ministerio-das-relacoes-exteriores-brasilia-2-de-janeiro-de-2019
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Community and Mercosur because of their underlying neoliberal principles. 
Secondly, he considered South America as a single nation, and not a ‘community of 
nations’. This idea was accepted in a Summit of South American leaders held in 
Margarita Island, Venezuela, in 2007, and the denomination SACN was replaced for 
UNASUR, formally created in May 2008 (Briceño-Ruiz, 2010).
Despite the initial Brazilian influence, Venezuela and its ALBA allies (Bolivia 
and Ecuador), and to a lesser extent Argentina, played the main role in the transfor-
mation of the SACN into UNASUR. Other countries such as Peru and Chile were 
also important players. As Comini and Frenkel (2017, p. 189) argued, UNASUR 
was the minimum common denominator of two models: one giving priority to the 
international markets and the promotion of relations with the rest of the world, 
called by them ‘polygamic’; and another privileging regional markets and further 
relations firstly with the neighbours and, after consolidating those relations, with the 
rest of the world, referred to as ‘concentric circles’. Therefore, from a modest and 
minimalist project that aimed to achieve a limited number of goals, integration in 
South America became a maximalist scheme with multiple political, economic and 
social objectives. New institutions were created in order to exchange information 
and best practices and foster common approaches in a number of issue areas such as 
the 13 sectorial ‘Councils’, the most active being the South American Council of 
Defence and the South American Council for Health.
UNASUR was considerably successful in its early years. Firstly, it contributed to 
the resolution the domestic crises in Bolivia and Ecuador, and the conflict between 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela in 2011. The South American Council of Defence 
(SACD) was perceived as an original regional space able to counterbalance the US 
influence in military affairs, including ambitious goals such as the creation of a 
South America School of Defence (Frenkel, 2016). After the demise of Inter- 
American Treaty of Defence (TIAR) in 1982, in the context of the Malvinas war, the 
Organization of Americas States (OAS) had lost its influence in the discussion of 
security and military affairs in the region. At least partially, the SADC was designed 
to fill the vacuum produced by the Malvinas War. UNASUR also advanced initia-
tives in the area of development and finance: the idea of creating a Bank of the 
South was part of a debate about a ‘new financial architecture’ for South America, 
able to mitigate the influence of International Monetary Fund in the region. IIRSA 
was perceived as a necessary instrument to improve the South American infrastruc-
ture and facilitate closer relations among the countries of the whole region (Palestini 
and Agostinis 2015). Cooperation in health became one of the most innovative in 
UNASUR (Ribeiro Hoffmann & Tabak 2016; Yeates & Riggirozzi 2017; Herrero & 
Loza 2018).
While UNASUR allowed a dialogue between governments with different ideolo-
gies and views on economic and social issues (Mace, 2018), government changes in 
countries such as Argentina and Brazil after 2015, and the domestic crisis in 
Venezuela evidenced the weakness and shortcomings of the organization. The crisis 
in Paraguay launched by the ‘fast track’ impeachment of President Fernando Lugo 
was the first main failure of UNASUR in its role as mediator. Contrary to the crisis 
in Bolivia and Ecuador, the constitutional order was not restored in Paraguay; 
President Rodriguez replaced Lugo, and even if Paraguay was suspended of 
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UNASUR, Asunción did not accept the regional intervention in the crisis. UNASUR 
also did not address the controversial impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff.
The case of Venezuela was even worst; this crisis was not only unsolved by 
UNASUR but triggered this bloc’s decay. After the death of Chavez and contested 
elections in 2013, Venezuela entered in a spiral of conflict and violence. 
Manifestations in the streets demanded the end of Maduro’s government in 2014. 
Led by the opposition leaders Leopoldo López, María Corina Machado and Antonio 
Ledezma, part of the Venezuelan opposition promoted La Salida (the exit) which 
meant the immediate resignation of the Maduro regime. The governmental response 
was military repression and the detention of Lopez accused of promoting violence 
and the death of 43 people. President Maduro initially accepted mediation by 
UNASUR, while rejecting the OAS, seen as dominated by US interests. Secretary 
General Ernesto Samper actively participated in the mediation efforts, but the politi-
cal dialogue failed as Maduro’s administration did not accept almost any of the 
opposition demands. In particular, the demand for a release of all political prisoners 
was rejected, and Lopez and Ledezma were both condemned to jail. Another attempt 
to mediate political dialogue in Dominican Republic in December 2017 was also 
unsuccessful. The failed UNASUR mediation transformed its image because the 
perception that it served the interest of the Venezuelan government increased.
Closa and Palestini (2015) argued that UNASUR was created to protect incum-
bent governments such as Morales, Correa and Lugo, and that the mechanism was 
never applied to a legitimate elected government that had decided to violate the 
democratic rules and practices, as was the case of Venezuela, or, one could add, 
Brazil under Bolsonaro. Riggirozzi and Grugel also noted that ‘the fact that South 
American countries use UNASUR to defend democracy is not evidence…that 
UNASUR is part of a project of deep democratization or citizenship governance. 
UNASUR is willing to act to stop elected governments being overthrown, but it is 
not pushing for mechanisms to ensure citizen voice or representation’ (Riggirozzi & 
Grugel 2015, p. 796). The modification of the institution of electoral observation at 
UNASUR and the creation of the concept of ‘electoral following’ (acompañamiento 
electoral), in which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would observe the 
elections without elaborating reports about the quality of elections, were also sig-
nals of weakening democracy in the region (McConnel et al. 2015).
The political changes which took place after 2015 with the election of right-wing 
governments further weakened UNASUR. A key factor that deepened the crisis was 
the inability of member-states to appoint a new Secretary General in 2017. President 
Macri, who was holding the Pro tempore Presidency, proposed José Bordón, a 
known Argentinean diplomat, but he was rejected by Venezuela. As consensus is 
required to make decisions at UNASUR, the appointment of a new Secretary 
General was suspended, leading to further paralysis. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Chile, Paraguay and Peru suspended their participation in the meetings of UNASUR 
institutions in April 2018. Afterwards, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru withdrew from the organization. More recently, Chile and Colombia proposed 
the creation of a new organization to replace UNASUR, the Forum for the Progress 
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of South America (PROSUR in Spanish), but it is too soon to include this organiza-
tion in the analysis.
 ALBA: When Domestic, Regional and Global Factors Matter
Closely related to Chávez and Venezuela, but also influenced by Cuba, ALBA was 
presented as an ‘alternative model’ of regional integration with some characteristics 
which differentiated it from other regional organizations: first, no geographical con-
tiguity among its members; second, absence of free trade as a goal, instead, a narra-
tive allegedly based on solidarity and ‘concertation’; third, open intention of being 
a ‘non-capitalist’ model of regional integration; and four, emphasis on the role of 
society (the people) in the integration process.
Initially ALBA was a Venezuelan unilateral initiative, announced by Chávez in 
the Summit of Association of Caribbean States held in Margarita Island, in December 
2001, aiming at presenting an alternative to the US proposal of the FTAA, more 
radical than the ‘4 + 1’ strategy advanced by Brazil via Mercosur earlier. ALCA was 
the Spanish acronym for FTAA, and Chávez smartly opposed ALCA to ALBA, 
namely, the US interests to the Latin American ones. Norman Girvan summarized 
ALBA’s goals:
Tariff protection for infant industries is allowed; public procurement as a tool of 
development is recognised; intellectual property rights are subordinated to the right 
to development and health; basic social services are, by implication, insulated from 
privatisation and commercialisation; special treatment for indigenous enterprises is 
assured there will be concessionary treatment of smaller and weaker economies; 
and the rights of labour and indigenous peoples are guaranteed (Girvan 2011, 
p. 164–165).
When Chávez met Fidel Castro in Havana, in December 2004, and ALBA 
became a bilateral initiative, opposition to ALCA was still the main (outward look-
ing) goal; it did not have the clear-cut objectives in terms of projects to be imple-
mented in the region beyond being linked by the Venezuelan government to the 
strategy of endogenous development furthered in those years by Chavez (Briceño- 
Ruiz 2011). The paradigmatic shift in ALBA took place after 2006, a year in which 
Chávez adopted the twenty-first century Socialism as the ideological fundament of 
the so-called Bolivarian Revolution. From that year onwards, the shape of ALBA as 
a project for the region gradually emerged.
In terms of member-states, ALBA was widened to include new countries led by 
left-wing governments such as Bolivia under Evo Morales, Nicaragua ruled by 
Daniel Ortega and Ecuador led by Rafael Correa. Later, eastern Caribbean Islands 
such as Dominica, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis 
and Saint Lucia became ALBA’s members. Even Honduras under the José Manuel 
Zelaya’s government participated in the initiative. Thus, ALBA became the unique 
regional group in the continent that included Caribbean, Central American and 
South American members with no contiguity, but ideological similarity. In 
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substantive terms, ALBA defined more clearly its activities. Initially, ALBA was 
centred on the Venezuelan–Cuban axis, and the initial strategy was to replicate at 
Latin American level what they were doing bilaterally. Thus, social programmes in 
the sectors of education and health, the ‘Misiones’, were incorporated into ALBA in 
order to be implemented in other Latin American and Caribbean countries. In 2006, 
Venezuela launched Petrocaribe, and Bolivia promoted the idea of the Peoples 
Trade Treaty (Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos—TCP in Spanish) as an alterna-
tive to the free-trade agreements fostered in the framework of the open regionalism. 
In 2008, Ecuador proposed the Unitary System for the Regional compensation of 
Payments (known in Spanish as Sucre), and the proposal of creating Grand national 
projects and enterprises was announced. At the institutional level, despite being an 
intergovernmental organization, ALBA included a Social Movement Council, an 
innovation compared to other regional institutions where the social participation 
was included only as mechanisms of consultation (Muhr 2012).
These initiatives were initially successfully implemented led by Venezuela as a 
paymaster, favoured by the high prices of commodities, particularly, oil. Some 
Grand nationals were announced such as in the sector of medicaments. ALBA also 
played a political role, particularly in the crisis in Honduras in 2010 (De La Torre 
2017) and, to a lesser extent, in Paraguay in 2013 after the coup d’état against 
Zelaya and Lugo. It also developed joint positions at global level, for example, in 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) con-
ference in Copenhagen in 2009 (Watts and Depledge 2018). ALBA became to be 
seen as an ‘alternative model’ of regional integration, as their political leaders 
argued; the literature refer to it as a model of counterhegemonic governance (Muhr 
2012); a new strategic regionalism (Aponte García 2014), an alternative to general 
law of capitalist accumulation (Seabra and Gimenez 2014) or a manifestation of 
decolonial delinking (Al-Kassimi 2018). Under the leadership of Chávez, ALBA, 
even with internal contradictions and excessive rhetoric, became a player in the 
regional affairs.
Notwithstanding these initial successes, ALBA showed clear shortcomings. 
Firstly, the borders of ALBA were never clear; some initiatives that the Venezuelan 
government considered part of ALBA were something different from ALBA for 
other countries, the best example being Petrocaribe. Secondly, ALBA was always 
quite dependent of the Venezuelan financing. Thirdly, many projects were not 
implemented and others just partially, such as the ‘Peoples Trade Treaties’ or the 
Sucre (see Chap. 7). Only few Grand national projects announced from 2008 to 
2016 were implemented such as ALBA-Cultura, ALBA Pesca and ALBATEL 
(Benzi 2017, p. 84). Strategic projects such as ALBA- Alimentos (ALBA food) and 
ALBAMED (ALBA medicaments) did not advance. Fourthly, the impact on civil 
society, in particular the role of the Social Movements Council, one of the innova-
tions of ALBA, was limited.
Peter Birle (2018, p. 166) argued that although the participation of civil society 
actors was rhetorically emphasized repeatedly, there was no real communication or 
decision channels available to achieve that goal. Moreover, ALBA did not attract 
other countries in the region such as Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, El Salvador or 
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Paraguay, when ruled by left-wing governments. Finally, as ALBA discarded free 
trade, the economic interdependence among the countries was weak, a factor 
pointed out in the literature as key or at least important to sustain processes of 
regional integration. Interdependence can also be achieved by promoting invest-
ments of the integration of production, for example through regional chain values, 
but these were not goals fostered. An Agreement of Economic Cooperation signed 
in 2013 by Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela in the framework of 
the Latin American Integration Association would be the basis to constitute the 
Economic Zone with Mercosur, but the lack of complementarity among the member 
of ALBA and Petrocaribe made a convergence difficult (Giacalone 2017, pp. 56–57). 
When right-wing governments took power in Argentina and Brazil in 2015 and 
2016, the issue was excluded from the agenda of Mercosur.
To sum up, ALBA is a process in crisis as most of its goals have not been 
achieved, and as it suffered from the weakening of Venezuela, its paymaster. The 
global crisis that started in 2008 initially did not affect the agenda of ALBA because 
oil prices remained relatively high, and the demand for oil by China and India con-
tinued stable for some years; only in 2013, when the Chinese economic growth 
slowed down and when fracking became an important source of oil production that 
situation changed. The severe decline in oil prices to less than US$ 30 in 2014 had 
an impact on the Venezuelan economy, with important implications on the develop-
ment of the Bolivarian revolution, but also on the Venezuelan regional integration 
policy and ALBA. Mostly important, the death of Chavez in 2013 and the domestic 
political crisis and lack of regional leadership which have only increased since then 
have practically sealed ALBA’s fate; its survival is closely related to the survival of 
President Maduro in Venezuela.
 Pacific Alliance: The Way Ahead?
The Pacific Alliance was advanced by the Peruvian President Alan Garcia and 
included Chile, Colombia and Mexico. It can be seen as a follow-up from the Pacific 
Rim Arc initiative from 2007 that included countries from South and Central 
America and aimed at fostering a common economic approach towards Asia, and 
engaging with the megaregional negotiations, but was undermined by different 
approaches among free trade and left-leaning governments at the time. The election 
of centre-right governments provided a new opportunity to the advance of free trade 
at the regional level. The Pacific Alliance was announced in the Lima Declaration, 
signed in 2011, and this was followed by the Framework Agreement of the Pacific 
Alliance signed in 2012 and by the Additional Protocol of the Framework Agreement 
of the Pacific Alliance, subscribed in 2014. Durán and Cracau (2016) argued that the 
entry into force of the Additional Protocol marked an important step towards the 
regional integration effort, immediately eliminating tariffs for nearly 95% of intra-
regional imports and fostering economic integration through accumulation of origin 
and trade facilitation, and the formation of regional value chains.
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Legler et al. (2018) discuss the ‘actorness’ of the Pacific Alliance and argue that 
the lack of formal institutions and international legal personality is compensated by 
the existence of a ‘web of agency’ constituted by a number of actors engaged in the 
process of regional integration, which have provided security regarding its continu-
ity and consolidation. They also argue that the ideologically based identity of the 
Alliance, confirmed by the commitment with neoliberalism, representative democ-
racy, human rights and rule of law, compensates for the lack of geographic continu-
ity, appointed in the literature as a hindrance for regional integration. In fact, the 
Pacific Alliance has a clear focus on the free trade agenda, in line with open region-
alism, differently from Mercosur, UNASUR and ALBA at the time of its creation.
Scholars disagree as to what extent the creation of the Pacific Alliance contrib-
utes to the consolidation, or the fragmentation of Latin American regionalism 
(Heine 2016, Bernal-Meza 2015, Briceño-Ruiz and Morales 2017, Aranda and 
Salinas 2015). For those governments favouring free trade, the convergence between 
the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur is seen as an alternative to reunite countries, as 
supported by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(CEPAL), and discussed further below. But the fact that the Pacific Alliance does 
not include security in its agenda does not mean that its member-states are not 
involved in (geo)political considerations in the region; they did take parallel stances 
in the situation in Venezuela, for instance, what could represent a challenge in case 
of further escalation of the crisis. The rise to power of Andres Obrador in Mexico in 
2018 has also raised the question of the stability of the neoliberal consensus among 
Pacific Alliance member-states (Legler et al. 2018).
 Concluding Remarks: Rising From the Ashes? South 
American Regionalism After the Crisis
This chapter shows that Latin American regionalism is experiencing a period of 
crisis and redefinition. The crisis is related to a large extent to the effects of global 
financial crisis, and the end of the commodities’ boom in key countries such as 
Venezuela and Brazil, which have acted as leaders of regionalism. ALBA and 
UNASUR are in deep crisis. After being presented as a ‘new model of integration’ 
based on solidarity and cooperation, ALBA suffers from the increasing deteriora-
tion of the Venezuelan economy, and the negative image of President Maduro’s 
government. Even if the treaty of UNASUR is still in force, it is paralysed after most 
of its member-states suspended their participation or denounced its treaty. The cre-
ation PROSUR is an attempt to replace UNASUR with a less political and more free 
trade agenda. Mercosur is in a process of redefinition, the convergence with Pacific 
Alliance is in discussion, but the anti-globalist approach of Bolsonaro’s government 
foreign policy and its prioritization of the USA and sole partner rise doubts about 
the Brazilian commitment to Mercosur. The Pacific Alliance did not evolve much 
beyond a network hub for pro-free trader stakeholders.
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Despite the uncertainties, possible scenarios are beginning to take shape. One 
way ahead would be the revival of UNASUR but, at least in the short term, this does 
not seem likely; the crisis in Venezuela has profoundly damaged its role in the 
region, and Brazil under President Bolsonaro’s foreign policy of alignment with the 
USA and distance from South–South cooperation will not exert leadership. The 
protection of democracy has been key to UNASUR, but the recent crises, including 
Venezuela and Brazil, indicate that mechanisms developed are not robust enough to 
hold governments accountable. The worldwide crisis of democracy has further 
weakened the idea of democratic interference as countries become more zealous of 
sovereignty, and nationalist and extreme-right populism is on the rise. Sectorial 
cooperation in key areas such as security and defence, and health, key to UNASUR, 
were dismantled.
An alternative scenario would be a minimalist project based on the convergence 
in trade and the creation of regional value chains between a rolled-back Mercosur 
and the Pacific Alliance, but there are limitations regarding the complementarity of 
its member-states and the political disposition of Mexico under President López 
Obrador. PROSUR could evolve from this principle, but it is too early to assess this 
initiative.
We argue that the revitalization of Latin American regionalism could find a sup-
portive pillar in the advancement of free trade, an agenda which could counterbal-
ance protectionist trends, including the policies promoted by President Trump. 
However, the return of free trade should not be made at expenses of weakening the 
social and productive dimensions of regionalism. Both Mercosur and UNASUR 
have developed important social dimensions aiming at reducing asymmetries within 
and among their member-states in the last decades. Similarly, the integration of the 
production is still a goal to be achieved as Latin American countries must diversify 
their economies and become less dependent on the export of commodities in order 
to achieve sustainable development. To sum up, despite the uncertainties about the 
future institutional framework, a multidimensional integration that includes trade, 
the productive sector and infrastructure, as well as political and social areas is the 
way to deepen Latin American regionalism.
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Abstract This chapter summarizes the findings of the theoretical and analytical 
chapters, and comparatively assesses the causes of the crises, the crisis management 
strategies, and their impact in a selection of case studies from the national 
level – Greece, Portugal and Italy in Europe; and Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and 
Venezuela in Latin America; and the regional level  – the European Union, and 
regional organizations and regional governance structures in Latin America such as 
CELAC, Unasur, Mercosur and Alba.
 Introduction
This edited volume analyzes the crises in Europe and Latin America, starting from 
the debt crisis in the 1980s in Latin America and its lost decade, covering the 2008 
global financial crisis impact on the European Union (EU), and the resulting lost 
decade for Europe, and the current crisis in Latin America, which started by 2012. 
At the theoretical and analytical level, it aimed to understand the causes of these 
crises, to what extent we can find common systemic causes, and to what extent each 
region faced (additional) particular processes derived from their local 
socio-economic specificities and the way they managed the crises both at the 
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regional and domestic/country levels. Another objective was to address the impact 
and consequences of the crises, both in their economic and political aspects. In par-
ticular, we aimed to understand the relation between the financial crisis and the 
democratic backlash with the rise of populism and extreme-right movements and 
parties in Europe and Latin America.
This chapter summarizes the findings of the theoretical and analytical chapters, 
and comparatively assesses the causes of the crises, the crisis management strate-
gies and their impact in a selection of case studies from the national level (Greece, 
Portugal and Italy in Europe; and Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela in Latin 
America) and the regional level: the European Union, and regional organizations 
and regional governance structures in Latin America such as CELAC, Unasur, 
Mercosur and Alba.
The following chapters draw on these findings and advance policy recommenda-
tions about possible ways out of the crises, focusing on measures at the regional 
level, and political cooperation between the EU and Latin America at the interre-
gional level, especially the EU–CELAC dialogue.
 Financial Crises in Global Historical Context: Exploring 
the Common Systemic Causes of the Current Situation
The authors of this edited volume have come to share the understanding that the 
financial crises in Europe and Latin America have common systemic causes, even if 
each region and each country had additional particular local economic and political 
dynamics. Schulmeister (Chap. 2) and Ghymers (Chap. 3) analyze the systemic 
causes of the crises in detail. Schulmeister contextualizes historically the current 
global financial governance structures and traces the origins of the asymmetries and 
imbalances to the end of the Bretton Woods system and the processes of deregula-
tion in the 1970s/1980s. He argues that this unregulated system has caused a 
sequence of “bull and bear” markets which led to the global financial crisis of the 
1970s, 1980s, the end of 1990s, early 2000s and, in a more radical way, 2008. He 
also shows that the successions of bull and bear markets shape commodity price 
dynamics, especially over the past 15  years, when financial investors became 
increasingly active in commodities’ derivatives trading, and that this has created 
high levels of volatility. By differentiating between “real capitalism” and “finance 
capitalism”, and between the US and European models of capitalism, Schulmeister 
traces the conditions under which financial crises burst and diffuse around the globe.
Ghymers also argues that the current global macroeconomic crisis, the weaken-
ing of democracy and, in addition, climate change are all expressions of the incoher-
ence of the present global economic system, which operates on the basis of biased 
relative prices, relative returns for financial activities which are too high with respect 
to productive activities, prices for safe assets in the US dollar which are too high, 
and costs for carbon emissions which are too low. In particular, the use of one 
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national currency (US dollar) as the main vehicle of international payments (Triffin 
dilemma) created distortions in the capital flows, with the US economy absorbing 
the net world savings in a way which impedes the huge resource transfers necessary 
for financing the energy transition in emerging and developing countries committed 
in the Paris Agreement.
Guilherme (Chap. 4) and Lins (Chap. 11) discuss further the differences in the 
position of Europe and Latin America in the global finance system, the interconnec-
tions between both regions and the similarities of the patterns of the 2008 crisis with 
those of the 1980s and 1990s. Lins highlights that the 1980s’ Latin American for-
eign debt crisis reflected the priority of military dictatorships to maintain high levels 
of growth despite rising inflation in several countries of the region. High liquidity in 
international financial markets in the wake of the oil crisis (“petro dollars”) granted 
these countries access to credit at initially low—though floating—interest rates, 
allowing them to postpone necessary reforms and preserve growth. As Schulmeister 
argues, the effect of the depreciation of the dollar with the oil crisis also raised the 
attractiveness of debts denominated in dollar. The enlargement of the EC/EU to the 
Southern countries, Greece, Spain and Portugal, and their rapid membership to the 
Economic and Monetary Union had been a political decision to stabilize their econ-
omies and democracies after coming out of dictatorships. Their economic develop-
ment, however, was not sufficient to form an Optimum Currency Union, and as a 
consequence, they became a source of internal imbalances within the European 
Monetary Union (EMU).  Being part of EMU and sharing the Euro directed the 
inflow of liquidity to Europe’s periphery and created major (housing) bubbles. 
Greece, in particularly, was demonstrating growth rates twice the EU average, and 
for this reason, the EU showed more leniency with its current account deficits and 
public debts. This boom was (mistakenly) perceived as a sound process of conver-
gence and took from them the pressure to undertake necessary reforms to increase 
competitiveness and real convergence.
The trigger for the eurocrisis was the announcement of the actual dimension of 
the public deficit by the Greek Prime Minister Giorgos Papandreou in late 2009. 
The bursting of housing bubbles, in particular in Spain, the disparity of interest rates 
and the escape of financial funds to the safe havens such as Germany and the USA, 
together with the lack of solidarity of the other EMU member-states, deepened the 
eurocrisis. At the same time, financial funds flew to emerging economies including 
in Latin America, which supported, together with the countercyclical policies, a 
jump in their growth rates. The global financial crisis of 2008 supported the rise of 
the emerging countries with the creation of the BRICS and the G20, which demanded 
for reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions to represent them more proportionally. 
The influence of the European Union at the international level diminished corre-
spondingly. The EU was busy with its own problems, and in particularly, EMU 
showed neither unity nor solidarity and struggled with several simultaneous crises 
at the same time (eurocrisis, foreign political crisis with the Ukraine and the refugee 
crisis).
Additionally, the fact that the EMU followed the same path and recipes of the 
Washington Consensus and integrated the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
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within its TROIKA, benefiting from its ample experience in crisis management 
(much of it with little success and high social costs in Latin America), led to the loss 
of attraction of the EU as a model of regional integration and its social model. 
Indeed, the EMU crisis countries found themselves in a similar situation as Latin 
America, without any control over the currency in which their debt had been denom-
inated and suddenly affected by the increase of interest rates which made their debts 
unsustainable. Additionally, the fiscal framework and its reinforcement and the 
adjustment programs proved to be largely pro-cyclical, suppressing investment and 
growth and constraining the functioning of the automatic stabilizers leading to a 
deepening and prolongation of the crisis with dramatic social and employment con-
sequences in some of the crisis countries. The Eurogroup invited the IMF for its 
experiences, however, not its experiences and usual praxis of debt restructuring, but 
mainly its focus on adjustment programs in line with policies of the Washington 
Consensus. Latin America, likewise, did not receive support on debt restructuring in 
the 1980s’ crisis. The European Social Model was not protected and did not make 
any difference to the design of the policies which had been implemented in the Latin 
America, partly under military regimes and partly under political forces supporting 
neoliberalism. Interestingly, as highlighted by former ECB President Draghi in his 
farewell speech, the USA did not apply the same kind of Washington Consensus 
austerity policies after the global financial crisis, but engaged into countercyclical 
fiscal policies which allowed a quicker recovery and return to price stability 
than Europe.
 Regional and Country-Based Causes and Management 
of the Crisis
A key difference between the reaction and management of the crisis in Europe and 
Latin America was the role that regional-level institutions played. Despite all the 
problems and lack of democratic accountability, which were discussed in several 
chapters, the European Union had the Eurogroup, an informal intergovernmental 
coordination body which was actually strengthened during the crisis, and estab-
lished new mechanisms such as the Banking Union, still ongoing, while most 
regional organizations in Latin America did not develop any relevant collective 
mechanism to deal with financial crisis.
Guilherme (Chap. 4), Katsikas (Chap. 5) and Schulmeister (Chap. 6) analyze 
several aspects of the EU reaction and attempt to manage the crisis. Schulmeister 
shows how instruments such as the financial transactions tax (FTT), which could 
have contributed to buffer the negative impact, ended up being rejected by the 
Commission, which was captured by the interests of big financial players and sur-
plus countries, mainly Germany and France. Katsikas argues that the European 
EMU was actually the biggest victim of the 2008 global financial crisis given its 
incomplete nature and lack of supranational mechanism, which led to the creation 
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of ad hoc intergovernmental political handling of the crisis with the creation of fur-
ther treaties (Fiscal Compact) and intergovernmental institutions (ESM) outside of 
the legal framework of the EU and as a consequence, not accountable to EU citi-
zens. The intergovernmental crisis management style favored the rise of the hege-
mons and the division of Europe in creditor and debtor countries, instead of a strong 
solidary reaction to the eurocrisis, which could have put the speculation on hold. 
The lack of solidarity and joint risk-sharing in an EMU, in which member-states 
have given up their tradition tools to smoothen asymmetric shocks, weakened 
Europe, the euro and EMU. Additionally, the publically exposed animosity stirred 
nationalism and populism which will make future solutions to jointly counteract 
any eurocrisis much more difficult. It legitimized attitudes of an extreme right-wing 
party which in the past would not have been considered politically acceptable. The 
rise of this party (the “Alternative für Detschland”, AfD) put a stress on the political 
predictability of German’s politics. The strategies adopted by the EU ended up leav-
ing the costs of the adjustment to the crisis-hit countries, which had to implement 
individual bailout programs. The strategy was not anti-cyclical and accentuated the 
crises especially in countries such as Greece and Italy. Germany prevented an early 
involvement of the IMF and with it the usual debt restructuring which would have 
affected their own banking sector but insisted in its involvement once the private 
(financial market) debts had already been rolled over to the public debts in Greece. 
Worst, Ghymers (Chap. 22) reminds that the eurosystem then was the only mone-
tary area of the world operating without a Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR), giving so 
to financial markets the power to precipitate non-necessary liquidity crisis in a one- 
bet speculation in case of doubts on sovereign debts.
Guilherme (Chap. 4) discusses in details what she calls the “double democratic 
deficit” of the EMU, and how it failed to protect the EU and its citizens from the 
financial crisis and to manage the crisis in a credible, equitable and democratic way. 
She argues that a key underlying cause of this failure is the monetarist and neolib-
eral/ordoliberal approach of the project agreed at Maastricht and vis-a-vis the alter-
native Werner Plan which had Keynesian and federal elements, such as pointed out 
by Schulmeister (Chap. 2) when he discusses the design of the global financial 
system. Guilherme argues that the Maastricht Treaty deliberately eliminated funda-
mental building stones from the Werner blueprint which would have made EMU 
more crisis resistant, resilient and allowed a more efficient, equitable and demo-
cratic crisis management. The omissions include regulation and supervision of 
financial markets, monitoring and counteracting of internal imbalances, including 
policies to support the competitiveness of the weaker economies and regions, stabi-
lization functions such as a euro area budget and a European Monetary Fund and 
political decision taking institutions which are fully democratically accountable and 
within the EU legal framework. She shows how the ordo/neoliberal and intergov-
ernmental design of the EMU led to choices made during the crisis by creditor 
countries, especially Germany, which favored the banks and not crisis-hit countries 
and EU citizens. Furthermore, the austerity bias of its approach—especially but not 
only in crisis-hit countries—had negative effects on overall EU growth and a defla-
tionary impact on the rest of the world. On the other hand, there were positive 
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collective responses at the EU level, such as via EFSI, better known as the Juncker 
Plan, aimed at stimulating investment in EU countries via an expansion of the role 
of the European Investment Bank (Griffith-Jones, Chap. 21).
Latin America did not have regional governance institutions to deal with macro-
economic and financial matters equivalent to the EU, despite the shortcomings of 
the latter. Lins and Ribeiro Hoffmann (Chap. 7) show that most Latin American 
countries dealt with the crisis individually; very few collective initiatives were 
attempted, such as via the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) and the Latin 
American Fund of Reserves (FLAR). Regional integration organizations such as 
Unasur, Mercosur or ALBA did not have mechanisms to deal with the crisis, and at 
the multilateral level, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) provided 
important support too.
 Impact and Consequences of the Crisis at the Domestic 
and Regional Levels: Challenges to Equity, Democracy 
and Regionalism
The impact and consequences of the crisis at the domestic level were analyzed in 
selected case studies in Europe (Greece, Portugal and Italy) and in Latin America 
(Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina and Mexico). Katzikas and Bazoti (Chap. 8) analyze 
the main traits of the Greek politico-economic system and argue that the EU policy 
program failed to take into account these characteristics and therefore accentuated 
the negative impact of the crisis on the Greek people. He argues that even if the fis-
cal balance had been restored, and some progress was done in public administration 
and regulations, structural problems remain unresolved, and the population still suf-
fers from the decline of GDP and increase of poverty levels. These have fed left- and 
right-wing populism and anti-EU feelings. Romano (Chap. 10) also explores the 
domestic structural problems of Italian economic and political system and shows 
how they have contributed to the lack of resilience when the crisis hit the country 
following the Greek crisis and the lack of appropriated response at the EU level to 
that crisis and the risk of contagion. He analyzes the economic and political legacy 
of the crisis and shows that not only were the social and economic structural prob-
lems, such as unemployment, low productivity and high public debt, not resolved, 
but they also paved the way for populism.
Sandrin (Chap. 14) and Poli (Chap. 15) focus on the political impact of the crisis 
in Europe and show how most countries saw a surge in polarization, populism and 
extreme-right movements and parties during this period. Sandrin argues that eco-
nomic crisis and the “left behind” are not enough to explain the current democratic 
crisis, and explores the role of identity and effects, and how they have been mobi-
lized by the extreme right against various “others”. Poli discusses the concept sovra-
nism to make sense of the right-wing populist parties in Europe. She differentiates 
this concept from nationalism or fascism given the lack of a deep ideological 
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backing and the vertical collusive relationship between “the people” and “the elite”, 
instead of focusing only on the external others and/or anti-pluralism. Therefore, 
sovranist parties such as Golden Dawn in Greece (even though it has remained com-
paratively small), Alternative for Germany, Brexit Party in the UK, Lega Nord in 
Italy and Vox in Spain do not develop coherent policies and are normally led by 
charismatic leaders. Portugal followed different trends as argued by Lehmann 
(Chap. 9); despite being hit hard by the crisis, populism did not thrive and had a 
relatively successful economic recovery due to particularities and the capacity of 
the country’s domestic society to avoid political rupture and a broad informal alli-
ance of the center-left and left, pursuing Keynesian policies.
Despite the differences in timing and the role of the regional level, the impact of 
the crisis in countries such as Brazil and Venezuela was as drastic as in Europe, 
especially when considering the political impact. Venezuela has a different trajec-
tory as the country was in crisis for some years before the financial crisis hit the 
region. As Briceno-Ruiz and Lehmann (Chap. 13) discuss, the problematic eco-
nomic policies of former President Chavez and his successor Maduro (after Chavez’s 
death in 2013) increased the vulnerability of the country to external shocks, espe-
cially given the overreliance on oil exports. Moreover, their anti-US and anti-West-
ern geopolitical foreign policy led to the rejection of traditional institutions such as 
the IMF support to handle the crisis. Instead, Venezuela increased cooperation with 
Russia and China, a country which owns most of its external debt. The socio-eco-
nomic situation in Venezuela is dramatic with levels of poverty and mass emigration 
unseen in the region, defined as a humanitarian crisis by the UN Refugee Agency. 
The political situation is even worse as political repression and lack of an effective 
opposition have progressively isolated the country.
Brazil has gone through radical changes since 2012–2013. Lins (Chap. 11) ana-
lyzes how the government deals with the financial crisis; she shows that by 2008 the 
Brazilian economy was undergoing a prosperous phase and adopted an expansion-
ary policy under the governments of the Workers´ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores—
PT), to stimulate domestic consumption and investment. When the crisis hit, it 
continued this approach, and the countercyclical policies were initially successful. 
By 2011, however, the policy adopted in the USA and Europe reduced capital flows 
to emerging economies, and in addition, demand for primary goods decreased, as 
the world economy slowed down. Brazil used taxes to control capital outflows, but 
by 2013, the political crisis evolved and mass protests hit the streets, and culminated 
with the impeachment of President Dilma in 2016, as analyzed in detail by 
Guilherme and Ribeiro Hoffmann (Chap. 12). Former Vice-President Temer 
assumed the presidency, enforced a neoliberal U-turn in economic policy, initiating 
the dismantlement of social policies created under the PT governments, which has 
led to a fast increase of unemployment and poverty. The following elections were 
marked by polarization and fake news, and led to the election of right-wing President 
Bolsonaro. The challenges to democracy of his government are explored by Salgado 
and Sandrin (Chap. 17). They contextualize the Brazilian crisis in the waves of 
populism in Latin America and argue that the frustration and discontent with the 
pink-tide governments such as Chavez/Maduro in Venezuela and Lula/Dilma in 
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Brazil led to increased opposition and popular manifestations and a turn to neolib-
eral and right-wing governments in most countries. As seen above, Venezuela and 
Brazil had particularities, Venezuela for the continuity of the radical left govern-
ment which became increasingly more repressive, and Brazil for the “impeach-
ment” of the more socio-democratic PT governments by initially a neoliberal 
coalition which paved the way for the election of the extreme-right President 
Bolsonaro, and what they call the “politics of social antagonism”. In both cases, 
Venezuela and Brazil exhibit a clear trend of militarization of politics, and the politi-
cal system is ongoing, with Brazilian government leading in the proportional num-
ber of military as Ministers.
The cases of Brazil and Venezuela are complemented by a discussion of Argentina 
and Mexico by Lins. She argues that such as in the crises of the 1980s and 1990s, 
the IMF was the main multilateral institution involved in the financial crisis man-
agement in Latin America, especially Argentina, but differently from the previous 
crisis, domestic political choices prevailed over international pressures on crisis 
management and policy making. Lins´ analyses contribute to the reflection about 
the different location of Europe and Latin America in the global financial system, 
and about the similarities of the Latin American crisis in the 1980s and 1990s and 
the Euro crisis and their interconnections.
Finally, Katsikas (Chap. 16) and Briceño-Ruiz and Ribeiro Hoffmann (Chap. 18) 
analyze the impact of the crisis and of the way how the regional governance institu-
tions reacted to the crisis on these institutions themselves. Verney and Katsikas 
(Chap. 16) show how the EU has been criticized for the lack of efficiency and demo-
cratic accountability, and how their role was questioned by political parties and the 
public in general. EU’s image, and trust in the EU, especially in crisis-hit periphery 
countries decreased dramatically by 2012, and even though they recovered since 
then, they have remained at lower levels than before the crisis. They raise the risk 
that future policy failures might undermine the viability of the system as a whole, 
therefore calling the EU to positive action. And, as pointed out by Sandrin and Poli, 
the damage to democracy at the national level is not yet reversed.
Briceño-Ruiz and Ribeiro Hoffmann (Chap. 18) discuss the crisis of regionalism 
and the disintegration of the region, with the abandonment or formal renunciation 
of the founding treaties of organizations such as Unasur by several countries, and 
CELAC by Brazil. Countries which have played leadership role fostering regional-
ism such as Brazil and Venezuela became inward looking since then and adopted 
more nationalist foreign policies.
 Final Remarks
The chapters of this edited volume show that despite the common systemic causes, 
the timing and nature of the crises in Europe and Latin America following the 2008 
financial crash in the USA were and are very different. The Euro crisis hit Europe in 
2010, and the existence of the European Union and the Euro made regional level 
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actors, especially the Eurogroup, the key actors in managing the crisis, despite the 
legitimacy problems.
Latin America faced severe debt crisis already in the 1980s, following a continu-
ous number of crises prior and since. However, by 2010 most countries were enjoy-
ing stability and growth led by among others, external investments and Chinese 
demand for primary goods; the impact of the crisis began to be felt by 2012–2013. 
These developments coincided with the decline of commodity and in particularly oil 
prices, and the price pressure from fracking, which had major consequences for the 
oil-exporting countries. The economic slowdown and rise of inequalities led to dis-
content, which were expressed in mass protests and the rise of new social movements.
Local specificities at the regional and country level explain the differences of the 
impact of the financial crisis in Europe and Latin America, including their place in 
the global financial system, and local social, cultural and political characteristics. 
Despite these differences, the consequences for European and Latin American soci-
eties were equally dramatic, challenging social cohesion and democracy, and con-
tributing to political polarization and the election of populist and extreme-right 
parties in several countries.
The USA and the UK were not analyzed in this volume, but the election of 
Donald Trump and of Boris Johnson, implying not just Brexit but likely a hard 
Brexit, have also to be assessed in light of the management of the 2008 crisis and 
strengthens the argument of the Jean Monnet Network Crisis-Equity-Democracy 
for Europe and Latin America that these phenomena are interrelated and have rein-
forced each other given their common systemic sources, and transnational and inter-
regional relations.
Recent events, especially in Chile with its so-called “social explosion” but also 
in other Latin American and even European countries, show that even in economi-
cally successful and politically stable countries, challenges such as a slowdown of 
growth and an increasingly unequal distribution of income as well as of wealth can 
produce major tensions in societies. They might lead to significant violence, which 
can potentially undermine future economic development and contribute to political 
polarization and instability. Only with more progressive policies, such as those 
which mitigate inequality—via increased social spending in key sectors such as 
health and education, as well as increased pensions and salaries for the poorer seg-
ments of society, funded by increased taxation on the wealthy, as well as policies 
that will encourage more dynamic, sustainable and inclusive growth—can such 
“social explosions” be followed by positive economic and political developments 
that improve both social coherence as well as democratic legitimacy.
Disclaimer The opinions expressed in this introduction/volume are the sole responsibility of the 
authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament or of any 
other EU institution.
19 Comparing the Crises in Europe and Latin America: Causes, Management, Impact…
306
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, shar-
ing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons 
license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
A. Ribeiro Hoffmann and B. De Souza Guilherme
Part VI
Reform Proposals
309© The Author(s) 2021
B. De Souza Guilherme et al. (eds.), Financial Crisis Management and 
Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54895-7_20
Chapter 20
Financial Instability, Climate Change 
and the “Digital Colonization” of Europe: 
Some Unconventional Proposals
Stephan Schulmeister
Abstract This chapter addresses the three main challenges by sketching three 
types of policy proposals. First, measures for repression of “finance alchemy” as 
precondition for a sustained recovery of the real economy and for a “renaissance” 
of the European Social Model; second, measures for fighting climate change and for 
promoting (“green”) economic growth over a transition period; and third, measures 
for overcoming the “digital colonization” of Europe by US providers of operation 
systems, standard software and online platforms.
 Key Challenges for Overcoming the Present Crisis
The transition from finance capitalism to real capitalism—the trough phase in the 
long cycle triggered by financial crises as in 1873, 1929 or 2008—usually takes 
many years since governance according to the old “navigation map” makes things 
only worse, but a new map has not yet been developed. Such a transition phase calls 
for fundamental changes in the direction of the course even without guidance by a 
new theory (like Roosevelt’s New Deal).1 The new direction of economic and social 
policy can be derived from a comparison of the framework conditions shaping the 
post-war prosperity phase on the one hand and the subsequent crisis phase on the 
other hand.
1 It is no coincidence that the new EU Commission calls its ecological growth strategy “European 
Green Deal”. Climate change is only the most evident example of the basic problem of systemic 
crises, typical for the trough phase of the long cycle: the paths followed so far led into a dead end 
(on the long cycle as sequence of real-capitalist and finance-capitalist regimes, see Schulmeister, 
Chap. 2 of this book).
S. Schulmeister (*) 
University or Vienna, Wien, Austria
e-mail: stephan.schulmeister@wifo-pens.at
310
Until the 1970s, strict regulation of financial markets focused on striving for 
profits on activities in the real economy, production and income expanded over 
20 years without major recessions. Social coherence was strengthened, in particular 
through building up the welfare state. At the same time, public debt declined relative 
to GDP. The guidelines of economic policy were derived from a simplified version 
of the theory of Keynes. Over the past decades, by contrast, neoliberal guidelines 
have been shaping the course of economic policy: financial markets were deregu-
lated, the welfare state was weakened and climate change vastly ignored. The wide 
fluctuations of exchange rates, commodities prices, stock prices and interest rates 
had two types of effects. First, the emergence of “shocks” like the two “oil price 
shocks” of the 1970s (triggered by two preceding dollar depreciations), the 1982 
debt crisis of Latin America or the great financial crisis of 2008. Second, the “struc-
tural” shifting of striving for profits from activities in the real economy to financial 
investment/speculation. Both effects caused unemployment, atypical employment 
and the public debt to rise. As a consequence, labour protection as well as the wel-
fare state in general was weakened. Widening inequality and the growing number of 
people feeling “left behind” promoted the rise of nationalist-populist movements 
and politicians.
The dominance of neoliberal thinking in economics, in the media and in politics 
had not only specifically weakened the European Social Model but has also become 
the most important ideological reason for the failure to fight climate change—in 
spite of the growing evidence that global warming was caused by men. Even though 
standard economic theory acknowledges externalities as “market failures” (and cli-
mate change is the most threatening example), policy has remained unwilling to 
take serious collective actions. Those actions ran counter to the “Zeitgeist” which 
was (and still is) biased in favour of “market solutions”.
The third “mega-trend” of last decades besides growing financial instability and 
continuing climate change has become digitalization in all its forms, from computer 
hardware and software, the internet, social media and the platform economy. In all 
these fields, innovative US corporations acquired global (quasi-)monopoly posi-
tions: Microsoft in operating systems and standard software, Apple in hardware and 
operating systems, Google in both fields as well as in search engines and online 
advertising, Facebook, Twitter and Instagram in social media, amazon in online 
commerce, Airbnb in arranging lodging and Uber in ride-hailing. The main reason 
for this success lies in the combination of “first-mover advantages”, continuing glo-
balization and—most important—“network externalities”. The latter arise from the 
fact that all these activities are based on networks (including using the same stan-
dard software). For network economies, standard rules of market competition do not 
hold as the network gets the more attractive to “newcomers” the greater it has 
become (“the winner takes it all”). In this way, US corporations became “digital 
colonial masters” of the rest of the world (except—in part—for China), and the lat-
ter has to pay “tributes” in the form of money and data and remains technologically 
dependent. As market forces rather deepen than mitigate this relationship, overcom-
ing the “digital colonization” of Europe constitutes a crucial challenge for European 
Union (EU) policy in the years to come.
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This chapter addresses the three main challenges by sketching three types of 
policy proposals. First, measures for repression of “finance alchemy” as precondi-
tion for a sustained recovery of the real economy and for a “renaissance” of the 
European Social Model; second, measures for fighting climate change and for pro-
moting (“green”) economic growth over a transition period; and third, measures for 
overcoming the “digital colonization” of Europe by US providers of operation sys-
tems, standard software and online platforms. Even though the chapter deals only 
with these three challenges, one should be aware that a long-term economic, social 
and ecological renovation programme for Europe should also include the following 
components: first, the modernization and enlargement of the welfare state as prob-
ably the most important fundament of a new/renewed “European identity”; second, 
the implementation of infrastructure projects as part of development cooperation, in 
particular in Africa, but also in Latin America; and third, the development of new 
labour time models as prerequisite for combining low economic growth (once 
climate- neutrality and “true” full employment are achieved) with continuous imple-
mentation of technical progress (raising labour productivity) and sustained full 
employment. The following proposals are designed for the EU, but they could also 
be implemented in other countries and regions albeit with some modifications.
 Promotion of Activities in the Real Economy Through 
Restricting “Finance Alchemy”
Fostering entrepreneurial activities in the real economy is the most important pre-
condition for prosperity. It can only be achieved if “finance alchemy” is repressed 
and if exchange rates, commodities prices, interest rates and stock prices are stabi-
lized. The reason is simple: Capital is a greedy, yet flexible, “animal”, and it invests 
where profits are highest. If short-term speculation is unprofitable, then long-term 
investment in the real economy predominates—as over the 1950s and 1960s in 
industrial countries or since the reforms in China in the early 1980s.
 Foundation of the European Monetary Fund
In a monetary union, interest rates on government bonds have to be stabilized at a 
common and sustainable level—otherwise speculators can play euro countries off 
against each other (as in the euro crisis). Hence, the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) should be transformed into the European Monetary Fund (EMF) as the com-
mon financing agency of all euro states. The EMF is financed by selling Eurobonds 
in capital markets as well as by deposits, which are open to any investor (not only 
banks) as a longer-term financial investment. Unlike Eurobonds, the EMF deposits 
would not be tradable and can therefore not be used to speculate on changes in inter-
est rates (they are similar to the former German “Schatzbriefe”, which allowed pri-
vate individuals to finance the state directly). As EMF liabilities are guaranteed by 
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the ECB, they are even safer than German government bonds (a central bank cannot 
go bankrupt).
The (long-term) EMF interest rate is set at a level below the level of medium- 
term economic growth (in nominal terms). In addition, the EMF stabilizes the inter-
est rate at the target level by intervening in the secondary market. Under these 
conditions, speculation on the bankruptcy of an EMU member state becomes use-
less. At the same time, guarantees for the liabilities of the EMF by euro member 
states are superfluous. Loans are granted to euro states under certain conditions 
(“conditionality” as with the IMF). They need not be restrictive and are differenti-
ated according to project and country. The loans should in particular support eco-
nomically weaker countries and focus generally on projects in the environmental 
and social sectors. In this way, one could also enforce fiscal discipline of euro coun-
tries: If the latter fail to meet the EMF conditions, they are no longer eligible for 
EMF loans and have to finance themselves through national government bonds.
 Transition from Continuous Trading to Electronic Auctions
The overwhelming majority of financial transactions are triggered by computer- 
based speculation systems. They exploit the phenomenon of “runs” (i.e., “mini- 
trends”) of exchange rates, stock and bond prices and commodity prices, and 
reinforce them at the same time (e.g., through the “clustered” trading signals of 
trend-following systems). The sequence of “runs” accumulates into bull or bear 
markets lasting several years (see Chap. 2). The most efficient means of breaking 
the feedback between technical speculation and the trending of the key prices in the 
global economy would consist in moving from continuous trading in microseconds 
to electronic auctions, for example, every 3 hours. The auctions shall be conducted 
on electronic trading platforms in the same manner as the opening price is deter-
mined already today: The computer calculates the equilibrium price based on all 
buy and sell orders, valid for the following 3 hours (to stick to the example).
Auction trading would radically reduce the “finance alchemy”, stabilize prices 
and thus make activities in the real economy more attractive. For everybody who 
buys or sells stocks, bonds, foreign exchange or commodities futures for investing, 
trading or hedging purposes, it is sufficient when he/she can do so every 3 hours. At 
the same time, the technical trading systems cut off their “food”, that is, high- 
frequency data. As a consequence, trends would occur less frequently and would be 
less pronounced so that speculation on the direction of imminent price movements 
on the basis of algorithm becomes less unprofitable. At the same time, focusing on 
market fundamentals would pay off more than is the case nowadays: In order to give 
buy/sell orders, traders are forced to form expectations about the level of the funda-
mental value of an asset. This is not the case in continuous trading: High-frequency 
trading is done automatically by computers and a technical trader will often buy 
(sell) an asset which he considers over(under)valued just because a short-term trend 
has taken off and his trading system produces buy (sell) signals.
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Auction trading in asset markets would fundamentally change trading practices: 
“Automated trading systems” (including high-frequency trading) would no longer 
work as they are deprived of “fast” price data. For the same reason, traders no longer 
need to watch so many monitors. Instead, reflecting about the fundamental value of 
the respective asset and its determinants would become more profitable. Finally, one 
should keep in mind that electronic auction as means of approximating the equilib-
rium price is perfectly in line with mainstream economic theory. In fact, the founder 
of general equilibrium theory, Leon Walras, considered this method as the optimum 
possible.
 General Financial Transactions Tax
Even though moving to electronic auctions would be most efficient in curbing short- 
term speculation, it is very improbable that such a move would take place in all 
countries with important financial markets. This will limit the stabilizing effect, for 
example, if only the “Post-Brexit-EU” makes this step. It would nevertheless be 
useful, if “finance alchemy” emigrates from this area. In order to prevent banks and 
corporations resident in the EU to engage in (very) short-term speculation else-
where (e.g., in London), one should introduce a financial transactions tax based on 
the “residence principle” as proposed by the European Commission (see Chap. 6).
 Towards a Supranational Monetary System
The double role of the dollar as the national currency of the US and as a (substitute) 
world currency is a major cause of fluctuations in dollar-denominated commodity 
prices (including “oil price shocks”), of the financial crises of dollar-indebted 
emerging market economies and of the excessive external debt of the US (see Chaps. 
2 and 3). At the same time, the dollar is the most unstable of all major currencies 
because it is the “vehicle currency” in foreign exchange markets. Since the creation 
of the euro, there are only four major currencies in the global economy, the dollar, 
the euro, the renminbi and the yen. By setting target rates with small fluctuation 
margins (about 2%), the exchange rates between these currencies could be stabi-
lized. Such an agreement would also be important as a prevention against “devalu-
ation races”, as this danger could sharply increase in the next financial crisis. At the 
same time, this agreement would be a first step towards the long-term goal of a 
genuine global currency (“globo”), which would act as a unit of payment and 
account for global economic “flows” (commodity trading) and “stocks” (transna-
tional financial assets and liabilities) and consist of a bundle of the most important 
national currencies.
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 Improving the Environment as (Transitory) “Growth Engine”
Many (very) great investment programmes (in the spirit of the New Deal) would 
improve the environment over the long run, in particular by reducing CO2 emis-
sions, and would strengthen economic growth during the implementation phase at 
the same time (“green growth”). Examples of such projects are the thermic isolation 
of the whole stock of buildings in the EU, the construction of a (super-)high-speed 
railways net across Europe as alternative to air travel, and the transition from fossil 
energy to emission-free cars in individual mobility and to hydrogen technologies in 
industrial production. However, the potential of a (temporary) “green growth” can 
only be efficiently utilized if the price of CO2 emissions and, hence, the price of 
crude oil, coal and natural gas as the most important polluters, rises steadily and 
faster than the general price level—simply because the profits from investments in 
energy efficiency consist of the saved energy costs (“opportunity profits”).
 Fixing the Long-Term Price Path of Crude Oil, Coal 
and Natural Gas in the EU
Recently, the renowned Harvard professor Jeffrey Frankel (2020) summed up the 
problem of how to motivate everybody to avoiding greenhouse gas emissions: “(….) 
the policy that will move us closest to achieving global environmental targets (….) 
is to raise the price of emitting carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. (….) it 
would be great if policymakers could commit to a century-long rising path for the 
carbon price. People could then plan far ahead. Firms would know with certainty the 
penalty for building long-lasting coal-fired power plants. (….) What is critical, 
though, is quickly to establish the expectation that the price of carbon will follow a 
generally rising path in the future”. The crucial point is fixing the expectations of all 
actors that the price of CO2-emission will never again become cheaper, but will 
permanently rise somewhat faster than the general price level. As long as there is 
uncertainty about the future price development of oil, coal and natural gas, even 
temporarily high prices will not sufficiently motivate households and companies to 
invest in emission-free technologies.
A concrete example: between 2004 and 2008 and between 2009 and 2012, the 
price of crude oil rose dramatically and with it the price of fuels, heating oil and 
natural gas (Fig. 20.2 shows the price of Brent crude oil and diesel in Germany in 
€—the latter rose to more than 1.50€). However, the oil bull market was followed 
by a bear market, and the diesel price fell again to only about 1€ in 2009 as well as 
in 2016. As a consequence, the demand for SUVs picked up again and investments 
in CO2 reductions, which were profitable at an oil price of 70€ (and more), turned 
into “sunk investments”. The following fact massively exacerbates the problem: 
Investments in energy efficiency or in renewable energy only pay for themselves 
after many years (energetic renovation of buildings, spread of e-cars including sup-
ply networks, etc.) or even decades (development of hydrogen technology in 
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industry and—possibly—also in (heavy) traffic, trans-European network of high- 
speed trains as a prerequisite for a radical restriction of air traffic, etc.). An ecologi-
cal investment offensive therefore requires maximum planning security.
Even under the extremely restrictive conditions of (general) equilibrium theory, 
market prices cannot take into account the “external costs” caused through production 
and consumption. It is up to policymakers to “internalise” these costs (directly through 
environmental taxes, indirectly through emissions trading, in which the quantity of 
permits is gradually reduced). This market failure is exacerbated by a second market 
failure typical for all asset prices, including not only stock prices and exchange rates, 
but also the prices of fossil energy or of CO2 permits: They fluctuate in a sequence of 
bull and bear markets, that is, they deviate widely from their “fundamentals”. The 
development of the oil price (and thus indirectly also of the prices of natural gas and 
coal) is a particularly pronounced example of the “manic- depressive” dynamics of 
speculative prices (see Figs. 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 in Chap. 2).
By combining both types of market failure in those goods whose consumption is 
mainly responsible for global warming, this problem reached a life-threatening 
dimension. Climate researchers recognized the extent of the problem in recent 
decades, and most economists, however, did not as they disregarded the importance 
of the two types of market failures in times of neoliberal thinking. In particular, the 
idea that the “freest” markets, the financial markets, systematically create false 
prices (through “bulls” and “bears”) is unthinkable within the paradigm of general 
equilibrium economics.
Economic policy has been focused on the two standard instruments for pricing 
CO2 emissions, carbon taxes or emission trading schemes. Unfortunately, neither of 
them can achieve a path of continuously rising CO2 prices. Let’s begin with carbon 
taxes. In all EU countries, there has long been a tax on fuels. It is equivalent to a tax 
on CO2 emissions caused by fuel consumption since there prevails a fixed relation-
ship between the quantity of fuel consumed and the related CO2 emissions. In 
Germany, for example, the tax on diesel is 47 cents per litre. Since the burning of 1 
litre diesel produces 2.65 kg CO2, the diesel tax burdens the emission of 1 ton of 
CO2 by roughly 180€ (= 0.47/2.65 per kg). This is much more than in most planned 
or—like in Sweden or Switzerland—already implemented (general) carbon taxes. 
Due to the extent of fluctuations in the world market price of crude oil, phases of 
marked price reductions for petrol, diesel and heating oil are inevitable despite a 
CO2 tax (even as high as 180€ per ton). This also applies if—as planned—the CO2 
tax is raised gradually. In the last 10 years alone, for example, the price of oil fell 
twice to such an extent that the price of diesel declined by about 50% (Fig. 20.2). As 
long as the oil price is determined on the derivative markets, where short-term spec-
ulative transactions dominate (the trading volume of “paper barrels” is many times 
greater than global oil production), CO2 taxes cannot anchor the expectations of a 
steadily rising price of CO2 emissions. Rather the opposite: the more the EU (and 
other countries) succeed in reducing the consumption of fossil energy, the more 
likely it is that world oil prices will fall, which in turn will counteract the increase 
in the price of fossil energy through CO2 taxes.
Regardless of this “rebound effect”, renewed drops in oil prices are likely because 
both supply and demand are not price elastic. Even small increases in global oil 
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supply (e.g., due to “undisciplined” OPEC countries or other oil producers such as 
Brazil, Guyana, Norway and Canada) or a slight weakening of demand (e.g., due to 
a further deterioration of the global economy or even a new financial crisis) triggers 
significant price declines. The basic structural problem is as follows: the global 
reserves of fossil energy are much larger than the global “CO2 budget”—if a climate 
catastrophe is to be avoided, the reserves must not be exhausted. This over-supply 
will exert a permanent downward pressure on fossil energy prices.
The problem of setting an upward price path of CO2 through emissions trading 
schemes can be illustrated using the EU trading scheme (EUETS) as example: It 
was introduced in 2005 and covers only the main CO2 emitters from industry such 
as iron and steel, paper, chemicals, power generation and (EU internal) flights, 
which together account for about 45% of all CO2 emissions. In theory, emission 
trading is the optimal control instrument: the amount of CO2 is limited by the vol-
ume of permits and the cap is gradually reduced. A uniform price is formed on the 
permit exchanges, which ensures that the emissions occur where their benefit is 
greatest: A company that needs more certificates because of a good business situa-
tion buys them via the exchange from another company that has a surplus. These 
transactions constitute compliance transactions.
In order for emissions trading to create incentives to invest in the CO2 reduction, 
the permit price would have to rise steadily. However, this is precisely what is not 
the case. In fact, the price for the emission of 1 tonne of CO2 fluctuated between 
€32.3 and €3.1 (Fig. 20.1). Moreover, between 2011 and 2017, it was at such a low 
level that it did not create an incentive to invest in CO2 avoidance.
This disaster has two main causes. First, the certificates for a longer period must 
be fixed in advance (almost 12,000 operating sites need planning security). This 
organizational necessity must lead to misallocations and thus “wrong” CO2 prices 
due to the fundamental uncertainty about the medium-term economic development. 
For example, the financial crisis was—of course—not foreseen, resulting in an 
oversupply of emission permits so that their price fell to below €10 in 2009 and to 
below €5 by 2013 (Fig.  20.1). The fact that the EU had to introduce a “Market 
Stability Reserve” to reduce the (over)supply of allowances illustrates the issue. 
Second, financial actors on the CO2 permit exchanges “interpose” themselves 
between companies with a surplus or deficit of permits and use the derivatives based 
on permit price as speculative vehicles. Thus, since 2010, 99% of all transactions 
have been based on derivatives and only 1% on genuine certificates (hedging can 
therefore only play a minor role). Already in 2012, the total CO2 transaction volume 
(including derivatives) was more than 33 times higher than the companies’ “compli-
ance needs” (Berta et al. 2017). Moreover, the CO2 price dynamics shows the pat-
tern typical for speculative price in general: Short-term trends, which are exploited 
by algorithmic trading, accumulate into longer-term bull or bear markets (Figs. 20.1 
and 20.2).2
2 The properties common to speculative assets are: They can easily and almost permanently be 
traded, at least in derivatives markets (as in the case of commodities), the supply is fixed over the 
short run and might be shrinking over the long run (as with Bitcoins or CO2 permits). In the respec-
tive markets, professional players trade with amateurs. In some cases, the latter buy or sell the 
respective asset for reasons of their business in the real economy (e.g., exporters/importers or tour-
ists in the foreign exchange market or industrial or energy companies in the CO2 emission market).
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The participating industrial and energy companies, whose CO2 emissions should 
be optimally allocated by the system, have to accept permit prices resulting from 
speculative derivative transactions of “financial investors” (traders). They of course 
also take into account “news” about the fundamentals, but mainly as a trigger for 
short-term price movements, which are exploited and reinforced at the same time by 
technical trading systems (Figs. 20.1 and 20.2 show a particularly simple system: 
buy or sell when the price intersects the line of the moving average of the last 50 
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prices from below or above—the “trading systems” used today are much more com-
plex, but all of them aim at exploiting the “trending” of asset prices).
To summarize, the fluctuation of crude oil, coal and natural gas prices as well as 
of carbon emissions prices is almost systematically preventing ecologically neces-
sary investments, since the profit of the latter lies in the avoided energy costs. Such 
investments will only be made to a sufficient extent if fossil energy becomes steadily 
and predictably more expensive. How could this be achieved? Instead of taxing the 
CO2 content of oil, coal and natural gas, the EU should set a path with steadily rising 
prices for these energy sources (initially for about 20 years) and skim off the differ-
ence between the EU target price and the respective world market price by means of 
a monthly adjusted quantity tax—instead of the prices of fossil raw materials and 
the products made from them, the (implicit) quantity tax should fluctuate.
Here is a thought experiment using the example of crude oil to illustrate the 
working of such a price and tax regime. On 1 January 2006, the following regulation 
came into force in the EU: Starting from the (then) current oil price (Brent) of 52.0€, 
the price valid within the EU would rise along a predetermined path by 5% per year 
(just 3 percentage points higher than target inflation). This rate of change would be 
much smaller than the fluctuations realized since then, but it is always positive—
and everybody knows it in advance. As a result of a second “bear market”, the price 
of oil fell from €95.0 to €28.3 between March 2012 and January 2016, while the 
price of diesel in Germany fell from €1.52 to €0.99 (Fig. 20.2). However, the EU 
guideline price for oil would be €84.8 in January 2016. For February 2016, the EU 
oil tax would thus amount to 56.5€ (84.8 minus 28.3) per barrel, about twice the oil 
bill (the figures are for illustrative purposes only; if an EU price path had actually 
been introduced, the world market price of oil would have developed differently, 
most probably, it would have been further dampened).
If one considers that the EU had to pay a total of €414.5 billion in 2016 for 
energy imports—almost exclusively fossil—it becomes clear that the return on an 
EU tax on fossil energy would be well over €500 billion (even without the UK). In 
the long term, it would increase at an above-average rate: On the one hand, the EU 
target price is rising, while on the other hand, the EU’s climate policy is curbing its 
energy imports and thus world market prices. This would also bring about a lasting 
change in the distribution of oil and natural gas income: These are mostly “rentier 
income” of the owners of the great oil and gas reservoirs. Whenever oil prices rose 
in the past, the producing countries, but also the oil companies, made extra (“wind-
fall”) profits. By constantly increasing the price itself, the EU is dampening world 
market prices and thus diverting part of the “rents” into the budgets of the 
Member States.
Technically, the implementation of such a flexible quantity tax would be very 
simple in the “digital age”: Based on the difference between the EU target price and 
the world market price, the tax per unit of quantity of oil, coal and natural gas valid 
in the following month is determined at the end of each month by the EU Commission 
and paid in the Member States by producers and importers of fossil energy in the EU.
What would be the most important price and investment effects of EU target 
prices for fossil energies (because of the different “CO2 intensity”, the price path for 
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coal should be steeper and that for natural gas flatter than the oil price path)? All 
goods and services would become more expensive within the EU to the extent that 
fossil fuels are used in their production (from fuels including kerosene to plastic 
products). Products produced with renewable energy or less energy would become 
relatively cheaper. Goods imported into the EU would be subject to an analogous 
energy tax (border carbon adjustment tax). Since EU price paths “internalise” the 
environmental costs of fossil fuel consumption, such a levy would not contradict the 
rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). As long as no comparable CO2 taxes 
exist in the EU’s trading partners, EU exports would have to be relieved from the 
EU tax paid (analogous to VAT).
The investment effects would be most significant: Since owners of single-family 
homes, housing cooperatives and so on know how much heating costs they could 
save by renovating buildings to make them more energy-efficient, they would 
expand their investments accordingly. The mandatory price paths would relieve the 
car companies of a large part of the risk of long-term and expensive investments in 
the development of electric vehicles. Of course, the “pace” of the price paths should 
be adapted to developments at greater intervals, but since a reduction in the price of 
fossil energy is ruled out, the following holds: the earlier an investment is made, the 
greater is its profit. Such a system of pricing fossil energy would therefore trigger a 
sustainable investment boom. This could be promoted by using part of the (enor-
mous) returns from the energy tax for long-term large-scale projects (another part 
should offset the burden of energy price increases on low-income groups). These 
projects include the energetic restoration of the entire building stock in the EU, the 
creation of a trans-European network for high-speed trains, the switch to electric 
cars and to hydrogen technology, especially in the most energy-intensive industries 
(steel, paper, basic chemicals, building materials) and finally investment in public 
transport.
Such a Green New Deal would rise and—more important—stabilize economic 
growth in the EU while at the same time improving long-term environmental condi-
tions. Such a (temporary) “green growth” would reduce unemployment and atypical 
employment, and with it the (fear of) poverty and declassing of more and more 
people. Technically, it would be far easier to implement just three flexible quantity 
taxes on oil, coal and natural gas than managing the complex and bureaucratic EU 
emissions trading scheme (not to speak about extending it to transport and housing) 
or taxing the CO2 equivalent of all primary production inputs.
 Thermic Renovation of the Stock of Buildings in the EU
The energy requirement of (residential) buildings for heating, air-conditioning and 
warming water can technically be reduced by almost 100% in most cases. Even if 
one would reach only the “low energy standard”, one could save roughly 80% in 
energy and, hence, in CO2 emissions. At the same time, however, the renovation rate 
per year is less than 1% in the EU.  This situation calls for initiating and 
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implementing a mega-project in the spirit of the New Deal: The thermic renovation 
of the overall stock of existing—primarily residential—buildings in all EU coun-
tries over a period of 15–20 years. This project should be promoted at all levels—
from the EU down to the communities—by linking together business, banking, 
public administration, house owner and residents in “concerted actions”. The proj-
ect needs to be promoted through campaigns in TV, print and social media, docu-
mentation of best practices (in particular with respect to the insulation material), 
engagement of local banks taking over the management of single projects (“one-
stop-shop”) in exchange for secure investment/credit opportunities in real capital, 
etc. The macroeconomic effects of this project would be very substantial for several 
reasons: It consists of millions of single projects and, hence, stimulates the econ-
omy on a large-area basis, that is, EU-wide. The production is labour-intensive and 
requires in particular not “too” highly qualified workers. For both reasons, the mul-
tiplier effects will be above average. Very rough estimates indicate that the annual 
GDP growth in the EU could be raised by up to 3 percentage points through such a 
“mega project” (Schulmeister 2018, p. 334).
 Trans-European Network of High-Speed Railways
If the price of fossil energy would steadily increase in the EU, using airplanes as 
means of transport would become particularly more expensive. At the same time, air 
traffic accounts for a substantial part of CO2 emissions. To steadily reduce them, one 
needs alternatives for transportation, in particular over distances below 1000 km, for 
example, a net of high-speed railways.
Nowadays, high-speed trains already reach more than 500 km/hour in tests. It is 
therefore not unrealistic that it might take roughly 3  hours to get by train from 
Berlin to Paris. If, at the same time, an air ticket for the same trip cost several hun-
dred euros, more and more people would prefer the train (as is already the case 
today for the trip from Milan to Rome as the train takes less than 4  hours). 
Constructing such a railway network will take several decades, it would create a 
great number of jobs and it would “move” the countries at the EU periphery like 
Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltic states and also—in the future—the Western Balkans 
closer to the centre, not only as regards travel distance, but also the social–psycho-
logical and political distance.
 Overcoming Europe’s “Digital Colonization”
Wherever exchange, transportation and communication links are to be extended, 
uniform networks and standards offer the most efficient solutions. This holds for 
physical networks as “natural monopolies” (railways, power and water lines, etc.), 
for information networks as “quasi-natural monopolies” (Facebook, Twitter, etc.), 
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for search engines like Google, for operating systems (Windows of Microsoft, OS 
of Apple), for standard software like Microsoft Office as well as for internet plat-
forms for services exchange (Airbnb, Uber, etc.). As efficient as such “universal 
solutions” are, they give private (US) corporations (quasi-) monopoly positions in 
the global economy. As a result, Facebook, Google, Apple, Microsoft, Airbnb, Uber 
or Amazon not only receives billions of euros as monopoly rents, but also an incred-
ible amount of information about the lifestyles, values and preferences of every 
single user in the world. This information is linked and used for commercial and 
political advertising. Whoever has these data at his disposal can also manipulate 
democratic processes.
This situation poses a challenge for the EU in several respects. First, the EU has 
no chance to obtain any control or even substantial information on the use of the 
data collected by the giants of the Silicon Valley. Second, households and compa-
nies in the EU will have to pay monopoly rents to the USA which can be increased 
at will—for at least the next decades. Third, Europe remains technologically depen-
dent on US companies in a field which is extremely important and vulnerable at the 
same time—in particular in times of crises (e.g., all government agencies in the EU 
use Microsoft Office).
The only viable way out of the dilemma: Europe must develop its own operation 
system, standard software, networks and search engines. Just as with the “natural” 
monopolies of rail, electricity or water supply networks, the “quasi-natural” IT 
monopolies should be operated by enterprises in the public interest. To this end, a 
European Software Consortium (ESC) should be created, in which the best IT com-
panies, university departments and research institutes from the entire EU work 
together. After all, there are hundreds of thousands of highly qualified computer 
scientists and engineers, most of whom are highly motivated to work on such a 
European emancipation project.
The best historical example of such a strategy was the creation of Airbus in 1970, 
when Europe was lagging behind the US in the aircraft industry more than it is 
today in information technology. The formation of a trans-European consortium, 
massive subsidies and the political consensus on the importance of this project 
made it possible to catch up within 20 years. The realization of this Pan-European 
mega-project requires close cooperation between research policy and companies (at 
the EU level as well as within the member states) and massive financial support for 
the ESC. For example, the number of ESC employees could well reach the size of 
Airbus (about 60,000). An annual budget of 15 billion euros may seem gigantic at 
first glance, but it would still only be 0.1% of the EU GDP (without the UK). Finally, 
implementing this project also requires a sustained campaign to educate the public 
that Europe’s information technology dependence will not only force tribute pay-
ments to the USA for decades, but will also threaten freedom of opinion, democracy 
and human rights. If all these conditions were fulfilled, Europe could overcome its 
“digital colonization” in 10–20 years.
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Chapter 21
Promoting Investment in the European 
Union, Evaluating the Juncker Plan
Stephany Griffith-Jones
Abstract This chapter analyzes the Juncker Plan, in particular, the European Fund 
for Strategic Investment (EFSI), highlighting its achievements in expanding invest-
ment in the European Union and challenges in mitigating future risks to the European 
Investment Bank, as well as maximizing the development impact of its activities.
 Introduction
Economic growth and specifically investment levels in the European Union (EU) 
recovered far more slowly after the financial crisis than, for example, in the United 
States or even more in Asia (Klein 2019). Total investment is too low in the European 
Union. For some time before the crisis, the EU had relatively low levels of invest-
ment, reaching 22.5% of GDP in 2006. In emerging and developing economies, it 
reached 26.7% in the same year. But the 2007–2009 financial crisis and the Eurozone 
debt crisis dragged it sharply downward. By 2016, total EU investment had fallen to 
19.9% of GDP, even as emerging and developing countries were at 24.5%. The fall 
in public investment has been striking in the Eurozone—over 20% between 2007 
and 2016. The trend was most notable in the crisis-hit countries. For example, gross 
public investment in Greece fell from a high 4.9% of GDP in 2006 to 3.1% in 
2016—and that of a far smaller GDP due to a major contraction. In Spain, the same 
ratio declined even more dramatically, from 4.3% in 2006 to 1.4% in 2016. Net 
public investment—gross investment minus depreciation—was actually negative in 
the Eurozone in 2016. Some member states were, of course, affected more, but this 
decrease in public investment represented a worrying trend common across most of 
the Eurozone. Even in Germany, gross public investment was low and below the 
Eurozone average.
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The reasons for the decline in public investment across Europe were clear. In 
crisis-wracked countries, austerity forced on countries including Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland compelled large cuts in government expenditures. It was 
impossible to cut the lifelines on which so many depend, for instance, assistance in 
housing. The consequences of these cutbacks are felt immediately; it will be years 
before the consequences of cutbacks in public investment are noted. Therefore, 
politicians focus cutbacks disproportionately on investment. But even in countries 
with public finances that would have permitted greater investment, notably Germany, 
ideology prevented higher public investment, that would have both increased aggre-
gate demand and immediate growth, as well as future growth.
In 2015, the European Commission acknowledged the Growth and Stability Pact 
served the Eurozone badly and published a framework allowing countries to deviate 
from the anti-deficit rules to promote investment. Though the flexibility introduced 
was welcome, the problem that the Pact curtails productive investment at precisely 
the time it is needed most remained. Even worse, it curtails productive investment 
at precisely the time when the social benefit cost ratio is highest, and when the 
opportunity cost of these investments is low. Public investments are not crowding 
out (displacing) either private investments or consumption, because it can use 
resources that otherwise would be idle. On the contrary, public investments crowd 
in private investment.
Even in financial terms, economic downturns are the time to make investment. 
With long-term government bond yields close to zero, it would have been easy to 
find public investment projects that generate a much higher return. By failing to 
increase government investments in this period, Europe missed an opportunity, 
which was reflected in the far lower growth rate it had than for example the United 
States, even though the financial crisis originally came from the United States. 
During and after the Eurozone debt crisis, problems with low aggregate demand, 
economic uncertainty and a weakened private banking system contributed also to 
low levels of private investment. The reduction was sharpest in the southern 
Eurozone countries, with private investment decreasing from 22% of GDP in 2007 
to 14% in 2014—but the picture was almost uniformly grim across Europe.
After the Eurozone debt crisis started, creditor Governments (especially 
Germany, but also Holland, and Finland) were unwilling to modify in a significant 
way the so-called Growth and Stability Pact, so as to allow countries to increase 
their national fiscal deficits to fund higher public investment; this was argued would 
have been a desirable path forward by many academics, such as Peter Bofinger and 
Gustav Horn in Germany, as well as Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz internation-
ally (e.g. for the latter see Stiglitz 2019), as well as of course the governments and 
academics of crisis countries and France. At the same time, it was difficult formally 
to expand EU level of investment (e.g. via Structural Funds), because the European 
Union budget had been approved until 2020; of course supplementary funds could 
have been made available if member states were willing, again, this was blocked 
especially by creditor countries. Simultaneously, in the wake of the financial crisis 
of 2007–2009, and the Eurozone debt crisis of 2009–2010, there had been renewed 
support for public regional and national development banks, as the limitations and 
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problems of a purely private financial sector became more evident to different 
strands of economic thinking (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2018).
In this context, the European Investment Bank Group (EIB), with its long track 
record of successfully playing a key and large role in funding intra-European infra-
structure, including renewable energy, Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and 
innovation, took on renewed importance. Thus, an indirect route, using the European 
Investment Bank, was chosen to encourage investment, especially private one, in the 
European Union. A first step was the doubling of paid-in capital of EIB by all mem-
ber states in 2012, which allowed EIB to expand its lending (Griffith-Jones and 
Kollatz 2012). The public contribution by member states was limited, but was 
reported to generate far higher finance and investment via leverage with private 
resources.
Furthermore, as a more traditional Keynesian response (at both national and 
Eurozone levels) was not deemed acceptable, EFSI was created, as a sort of 
Keynesian mechanism “sans dire”, and with no or little additional public money, but 
a large potential impact, due to the effect of leverage. Indeed, the EIB is implement-
ing the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), which is the core of the 
Investment Plan for Europe (the “Juncker Plan”), and aims to fund much needed 
investment for Europe, especially in the wake of devastating austerity (phase 1) as 
well as to facilitate much needed structural change to a greener, more dynamic and 
more inclusive economy (phase 2). Emphasis was placed on financing riskier invest-
ment, for example in the crisis-hit countries, as well as in the newer member coun-
tries. In this context, the Juncker Plan seems broadly highly successful (Fig. 21.1).
The EFSI is a EUR 26 billion guarantee from the EU budget, which comes 
mainly from existing research and innovation and transport budget lines, comple-
mented by a EUR 7.5 billion allocation of the EIB’s own capital, given EU budget 
limitations. The total amount of EUR 33.5 billion aims to leverage additional invest-
ment of at least EUR 500 billion between 2015 and 2020. Essentially a small frac-
tion of the EU budget is used as a guarantee for EIB projects that have a higher risk 
profile than the usual ones. The aim is to push the EIB to finance valuable but risky 
projects that could not secure funding on their own, to adopt a junior position with 
respect to co-financiers, to reduce the risks taken by private investors and to increase 
the chances of attracting their investment (interview material). EFSI has two com-
ponents, the innovation and infrastructure window managed by the EIB, and the 
SME window implemented by the EIF (European Investment Fund).1
It is interesting that about a fourth of the transactions of EFSI are estimated to 
have been channeled through national development banks (NDBs), thus increasing 
the role these banks play in the EU.  They will play an even larger role in 
InvestEU. Indeed, in InvestEU, the EU guarantee can be granted directly to NDBs, 
up to a certain proportion. If properly done, increasing the loan volume through 
leverage is a positive thing, as it should facilitate higher levels of investment. 
However, there is a risk that the greater the loan volume achieved through involving 
1 https://www.eif.org/what_we_do/efsi/index.htm. Accessed 08 March 2020.
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private intermediaries, the more indirect the operations become, and the less strate-
gic direction the European institutions are able to exert over projects. In this sense, 
there is some trade-off between loan volume and policy steer.
For the next EU budget (2021–2027), the Commission is developing the continu-
ation of EFSI, with some modifications as the InvestEU Fund. The InvestEU Fund 
will consolidate various EU financing programs and instruments into one, which 
should lead to economic efficiency gains, and politically may be more desirable, 
due to greater decentralization; InvestEU will follow the Juncker Plan model of 
mobilizing additional private funds for additional investment. This is expected to 
allow the EU budget to provide a €30 billion guarantee, expected to crowd in an 
additional total of €650 billion of mainly private investments over the 7-year period. 
It is argued this will result in investment far greater than is possible via for example 
public investment, in the context of member states’ budget real and perceived con-
straints, or via conventional EIB activities, as happened before EFSI.
One of the continuous challenges to move beyond the crisis is to restore growth 
in the European Union, but this should not just be more dynamic but both more 
sustainable and inclusive growth. Particular priority has rightly been given by the 
EU to measures and instruments to facilitate a speedy and significant transition to a 
low carbon economy.
Indeed, the European Commission’s Green Deal released in December 2019, and 
the accompanying Investment Plan (EGDIP), which aims to make the EU into the 
first climate neutral bloc in the world by 2050, will be key. The European Investment 
Fig. 21.1 Structure of EFSI. (Source: Interview material)
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Bank (EIB) as well as the European countries’ national development banks 
(NDBs)—which have been expanding in scale and extension to practically all EU 
countries—are expected to play a key role, both in funding key investments for the 
green transformation directly, as well as in catalyzing significant additional private 
finance (both lending and equity) to low carbon projects.
It is important that the EU as a whole as well as individual EU countries deploy 
broader policy measures to facilitate finance (both public and private) is redirected 
and channeled to low carbon or carbon neutral activities. These broader policy mea-
sures could, for example, include financial regulatory and fiscal policies that would 
supplement and support the activity of EIB and NDBs in the green transformation.
In this sense, it is important to have an ambitious design of structural transforma-
tion for the EU economies (e.g. in sectors like electro-mobility and renewable 
energy, and the infrastructure that supports them), with a large impact on lowering 
carbon emissions to meet the challenges of the climate emergency.
 A Bit of History
The EIB was established in 1958 by the Treaty of Rome, and historically provided 
infrastructure financing, usually through long-term fixed interest rate loans, backed 
by member state guarantees. The EIB then broadened its activities and currently 
focuses on: innovation, SMEs, infrastructure and environment.
The EIB essentially took little risks on its activities and had an AAA credit rat-
ing, which it could use to cheaply finance its activities on international financial 
markets, and then on-lend very cheaply to its customers. It is interesting that even 
though several member countries were downgraded from AAA (some dramatically 
like Greece), after the Eurozone debt crisis, the EIB maintained its AAA status, 
though using lower leverage than in the past (Interview material). The fact that EIB 
maintains AAA status is very positive from the perspective of the borrowers, as well 
as its strength as a major EU institution. From the late 1980s/early 1990s, the EIB 
began changing its business model to take on more risk, as its statute was amended 
to manage the new European Investment Fund (EIF). The EIF has a unique capital 
structure, with most of its capital contributed by the European Commission and the 
EIB, 11.6% of its capital is owned by public and private financial institutions; most 
of these are national development banks, but also some large private banks, like 
Barclays (Interview material). The instruments evolved. The EIB and EIF began 
giving loan guarantees, relaxing requirements for member state guarantees and 
using equity instruments. Though guarantees can be problematic, especially if badly 
structured, or if a big financial crisis happens (where uncorrelated risks become cor-
related), they have important advantages. Furthermore, it is argued by some that 
“the biggest risk are grants”, because there is in that case certainty the funds will not 
be paid back. So guarantees have two advantages: firstly, they provide leverage, and 
secondly, they are like a revolving fund and resources can be used again if there are 
no major losses. On the other hand, if major losses occur, the provisions are not 
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sufficient and guarantees have not been fully priced, then governments (taxpayers) 
have to pay in the future. Furthermore, there is evidence that, though the EIB and 
EIF pay fully the price of the European Commission guarantee, it is likely that an 
important part of EFSI guarantees granted to commercial banks do not price fully 
their cost. Above all, the pricing of guarantees seems opaque. This is reportedly in 
contrast with loans, where products are more fully standardized and transparent 
(Interview material).
The EIB’s approach to innovation also changed. Until 2007, innovation was only 
funded through grants. In 2007, the EC and the EIB set up the Risk Sharing Finance 
Facility (RSFF) with the stated aim of improving access to finance for activities in 
the field of R&D and innovation. It was built on the principle of pari passu (equal) 
credit risk sharing between the EC and the EIB, which was designed to give the EIB 
capital relief, and therefore allow it to take more risk by providing loans or guaran-
tees with a sub-investment grade risk profile. This could be said to be the first time 
EU institutions used financial engineering to make risk-sharing agreements, and 
became the blueprint for EFSI (interview material).
 The Working of EFSI
EFSI has a high overall multiplier target of 15×. The first step is the internal multi-
plier of 3×, where the EFSI guarantee of 33.5 billion Euros from the European 
budget is expected to generate 100 billion Euros of EIB financing on international 
financial markets. The second step is the external multiplier of 5×, where the inter-
nal funds of 100 billion are expected to catalyze additional private and public 
financing to reach a total mobilized investment volume of 500 billion. The external 
multiplier varies across financial products, so the 5× target applies to the entire 
portfolio of operations. The overall multiplier target of 15× is the relation between 
expected total investment mobilized (500 billion) and the initial EFSI guarantee 
(33.5 billion) (EIB 2019) (Fig. 21.2).
The EFSI has taken a number of steps including the creation and use of new 
financial instruments (financial innovation), especially in EIB operations, while EIF 
operations for SMEs relied mainly on existing instruments; both encourage greater 
involvement of public and private actors, in particular national development banks 
(NDBs) and institutional investors. The mobilization of private capital brings poten-
tial benefits (achieving higher levels of investment, by “doing more with less fiscal 
resources”), but also generates potential risks, via contingent liabilities, that need to 
be properly accounted and provisioned for. In 2014, the RSFF was turned into 
InnovFin, and both the size of the funds as well as the range of financial products 
were increased.2 COSME, the EU program for Competitiveness of Enterprises and 
SMEs, operated by EIF, was also set up during 2014–2020, with a budget of €2.3 
2 https://www.eib.org/en/products/blending/innovfin/index.htm. Accessed 08 March 2020.
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billion, in order to provide financing support for SMEs.3 COSME has a Loan 
Guarantee Facility that aims to enable financial institutions to increase loan and 
lease finance to SMEs, as well as an Equity Facility for Growth that provides risk 
capital to equity funds that invest in SMEs.
 Financial Products
The EFSI has widened its range of financial products to include not only its tradi-
tional loans and guarantees, but also credit enhancement products, using the RSFF 
blueprint and equity type products (for more details, see Griffith-Jones and Naqvi 
Forthcoming). Equity type products imply more risk than loans, but have the advan-
tage of also being able to “capture the upside” if projects are more profitable than 
expected. One such instrument being currently applied is venture debt. The EFSI 
operational strategy further specifies the different products that the EIB Group can 
use to deploy EFSI. These include senior and junior loans, risk-sharing instruments 
and capital market instruments including equity or quasi-equity participations 
(European Court of Auditors 2019, p. 18).
Under the SME window, EIF continues to rely on existing products already used 
under COSME, InnovFin and other mandates. It was reportedly an advantage for 
3 https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/9783. Accessed 08 March 2020.
Fig. 21.2 Overall multiplier for EFSI. (Source: EIB 2019a)
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the SME window, EFSI, especially initially, used existing, well-tested product lines. 
This seemed a wise decision. It may have contributed to the more rapid deployment 
of EFSI finance for SMEs, especially initially seen as more successful. The EIF’s 
volume of operations has been increased very significantly thanks to EFSI, growing 
from EUR 3.3 billion in 2014 to EUR 10 billion in 2018, that is more than tripling 
in 4 years (interview material). EIF’s focus is to enhance access to finance for SMEs 
as part of its EU mandate, but also provides ecosystem support like development of 
the European venture capital market, as well as the market for business angels, via 
a fund to co-finance with angels, that helps develop fintech, crowd funding, etc. EIF 
covers the whole financing chain, starting with funding for seed capital to later- 
stage growth to mid-cap market, but also is active in more mature markers with 
guaranteed products. EIF does not finance SMEs directly, but always goes through 
intermediaries—the guarantee is provided to banks or counter guarantees are pro-
vided to guarantee institutions (NDBs mainly like BPI France, KfW). The counter-
party has to do riskier business than they would do normally if they get EIF 
guarantees.
Because COSME was focused on smaller transactions, over one million SMEs 
have been supported. EFSI support has also not just increased number of SMEs 
served, but also riskier SMEs, in more countries. Start-ups are often neglected on 
the side of debt, some sectors are neglected, for example, creative, but even tradi-
tional sectors have niches of sectors not well served. Under the infrastructure win-
dow, in addition to relying on traditional long-term senior loans (about 60% of the 
total), the EIB expanded the use of existing higher-risk products and developed new 
ones. The EIB has conducted securitized transactions under the infrastructure win-
dow in partnership with the EIF. One of the interesting new products is venture debt 
where EIB provides debt, but there is an equity kicker—if business does well, EIB 
also gets part of that higher profit, as compensation for taking higher risk, implying 
this is an instrument where EIB captures the upside, which is clearly desirable, as 
EIB is not just sharing risks but also profits with private company.
 Analytical Framework for Different Risks
There is a key distinction on the nature of risk that is essential to clarify, both from 
an analytical point of view and a policy perspective. This should be important to 
evaluate initiatives like EFSI and InvestEU. There is first the “economic” type of 
risks; these are basically related to the natural uncertainty related to projects or sec-
tors. These are typically: (1) in infrastructure projects (e.g. risks of construction 
difficulties and delays, especially in engineering ambitious projects, see for exam-
ple, Griffith-Jones 1993); (2) “Economic” risks are also very prevalent in the fund-
ing of innovative companies, such as start-ups, often based on potentially excellent 
ideas, but lacking assets for guarantees, and/or track record; (3) Financing SMEs is 
generally considered riskier in most countries, except in countries like Germany, 
with decentralized banking systems, which allow for greater knowledge of 
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companies. SME financing becomes riskier if financial crisis happens, when the 
benefits of diversification are reduced; (4) Very importantly, “economic” risks can 
also relate to sectorial or cross-sectorial innovation that may lead to major increases 
in productivity and/or significant structural transformation, for example to a greener 
economy (Mazzucato 2013); (5) Also assuming “economic” risk implies lending to 
or investing in countries that are (usually temporarily) seen as less creditworthy by 
financial markets, especially, during, and in the long aftermath of, financial crises or 
other major shocks.
These “economic” types of risks are in sharp contrast with “financial engineer-
ing” risks, created by financial actors, often partly hidden by opaque and complex 
structures, and whose impact only often emerges ex post in crises’ situations. The 
alleged, and sometimes legitimate, aim may in some cases partly be to increase 
leverage of public resources, and for this reason may be backed also by policy- 
makers, with the aim of doing “more with less”, as in the case of the European 
Union. However, the main general aim of creating instruments with “financial engi-
neering” risk is to increase profitability for private financial actors, while minimiz-
ing their risk of losses. The financial sector, however, must serve the real economy, 
and financial objectives, for example, the development of capital markets, must 
never be an end in itself. EFSI and InvestEU must have a greater focus on the final 
beneficiaries of projects rather than on the private financial intermediaries.
The distinction between “economic” and “financial” risk was less important in 
the aftermath of the 2008 and Eurozone debt crisis, as there was a great need to 
counter-cyclically increase lending volume to maintain investment as the private 
financial sector became risk averse. However, now the private financial sector has 
become more willing to lend, and even does so at very low margins, there is not 
much benefit in most countries and sectors to de-risking them further. Indeed, they 
may even need to be held back from causing a bubble in certain sectors (interview 
material). However, there remains a need to take “economic risk”, especially for 
sectors important for industrial policy/structural transformation, or developmental 
objectives, such as green energy, innovative companies or riskier less developed EU 
countries. Financial risk on the other hand needs to be limited in scale, very care-
fully evaluated ex-ante, to avoid large contingent liabilities and possible signifi-
cant losses.
One of the main aims of the Juncker plan and EFSI is to provide finance to valu-
able projects that would not get financed on private markets, or through normal EIB 
channels due to their high risk. Although these risky projects might not be bankable 
in the sense of resulting in short-term profits, they are vital for long-run growth and 
structural transformation. The Juncker plan envisions doing this by getting the EIB 
to take on more risk than it normally would. While EFSI (in its phase 1) initially had 
a counter-cyclical focus in the postcrisis environment, EFSI 2 and InvestEU have 
more of a structural transformation objective.
The EU institution’s matrix for assessing whether this developmental role is 
being played is to take into account the risk profile of the EIB’s financial products, 
rather than on the beneficiaries. This can be problematic in some cases, as economic 
and financial risks can at times diverge, and projects that the EIB classified as “high 
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risk” according to the EFSI objectives may in fact only be risky in the financial 
sense. In some cases, the same project was classified as a riskier EFSI project rather 
than a normal EIB project, purely because the financial products changed to riskier 
ones (interview material).
While funding projects with economic risk is good, taking excessive financial 
risk through complex financial products or through too high risk sharing with the 
private sector creates the danger that the public entities (and ultimately the taxpay-
ers) will bear the risks, while the private sector reaps all the rewards. It could also 
have negative long-term budgetary implications via contingent liabilities. This leads 
us to the third issue, which is that of the distribution of risks of losses and profits, 
between the public actors (in this case, EIB and European Commission funds, for 
example deployed as guarantees) and the private financial actors (lenders and inves-
tors). If with the aim to attract additional private lending or investing, financial 
products are created that generate too much additional financial risk and transfer too 
high a proportion of that risk to the public sector (especially without transferring 
any of the potential upside of profits to the public sector), then this is highly undesir-
able from a welfare and public policy perspective. This is particularly the case if 
these instruments lead to high losses, which can only be known ex-post in the future; 
such losses could be costly to the public sector, if the instruments are not properly 
priced, and can generate future problems if there are no adequate provisions against 
such potential future losses. Because many of the projects have long maturities, it is 
harder to know what the longer term possible losses and thus budgetary implica-
tions of the risk-sharing agreements are before loans become due (interview 
material).
 Collaboration with National Development Banks
The EIB’s cooperation with member states’ national development banks (NDBs) 
has been strongly enhanced as part of EFSI, including its leverage strategy. As dis-
cussed above, participation of an NDB as a financial intermediary increases EFSI’s 
leverage due to the catalytic effect. NDB participation also helps with overcoming 
fiscal constraints. Although NDB activities do count as contingent liabilities, they 
do not count toward the Maastricht criteria (EC 2015). Cooperation between the 
EIB and NDBs can take four forms: (1) Co-investment, at the project level; (2) 
Intermediated financing where the EIB provides loans or guarantees to NDBs for 
on-lending; (3) Risk-sharing instruments where the EIB makes an agreement to 
cover up to a certain percentage of credit risk associated with a portfolio of loans. 
This reduces the exposure of the NDB to certain sectors or client segments, and 
frees up capital and other resources to grant new loans; (4) Collaborative investment 
platforms that involve joint cooperation among the EIB Group, several NDBs and 
potentially other IFIs, the latter especially in the context of InvestEU (EIB 2016).
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 Distribution of EFSI Resources Between Countries
Is EFSI a tool that can benefit all Member States? Because the EFSI has been 
designed to allocate financial support without so-called “political interference” in 
the selection of projects, it is more prone to support those economies where greater 
investment opportunities already exist. Since the very beginning of the program, the 
uneven geographical distribution of its support has been criticized. Larger and richer 
economies have more experience to develop a greater number of viable projects. By 
mid-2016, almost all financing granted under the EFSI (92%) had been allocated to 
the initial member countries, the EU-15, among which the largest beneficiaries were 
Italy, Spain and the UK. This is in stark contrast with the “new” EU-13 (mainly the 
Central and Eastern European countries that joined later), which accounted for a 
mere 8% of disbursements.
Although less developed EU countries were initially excluded, the situation 
seemed to be improving, as special efforts were made in this. Data from the European 
Parliament shows that while the more advanced Western European countries are the 
main beneficiaries in terms of absolute investment, once size of the economy and 
population are accounted for, the distribution is much less concentrated (European 
Parliament 2017, pp.  13–15). Countries harmed by austerity, including Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and Greece, now rank among the highest receivers of EFSI invest-
ment as a percentage of GDP, which is to be praised. In investment per capita terms, 
they also remain high, but Central and Eastern European countries, in particular, 
Romania, Croatia and Hungary, remain lagging behind. Capacity building to over-
come discrepancies like these must become one of the key objectives for both the 
European Investment Bank as an institution and EFSI as a mechanism (Griffith- 
Jones and Naqvi Forthcoming).
 Conclusion
Relying on a budgetary allocation of EUR 33.5 billion, EFSI aims to leverage addi-
tional investment of at least EUR 500 billion between 2015 and 2020. The plan 
seems to be broadly on track, with EUR 70.4 billion of financing approved, from 
which EFSI claims to have mobilized a total of EUR 375.5 billion, as of July 2018.4 
One important achievement of EFSI is that of the clients it has served, 75% are new 
ones, who had never borrowed before from the EIB. This is encouraging, in terms 
of additionality achieved and new clients. Furthermore, before EFSI, the EIB is 
reported to have had among its operations only 5% of risky business; however, by 
2018, 20% of EIB operations are reportedly risky business (interview material). 
This is a positive achievement, particularly to the extent that increased risk means 
increased economic risk and not purely financial risk.
4 https://www.eib.org/en/efsi/. Accessed 08 March 2020.
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In the context of supporting innovative technologies, with climate mitigation 
aspects, it is impressive that the EIB has funded 40% of offshore wind installed 
capacity in Europe; it often moved to support the more innovative aspects of off-
shore (larger scale of blades, and even floating offshore wind farms). The EFSI thus 
has important achievements, including the significant leverage it is providing on 
scarce EU budget resources, to help provide lending and guarantees to important 
innovative projects and provide additional resources to countries that have suffered 
from the Eurozone crisis, or who are new EU members, as well as supporting 
increased investment in the EU more broadly. It has also allowed the EIF to signifi-
cantly increase its operations in its important role of catalyzing financing for SMEs.
While the mobilization of private capital brings potential benefits (achieving 
higher levels of investment, by “doing more with less fiscal resources”), it also gen-
erates potential risks, via contingent liabilities, that need to be properly accounted 
for and provisioned for. The use of opaque new financial instruments can further 
increase unnecessary “financial” risk, of the type that resulted in the 2007 subprime 
mortgage crisis, without increasing necessary and valuable “economic” risks. There 
is also a risk that the greater the loan volume achieved through involving private 
intermediaries, the more indirect the operations become, and the less strategic direc-
tion the European institutions are able to exert over projects.
While funding projects with economic risk is valuable, taking excessive financial 
risk through complex financial products or through excessive risk sharing with the 
private sector creates the danger that public entities (and ultimately the taxpayers) 
will bear the risks, while the private sector reaps all the rewards. This is highly 
undesirable from a welfare and public policy perspective. If the EIB wants to take 
more risk, it is key it identifies higher risk projects/sectors/countries, as opposed to 
higher risk financial products.
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Chapter 22
Proposal for a Pact for National 
Responsibility Through EU Solidarity 
Within the Present EU Architecture
Christian Ghymers
Abstract This Chapter shows that there still exist urgent actions possible with 
existing tools and procedures for breaking the prisoner dilemma through modalities 
of solidarity leading to more responsibility. These feasible solutions are simple reci-
pes based upon past experiences for opening again the European Union (EU) win–
win game by activating conditional incentives able to enhance channelled financial 
market reactions favourable to adjusting countries, preventing self-fulfilling specu-
lation and benefiting the whole EU.
 Introduction
Northern European Union (EU) member states (MS) fear that solidarity financing 
could weaken national responsibility and postpone the necessary budgetary consoli-
dation in the South. However, this position has made more difficult any adjustment 
and increased the gravity of the crisis, with Southern economies falling in deeper 
depression, worsening their fiscal position but also leading to depressing spillovers 
to the North. This “loss-loss” game illustrates the “prisoner dilemma” impeding 
solidarity and responsibility in the euro-area: the European Central Bank (ECB) 
cannot give liquidity without guarantee of effective fiscal sustainability while fiscal 
sustainability is impossible without a liquidity safety net for preventing contagion 
and rescuing treasuries in liquidity trouble even when they try to adjust. A signifi-
cant part of this deadlock comes from the overwhelming dogmatic ideas relative to 
spontaneous efficiency of free markets—especially for financial markets—com-
bined with the rent-seeking interests of incumbent authorities whatever left or right.
In a nutshell, this general dogmatic belief has led to combine two big “technical” 
mistakes of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) architecture:
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 (i) The euro-area remains especially exposed to the destabilizing power of wild 
financial markets because it is the only monetary area in the world without a 
genuine Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR) and without credible mechanisms of 
solidarity among its members. In the EMU, this gives financial markets the 
power to precipitate a liquidity crisis (and even to turn it into a solvency crisis 
cfr. Spain) in a one-bet speculation in case of doubts on sovereign debts because 
national treasuries cannot control, by definition, the currency and the exchange 
rate in which they issue their debt, like Argentina during its currency board with 
the dollar.
 (ii) This fatal caveat was combined with a surveillance process of national policies, 
which remained excessively intergovernmental and imbalanced, with ministers 
playing as “Judges and Parts”. It focused almost exclusively upon fiscal poli-
cies (Stability and Growth Pact—SGP) and adopted a benign neglect about the 
divergences and current account disequilibrium that the single currency inevi-
tably had to imply.1 The argument of financial efficiency was used for present-
ing these results as sound because they are the inner advantage of the single 
currency, which eradicates saving constraints, allowing both left and right gov-
ernments to satisfy their respective electorates in such an EMU regime spurring 
consumption, indebtedness and speculation, but accumulating unsustainable 
disequilibrium within the euro-area.
The same dogmatism explains the refuse to care about the credit-boom and the 
unproductive uses of these huge free capital flows in the Southern economies, even 
in the surveillance exercises of the Commission/ECOFIN! Such degree of incompe-
tence had inevitably to be sanctioned by citizen reactions once the artificial benefits 
of the single currency vanished, increasing unfair inequalities, insecurity feelings 
among EU citizens and distrust among MS, trapping them into a typical “prisoner 
dilemma”. Unfortunately, but logically, the euro and the EU became the easiest 
scapegoat for the failure to bring a visible value added.
Although these mistakes must be corrected anyway through a new EU architec-
ture with a new EMU Treaty, the necessary consensus needs too much time before 
being ready for facing the new coming difficulties and crisis. Therefore, this Chapter 
shows that there still exist urgent actions possible with existing tools and procedures 
for breaking the prisoner dilemma through modalities of solidarity leading to more 
responsibility. These feasible solutions are simple recipes based upon past 
experiences for opening again the EU win–win game by activating conditional 
incentives able to enhance channelled financial market reactions favourable to 
1 With a single nominal interest rate and inflation rates higher in the South than in the North (price 
level convergence and growth differentials), inevitably real interest rates are too low in the South 
and too high in the North, creating credit-boom in the South amplified by huge capital movements 
from the North to the South but in speculative investment spurring consumption. This is basic 
economics and would have required special policy measures with other tools yet available (bank 
reserve requirements, capital ratio, prudential regulations) at national level, but dogmatism was 
used by politicians and even in the Commission the answer given to the current account imbal-
ances in the South financed by capital inflows was that “markets know better that civil servants”.
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adjusting countries, preventing self-fulfilling speculation and benefiting the 
whole EU.
 The Basic Principles for Breaking Out the EMU Prisoner 
Dilemma Blocking EMU Governance
Solving the present prisoner dilemma relies upon correcting the two caveats of the 
present EMU by linking visibly national responsibility to the access to cheap condi-
tional EU solidarity funds. As demonstrated in the last decade by the disasters of the 
over indebtedness cases (Greek, Spain, Portugal and Ireland), the way the budgetary 
consolidations were imposed became very counterproductive and damaging for all 
EU partners. Making available adequate conditional EU solidarity could give imme-
diate positive results through their powerful impacts on the spreads of sovereign 
bonds and the positive growth spillovers for both debtors and creditors.
Analyses of the facts and the history of the EU integration tends to show that 
integration progress depends upon the degree of mutual confidence among member 
states, which is fragile but reversible as shown by past episodes of European inte-
gration. Observation of four decades of monitoring economic policy coordination 
and of EMU process permits to draw three intertwined lessons:
 (i) Confidence among Member States as well as citizens with respect to EU 
requires a clear deal between solidarity and responsibility;
 (ii) This deal needs a credible process of collegial monitoring based upon factual 
indicators allowing for national policymakers to work together for building 
trust and consensus on common interests and making citizens more aware of 
the convergence between national self-interests and the shared euro interests, 
that is, to make explicit and tangible the win–win game at stake and the cost/
benefit challenge of national responsibility giving right to solidarity.
 (iii) All the attempts since the very beginning of the EU to coordinate national poli-
cies failed as far as they were conceived as a central coordination, while they 
succeeded when they resulted from the progressive awareness of the self- 
interest at stake for each Member State to respect by their own sovereign deci-
sions the common discipline and interests (Ghymers 2015).
These lessons explain that coordination among sovereign states never works for 
the sake of “general interest” but only for the selfish interests of governments and 
their electorates. Therefore, it is possible to use this basic principle for activating 
specific tools revealing the self-interests of each sovereign government to converge. 
This explains the success of the European Monetary System (EMS) with its 
exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) which “internalized” visibly the consequences of 
policy choices and the degree of solidarity (Ghymers 1995) and allowed for forging 
(progressively) a consensus thanks to a clever procedure combining:
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 (i) The collegial monitoring of the ERM imposed automatically by the European 
Currency Unit (ECU) which effectively “multilaterialized” all bilateral parities, 
because any exchange-rate adjustments had to be bargained collegially2 through 
a peer review of sovereign policies at EU level, and;
 (ii) Monitoring the impacts of these sovereign policies upon the exchange rates and 
the spreads of interest rates.
The following proposals are based upon these ERM lessons transposed to the single 
currency for internalizing national policies by influencing financial markets through 
two linked key tools correcting the two major failures of EMU:
 (i) A less discretionary and more powerful system of solidarity (in the ERM, the 
solidarity was used very selectively by the monetary hegemon, Germany and 
the Bundesbank);
 (ii) A more objective and less intergovernmental monitoring of all national policies.
These two instruments could be made quickly available inside the present imperfect 
treaty by using current procedures and instruments.
 The Proposed Recipes for Redeeming the Two Major Failures 
of the Euro-Governance
The idea is to incentivize national responsibility by providing to adjusting MSs 
cheap but conditional EU financial assistance proposed by an independent monitor-
ing, that is, exactly what the present EMU does not provide. Such a reconciliation 
between EU solidarity and MS responsibility results from two complementary 
initiatives:
 1. To transform the European Stability Mechanism (EMS3)—which is not a soli-
darity tool (no concessional loans but castigating loans with very high spread) 
and too limited size for compensating credibly the inhibition of the LOLR func-
tion of the ECB into an effective LOLR by changing it into an “European Debt 
Agency – EDA” offering conditional incentives for increasing national responsi-
bility. EDA would use the Treaty as an EU public Bank (Art. 123, §2 see follow-
ing section) for getting conditional access to ECB overdraft facilities for 
short-term liquidity assistance and, by ECOFIN decision, could also issue—
2 Because the ECU basket was a fixed number of national currencies, any change in the parity of 
one member implies arithmetically that all the other central parities also do change, therefore 
requiring a collegial agreement, thus opening a discussion on the policy adjustments for making 
sustainable the new parities  as a formal condition imposed by the partners for accepting the 
demand for realignment from one of the MS.
3 Created in 2012 with a special Treaty for replacing the temporary European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) created in 2010.
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under strict conditions—euro-bonds for supporting medium-to-long-run assis-
tance to Member States under consensual structural adjustment.
 2. To make attractive for MSs the respect of the conditions for access to the EDA 
loans by channelling financial markets reactions (spreads) with credible assess-
ments and objective surveillance communiqués issued by a more independent 
monitoring body than the Commission/ECOFIN; this means to outsource to 
independent experts with the mandate to formulate public recommendations for 
preventing liquidity crisis without creating moral hazard situations. Commission/
ECOFIN decision procedures would still enact, amend or oppose to, but being 
fully accountable of any discrepancy with this new independent European 
Monitoring Board – EMB by “reversing the charge of the proofs”, Commission/
ECOFIN having to demonstrate to public opinions their reasons for not follow-
ing the independent surveillance exercise and its technical proposals.
The combination of these two simple ECOFIN decisions would reduce the inner 
myopia of financial markets by ensuring a credible guidance for preventing any self- 
fulfilling speculation and turning them in a powerful support to sustainable and 
responsible national policies. The idea is to incentivize governments and get citi-
zens’ support for respecting strict conditions by organizing clear, simple, reduction 
in the interest-rate spreads when sovereign policies are credibly sustainable accord-
ing to technical assessments issued by independent experts, validated by 
Commission/ECOFIN under the scrutiny of a broad, trans-European public debate. 
This means to stop the present bias of a too intergovernmental surveillance by the 
“judges & parts” composing the ECOFIN.
 Concrete Modalities for Implementing the Two 
Proposed Recipes
Art. 123 §2 of the present Treaty provides the simple legal way for giving to the 
EMS a potential direct access to the ECB cash facilities, thus allowing this EMS to 
fulfil de-facto the role of an EU missing LOLR. Indeed, Article 123 in its §1 prohib-
its (correctly) any ECB loan or overdraft to any government or public institutions, 
but §2 precisely sets (correctly too) that: “§1 shall not apply to publicly owned 
credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, 
shall be given the same treatment by national central banks and the European 
Central Bank as private credit institutions”. Thus, the Commission/ECOFIN deci-
sion process could—instantaneously—make the EMS a public bank of EU Member 
States—calling it “European Debt Agency - EDA”—for giving a clear signal to the 
financial markets that the euro-area has instantaneously the capacity to get unlim-
ited liquidity in case of justified needs (under conditions) for giving emergency 
liquidity loans, stopping thus any one-bet speculation like what occurred in the wor-
rying episode of the Euro sovereign-debt crisis, which would not have happened if 
the euro-area has had such an LOLR or a genuine Central Bank.
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Furthermore, in order to provide medium-to-long-run support to adjusting MSs, 
this EMS/EDA could issue its own euro-bonds under strict conditions imposed by 
ECOFIN. The purpose of this measure is triple: (i) to create an operational lever 
upon the spreads on sovereign bonds for supporting—always under conditions—
convergent policies by buying them (or swapping them) with euro-bonds, (ii) to 
develop the euro-bond market for accelerating the financial integration in the euro- 
area by improving liquidity conditions for euro-bonds, and (iii) to provide addi-
tional safe-assets which are the too-narrow base of the reversed pyramid of private 
liquidity which is pro-cyclical and exposed to run for safe assets once global activity 
turns negative. This would create a mechanism for “internalizing” the effects of 
respecting—or not—the common discipline: rewarding approved adjustment poli-
cies by reducing the interest-rate spreads imposed by myopic financial markets, that 
is, giving visible incentives to any member of the euro-area to respect the common 
rules, especially the fiscal discipline, while preventing wild overshooting resulting 
from the financial market excessive reactions.
More technically, the mechanism consists in three articulated successive steps:
 (i) First, the introduction of a system of “blue-bonds versus red-bonds”. Bonds 
getting the EU label of conformity of national fiscal policy with the common 
discipline become “Blue-bonds” and enjoy seniority and full guarantee from 
the EU MS, and all other sovereign bonds become “subordinated” (i.e. neither 
priority nor solidarity guarantee) and become “red-bonds” paying a higher 
spread in exchange for free sovereign issuance. Therefore, once an economy 
would not respect the fiscal discipline, all its bonds issued would be castigated 
automatically by a spread with respect to its past warranted blue-bonds. Such 
a spread permits to internalize very visibly the costs of the non-respect of the 
common rules or interests of the euro-area. The collegial assessment proposing 
the blue label and the conditionality relies upon an independent technical sur-
veillance process (see following section).
 (ii) Second, a solidarity arm with the possibility for EDA to conditionally buy or to 
swap red-bonds with its own EU bonds, improving liquidity conditions and 
reducing the spreads; even an adjusting economy like Greece could demand 
through the technical surveillance exercise (see below) to upgrade as blue- 
bonds its new issuances when a formal stability programme is agreed upon 
with ECOFIN and duly implemented. This tool would give—immediate and 
costless—budgetary advantages to sustainable reforms/policies credibly com-
mitted with ECOFIN and monitored along a medium-term programme of 
reforms. It could also be possible to use the amount of swaps as a lever for 
influencing the spreads on sovereign red-bonds according to the speed of 
implementation of reforms or adjustments. EDA would make profits with the 
resulting appreciation of the red-bonds of adjusting economies, allowing to 
assess its efficiency and to build up free EDA reserves.
 (iii) The next step would be to consider swapping all the sovereign blue-bonds by 
single EU-blue bonds issued by EDA. Indeed, all the euro-area members would 
be already solidary linked by their mutual guarantee given to the labelled sov-
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ereign blue-bonds. Therefore, additional liquidity advantages could result for 
all members (but especially to small/medium economies) and by the technical 
progress to get a genuine benchmark for the euro assets opening interesting 
perspectives of an additional coordination tool. The purpose of this proposed 
experimental new tool would be to unify progressively the euro-bond markets 
while respecting the no-bailing clause and increasing the enforcement power 
of the SGP through the self-interest of Member States to coordinate budgetary 
stances. This tool could be an attractive way to enforce the policy discipline 
without having to take financial sanctions in case of damaging policy 
divergences.
The whole philosophy behind a pact between more EU solidarity for more 
national responsibility relies entirely upon objective and credible technical condi-
tionality. This has not been convincingly the case in the EMU governance. Therefore, 
for breaking the prisoner dilemma, the inseparable complementary initiative is to 
improve the transparency of the monitoring in charge of ECOFIN. Although a sig-
nificant progress was made in 2015 with the creation of the European Fiscal Board 
(EFB)—an independent advisory committee of fiscal experts—the past period 
shows clearly several failures: intergovernmental bias with national Ministers 
behaving in the ECOFIN as “judge & parts”, lack of independence and courage of 
the Commission, lack of transparency and open public debates, and—most grave—
insufficient coverage of the surveillance limited de facto to the SGP. No effective 
monitoring was possible before the crisis, and incumbent governments benefited 
electorally from the short-term advantages of the single currency. In the present 
situation, they try to benefit from their opposition to EU solidarity, demonstrating so 
that MSs behave as free riders with the EU, which indicates so an incoherence in the 
present Treaty and an abuse by the MSs in the EU decision-making.
This is why the recipe needs two components: (i) the scope of the “Independent 
European Monitoring Board – EMB” covers all the policies; (ii) the “charge of the 
proof” is reversed by giving the main role to the independent experts for assessing 
policies and proposing measures and conditionality, the Commission/ECOFIN 
being able to change or to oppose but being publicly accountable of their decisions 
in a special procedure of trans-European public debate among professionals orga-
nized by the European Parliament.
The purpose is to separate explicitly technical analysis from political decisions, 
preventing the damages from too dogmatic positions as this has been the case since 
the euro creation. Politics must remain in its own realm with political choices being 
transparently decided by elected power after previous technical assessments provid-
ing the cost/benefits of any action. This split makes authorities more accountable to 
public opinion. Both technicians and politicians will become more accountable of 
critical political decisions (like the use of EDA solidarity and its conditionality) as 
a result of professional debates, Parliaments’ hearings (European and national) and 
trans-European debates.
Concretely, the existing EFB would be strengthened and included in the broader 
EMB as a specialized department in charge of fiscal policies, proposing to simplify 
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the SGP. A full team of independent economists would cover the other economic 
policies relevant for EMU. Operationally, this would be easy to do by moving some 
experts from DG ECFIN of the Commission to the EMB plus acknowledged experts 
proposed by the European Parliament together with the Commission and approved 
by the ECOFIN.  This EMB would issue and publish regular technical reports 
assessing the macroeconomic development and the policy-mix stances. In addition, 
EMB would be responsible for issuing the technical assessments and conditionality 
proposed to Commission/ECOFIN decisions for getting access to the solidarity 
facilities or for being rated as blue-bonds or red-bonds. Then, Commission would 
formally—but publicly—report to the ECOFIN, taking position on the EMB pro-
posals. Any discrepancy with the EMB report would be intensively scrutinized by 
the EP, the financial press, the think-tanks, International Financial Institutions and 
the international economist community, creating some “cooperative competition” 
between Commission and EMB, stimulating a broad public debate across the EU 
before ECOFIN final decisions. In case of significant discrepancies between final 
decisions and EMB, a special hearing with additional experts would be organized 
by the European Parliament and published.
The purpose is to restore the spirit of the Treaty by increasing transparency and 
accountability and creating horizontal debates across the whole EU reducing the 
democratic gap and improving the existing decision making of ECOFIN and EP, 
ultimate legitimate actors.
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Chapter 23
Proposals for Reforms 
and Democratization of the EMU
Bettina De Souza Guilherme
Abstract In this part of the book, we discuss proposals to improve architectural 
and crisis management lacunas. While other partners of the network present own 
proposals, this chapter has the objective to sketch out proposals, which have been 
discussed or are still in the pipeline at the top level of European Union (EU) 
decision- takers and institutions to remedy lacunas, errors and omissions of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) architecture. A main argument advanced is 
that the reforms with a focus on “risk-avoidance” and stronger “surveillance” and 
“monitoring” had more success, while any reforms based on the principle of “risk- 
sharing have encountered major resistance, both for the financial market regulation 
and for the fiscal framework.
 EMU Design Flaws and Ongoing Reforms
Design flaws of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have been extensively 
discussed in the first part of the joint volume. EMU’s imbalances and instability 
have their origin within its asymmetric construction both in terms of a fully fletched 
supranational monetary union and a largely intergovernmental fiscal policy coordi-
nation and in terms of risk avoidance and risk-sharing mechanisms. The focus of the 
surveillance before the crisis was on the fiscal deficits, while both public and private 
debt, and the rise and risks of macroeconomic imbalances and of deregulated finan-
cial markets were largely disregarded. EMU did not have the institutions, finances, 
tools and rules in place to deal with the crisis in an efficient, adequate and equitable 
way. Informal bodies outside of the EU legal framework rose to be the top decision- 
making institutions taking decision with major impact on the lives and work of EU 
citizens, while democratic accountability was eroded both at EU and at national levels.
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The reform of the financial market regulation has advanced considerably in the 
aftermath of the Lehmann’s bank default, leading to the establishment of the 
“Banking Union,” with a strengthening of financial service regulation and the intro-
duction a supranational supervision by the European Central Bank for systemically 
relevant banks as the first pillar. This can be considered a major achievement, which 
prior to the crisis would have been difficult to envisage. The second pillar of the 
Banking Union deals with a single resolution mechanism (SRM), regulating the 
orderly restructuring of a bank by a resolution authority when the bank is failing or 
at risk to fail for the banks covered by the single supervisory mechanism to avoid 
that tax payers have to pay once again for a failing bank sector. This is why it has at 
its heart the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), financed by contributions of the banking 
sector. In case that the SRF does not have sufficient means, the Member States 
decided in 2013 the establishment of a “common backstop,” which would serve as 
a safety net in case that, after a bailing in or haircut of the banks’ shareholders and 
creditors, the Single Resolution Fund would temporarily not have sufficient 
resources for an orderly resolution of the distressed banks. The Commission pro-
posed to make the backstop part of a future European Monetary Fund (EMF), to be 
established within the EU legal framework, but the Eurogroup preferred to keep the 
intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in place and decided in 
December 2019 to establish the common backstop in the ESM at the latest by 1 
January 2024. “The size of the credit line(s) will be aligned with the target level of 
the SRF, which is 1% of covered deposits in the Banking Union (currently estimated 
at around €55 billion). If the credit line is used, the SRF will pay back the ESM loan 
with money from bank contributions within three years, although this period can be 
extended by up to another two years. As a result, it will be fiscally neutral over the 
medium term.”1
In terms of increasing financial stability and the resilience of EMU, the common 
backstop represents indeed a major step forward and a precious contribution. In 
terms of democratic accountability on the other hand, the fact that the ESM was 
entrusted with the common backstop could eventually signify the perpetuation or at 
least the prolongation for a considerable time of an intergovernmental crisis man-
agement void of proper democratic accountability. A solution could be to transform 
the ESM into the EMF through co-decision, however duly allowing the European 
Parliament to make an input in the shaping of this important crisis management tool 
after all the failures and policy errors in the crisis management and, second, to 
ensure its accountability.
However, it is clear that even given the common backstop, the missing part of the 
regulation and improved resilience as part of the consolidation of the crisis manage-
ment in the financial markets sector is the risk-sharing element, the third pillar of the 
Banking Union, which is the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). In 
November 2015, the Commission presented a proposal on the European deposit 
1 Explainer on ESM reform and revisions to the ESM Treaty, ESM website: https://www.esm.
europa.eu/about-esm/esm-treaty-reform-explainer. Accessed 01 March 2020. 
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insurance scheme (EDIS) for bank deposits in the euro area, building on the system 
of national deposit guarantee schemes, which guarantees the deposit of up to 
100,000 euros in the case that a bank fails in all EU member states and is funded 
entirely by banks. EDIS would provide a stronger and more uniform degree of 
insurance cover in the entire euro area and thus provide a strong protection against 
speculation. The Commission proposal foresees a gradual introduction of EDIS 
with first a “reinsurance phase” in which EDIS would provide liquidity to national 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) in case of a bank failure, which would then have 
to be paid back by the national DGS. In a later phase, the principle of “coinsurance” 
would apply and EDIS could also cover losses, without that national DGS would 
repay them (European Commission 2020). EDIS would on the one hand reduce the 
vulnerability of national DGS with limited financial means to large local shocks and 
on the other hand move against the sovereign-bank nexus by significantly reducing 
the link between banks and their national sovereign ensuring that the level of depos-
itor confidence in a bank would not depend on the bank’s location. This could sig-
nify an important stepping stone in the direction of a genuine European financial 
and capital market. However, negotiations were blocked by both the European 
Parliament and even more in the Council, until late 2019, when the German finance 
minister Scholz presented a proposal on EDIS. However, his proposal restricts EDIS 
to the reinsurance phase and request at the same time more stringent conditions such 
as a concrete target for nonperforming loans  (NPLs).  According to the 
IMF's Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness Indicators 2004 “a loan is non-
performing when payments of interest and/or principal are past due by 90 days or 
more, or interest payments equal to 90 days or more have been capitalized, refi-
nanced, or delayed by agreement, or payments are less than 90 days overdue, but 
there are other good reasons5 —such as a debtor filing for bankruptcy—to doubt 
that payments will be made in full. After a loan is classified as nonperforming, it 
(and/or any replacement loans(s)) should remain classified as such until written off 
or payments of interest and/or principal are received on this or subsequent loans that 
replace the original.” Scholz’s proposal envisages a NPL ratio of below 5% gross 
and 2.5% net, country by country and to introduce non-zero credit risk weights and 
a concentration charge on government debt which would increase capital cost for 
large exposures to individual countries. Both conditions are detrimental to high- 
debt countries like Italy, Portugal and Greece, and the most recent German proposal 
might fail for this reason. The German proposal is a clear attempt to transform a 
proposal, which was meant to be the strongest risk-sharing element of the Banking 
Union, into another element of risk reduction and at the same time falls short of the 
aim of EDIS to give to same feeling of security to avoid a bank run or the distinction 
of the rating of the security of deposits according to the location of the deposit.
Risk avoidance had already been the main characteristic of the Maastricht origi-
nal design of the fiscal framework. Following the crisis, it was further strengthened 
with the 2 and 6 packs, the Fiscal Compact, the institutionalization of the so-called 
European semester, which is the coordination process of economic policies, the 
establishment of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) to monitor any 
developments which could lead to new imbalances. At the same time, the crisis 
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management and the reforms widened the democratic deficit brought about by the 
increase of intergovernmentalism with the rise of the informal Eurogroup together 
with the Eurosummit to the most important decision-taking bodies of the EMU, and 
the creation of further intergovernmental institutions such as the ESM and intergov-
ernmental treaties such as the Fiscal Compact, all outside of the legal framework of 
the EU and bypassing the democratic accountability of the European Parliament 
and in many cases of national parliaments. These developments have induced a 
process of erosion of democratic legitimacy and accountability both at national and 
at EU levels and successively led to a loss of trust in traditional political institutions 
at EU level but even to a stronger extent at national level with the rise of protest 
movements, mushrooming of new parties and movements, an increasing polariza-
tion of society and politics. Neither of the previously mentioned democratic ero-
sions has so far been remedied.
First, the asymmetric construction of EMU hampered its resilience and proved 
ineffective to avoid or shield from a crisis, and the reforms in the aftermath of the 
crisis have at best shown mixed results. The further tightened fiscal rules showed 
success in imposing discipline in regard to the fiscal deficits, which led to a slow 
reduction of the public debt level towards the pre-crisis level over a timespan of 
more than 10 years (however not yet reached). On the other hand, the fiscal frame-
work, even more with the reforms and the imposed adjustment programmes, proved 
to be largely pro-cyclical, inefficient to protect the quality of public expenditure—in 
other words growth-enhancing investment—with negative impacts on productivity, 
competitivity and growth, and inefficient to lead to a reduction of the debt level of 
highly indebted countries, as has been reported by the president of the European 
Fiscal Board (EFB) to the European Parliament (European Fiscal Board 2019). The 
European Fiscal Board, an independent advisory body to the European Commission 
with the objective to improve the current economic governance framework of the 
Economic  and Monetary  Union, criticized the multiple sources of unnecessary 
complexity in the current framework and proposed its simplification with a focus 
rather on debt reduction than on the public deficit. The EFB proposals rely on “a 
simple medium-term debt ceiling and one operational target, namely, a ceiling on 
the growth rate of primary expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, and 
an escape clause triggered on the basis of independent economic judgement. This 
proposal would focus more clearly on underpinning sustainability, improve observ-
ability, simplify the rules and reduce pro-cyclicality.” Additionally, the European 
Fiscal Board proposes the introduction of a limited Golden rule to protect public 
investment. The EFB proposes to exclude some “specific growth enhancing expen-
diture from the net primary expenditure growth ceiling” and “national fiscal council 
institutions could monitor the classification of growth-enhancing expenditure” 
(European Fiscal Board 2019).
In the meantime, climate change had proven to be a major threat to human sur-
vival and requires a change of paradigm which will affect all fields of policy, includ-
ing economic and financial policies. The last elections to the European Parliament 
increased both its legitimacy and the pressure to address the climate crisis with 
serious action. As a consequence, the newly invigorated European Commission 
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adopted the European Green Deal as part of which the Commission announced that 
it will refocus the European Semester process of macroeconomic coordination to 
integrate the United Nations’ Sustainable Development (SDGs) goals, to put sus-
tainability and the well-being of citizens at the centre of economic policy, and the 
sustainable development goals at the heart of the EU’s policymaking and action. 
With the refocusing of the European Semester, the Commission changed the Annual 
Growth Survey into the Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2020 and with it the 
content: “Environmental sustainability, productivity gains, fairness and macroeco-
nomic stability will be the four dimensions of our economic policy in the years to 
come. These dimensions, which are closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing, 
should guide structural reforms, investments and responsible fiscal policies across 
all Member States” (European Commission 2019, p. 3).
The Climate Change Agenda goes beyond fiscal policies, and the Council and 
European Parliament negotiated a list of investment (taxonomy) which should serve 
as guidelines for the ECB, EIB and financial markets, which investments should be 
considered environmentally friendly and should be favoured. With the coinciding of 
the Climate Change Agenda and outstanding reforms of the fiscal framework, the 
coming years will be decisive for implementing reforms which will render the EU 
more resilient for financial, economic and climate crisis. However, one cannot close 
the eyes to the fact that there is a lot of resistance to changes and efforts to water 
down or limit reforms as was the case with the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) to 
make the financial markets pay taxes in general (as any other business sector) and 
compensate for the enormous costs the financial crisis had caused but also taking 
into account the resistance against a common fiscal capacity to counteract against 
asymmetric shocks. Indeed, the crisis gave rise to various concepts of fiscal capaci-
ties which remained not only at the academic level but entered the deliberation at 
the highest level of the EU institutions.
The European Parliament was indeed the first EU institution, which in 2011, 
after a nearly 2 years of extensive hearings with experts, fact finding missions and 
deliberation—within its Special Committee on the Financial, Economic and Social 
Crisis—founded with the purpose to evaluate the causes and make proposal for a 
better crisis resilience of EMU, voted in favour of a euro-area budget and of “the 
development of the concept of a European Treasury to strengthen the economic pil-
lar of EMU.” (European Parliament 2011) According to the European Parliament, 
the euro-area budget should be “a budget of sufficient size to accommodate the euro 
in a sustainable way, providing the currency with a relevant budget space on the 
level of political organisation at which it is issued.” Concerning the details on a 
euro-area budget, the European Parliament referred in its resolution to the McDougall 
report (European Commission 1977), which had analysed the conditions necessary 
for the implementation of the Werner plan for an Economic and Monetary Union in 
the 1970s and affirmed that: (1) the volume of such a budget would have to be 
between 2,5 and 10 percent of Union GNI, depending on whether and which re- 
allocation functions would be assumed by the Union budget (...); (2) the budget 
would need to be financed on the basis of own resources, (...) and; (3) national 
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budgets would be reduced correspondingly in order to achieve tax neutrality for 
citizens and businesses.
The president of the European Council together with the Presidents of the 
Commission, the Euro-group and the European Central Bank published the “Four 
Presidents Report” (Van Rompuy 2012), which underlined that “while the degree of 
centralization of budgetary instruments and the arrangements for fiscal solidarity 
against adverse shocks differ, all other currency unions are endowed with a central 
fiscal capacity.” The report defines a specific and time-bound road map for the 
achievement of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union with the objective to 
improve the resilience of EMU. The Four Presidents envisaged “the creation of a 
shock-absorption function at the central level,” as the “culmination of the process” 
of achieving a fully fledged EMU in its stage 3 (post 2014). In their report, they 
stress that the establishment of “a well-defined and limited fiscal capacity to improve 
the absorption of country specific economic shocks, through an insurance system 
set up at the central level” accompanied by “a built-in incentives-based system 
(which) would encourage euro area Member States eligible for participation in the 
shock absorption function to continue to pursue sound fiscal and structural policies 
in accordance with their contractual obligations.”
The envisaged proposal should thus link “the two objectives of asymmetric 
shock absorption and the promotion of sound economic policies” with the intention 
to render them “complementary and mutually reinforcing.” Additionally, it empha-
sizes the importance of an “increasing degree of common decision-making on 
national budgets and an enhanced coordination of economic policies,” in particular 
in the field of taxation and employment, to prepare for this stage.
The European Commission published its Reflection Paper on Deepening the 
EMU in May 2017 and announced that it will look into different options for a mac-
roeconomic stabilization function for the euro area such as: (1) a European 
Investment Protection Scheme; (2) a European Unemployment Reinsurance 
Scheme; (3) a rainy day fund that could accumulate funds on a regular basis; (4) a 
dedicated euro-area budget; (5) the conversion of the ESM into a European Monetary 
Fund integrated in the EU legal framework.
In addition to these stabilization facilities, the Commission announced an instru-
ment or budget line to support (administrative) capacity building and/or structural 
reforms, which should also support convergence and cohesion to counteract internal 
imbalances, and proposed a regulation establishing the Structural Reform Support 
Programme. An interesting feature of the Reform Support Programmes as well as of 
the Commission Proposals on the Common Provision Regulation (CPR) for all the 
Structural and Cohesion funds is the idea to rather work with incentives to better 
implement the Country-Specific Recommendations (CSR) of the European 
Semester as a conditionality. This approach should be the carrot to incentivize 
adherence to the Country-Specific Recommendations (CSR) of the European 
Semester additionally to the enhanced surveillance of the European Commission 
with the possibility of sanctions, which represents the whip.
In 2018, the Commission presented its proposal on the establishment of a 
European Investment Stabilization Function (EISF) building on the Five Presidents’ 
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report (Juncker 2015) and on the Commission Reflection Papers on Deepening the 
EMU and on the future of EU finances of 28 June 2017. The proposal has the objec-
tive to protect investment in the event of a downturn, by supporting well-identified 
priorities and already planned projects or activities at national level, such as infra-
structure or skills development. As experienced in the Great Recession, public 
investment was the first to be cut in the national budget, which actually deepened 
the economic crisis and had detrimental effects on growth, employment and produc-
tivity. The proposal is based on Article 175(3) of Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), which allows for the creation of an instrument supporting 
eligible public investment in Member States that are confronted with a large asym-
metric shock with a view to strengthen cohesion. It would empower the Commission 
to grant financial assistance to Member States, which are faced with a large asym-
metric shock, by contracting borrowings on the financial markets or with financial 
actors and lending them on to the Member State concerned to maintain eligible 
public investment, specified in an Annex. Additionally, the proposal included the 
possibility that the interest rate costs incurred on the loan could be subsidized. With 
the purpose to link both the risk reduction and risk-sharing approach, access to the 
Stabilization function is conditional on compliance with decisions and recommen-
dations under the fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance framework.
The criterion to activate the support is a double unemployment trigger, because 
strong increases in national unemployment rates are a relevant indicator of the 
impact of a large asymmetric shock. Additionally, it includes an obligation to use 
the support received for investment in policy objectives under the Common 
Provisions Regulation and to maintain the average level of public investment of the 
last 5 years. The proposal was both long awaited but also encountered strong criti-
cism on the one hand from those who are in principle against any risk sharing and 
on the other hand for the rather modest volume of €30 billion earmarked for it.
The European Parliament (2015) having already expressed its support for a fiscal 
capacity, and stabilization function took up the challenge to deliberate on the bases 
of the draft report of the co-rapporteurs Beres-Boege within a joint committee of 
Budget and ECON members among the following lines: First of all, the report pro-
poses that activation trigger should be “automatic,” still based on both the level of 
national unemployment rate compared to its past average and the change in unem-
ployment compared to a certain threshold. The rapporteurs intended to avoid delays 
for the activation and the repetition of the previously witnessed political conflicts 
around financial assistance. Furthermore, with the intention to avoid any revival of 
debtor and creditor conflicts on the financial means, the European Parliament’s draft 
report additionally proposed to feed the fund with Member States’ contributions of 
10% of monetary income allocated to the national central banks of the Eurosystem 
pursuant to Article 32 of Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and the European Central Bank1a and that it should not be less than 
billion euros. In this way, the Parliament intended to increase the budget for the 
EISF to at least €55 billion. Additionally, to the conditionality proposed by the 
Commission, the EP asked for compliance with “a convergence code” focusing on 
a few decisive criteria allowing for better national ownership and for a special clause 
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ensuring that EISF support should be conditional on respect for Union values, and 
Member States subject to a procedure pursuant to Article 7(1) or (2) of the Treaty 
on the European Union should not be eligible.
The Parliament (2017) preferred the EISF to be independent from, and in parallel 
to the ESM and his successor and to ensure a much greater accountability than the 
non-existing accountability of an institution founded outside of the EU legal frame-
work with a yearly exchange of view with the relevant committee and immediately, 
whenever the EISF becomes operational. However, given that the report fell into the 
last year of the legislature, it became victim to the increased political polarization in 
the European Parliament ahead of elections and was not put to vote. It remains a 
pending file to be picked up once one of the future presidencies, possibly the 
Portuguese, in the first half of 2021, intends to push for it again.
In the Council, the proposal had encountered major resistance and did not 
advance much. Indeed, the proposal can also be seen as a fruit of the strong push for 
a Eurozone budget by the newly elected French president Emanuel Macron. In his 
speech of 26 September 2017 at the University of Sorbonne, the newly elected pres-
ident presented his clearly pro-European stance and highlighted the importance of a 
euro-area budget to provide public goods and stability when confronted with eco-
nomic shocks: “We need convergence and stability through national reforms, but 
also by coordinating our economic policies and a common budget. If we want to 
reduce our differences and develop our common goods  – everything I have just 
mentioned, security, protection in the context of migration, digital transition, eco-
logical transition, a genuine development and partnership policy – these common 
goods, foremost among which is our currency, must be financed. And we therefore 
need more investment, we need the means to provide stability in the face of eco-
nomic shocks, as no state can tackle an economic crisis alone when it no longer 
controls its monetary policy. So for all these reasons, yes we need a stronger budget 
within Europe, at the heart of the eurozone.”
To achieve a euro-area budget, the German support is essential, and in June 2018, 
Macron achieved an agreement with Merkel, which was a compromise and spelled 
out in the Meseberg Declaration, in which they proposed “establishing a Eurozone 
budget within the framework of the European Union to promote competitiveness, 
convergence and stabilization in the euro area, starting in 2021. Decisions on the 
funding should take into account the negotiations on the next Multiannual financial 
framework. Resources would come from both national contributions, allocation of 
tax revenues and European resources” (Macron and Merkel 2018). However, in the 
text, it no longer defined the purpose of the eurozone budget to be for stabilization 
but rather to increase “competitiveness and convergence, which would be delivered 
through investment in innovation and human capital. It could finance new invest-
ments and come in substitution of national spending.” Instead of the European 
Investment Stabilization Function, the Meseberg Declaration proposed a European 
Unemployment Stabilization Fund, for the purpose of stabilization in case of severe 
economic crises, without transfers. This idea was promoted by the German Finance 
Minister Olaf Scholz, but found strong opposition both within the German parlia-
ment and among the Nordic countries of the European Union.
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The Unemployment Re-Insurance Scheme has the aim to provide counter- 
cyclical stabilization in case of large labour market shocks and could be funded by 
national contributions and then grant loans to national unemployment insurance 
schemes in times of severe economic crises. The objective of the loans would be to 
avoid cuts in unemployment benefits or increases in social insurance contributions 
in recessions and thereby would allow the role of domestic unemployment insur-
ance schemes to act as an automatic stabilizer (which had been restrained by the 
adjustment programmes). Additionally, it would help to support income in a reces-
sion or stagnation and in particularly the social strata which bears a large part of the 
social costs in a recession, which in term would increase the trust in European insti-
tutions (Beblavý et al. 2015). According to an impact assessment by the Bertelsmann 
Foundation (Dolls 2018), the re-insurance scheme would have cushioned on aver-
age 15–25% of the income losses following large labour market shocks in the period 
2000–2016 through the interregional smoothing channel of the re-insurance and 
would have been revenue-neutral at EA19 and not led to permanent transfers across 
member states. On average, the member states would have paid less than 0.1% of 
their gross domestic product (GDP) annually.
Some of the proposals of the European Commission’s Reflection Paper go 
beyond a funding mechanism and don’t have the target to mitigate economic shocks. 
While the newly elected Commission president, Ursula Von der Leyen, announced 
a proposal for a European Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme to be presented by 
the end of 2020, the only proposal following up Macron’s call for a euro-area bud-
get, which is currently being negotiated in the Council and the European Parliament, 
is the budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness for the euro area 
(BICC). It is a new version of the Reform Support Programme+. In practice, it 
extends the programme from its previous focus on structural reforms to investment 
relevant for convergence and competitiveness. It will not fulfil the purpose of a sta-
bilization of the eurozone in asymmetric shocks, but, if designed in an appropriate 
way, it could help to improve the competitiveness and the convergence of the weaker 
regions and countries and thus counteract the internal imbalances. However, given 
the strong conditionality to the adherence to the fiscal framework and the country- 
specific recommendations, some of the peripheral countries fear that it will rather 
lead to a kind of “rebate” because the countries which are meeting these precondi-
tions might in fact be the strongest economies.
One of the objectives is to offer a carrot to a greater adherence to the country- 
specific recommendations within the European semester. However, the budget fore-
seen in it is also limited to €30 billion, which raises the same criticism as the 
proposal of the EISF and the reform support programme. The former ECB president 
M. Draghi considered the agreement on “the Budgetary Instrument for Convergence 
and Competitiveness a step in the right direction, but it does not yet meet the neces-
sary criteria in terms of size or design.” According to him, “The most effective 
response, however, would be an investment-led stimulus at the euro area level. This 
would be the best way to achieve an efficient distribution of spending among euro 
area countries  – and is a further reason why I have called for a euro area fiscal 
instrument.”
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Another instrument which has better chances to be achieved because it tries to 
avoid any mutualization of debts or permanent transfer is the idea of the Rainy Day 
Fund. A rainy day fund has however the handicap that it would normally limit its 
payments to the accumulated contributions and would probably be too small in case 
of a large shock. Lenarčič and Korhonen (2018) published a saving-loans proposal 
of the Rainy Day Fund (RDF), which would avoid (permanent) transfers between 
member-states in the form of a “non-mutualised European RDF, composed of 
national compartments. In good times, countries would accumulate savings in their 
compartments, accruing self-insurance. In bad times, they would be entitled to use 
the savings in their own compartment, and – if needed – could access limited bor-
rowing from the rest of the fund. Further, the rules for national contributions, pay- 
outs, and repayment of any loans would be based on changes in unemployment 
rates, rather than on levels,” and would “follow the Carnot et  al. (2017) ‘double 
condition’ rule which assumes payments to the fund when unemployment is low 
and decreasing and disbursements when it is high and increasing. Countries would 
repay their loans according to rules similar to those for fund contributions, while 
observing a final maturity linked to the average length of the business cycle” 
(Lenarčič and Korhonen 2018).
In addition to the Euro-area budget and treasury, the European Parliament had 
already in 2011 supported the possible mutual issuance of sovereign debt, Eurobonds 
stimulating fiscal discipline and the EU’s borrowing capacity. The European 
Parliament’s concept on the Eurobonds was largely based on a proposal by Delpla 
and Von Weizsaecker (2011) on the blue bond (2010) and foresaw “that when 
Eurobonds are to be issued, their issuance should be limited to a debt ratio of 60% 
of GDP under joint and several liability as senior sovereign debt, and should be 
linked to incentives to reduce sovereign debt to that level” and that “the overarching 
aim of Eurobonds should be to reduce sovereign debt and to avoid moral hazard and 
prevent speculation against the euro.” At the same time “access to such Eurobonds 
would require agreement on, and implementation of, measurable programmes of 
debt reduction.”
The appealing feature of the Delpla and Von Weizsaecker proposal was that the 
blue bonds would constitute “a liquid and safe asset on par with the US Treasury 
bond. This should help the rise of the euro as a major reserve currency, enabling the 
entire euro area to borrow part of the sovereign debt at interest rates comparable to, 
or hopefully even below, the benchmark German bond” (Delpha and Von 
Weizsaecker 2011). Von Weizsaecker continued his commitment to the Eurobonds 
as a member and rapporteur on the subject “Sovereign bond-backed securities 
(SBBS)” in the European Parliament. The creation of European Safe Bonds 
(ESBies) should help to resolve the ‘diabolic loop’ between sovereign and bank 
risk, coupled with cross-border ‘flight-to-safety’ capital flows by serving as securi-
ties issued by a European Debt Agency (EDA).” ESBies should be composed of the 
senior tranche on a portfolio of sovereign bonds issued by EU Member States, held 
by a European Debt Agency or the ESM and potentially further guaranteed through 
a credit enhancement. The European Commission’s legislative proposal foresaw 
that the SBBS would consist of a diversified pool of euro-area sovereign bonds, 
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according to their economic weight. Advantages of the SBBS are that they would be 
considered save and not require any form of fiscal solidarity among euro-area 
governments.
Concerning a possible European Debt Agency, the European Parliament had 
already in 2011 requested to transform the temporary European Financial Stability 
Fund (EFSF) into a European Debt Agency and the Parliament to be given a consis-
tent role in this modification of the Treaty. However, the European Parliament had 
no say in the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), whose 
objective is to provide financial assistance to the euro-area Member States, which 
undergo a balance of payment crisis, which risks to endanger the financial stability 
of the euro area or of its MS. The EMS remained up to this day a purely intergov-
ernmental organization outside of the legal framework of the EU, which has been 
condemned by the European Parliament as a “setback in the development of the 
Union, essentially at the expense of Parliament, the Court of Auditors and the Court 
of Justice.”
During the Euro crisis, the Eurogroup set up the co-called “Troika,” consisting of 
the European Commission (DG Ecfin), the European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to set up the adjustment programmes for the 
debtor countries and to monitor their implementation. Since the Eurogroup is not a 
formal institution within the EU legal framework, the entire set-up of the financial 
assistance was exposing a blatant void of democratic legitimacy and accountability. 
EU institutions were “instrumentalized” to implement and monitor the political 
guidelines decided within the Eurogroup in “consensus.” Given that no procedures 
and rules for any case of “risk of sovereign default” had been foreseen, the debtor 
countries were absolutely dependent on the “good” or “bad” will of the creditor 
countries, which resulted that the costs of the adjustment of the internal imbalances 
and the bailing out of financial institutions (mainly from the creditor countries) fell 
entirely on the debt countries. It is obvious that the set-up of the decision-making 
process resulted in a number of conflicts of interest of this crisis management pro-
cess given the involvement of their national banks in the creditor countries. The 
European Parliament established the so-called Troika Inquiry Committee to analyse 
how these financial assistances had been handled. It exposed further conflict of 
interest of the European Central Bank—being responsible for the supervision of the 
biggest financial institutions and its role as the central bank (and normally lender of 
last resort) of all EU Member States, which lead the ECB to prevent the bailing in 
of the banks—at least in the first years of the crisis and thus insisting in rolling over 
the costs of the bank failures to citizens and tax payers. At the same time, it seems 
contradictory that an “independent” central bank imposes on Member States to 
change their traditional, equally “autonomous” collective bargaining structures by 
social partner to the detriment of labour. The current irony of history is that the ECB 
is not able to fulfil its primary objective to maintain price stability with the aim at 
inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. The inflation rate 
for 2019 has been 1.3%, and one of the main reasons is that in spite of the improved 
employment situation wage growth does not pick up given wage bargaining shocks 
and the increased number of involuntary part-time, both a consequence of structural 
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reforms as recommended or imposed. The European Commission was as well act-
ing in obvious conflict of interest as it is the institution which should be the guardian 
of the EU treaties, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights and all the objec-
tives of Europe 2020.
Some might argue that the imposed austerity programmes were a necessary evil 
to lead the crisis countries to a situation of sound public finance and to calm the 
financial markets. However, in retrospect, it is clear that the policy recommenda-
tions had not sufficiently taken into account the criteria of debt sustainability at the 
beginning of the financial assistance (as is usually a precondition of the involvement 
of the IMF), had been based on overoptimistic forecasts which were unrealistic to 
achieve, had ignored the functioning of fiscal multipliers and thus led—as had been 
admitted both by the IMF and the Commission—to a largely pro-cyclical policies 
which deepened and prolonged the crisis and finally even led to an increase of the 
debts of the debtor countries. Here I would like to introduce a crucial question: 
Would anybody in retrospect consider these policy recommendations in such an 
economic situation and within the given fiscal framework of the EMU as “sound 
budgetary policies” and will they be the same policies again? Were the underlying 
reasons behind these draconian but economically nonsensical measures at the given 
time not rather meant as a deterrent for any future fiscal lenience? Indeed, this is the 
Achilles heel of any future assistance programme design. ECB’s Draghi resumed in 
his farewell remarks that “in other regions where fiscal policy has played a greater 
role since the crisis, we have seen that the recovery began sooner and the return to 
price stability has been faster. The US had a deficit of 3.6% on average from 2009 
to 2018, while the euro area had a surplus of 0.5%. In other words, the US has had 
both a capital markets union and a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The euro area had 
no capital markets union and a pro-cyclical fiscal policy.” However, his quotation 
exposes the fact that according to the standards of the EU fiscal framework, the 
surplus of 0.5% would certainly be considered the sounder budgetary policy and 
would be reapplied again. It might be worthwhile to empower the European Fiscal 
Board to have a role in the definition of the adjustment programmes, as recom-
mended by Christian Ghymers (Chap. 22), however, after the European Parliament 
has defined a framework of (human) and social rights, which must not be under-
mined again.
The European Court of Justice has clearly explained the conditions for financial 
assistance in the EU: Article 125 TFEU does not prohibit the granting of financial 
assistance by one or more Member States to a Member State which remains respon-
sible for its commitments to its creditors provided that the conditions attached to 
such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound 
budgetary policy. Based on this article, the ESM financial assistance is strictly con-
ditional on the implementation of policy measures. As previously with the Troika, 
measures are specified in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), but will be 
negotiated by the European Commission on behalf of the ESM, the European 
Central Bank (ECB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (where applicable) 
and the beneficiary Member State. The lending instrument and the attached condi-
tions are approved by the ESM Board of Governors, which is composed of the Euro 
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Area Finance Ministers. In other words, the ESM is once again the prolonged arm 
of the Eurogroup, instrumentalizing both the European Commission and the ECB 
for the purpose of elaborating Memorandum of Understandings in line with their 
guidelines, by taking decisions in consensus, risking to repeat the same kind of 
conflicts as experienced in the past crisis. Additionally, although both institutions 
participate regularly in exchange of views in the European Parliament, neither the 
Eurogroup nor the ESM is legally  democratically accountable to the European 
Parliament (Zoppe et al. 2019).
 Addressing the Erosion of Democratic Legitimacy 
and Accountability of the EMU
In order to correct the architectural omissions, which led to an erosion of demo-
cratic legitimacy and accountability both at EU and at national levels, it would thus 
be urgent to either abolish the Eurogroup altogether again given that the UK has left 
the European Union which had been one of the main reasons to establish it anyway. 
Otherwise, the best alternative would be to integrate it within the EU legal frame-
work and thus correct the democratic deficit by making it fully accountable to the 
European Parliament. To avoid also a conflict of interest of president of the 
Eurogroup which is at the same time a full-time finance minister of a member-state, 
it would be better to introduce a full-time president of the Eurogroup, in whose 
nomination procedure the European Parliament would be involved. One possibility 
which has been proposed in the Commission’ Reflection Paper on EMU was to 
merge this function with the Commissioner on economics and to make him Vice 
President of the European Commission. The European Parliament in turn could cre-
ate a subcommittee on EMU and limit the voting rights to members of the European 
Parliament from EMU Member States in plenary.
Concerning the democratization of the financial assistance, be it within a 
European Monetary Fund (EMF) to be created, or by transforming the already exist-
ing European Stability Mechanism into an EMF, the important element is to give the 
European Parliament the right to co-decision on its architecture and to propose the 
changes necessary to take into account the lessons learnt from the assistance pro-
grammes of the last decade. It is clear that the policy recommendations within the 
financial assistance programmes cannot be a one-size-fits-all, but need to take into 
account the specific economic situation, crisis and circumstances of each country at 
a given time and respect democratic preferences of policies to achieve certain eco-
nomic objectives. However, it would be extremely useful for the European 
Parliament to already define a certain framework and conditions and (human)rights 
which must be guaranteed.
Resuming the reforms undertaken or being discussed at EU level in the aftermath 
of the crisis, we can clearly identify that there is a persistent resistance to any mea-
sures of risk sharing both in the area of financial markets, but even more concerning 
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fiscal policies. Yet, if we consider the most successful crisis management under-
taken at EU level, we can clearly see that the ECB was the one institution which put 
on hold financial market speculation by demonstrating that they will do “whatever 
it takes” in a common monetary policy. Had there been a Eurozone budget or any 
other form of fiscal capacity in place, alone its existence would already have calmed 
down the eurocrisis, or it might even never have come about.
Changes of the treaties are a risky endeavour in the European Union. However, 
Fabbrini (2019) states that “the current EU constitutional framework already allows 
taking important steps towards the creation of a fiscal capacity, and Brexit –the deci-
sion of the United Kingdom (UK) to withdraw from the EU  – actually opens a 
window of opportunity to this end. Nevertheless, as the in-depth analysis suggests 
in light of comparative insights, the proper design of a Eurozone budget is a pre- 
condition for its success: in particular, it is crucial that such a fiscal capacity be 
funded by real own resources, rather than state transfers, and subjected to mecha-
nisms of democratic legitimation.” Indeed, the UK departure represents a window 
of opportunity for treaty changes and a chance to move towards a more solidary and 
united European Union. Europe’s resilience and role in the world actually depend 
on its capacity to grow together not only in the form of an internal market but truly 
towards a real Economic and Monetary Union, and on whether Europe can regain 
its influence by sharing sovereignty: “In a globalized world, sharing sovereignty is 
a way to regain sovereignty” (Draghi 2019).
Disclaimer The opinions expressed in this introduction/volume are the sole responsibility of the 
authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament or of any 
other EU institution.
References
Beblavý, M., Marconi, G., & Maselli, I. (2015). A European unemployment benefits scheme: The 
rationale and the challenges ahead. CEPS Special Report, 19. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publi-
cations/european-unemployment-benefits-scheme-rationale-and-challenges-ahead/. Accessed 
1 Mar 2020.
Delpla, J., & Von Weizsaecker, J. (2011). Eurobonds: The blue bond concept and its implica-
tions. Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2011/02 March 2011. https://bruegel.org/wp-content/
uploads/imported/publications/110322_pc_blue_bonds.pdf. Accessed 1 Mar 2020.
Dolls, M. (2018). An unemployment re-insurance scheme for the Eurozone? Stabilizing and 
redistribute effects. Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018. https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/filead-
min/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/EZ_Study_Re-Insurance_2018_ENG.pdf. 
Accessed 1 Mar 2020.
Draghi, M. (2019). Farewell speech, at the ECB, Frankfurt, 29 Oct 2019.
European Commission. (1977). The MacDougall report — Volume I. Study group on the role of 
public finance in European integration. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/
documentation/chapter8/19770401en73macdougallrepvol1.pdf. Accessed 1 Mar 2020.
European Commission. (2019). Commission communication on the European Green Deal, COM 
(2019) 640 final, 11.12.2019. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european-green-deal-
communication_en.pdf. Accessed 1 Mar 2020.
B. De Souza Guilherme
359
European Commission. (2020). European commission 2020 work programme: An ambitious road-
map for a union that strives for more. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
IP_20_124. Accessed 1 Mar 2020.
European Fiscal Board. (2019). Assessment of the EU fiscal rules with a focus on the six-pack and 
two-pack legislation, August 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/assessment-eu-fiscal-
rules-focus-six-and-two-pack-legislation_en. Accessed 1 Mar 2020.
European Parliament. (2011). Resolution of 6 July 2011 on the financial, economic and social cri-
sis: Recommendations concerning the measures and initiatives to be taken (2010/2242(INI)). 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?reference=P7-TA-2011-0331&type=TA&l
anguage=EN&redirect. Accessed 1 Mar 2020.
European Parliament. (2015). Resolution on the review of the economic governance frame-
work: Stocktaking and challenges of 2015. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/
TA-8-2015-0238_EN.html. Accessed 1 Mar 2020.
European Parliament. (2017). Resolution on the budgetary capacity for the euro area in 2017. 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0050_EN.html. Accessed 1 
Mar 2020.
European Commission. (2017). Reflection paper on the future of EU finances, 28 June 2017, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-eu-finances_en.pdf
European Parliament. (2018). Draft report on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the establishment o1f a European Investment Stabilisation 
Function (COM(2018)0387 - C8-0241/2018 - 2018/0212(COD)), Committee on Budgets and 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Rapporteurs: Reimer Böge, Pervenche Berès, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CJ16-PR-628556_EN.htm. 4 October 2018.
Fabbrini, F. (2019). A fiscal capacity for the Eurozone: Constitutional perspectives. In depth anal-
ysis. European Parliament, February 2019. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
IDAN/2019/608862/IPOL_IDA(2019)608862_EN.pdf. Accessed 1 Mar 2020.
IMF Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness Indicators 2004, paragraphs 4.84-4.85, (https://
www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi/eng/2004/guide/index.htm)
Juncker, C. (2015). Completing Europe’s economic and monetary union (“Five Presidents report”). 
Report by Jean-Claude Juncker, in close cooperation with Donald Tusk, J.  Disselbloem, 
M.  Draghi, & M.  Schultz. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/5-presi-
dents-report_en.pdf. Accessed 1 Mar 2020.
Lenarčič, A., & Korhonen, K. (2018). A case for a European rainy day fund. European stability 
mechanism. https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dp5.pdf. Accessed 1 Mar 2020.
Macron, E., & Merkel, A. (2018). Meseberg declaration: Renewing Europe’s promises of secu-
rity and prosperity. 19 June 2018. https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-de/meta/startseite/
meseberg-declaration-1140806. Accessed 1 Mar 2020.
Van Rompuy H. (2012). Towards a genuine economic and monetary union/“Four Presidents 
report”, Report by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, EUCO 120/12, 26 
June 2012. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/33785/131201.pdf
Zoppe, A., & Dias, C. (2019). The European stability mechanism: main features, instruments 
and accountability. European Parliament. Economic Governance Support Unit. https://www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2014/497755/IPOL-ECON_NT(2014)497755_
EN.pdf. Accessed 1 Mar 2020.
23 Proposals for Reforms and Democratization of the EMU
360
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
B. De Souza Guilherme
361© The Author(s) 2021
B. De Souza Guilherme et al. (eds.), Financial Crisis Management and 
Democracy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54895-7_24
Chapter 24
Operational Proposal for an EU-CELAC 
Strategic Alliance
Christian Ghymers
Abstract This chapter proposes the strengthening of the bi-regional cooperation 
EU-Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) based upon a bottom-up exchanges 
across experts and officials through an innovative two-leg strategy of bi-regional 
dialogues. 
 Introduction
The European Union (EU) economies and other regions of the world are affected by 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its continuation and prolonged effects. 
Starting from the identification of the unsustainable character of the present eco-
nomic system for intertwined macrofinancial and environmental reasons (see Chaps. 
2 and 3 in this volume), the purpose of this chapter is to propose a costless for-
mula  of bi-regional cooperation between the EU and the Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) region for tackling the unsustainable aspects of their economies. 
The basic assumption upon which relies our Network “Crisis  – Democracy  – 
Equity” is that in spite of huge differences between the EU and LAC regions from a 
structural and socio-institutional point of view, the GFC and its consequences 
deserve to be analysed in a comparative way in order to identify not only common 
elements and interests but also differences with the view to formulate concrete pro-
posals for resolving the systemic crisis in a cooperative way.
Economic growth in the LAC area as in the EU is not sustainable. In particular 
productivity growth is very low in the EU and even negative in LAC. The solution 
is to recover a higher sustainable path of growth for productivity in both regions. 
The argument advanced in this chapter is that this urgent requirement could be 
better satisfied by an acceleration of the bi-regional cooperation EU-LAC especially 
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based upon an innovative two-leg strategy of bi-regional dialogues among stake-
holders and experts: (i) one between stakeholders from academic, scientific and 
firms cooperation in order to reduce their gaps with the SMEs and accelerate the 
diffusion of innovation and technologies in the whole economies, and (ii) a comple-
mentary one for interconnecting experts dedicated to macroeconomic aspects for 
anchoring stability through a mutual scrutiny of policy mixes in a macroeconomic 
mutual monitoring spurring regional and bi-regional cohesion and increasing the 
common EU-LAC voice on financial markets and inside multilateral 
organizations.
 The Method: Fostering a Dynamic Bi-regional Cooperation 
with a Bottom-Up Exchanges Across Experts and Officials 
Through 
a Two-Tier System of NetworksIntra- and Inter-regions
We propose a Plan with simple mechanisms for triggering new dynamics in the bi- 
regional relations. The proposal consists in a set of two complementary exchange 
initiatives able to change the routine and to free innovation capacities, and is based 
upon the concrete experiments of the EU,1 of REDIMA2  -  Red de Dialogos 
Macroeconomico, ECLAC-CEPAL (Ghymers 2005), for Latin America as well as 
equivalent cases in other regions:3
 1. To propose to all Bi-regional Summit participants the development of a “bottom-
 up method” for broadening the process of defining the content of the Strategic 
Alliance and the inputs for selecting cooperative ideas and projects to the Summit 
agenda. This “peer pressure” method consists in launching a two-leg (macroeco-
nomic and industrial dialogue networks), two-sector (public policies and private 
firms) and two-tier (regional and bi-regional levels) system of broad informal 
networks (internet) gathering basic actors for expressing their views and needs 
of regional and bi-regional cooperation:
 1.1. First, to create (with incentives) in CELAC and EU civil-servant networks 
between national administrations and experts, one network per technical 
1 Not for importing the EU model, but only the method which proved to be useful for stimulating 
regional cooperation by breaking the prisoner dilemma between national governments  (see 
Ghymers 2005).
2 Although conceived for macroeconomic policy monitoring, the REDIMA experiment is valid for 
spurring regional cooperation in any key area since it tackles the obstacles due to situation of pris-
oner’s dilemma (see Ghymers 2005). 
3 The move from West African Monetary Union (UMOA) to West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (UEMOA) in the Western CFA Franc monetary Union and the move from the Monetary 
Union (UMAC) to Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) in the 
Equatorial CFA Franc monetary union. See: Ghymers (1997).
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issue or policy; each participant acts on his own, without committing his 
administration or minister in confidential exchanges under “Chatham rule”;
 1.2. Second, to do the same for the business sectors, using the national Chambers 
of Commerce and SMEs’ associations as well as company or sector 
representations;
 1.3. Third, to connect each regional network (public policies and private firms) 
for developing at bi-regional level a direct mean of free exchanges and 
cooperation, giving so a direct voice channel to the peers in charge of poli-
cies and Trade/investment/production/employment;
 1.4. Fourth step is to collect the results at official level for processing them with 
transparency at ministerial level for bringing them in the Summit agenda 
and taking actions in bi-regional cooperation programmes.
These autonomous networks managed by the basic actors allow for direct trans- 
regional consultations first, followed by extending consultations and exchanges to 
the bi-regional level between these basic actors  from each regions. Autonomous 
networks permit a genuine technical democratization which gives a voice and stim-
ulate initiative and innovation from civil servant experts and private firms. 
Experiences in Africa and Latin America show that encouraging and warranting the 
informal and free nature (open competition between participants speaking on their 
own and not in the name of their institution) of the exchanges ensure a powerful 
dynamics and an endogenous development of structured networks beneficial for the 
policymakers. An emulation among technicians spurs the use of this tool in the own 
interest of the participants and their hierarchies, with a mechanism of self-selection 
from them to the EU/CELAC procedures, through incentives created by each coun-
try (and/or sub-region) in favour of the people in charge of each national administra-
tion (regional rewards, scholarships, missions, etc.).
By organizing incentives for making each separated technical network to report 
systematically to the decision-maker levels (ministers of both regions and Summit 
participants), they provide them with a spontaneous generation of ideas and projects 
which offer an extraordinary flow of innovations and efficient contributions to 
regional integration and bi-regional cooperation. In exchange, the participants can 
express their voice and transmit their views and advices to policymakers for reach-
ing consensual positions successively at regional and bi-regional levels, about the 
main issues for which these actors consider that regional cooperation would be ben-
eficial for them.
The need to maximize the interests of basic actors in the bi-regional cooperation 
moves them in favour of cooperative actions, both among peers in the public sector 
and for SMEs or for other interested firms. Thus, these networks—if sufficiently 
autonomous—have the potential to decentralize and to trigger a competition among 
actors which stimulates the efforts for identifying and selecting concrete bi-regional 
cooperation in their own interests in their area of technical responsibilities but lim-
ited by the scrutiny of their peers. Not for taking decisions but just for emulating 
regional and bi-regional cooperation at technical levels of public policies and firms. 
This “peer selection” mechanism is very powerful when it enjoys sufficient 
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autonomy for freeing technical competences in a competitive run for identifying 
common interests according to pure technical or scientific criteria by the technicians 
who participate in each network. The role of governments is only active at the two 
ends of the networks: at the starting point by deciding their administrations to 
launch the networks allowing civil servants to participate actively on their own (not 
as their delegates) since national administrations and ministers are the direct benefi-
ciaries of the works of the networks, and at the end of the works for decision making 
after collecting the results with conclusions, proposals, ideas or merely information 
on what the partners think, are doing or planning to do (exchanges of best practices 
or failures).
The final step of this “REDIMA4 recipe” for renewing the bi-regional agenda and 
working methods is to organize at official level (Ministers and Heads of State or 
Government) a decision-making process. It would merely consist in creating 
“Bi-regional Minister Councils” for deciding the ranking of priorities for common 
action and cooperation, as well as the organization and monitoring of the implemen-
tation of the Summit decisions. This method should be applied for dealing with four 
different issues by exchanging best practices and analysis on: (i) policies for restor-
ing a sustainable growth path for productivity, (ii) social policies, (iii) decarboniza-
tion and environmental policies, and (iv) implementing a Mutual Macroeconomic 
Monitoring for anchoring macroeconomic stability and mutual confidence.
 Restoring Sustainable Productivity Growth
Most of the lagging productivity in both regions comes from the insufficient diffu-
sion of technology (mainly in the service and logistic sectors) rather than at the 
technological frontier, and adopting a bi-regional approach allows for exploiting 
differences and triggering fast synergies to close the gap between the frontier firms 
and most other firms and sectors  inside each economy, a much easier task if an 
adequate EU cooperation allows for wrapping together the productivity increases. 
Contrary to superficial views, EU and LAC respective productivity weaknesses are 
additional reasons for spurring a deeper Strategic Alliance between the two regions. 
This chapter advocates for using the existing Bi-regional Summit Diplomacy as a 
catalytic tool for generating a new dynamic in these EU-LAC relations by formulat-
ing an operational method for decentralizing the preparation of the Summits and 
taking charge of dynamizing the follow-up with cooperation tools. This broadening 
of the bi-regional Summit is presented as an “EU-LAC Monnet Plan” for defining 
and executing the “Strategic Alliance” which was declared in 1999 in Rio by the EU 
and the LAC countries  but with a too timid content and few realizations  in two 
decades.
4 See footnote 2, the purpose is to extend the REDIMA approach to key aspects of the EU-LAC 
cooperation.
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 The Economic Deadlock of the LAC Economies According 
to Their Productivity Performance (TFP)
It is an amazing phenomenon that productivity progress—the driving engine of 
socio-economic prosperity—is in trouble and about to stop in the advanced econo-
mies—especially in EU economies—and has even turned negative in LACs ones. 
The adequate concept to use is that of “total factor productivity” (TFP) (or multi- 
factor productivity), i.e. the difference between the rate of growth of output and the 
rate of growth of the factors and inputs used for producing that output. It therefore 
provides a simple but powerful indicator of economic efficiency or “cost reduction” 
for an economy as a whole. It is the only sustainable source of long-term economic 
growth and social progress. Without productivity growth, an economy will slowly 
grind to a halt and to social and financial troubles. It is the only growth factor that 
does not suffer from diminishing returns as homogeneous inputs typically do. TFP 
growth represents the so-called “positive externalities” which arise from techno-
logical progress, innovation and the socio-institutional framework in which produc-
tion is organized. If sustained, low productivity growth would have profound 
adverse implications for progress in global living standards, the sustainability of 
private and public debts, social protection systems, and the ability of macroeco-
nomic policies to respond to future shocks and to the ageing costs. The LACs’ 
economies are affected by the same disease as other regions but at a higher degree 
of toxicity. During the same long-term period as shown in Fig. 24.1, the TFP growth 
for the CELAC economies is even worst since it is negative (−0.11% per year), and 
only the very poor region of Sub-Saharan Africa registers a worse performance 
(−0.5%) (Fig. 24.2).
This very poor performance of long-run TFP growth translates or “explains” 
statistically the impossibility for LAC economies, as a whole, to catch up with the 
advanced economies and to follow the emerging ones. The observed growth rate for 
the GDP of LAC area is the result of an improvement of labour absorption (demo-
graphic dividend and women inclusion, i.e. more productive workers) and human 
Fig. 24.1 CELAC region, long-term annual growth rate of Total Factor Productivity Growth, 
1960–2014 (Source: IDB 2018)
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capital (better education) combined with an investment increase. However, these 
efforts were more than compensated by a loss in efficiency, i.e. the bad TFP perfor-
mance (30% less than the US). Alternatively, this appears also in the fact that in the 
LAC region, any additional investment yields less than in the advanced economies 
or the emerging ones. For example, in South Korea, the capital stock increased two 
times faster than GDP between 1960 and 2017, while in Brazil, the capital stock 
increased three times faster than GDP for the same period. But this gap in “capital 
deepening” is not due to a better effort of investment in Brazil with respect to Korea, 
but to a lower growth of GDP for the same effort of investment, i.e. to a lower effi-
ciency of Brazilian economy, and apart from that in Brazil, labour inputs also con-
tributed positively to output increases. IDB (2018) calculated that if the LAC would 
have invested at the same rate than that in Emerging Asia (+7% in LAC investment 
ratio) and if the efficiency of the investment would have been the same (capital 
output ratio of 3.5 versus 5  in LAC), the level of LAC GDP would be six times 
higher in 2017 than the observed GDP for the same year.
The diagnostic appears to be clear: the LAC economies as a whole are less effi-
cient than the advanced and emerging economies, their scarce resources dedicated 
to investment are more wasted than elsewhere, and in the next future, the demo-
graphic dividend as well as the environment’s deterioration are about to turn into 
additional negative factors for growth. A radical change is needed both for reversing 
the general slowdown in TFP and for solving the specific inefficiency of the LAC 
economies.
Fig. 24.2 LAC region, relative evolutions of GDP, TFP and Factors accumulation with respect to 
the US economy 1960–2010. (Source: OECD 2019)
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 The Common Features Between the EU and LAC 
Performances in TFP
The EU and LAC regions share the same TFP disease as the rest of advanced econo-
mies, but with a common distinctive feature with respect to the US economy. When 
comparing the EU to the US TFP growth, the main part of the European lag comes 
from the lower productivity performance in European service sectors, as a result of 
low competitive pressures and heterogeneous regulations which blunt the incentives 
to adopt best practices. When comparing the LAC economies with the US and the 
EU ones, this disadvantage is even bigger and constitutes a major obstacle to the 
catching-up process and the necessary improvement in their competitiveness for 
facing the global and social challenges their economies are condemned to solve 
quickly. Inefficiencies come mainly from services but are also affecting manufac-
turing since in globalization the competition in tasks (not any more in products) 
makes efficient services the key for participation to Global Value Chains (GVCs). 
Inefficiencies in services result from distortions in incentives for innovation and 
protection rules favourable to inefficient firms, both in the LAC and the EU, but 
with big differences between the EU and the LAC. These differences offer a won-
derful opportunity for bi-regional alliances and cooperation, mutually beneficial. 
TFP potential growth is enormous for both regions by organizing technological 
transfer between the EU and the LAC in a strategy for SMEs’ joint competitiveness 
on GVCs.
This handicap in services is really the key of the needed productive transforma-
tion the LAC economies (as well as the EU ones) require. Services, in the broadest 
sense, including logistic and infrastructure, are the basic determinants of a fruitful 
and dynamic participation to Global Value Chains (GVCs) which would allow the 
increase of TFP and so putting both regions on a higher growth path. In fact, this 
common feature to the EU and the LAC economies is linked to the weakening dif-
fusion mechanism of innovation to the whole economy. The reasons are very com-
plex and very different from one region (or country) to the other; however, it is 
interesting to try to apply to them the same analytical scheme in order to identify 
common issues from idiosyncratic specificities. The lagging TFP in the LAC should 
not be a surprise as the diffusion mechanism is precisely what characterized an 
emerging economy while the so-called “under-development trap” impedes this dif-
fusion and maintains dualistic features inside the same economy with a big differ-
ence in productivity across sectors. This “internal gap” in productivity reflects the 
social exclusion in the LAC economies and generates a “vicious circles” typical of 
poorer countries. In fact, as shown by ECLAC studies, the internal productivity gap 
between the modern export sector and the rest of the economy reveals a sectoral 
strong heterogeneity which generates social inequalities, which in turn slows down 
progress in productivity and innovation, leading to the so-called “external gap”, or 
lack of structural competitiveness, due to exports with low impact on growth and 
social progress (less inclusive exports and international insertion). Large internal 
gaps reinforce the external gap and partially feed on it. Thus, vicious circles are 
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created, not only in terms of poverty and low growth, but also slow in learning and 
weak structural changes, all of which hinder regional integration and reinforce their 
handicap in competitiveness, to be able to insert themselves to value chains under 
good conditions. Since low productivity sectors have great difficulties for improv-
ing human capital, innovating, adopting technology and driving learning processes, 
the internal heterogeneity worsens systemic competitiveness issues, poor interna-
tional insertion and social exclusion.
In the EU, although the breakdown of the diffusion mechanism cannot be 
explained in the same way by under-development, there are yet similar processes 
through the increasing social inequalities linked to rent-seeking attitudes which lead 
to social exclusion too with a negative impact upon growth. In addition, the impact 
of the global crisis has played the same role in both regions for dampening the TFP 
progress through less investment and less innovation. The remedies are very similar, 
but in the EU, they deal more with the technological frontier firms and sectors. 
Since the LAC economies are much less present at the frontier (top technological 
firms and sectors), the priority for the LAC economies is merely to concentrate 
efforts where the results on TFP should be the highest and the cheapest, i.e. to focus 
their efforts towards the third mechanism: to raise the productivity of laggard firms 
and to accelerate the technological diffusion to the whole economy, to SMEs and to 
the labour force, something that necessarily involves universities. The technological 
gap is not only much easier and faster to close for the followers than for the leaders, 
but it is a prerequisite for climbing the production chains up to acquiring leading 
roles. Indeed, the spillovers across firms and sectors are increasing with the catch-
ing- up process and are two ways: modernization by importing leader technology 
opens the road to local innovation and diversification of technology, creating spe-
cific “niches” inside the Global Value Chains (GVCs) and improving also profit-
ability for both partners.
This general predicament is of course easy to say, but it takes its attractive opera-
tional sense by considering the higher returns the bi-regional cooperation could 
bring inside the strategic alliance that both regions intended to build together. The 
major objective should be to dedicate this alliance for improving their joint com-
petitiveness in the globalized world by cooperating to increase the diffusion mecha-
nism for reducing their respective productivity gaps with the technological frontier 
and the top firms.
 Some Key Weaknesses in LAC Economies Which Explain 
the Lagging TFP
Considering the most important causes for the lagging TFP in the LAC economies, 
a simple activation and extension of the existing tools for bi-regional cooperation 
could do most of the tasks for meeting the challenges both regions are facing. First, 
economic openness in the LAC economies remains insufficient, despite some clear 
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progress. Without getting into details or countries, Fig. 24.3 speaks for itself show-
ing the LAC economies are the less opened of the regions. Empirical results demon-
strate that trade openness is an important factor of TFP through several channels 
(competition, investments, specialization, technological information and spill-
overs). International Monetary Fund (IMF) research shows that reduction in input 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers is found to raise strongly TFP levels (Ahn et al. 2016; 
Dabla-Norris and Duval 2016), especially where protection is still high. Trade 
appears to be closely correlated to foreign direct investment (FDI) to which the 
region is not sufficiently open for benefitting from knowledge spillovers of FDI 
which spur TFP. Figure 24.4 shows this strong correlation.
The kind of strategic alliance both regions are trying to implement points pre-
cisely to increase mutually their respective markets and their reciprocal flows of 
investment, one of the keys to TFP improvements. Second, Fig. 24.5 shows that the 
region is also the less integrated into Global Value Chains. Globalization produced 
this fragmentation of the production processes, allowing for firms from less devel-
oped economies to join the global production network by specializing in specific 
activities within the value chain, focusing on those core tasks they are most efficient 
at without being obliged to create their own whole cluster and network as mature 
economies were obliged to do in their past stages of development. Recent empirical 
studies established a direct impact upon TFP and higher participation in GVCs 
(effects of specialization and scale economies, access to frontier technologies and 
markets, higher technology inputs, knowledge spillovers through cooperation with 
providers and suppliers). Economies can participate in GVCs by using imported 
inputs in their exports (so-called backward linkages) or by supplying intermediates 
to third country exports (forward linkages). GVC participation varies substantially 
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Fig. 24.3 Regional comparison of trade openness of LAC economies 1975–2016 (trade flows 
measured as % of GDP). (Source: Morgan 2017)
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across different Latin American countries. According to OECD (2019) database, 
Chile has the highest level of total GVC participation of the Latin American econo-
mies, accounting for 52% of gross exports (which is mainly driven by forward par-
ticipation because of its copper exports). However, many other Latin American 
economies are not well integrated within GVCs compared to other developing Asian 
and Eastern European economies. For example, the total GVC participation repre-
sents only 31% of gross exports in Argentina and 35% in Brazil.
Fig. 24.4 Correlation between Trade and FDI for LAC (billions of US $). (Source: Morgan 2017)
Fig. 24.5 Global Value Chain participation index by region (share of domestic and foreign value 
added in gross exports). (Source: Morgan 2017)
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More importantly, regional value chains within Latin America are also much less 
developed than in Europe, South-East Asia or North America. Intra-regional links 
are very low: out of the total foreign value added used for producing exports, only 
9% was sourced from within the region against 50% in the EU and 40% in Asia 
(Cadestin et al. 2016). Latin American economies are more integrated with external 
actors (e.g. China) than intra-regionally but with less transmission to the national 
economies. Also, firms in Latin America show a very low propensity to innovate 
through international collaborations, with 21% of Brazilian and 8% of Chilean large 
firms and only 2% of Brazilian and 3% of Chilean small firms doing so. These fig-
ures are much lower than in the OECD and Asian economies. For example, the 
share of SMEs collaborating on innovation with higher education or research insti-
tutions in the OECD economies is 14.5%, and for large firms, it is 37% (OECD 
2019). On these aspects too, a bi-regional approach would inevitably bring more 
regional cooperation, and also a more inclusive development through the explicit 
cooperation orientation and tools that are available.
Third, regional integration is lower than in other regions, and even Africa has 
now a higher share of intra-regional trade than the LAC area. This feature is a major 
handicap for productivity increase and for competitiveness and incorporation to 
dynamic GVCs. One of the constant guidelines of the EU agreements is to incentiv-
ize regional integration with specific methods and tools (Fig. 24.6).
Although not the only weaknesses that affect negatively the TFP growth in the 
LAC, these three categories are precisely those that could be solved through a stra-
tegic alliance with the EU along the lines exposed in the next section.
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Fig. 24.6 Intra-regional exports versus inter-regional by region (in % of total exports 2015). 
(Sources: IMF 2017)
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 The Win-Win Game of an EU-LAC Cooperation Addressing 
the Laggard TFP
According to our analysis, the priority for both the EU and the LAC economies 
should be to deal with the weakening in the technological diffusion mechanism. 
Indeed, in the EU, the TFP issue relies mostly in the too low productivity in the 
service sectors. In the LAC, the issue is much deeper because the gap is higher and 
more generalized to the whole economy: the rising gap between frontier firms and 
the rest of the economy dominated by inefficient SMEs is bigger. The positive 
appealing aspect is that focusing the efforts upon the pace at which the innovations 
spread throughout the economy by dealing with SMEs could yield much more TFP 
jumps than to try to develop new technologies for the frontier firms. Furthermore—
and more importantly—the easiest way to do it is through a mutually profitable bi- 
regional cooperation between academics and SMEs, since it is based upon 
technological exchanges, regional benchmarking, joint researches and joint ven-
tures, which are powerful ways to spur catching-up and innovation.
Our argument is structured as follows:
• Based upon the big change induced by globalization provoking the acceleration 
of the law of comparative advantages, a systematic fragmentation of tasks and 
outsourcing has resulted worldwide of the whole production chain, including the 
part R&D (knowledge).
• Exchanges of experiences between the EU and the LAC allow for making more 
visible common interests to strengthen the GVCs to which both producers belong:
 1. Weakest/smallest producers benefit more from being brought into a GVC for 
technological transfer and access to market which is fast, cheap and with a 
lever effect in the local environment,
 2. Wide productivity gaps allow for complementarity opportunities to be 
exploited in mutual interests along the GVC in a double dynamic: lower costs 
for inputs for the most advanced partner, opportunities for outsourcing benefi-
cial to both partners (new jobs in both regions as competitiveness increases 
along the GVC, cfr. Germany case with Eastern European economies) and 
broader field of differences spurring innovation.
Indeed, the actual way to spur productivity simultaneously in both regions is by 
using the profit-seeking drive of firms (and also in some cases with the cooperation 
of academics) looking at differences and complementarities that the respective 
GVCs’ participation of these regions offers: the EU needs anyway more competitive 
inputs for remaining competitive in its specialties, and it could find them in the LAC 
economies by contributing to adjust the technological know-how necessary for 
reducing the costs, while the LAC needs more incorporation to dynamic GVCs on 
which its members could develop new specialties, become more innovative and 
benefit from better access to more sophisticated technologies and markets. A closer 
bi-regional cooperation—focusing on applied research and helping SMEs to 
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internationalize—could speed up the technological catching-up in both regions 
(moving towards the production frontiers) and even provide the resources for inno-
vating and feeding the creation of new technological leadership (moving-up the 
production frontier).
Figure 24.7 presents a dynamic synthesis of what the EU-LAC Strategic Alliance 
should do. The red frontier is the local best technology, but most local firms are far 
from this frontier. Improving their effective use of technologies would move them 
upwards (red arrow of TFP jumps). The green frontier represents the top productiv-
ity performers trying to displace upwards the technological frontier. The incorpora-
tion of more SMEs from both regions into GVCs would allow a double upwards 
movement: increasing efficiency with existing technologies with an improvement in 
competitiveness of the whole GVC which could therefore benefit from more 
resources for R&D able to displace upwards the technological frontier with positive 
feedbacks for the whole chain and for both regions. The recipe consists in focusing 
SMEs’ reciprocal contacts and ventures through universities’ bi-regional coopera-
tion on local grounds for improving their operational efficiencies and technological 
catching-up, increasing their ability to integrate GVCs. The increased profits from 
acceding jointly to cheaper and better inputs for the joint GVC (upwards movement 
of red arrow) should allow for accelerating R&D dedicated to pushing upwards the 
joint technological frontier (upwards move of green arrow).
Fig. 24.7 Dynamic upwards moves of TFP through Bi-regional University-SMEs cooperation 
along joint GVCs (Source: Conference Board)
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 The Complementary Win-Win Game of EU-LAC Cooperation 
on Social and Environment Issues by Extending 
the REDIMA Method
The failure of both regions to cushion the social impacts of globalization, although 
to different degrees, provides another important application for the proposed 
REDIMA method because it would spur the exchanges of best practices across the 
Atlantic for improving the social consensus and fighting populism. The dynamics of 
improving productivity thanks to the kind of bi-regional cooperation exposed above 
require a parallel cooperation on social aspects because social consensus is a neces-
sary component for productivity progress. The same analytic reasoning added by 
the absolute urgency to curb global climate changes justifies the necessity to create 
also a REDIMA network on de-carbonization. Furthermore, these two additional 
networks would lead “to realize that a true ecological approach always becomes a 
social approach” (Pope Francis 2015).
 Conclusions
Bi-regional cooperation initiatives should give a special priority to match European 
Universities with that of the LAC, and simultaneously to organize the connection of 
SMEs from both regions for spurring their mutual internationalization and their 
technological and managerial evolution. Academic Summits have opened the way, 
but they should now be strengthened both at policy and company levels.
The basic idea justifying such a stronger cooperation of academics, governments 
and private firms from the EU and the LAC relies upon the very fact that the patterns 
of technology adoption, reallocation and productivity growth within and between 
firms in both advanced regions and lagging ones of these two regions are directly 
complementary for strengthening respective competitiveness on world markets. The 
successful integration of the Central and Eastern European countries into the EU 
economy in more advanced countries’ production networks (especially through the 
German/Austrian firms’ strategies) shows the ideal road to follow and to apply for 
the relations between the EU and the LAC economies. Ideal conditions of such a 
“win-win game” for both regional partners (the EU and the LAC) could be orga-
nized along the same lines and would lead to a significant improvement in Total 
Factor Productivity as a combined result of more global competition pressures but 
inside a more cooperative scheme at bi-regional and regional levels.
The EU and the LAC share the same values and socio-economic objectives more 
than with any other regions, making the LAC area the best candidate for a success-
ful alliance with the EU. This is not just a political discourse argument, but a strate-
gic reality: the LAC countries offer sufficient differences and divergences for 
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creating attractive synergies as any other LDCs or emerging countries, but at the 
same time, they offer simultaneously the closest similarities between social objec-
tives and the kind of societies in which citizens want to live which are necessary for 
mutual trust into a binding strategic alliance for the long run.
The concrete proposal: a set of bi-regional networks applying the REDIMA rec-
ipe to monitor four key areas of cooperation:
 1. Macroeconomic Monitoring: MMM
The purpose is triple: (i) to stimulate each region to organize a previous 
mutual monitoring across national peers at regional level, improving intra- 
regional mutual communication and building trust, therefore reducing uncertain-
ties and promoting regional consensus; (ii) the group dynamics and the resulting 
emulation process among national participants in face of their peers from the 
other region contribute to improve national governance, making-up for respec-
tive institutional weaknesses at national level (external scrutiny equivalent to 
checks and balances); (iii) to identify common interests in order to build consen-
sual views and credibility in front of third partners, financial markets as well as 
inside multilateral organizations (IMF, WB, WTO, ILO, UN, etc.).
Concretely, the importance and interest to establish such a dialogue with the 
EU should motivate the LACs to put in place their own scheme of Mutual 
Macroeconomic Monitoring schemes (MMM) (by sub-regions and for the LAC 
area as a whole), in order to level up to EU working method. This technique 
allows for generating individual incentives for the national players to use the 
mutual surveillance in their own interests through the credibility building brought 
by the MMM and the scrutiny of competing partners. The best example is the 
possibility to influence the “spreads” (interest rate risk premium) by winning 
credibility and being supported by the technical peer review involving experts of 
both regions.
How? By focusing attention of markets (and national public opinion) upon 
national policy performance and commitments, creating market and creditors’ 
reactions which reward sound policies (effects on credibility), that makes more 
identifiable the gains of regional integration and macroeconomic cooperation 
(making it self-rewarding and conciliating national and regional interests). In 
terms of game theory, this dynamic process leads to “dominant strategies” that 
coincide with regional optimum, making possible a process of visible “win-win” 
game in which the positive outcome increases as the game is repeated, and incen-
tives to defect tend to diminish with time as effective regional cooperation devel-
ops, as the game is repeated and seen as becoming an outgoing process 
(endogenous nature of the gains from Regional integration, seen in Axelrod’s 
work showing that expectations can speed-up cooperation). The MMM delivers 
a mix of competition and cooperation: the bi-regional level creates a more effec-
tive way to create quickly the “checks-and-balances” and to spur regional inte-
gration that LACs would otherwise have spent too much years and efforts to win 
alone by their own.
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 2. Social Policy Mutual Monitoring: SPMM
Extending the scope of the mutual monitoring to social issues would spur the 
awareness of the importance for productivity to go along with improving the 
social consensus.
 3. Mutual Monitoring of Environment: MME,
Complementary dimension of both social and economic policies, especially 
for making aware that GDP measures do not yet take on board the negative value 
added of environment destruction and CO2 emissions which correspond to lower 
effective productivity.
 4. Mutual Monitoring of Productivity: MMP
This monitoring would focus the university-firm gap, especially for SMEs, as 
well as the issue of negative externalities not included in national accounts.
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 Epilogue
 Financial Crises, Regionalism and Domestic Adjustment
Loukas Tsoukalis
I have compared elsewhere1 the international financial crisis that began in 2007 in 
the US sub-prime market and soon turned into an existential crisis for Europe’s 
common currency the euro, to a set of Russian dolls, the matryoshkas. You opened 
one and found another one inside, one uglier than the other.
The international financial crisis, the biggest since 1929, marked a huge failure 
of markets, institutions and democratic politics. Capital liberalization and financial 
deregulation had been meant to operate in the context of efficient markets with 
rational actors armed with perfect information. Instead, when the big bubble burst, 
we all discovered—the more innocent among us with utter dismay—that there was 
greed, wrong incentives and herd instinct, all operating in conditions of high uncer-
tainty and imperfect information, together with political capture. The process of 
financialization had set the stage for casino capitalism, and when things turned bad, 
governments were called upon to save the system from implosion. They were forced 
to use taxpayers’ money in order to bail out those who had made large profits and 
paid themselves exorbitant bonuses while the going was good. The alternative of 
doing nothing was clearly much worse. But it was all bound to have long-lasting 
effects: the economy suffered a heavy blow and the victims (so many of them) were 
justifiably angry. Big economic crises always leave scars on the body of democratic 
polities, and they take long time to heal.
In the European Union (EU), we had built a monetary union which remains 
today the most daring act of integration. But the decision to create the euro back in 
the early 1990s had not been matched by a collective will to endow the common 
1 Loukas Tsoukalis (2016), In Defence of Europe: Can the European Project Be Saved? (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press),
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currency with the institutions and policy instruments to ensure its long-term viabil-
ity. As so often in the past with earlier initiatives of European integration, the euro 
was an incomplete construction to which new pieces were expected to be added as 
we went along. Thus, when the international financial crisis reached the European 
shores, it exposed the vulnerability of the regional monetary construction.
The Europeans were unlucky because big bang crises are only supposed to hap-
pen once in a lifetime, if that, although in a world of global capital markets such 
crises may prove to be much more frequent than in the past. The Europeans were 
unlucky and totally unprepared because they lacked the instruments to defend their 
currency. They were also mentally unprepared, because the prevalent view (that of 
the strongest country, Germany) allowed little margin of manoeuvre in the use of 
monetary and fiscal policy to deal with the crisis.
Hence, adjustment in Europe took longer and was much more painful than in the 
United States. The burden of adjustment fell almost entirely on deficit/debtor coun-
tries. They were forced to resort to internal devaluations, because national curren-
cies were no longer there to be devalued nor was monetary policy available since 
responsibility for it had been transferred to the European central bank. To many 
people’s surprise, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) became directly involved 
in the domestic adjustment programmes of euro members, thus further undermining 
the political credibility of Europe’s monetary union. We all then discovered that 
Greece and Ireland were still very different from Louisiana and Nebraska as mem-
bers of the European and the US monetary unions, respectively. We had been told 
otherwise until then.
The last set of matryoshkas consisted of individual members of the Eurozone, 
namely those most exposed to the crisis. They had been wild revellers in the party 
having enjoyed a long boom with borrowed money under the protection of the com-
mon currency. Banks in Ireland and Spain had been for years on a borrowing spree 
feeding the local versions of the big bubble. In Greece, the state had done the same 
acting as the main vehicle for borrowing, instead of the banks. Yet, when the crisis 
hit, all of them faced the same problem: their sources of finance, being mostly other 
European financial institutions, suddenly run dry—and debts could no longer be 
serviced. Other Eurozone governments felt obliged then to come to the rescue and 
brought the IMF along in order to avoid a generalized financial meltdown.
Was the crisis entirely the fault of debtors who had borrowed as if there was no 
tomorrow, or were creditors also to blame? This is the perennial question being 
asked when debt crises occur, although the answer given in real life is usually the 
same. It is mostly a matter of balance of power.
Even today, it is difficult to tell which one of the matryoshkas was the ugliest. 
Back then at the peak of the crisis, Europeans spent an inordinate amount of time 
fighting it out in a toxic blame game—and European politics turned ugly. The offi-
cial verdict finally pronounced by the creditors was that the ugliest was Greece, and 
this provided the legitimization for austerity policies in the Eurozone. Austerity in 
turn prolonged the crisis. Had it been Ireland or Spain, instead of Greece, the main 
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culprit, it would have constituted an explicit or otherwise recognition that the main 
problem behind the crisis was bank debt and not government deficits. After all, the 
latter were the result and not the cause of the crisis, with the notable exception of 
Greece. Narratives usually shape policies. This was also true in the way in which 
Europeans (mis)handled the financial crisis in the early 2010s with major negative 
effects in economic, political and social terms, although very unevenly distributed 
between and within countries.
Financial crises in Latin America in the 1980s had provided a foretaste of what 
was to follow on a much bigger scale in other parts of the world few decades later. 
In terms of adjustment programmes that debtor countries had to go through, there is 
close similarity between Argentina in her recurring financial crises and Greece in 
the early 2010s. After all, the IMF was directly involved in all adjustment pro-
grammes, and the main recipe has hardly changed over time. Both countries discov-
ered in their own painful way that on the verge of bankruptcy they could afford only 
small portions of sovereignty and democracy. This has been true of other countries 
as well in similar circumstances except for the few, lucky enough who fall into the 
category of too big to fail. In such cases, bargaining power changes dramatically: 
Keynes had told us about this long time ago.
Latin American countries have other similarities especially with countries in 
southern Europe which found themselves in the eye of the latest financial storm. 
Corruption and low trust in public institutions are among them. We now know that 
the rise in populism caused by debt crises can have either a left- or a right-wing 
orientation; it does not only go in one direction. But populism is always closely 
associated with policy failures: difficult to admit when you are part of the system.
Greece’s democracy has proved to be remarkably resilient given what the coun-
try had to go through during the crisis. Surely, being part of the European political 
order also made a difference. And being a member of the European monetary union 
ultimately prevented Greece’s official bankruptcy, although the price the country 
was asked to pay was very high indeed.
The regional factor played virtually no role in Latin America’s financial crises, as 
was to be expected. Regionalism is after all still at an early stage in that part of the 
world. And in Latin America’s financial crises, the creditors always came from out-
side the region as did and still does the big power with heavy political clout in the 
Western hemisphere. Things were supposed to be different in Europe where regional 
integration is much more advanced than anywhere else. However, the international 
financial crisis of 2007–2008 soon morphed into a crisis that threatened both the 
euro and European integration in general, thus revealing the inherent weaknesses 
and limitations of the regional construction. True, much has changed in Eurozone 
governance since and because of the crisis. Thus, European integration has shown 
its capacity to adjust, although never enough and usually at the last minute.
Have we learned the lessons from the latest big crisis of the international finan-
cial system? Have we introduced mechanisms to prevent similar crises from occur-
ring in the future? If only we could give unqualified positive answers to such 
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questions. If not, will the euro prove to be robust enough when the next crisis hits? 
We keep going, unable or unwilling to think out of the box and hoping we will be 
lucky enough when it happens. However, I must confess to a late bout of optimism 
concerning Europe’s capacity to handle crises since the pandemic struck. Some 
‘unthinkables’ do indeed happen under extreme conditions.  Even the IMF is 
changing.
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